Across Europe, national attitudes toward the Russian threat against Ukraine reflect a broad array of concerns and historical experiences. Yet underlying Europeans’ differences are key shared interests that they are increasingly willing to defend
Russia still hopes to force Ukraine to accept its interpretation of the Minsk agreement. There is no evidence that it has abandoned the idea of achieving this through a large-scale military offensive
America as a political community is losing faith in Germany. Even if the Biden administration is currently satisfied with a Germany that does the minimum, this is hardly a foundation on which to build a new leadership model for the European security order
To prevent catastrophic wars, European states should concentrate on stabilising the West’s accomplishments and defending them against the revisionist policies of Russia in Europe and China in Asia
Russia’s ambition to draw up a new international security architecture extends to regions where the US and its European allies have traditionally taken a leading role
Heightened conflict in Ukraine could have serious consequences for European interests in the Middle East and North Africa. It could further disrupt energy supplies, exacerbate food insecurity, and help states in the region gain leverage over the US and Europe
Europeans are united around three key ideas about the war in Ukraine. The crisis will likely test their readiness to defend the European security order
Russia’s preparations for a full-scale war in Ukraine provide it with plenty of coercive options short of a massive invasion. Ukraine and the US may have different assessments of the threat, but they both need to prepare for all likely scenarios
Another Russian attack on Ukraine would jeopardise talks between Washington and Moscow on strategic stability and a follow-on agreement to New START
The Swedish debate on membership of NATO has been reignited by the Russia-Ukraine crisis. But there are still many good reasons why Sweden should not join the alliance