Overview

The European Union is struggling to establish its sovereignty on migration more than most other areas covered by this index. The union’s average score in this area, weighted by population, is a mediocre 5.2 points – lower than for any area except technology.

This index defines migration sovereignty as the capacity to implement a migration policy that meets the EU’s demographic and labour-market needs (given its ageing population), thereby improving the competitiveness of European companies. In this ideal situation, freedom of movement within the EU would be secure, as immigration into the EU would complement migration between EU states, compensating for brain drain and skills shortages wherever they occurred. A key humanitarian component of the EU’s migration policy – the capacity to host refugees, in line with member states’ legal obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention – would also be preserved, reflecting the EU’s values. Crucially, third countries would be unable to weaponise migration against the EU, as it would have systems in place to calmly deal with fluctuations in the number of arrivals in Europe.

To explore how close the EU is to this ideal and how member states are trying to realise it, the index focuses on collective management of the EU’s external borders and deals with third countries that externalise migration management, particularly that with Turkey.

Indicators

To evaluate member states’ capabilities in migration sovereignty, the index accounts for factors such as their participation in the Dublin framework, capacity to host refugees, use of resettlement schemes, and management of the public debate on migration. It also looks at their capacity to fulfil their responsibilities under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

The index assesses member states’ commitments based on factors such as their voluntary contribution of resources to Frontex and their use of the ‘sovereignty clause’ in the Dublin framework. In this, the index also accounts for public support for a common EU migration policy.

List of indicators
Case 1: Handling manipulated surges at EU external borders

Capabilities

  1. Effectiveness of the external border management. Source: own evaluation based on assessments provided by ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  2. Country’s national capacity to fulfil its role in the EU’s migration pact. Source: own evaluation based on assessments provided by ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  3. Dublin regulation: Requests acceptance per capita. In 2020. Source: Eurostat.
  4. Number of outgoing Dublin requests relative to the number of asylum applications: in 2020. Source: Eurostat.
  5. Total annual asylum applications received in 2021 per capita. Source: Eurostat.
  6. Preparedness for managing a migrant influx in times of crises; SDG Indicator 10.7.2 on Migration Policies, Domain 5: Mobility dimensions of crises. Source: UN, 2021.
  7. Preparedness for managing a migrant influx in times of peace; SDG Indicator 10.7.2 on Migration Policies, Domain 2: Whole-of-government. Source: UN, 2021.

Commitments

  1. Dublin regulation: use of the “sovereignty clause”. In 2020. Source: Eurostat.
  2. Frontex: Additional experts deployed per capita. In 2020. Source: Frontex.
  3. Frontex: Technical equipment deployed per capita. In 2020. Source: Frontex.
  4. Frontex: Human resources committed per capita. In 2020. Source: Frontex.
  5. Share of people who support a common EU policy on migration: in 2021. Source: Eurobarometer.
  6. State measures to address weaponisation of migration regardless of potential national impact. Source: own evaluation based on ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  7. Implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive in response to the war in Ukraine. Source: own desk research.
Case 2: Deals with third countries on managing migration flows to the EU

Capabilities

  1. Share of people who see migration as the biggest threat to the EU: change between 2015 and 2021. Source: Eurobarometer.
  2. Asylum applications pending at the end of the year per capita: in 2020. Source: Eurostat.
  3. Share of people with negative feelings about immigration from outside the EU: in 2021. Source: Eurobarometer.
  4. Number of refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and others of concern per capita: in 2021. Source: UNHCR.
  5. Number of resettled refugees within the framework of a resettlement scheme per capita: in 2021. Source: Eurostat.

Commitments

  1. National perception (including government, media, and public) of the EU migration pact. Source: own evaluation based on assessments provided by ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  2. Additional financial, human resources, or equipment contributions to collective EU efforts on migration management since the 2015 crisis. Source: own evaluation based on assessments provided by ECFR’s associate researchers, March 2022.
  3. Share of people who support a common European Asylum system: in 2021. Source: Eurobarometer.
  4. Share of people who support reinforcement of EU external borders with more European border guards and coast guards: in 2021. Source: Eurobarometer.
  5. Share of people who support more EU involvement in dealing with migration issues from outside the EU: in 2021. Source: Eurobarometer.

Results

Governments in the EU continue to be collectively and individually vulnerable to the weaponisation of migration. One example of this is Turkey’s threats in 2021 to send refugees to Europe unless the EU met its demands in negotiations over a support package for Syrian refugees. Another is Belarus’s decision the same year to encourage Middle Eastern migrants to cross into Poland – and Warsaw’s refusal to cooperate with the European Commission in handling the situation. Turkey and Belarus acted as they did because they believed the EU would bow to such coercion. So did Morocco when it used African migrants to pressure Spain in summer 2021. And it was right: hoping to address public concerns about migration, the Spanish government decided in March 2022 to end its long-standing rejection of Morocco’s position on Western Sahara – which infuriated Algeria (a country that could become an increasingly important supplier of energy to Europe).

Many member states lack not only the systems to work with one another to strengthen migration sovereignty but also the collective will to do so

Unlike the other terrains of sovereignty in this index, migration is an area in which there are only three leaders. It is characterised by mediocre capabilities and limited commitment to tackling migration at the EU level. Indeed, there is little difference between the best and worst performers on this terrain.

The countries that lead the group only receive ‘good’ scores. The first of these is Sweden (6.3), which performs well mainly on preparedness for an EU migration management system and on its engagement with the implementation of the EU’s migration pact. Sweden has one of the highest numbers of refugees per capita in the EU and one of the highest numbers of accepted resettlement applications per capita.

Another leader is Germany (6.2), which also accepts more resettlement requests than average and makes a significant contribution to EU systems for managing migration. Despite its backlog in processing such applications, Germany has the highest score of any member state for its ability to manage the public debate since 2015. While the country has since welcomed a significant number of refugees, public opposition to immigration from outside the EU is milder than in many other member states.

Malta (6.2) is the surprise leader in migration, making significant contributions to Frontex (as does Germany) and displaying public support for common EU policy on migration, the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and a common EU asylum system and external borders. Malta has also performed well in its preparations for the mobility dimensions of crises.

With the exception of Germany, the EU’s five biggest countries are not particularly committed to increasing Europe’s migration sovereignty. In France (12th place), the debate on immigration is dominated by the far right. Italy (13th place) is dealing with high numbers of arrivals by sea. Spain (14th place) has, as discussed, failed to deal with the weaponisation of migration strategically rather than purely in the context of its relations with Morocco. And Poland (last place) remains highly sceptical about non-European migration.

Many member states lack not only the systems to work with one another to strengthen migration sovereignty but also the collective will to do so. Continuing to view the issue through the lens of national interests alone, they have reduced EU institutions’ capacity to address challenges in the area. Nonetheless, member states have made some progress on migration issues since Russia launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine, particularly through their collective decision to activate the temporary protection directive.