How does Beijing manage its diplomatic differences with Delhi? The ECFR Asia Programme is delighted to invite you to our second webinar which is part of our virtual luncheon series dedicated to the future of India-China relations
The ECFR Asia Programme is delighted to invite you to our online webinar which will be the launching session of a luncheon discussion series dedicated to the future of India-China relations
The ultimate effect of AUKUS could be to force Europeans to conclude there is no point in engaging in the vital yet geographically distant issue of Indo-Pacific security
Japan’s citizens and leaders across the political spectrum are increasingly aware that China poses a security threat. The country’s next prime minister is unlikely to make a dramatic change to the China policy set by his predecessors.
In their new security and technology arrangement with Australia, America and Britain have achieved tactical gains at the expense of strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, given how deeply the deal has divided the West, the biggest long-term winner may well be China.
The initial high of announcing AUKUS has faded for British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who has returned from the United States to face a less congenial domestic agenda
The EU’s approach to foreign policy and economic policy needs to account for the fact that, globally, the space between the two areas is increasingly narrow
What does AUKUS mean for the future of transatlantic relations?
Europeans – especially the French – want Washington to explain its decision to ally with Australia and the UK. But the EU also needs to decide how to approach the Indo-Pacific.
A majority of European citizens believe a new cold war with both China and Russia is under way – but they mostly do not think that their own country is involved
A majority of European citizens believe a new cold war with both China and Russia is under way – but they mostly do not think that their own country is involved
ECFR’s policy experts examine what the Taliban takeover means for countries and regions around the world: Europe, the US, the Middle East, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and the Sahel
Beijing instrumentalises its fishing fleet for geopolitical gain, as evidenced by its policy on the South China Sea. Europe cannot be a bystander on the issue.
The EU has the ambition and potential to become a sovereign digital power, but it lacks an all-encompassing strategy for the sector, in which individual governments are still the key players
The EU urgently needs to incorporate the concept and reality of the ‘protected home market advantage’ into its thinking on China
As European and US ambivalence towards the Western Balkans persists, the region will be in increasing danger of falling into an endless spiral of competition between various foreign actors
As climate action becomes more material to economic interests, Europe and China will both compete and cooperate with each other, against the backdrop of an overarching systemic rivalry
Europe should upgrade its security activities, and seize the moment to push multilateral institutions up the agenda. But it will be Europe’s connectivity agenda that provides the golden thread running through its foreign policy and its other objectives in the region.
In its remaining months, the German Council presidency could use this momentum to create institutional structures to improve the EU’s capacity to act
The crisis is intensifying demands for Europe to puts its China policy on a more open, accountable, and values-based footing
The ultimate effect of AUKUS could be to force Europeans to conclude there is no point in engaging in the vital yet geographically distant issue of Indo-Pacific security
Japan’s citizens and leaders across the political spectrum are increasingly aware that China poses a security threat. The country’s next prime minister is unlikely to make a dramatic change to the China policy set by his predecessors.
In their new security and technology arrangement with Australia, America and Britain have achieved tactical gains at the expense of strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, given how deeply the deal has divided the West, the biggest long-term winner may well be China.
The initial high of announcing AUKUS has faded for British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who has returned from the United States to face a less congenial domestic agenda
The EU’s approach to foreign policy and economic policy needs to account for the fact that, globally, the space between the two areas is increasingly narrow
Europeans – especially the French – want Washington to explain its decision to ally with Australia and the UK. But the EU also needs to decide how to approach the Indo-Pacific.
Germany will find it increasingly hard to maintain its current level of prosperity – and security – without charting a new course on China. Fortunately, German voters seem ready for change.
The end of the US-led “forever war” in Afghanistan will not bring peace, because the methods that countries use to attack each other have changed. The world has entered a new age of perpetual competition among powerful states.
Western countries’ communications on Afghanistan have been a mess since the fall of Kabul, says Omid Nouripour. The country is set to face three types of wars – with the West as mere onlookers.
Nothing was inevitable about the Taliban reconquering of Afghanistan. But in the end the US lost what minimal strategic patience it had.
It will take more than just strong support from France, Germany, and the Netherlands to ensure that the new EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific is effective in the long term
Indians are many, as are their demands, aspirations, and ideas
What does AUKUS mean for the future of transatlantic relations?
How should the next German government concretely shape its China policy, and its approach to the Indo-Pacific?
How will the Western withdrawal impact on the state of European defence and military capabilities?
How much influence does China already ha be in the Western Balkans and how should European policymakers react?
What are the prospects for a closer EU-India relationship following the upcoming EU-India Leaders Summit?
How would a (partially) Green government affect German foreign policy?
How can Europe adapt its strategies for multilateralism in this competitive world and what would they look like?
Dr Janka Oertel discusses with Dr Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp and Bonji Ohara the cooperation in the field of cybersecurity between two of the US closest allies
What lies behind China’s dual circulation strategy? How will the EU approach all of this? And are European policy-makers really prepared to deal with this new challenge coming from China?
What are the prospects for transatlantic cooperation on China now that a new US administration is in power?
India would of course prefer a more active US role […] The two sides will continue to coordinate on intelligence and other matters related to militancy
Aukus tells us a lot about the foreign policy of the Biden administration & raises two questions: What does it mean to be an ally of the US? And what is Washington’s vision on the Indo-Pacific?
Aukus could force Europeans to conclude that the Indo-Pacific is too far from their interests, writes Frederic Grare
This won’t make the EU a decisive actor in the Indo-Pacific, but it will make it an actor
He [Kadisha] will keep the noticeably harder line against Beijing because I believe a reverse course will not be well accepted domestically as well as internationally
Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp aruges that while PM Kishida has stressed that dialogue with China will be necessary, it is unlikely that he will dramatically change the course set by his predecessors
Motegi’s reappointment symbolizes both continuity in terms of foreign policy, “but at the same time keeping and satisfying [Kishida’s] political capital within the Liberal Democratic Party
Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp comments on the reappointment of Toshimitsu Motegi as Japan’s foreign minister
