Overview

Europe’s security and defence sovereignty is defined by Europeans’ ability to ensure peace and security within their own borders, and to promote it further afield. A sovereign Europe would be able to respond to crises and conflicts in its neighbourhood even when the United States was unable or unwilling to engage with these issues. Within the framework of the transatlantic alliance, Europeans would be the backbone of conventional defence in Europe.

Europeans would be able to set their own political priorities and goals, and to make their own decisions in accordance with European rules, principles, and values. They would have the means, capabilities, and readiness to implement these decisions – autonomously, if necessary – in areas such as the credible use of military force. A sovereign Europe in security and defence would have a strong, innovative, and competitive defence industry whose expertise in future strategic technologies was on a par with that of other major powers.

Indicators

While in other policy areas this index focuses on contributions that strengthen EU institutions and initiatives, Europe cannot sufficiently strengthen its security and defence sovereignty solely within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. This index analyses member states’ overall engagement with NATO, the European Union, and other groupings, such as coalitions of the willing or other multilateral formats. To evaluate the state of European sovereignty, the index looks at territorial defence and crisis management, as well as countries’ capabilities and commitments in both areas.

To evaluate countries’ capabilities, the index assesses defence spending; troops deployed in joint missions and operations; membership in and contributions to military alliances and multinational standing forces; industrial cooperation; and military equipment. To evaluate commitment, the index assesses public opinion, member states’ official statements, and participation in joint research and development efforts.

List of indicators

Capabilities

1. Participation in mutual defence agreements. Source: ECFR, 2022.
2. Participation in and contribution to Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations. Source: EEAS, 2022.
3. Participation in NATO operations. Source: NATO, 2022.
4. Participation in coalition-of-the-willing operations. Source: ECFR, 2022.
5. Participation in and contribution to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Source: NATO, 2022.
6. Number and types of combat fighter aircraft. Source: IISS, 2022.
7. Number and types of main battle tanks. Source: IISS, 2022.
8. Number and types of longer-range surface-to-air missile systems. Source: IISS, 2022.
9. Number of militarily relevant satellites and type of launch vehicle. Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2022.
10. Nuclear deterrence capability. Source: ECFR, 2022.
11. Number of active and reserve forces per capita. Source: IISS, 2022.
12. Participation in multinational armament cooperation projects. Source: ECFR, 2022.

Commitments

1. Distance from 2 per cent of GDP spending target for three-year defence spending average, 2018-2020; post-invasion announcement to increase defence spending. Source: IISS, 2021/ECFR, 2022.
2. Participation and level of involvement in PESCO projects. Source: European Commission, 2022.
3. Share of people who are in favour of a common security and defence policy for EU member states: three-year average, 2019-2021. Source: Eurobarometer, 2019/2020/2021.
4. Number of Horizon 2020 projects in the ‘Security’ domain per capita. Source: European Commission, 2022.
5. Participation in European Defence Agency (EDA) Preparatory Action on Defence Research projects. Source: EDA, 2022.
6. Vision for the EU in the field of defence and security. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, January/February 2022.
7. Vision for the EU’s crisis management capability and cooperation in flexible formats. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, January/February 2022.
8. Post-invasion security and defence policy adjustment at the national level. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March/April 2022.
9. Post-invasion security and defence policy adjustment at the European level. Source: ECFR’s associate researchers, March/April 2022.

Results

Overall, the state of European security and defence sovereignty leaves much to be desired. Security and defence are areas in which member states have a mediocre overall performance – averaging 5.9, when weighted by population (although this is still a better result than for climate, migration, and technology). There is a considerable variation between member states’ scores in the area, ranging from Malta and Ireland’s 2.1 to France’s 8.7. This is the largest gap between the top and bottom performers on any of the six terrains.

Eleven member states receive a ‘poor’ score in the area – more than on any other terrain

Smaller or neutral member states such as Ireland, Hungary, and Malta score less than 3 in security and defence sovereignty. Eleven member states receive a ‘poor’ score in the area – more than on any other terrain. But because large member states such as France, Germany, and Italy perform well (all three scoring 6.5 or more), European security and defence sovereignty looks relatively strong when weighted by population.

On average, the scores Europeans receive for commitment to security and defence sovereignty are twice as high as those for capabilities. This is not a surprising result considering that it costs far less to achieve a good score in commitment than in capabilities. Making a political statement, declaring EU security and defence as an important topic, and boosting the domestic defence industry by joining research projects is much easier than buying and maintaining military equipment or participating in military operations (which put soldiers and political capital at risk). Accordingly, Denmark and Spain are the only member states whose scores for capabilities are as high as those for commitment.

There is still a clear divide within the EU between member states that see US security guarantees as their main form of life insurance and those that also consider the EU to be an important player in security and defence, or would like it to become one. The countries that focus on the US are mainly those that have joined the EU since 2004. However, there are also exceptions here: Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia also have a markedly pro-EU stance on this issue.

The EU’s five biggest economies all receive a score higher than the EU average of 4.5. France is the only one with an ‘excellent’ score, while Germany and Italy receive ‘good’ scores (more than 6), Spain receives a mediocre score (5.3), and Poland receives a ‘poor’ score (4.9).

The biggest surprise is Estonia, which receives the same score as Poland. While it scores only 2.9 on capabilities, this is offset by a score of 7.0 on commitments. Estonia makes a relatively strong contribution to NATO operations and other non-EU military missions – within coalitions of the willing – but a much weaker one to EU operations. Its commitment to European security and defence sovereignty is reflected in excellent scores in public surveys and the country’s participation in defence research projects.

It is no surprise that France is a leader in this area. Yet the fact that its score is almost two points higher than second-placed Italy suggests that President Emmanuel Macron has so far failed to convince other Europeans to follow his vision of security and defence sovereignty (or strategic autonomy).

Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine is likely to change the status quo significantly in the coming months and years. Countries such as Germany, Estonia, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Portugal have already announced plans to increase their defence spending. Denmark has voted to end its opt-out from EU defence projects, while both Sweden and Finland are on their way to joining NATO. Estonia and France appear to be open to supporting the issuance of joint EU debt to fund higher collective defence expenditure.