The decay within: Why the EU needs to help defend Bulgaria’s democracy

On July 8th, Bulgaria lived out a split-screen reality. In Brussels, European officials celebrated Bulgaria’s entry into the euro zone, with the euro set to replace the lev on January 1st 2026—a historic leap that gives Bulgaria a voice across EU institutions. Yet a European Commission report published on the same day highlighted an insidious erosion of judicial independence in the country and persistent political interference. Events on the ground bore this out as Bulgarian authorities arrested the mayor of the city of Varna, Blagomir Kotsev, on corruption charges widely seen as politically motivated. Thousands of people soon took to the streets to defend the rule of law and support the mayor.

The day should have symbolised Bulgaria’s ascent, but instead it revealed two things: first, the undermining of the rule of law in Bulgaria endangers its democracy; second, the EU’s longstanding silence on this could threaten the bloc itself. If the trend continues, Bulgaria might be on a path to follow in the footsteps of Hungary under Viktor Orban, now an “electoral autocracy”. If more member states become illiberal, including Slovakia under its hardline nationalist prime minister Robert Fico and potentially Czechia after its parliamentary election in October, the EU might find itself with a critical mass of members that do not flinch at breaking the rules.

Bulgaria’s arrival at the core of the EU is worth celebrating: it better integrates Bulgarian businesses into the single market and reaffirms the attractiveness of the euro area. But if the country’s democratic decay goes unchecked, it will continue to weaken public institutions and, by extension, undermine the very foundations of the European project.

Judging under the influence

Kotsev’s arrest was part of a wider operation targeting local government figures belonging to the main pro-European opposition coalition, We Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria. All of them had broken decades of political stagnation by winning some of Bulgaria’s largest cities from incumbents of the main party in the ruling coalition, Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB). Their arrests were marred by irregular proceedings. The most egregious was on the eve of Kotsev’s court hearing, when a key witness withdrew his testimony, claiming he had been under pressure to testify against Kotsev from the anti-corruption commission. Low-quality recordings hinting at Kotsev’s guilt have flooded the public space.

The European Commission’s report highlights a reversal in progress towards rule of law in the country. It assesses that Bulgaria lacks an independent judiciary, with only 27% of citizens and companies believing that courts and judges are truly independent, down from 43% in 2021. The commission also found that the prosecutor general retains disproportionate authority and that attempts to limit this power have been blocked or declared unconstitutional. These institutional weaknesses undermine checks and balances and the rule of law more generally.

Power on repeat

Bulgarians seeking true democracy are trapped in a system that resists change, despite outward signs of reforms and European integration. For more than a decade, Bulgaria’s centre-right GERB party has dominated politics by fuelling fear of Bulgaria’s communist past and promising a Euro-Atlantic future. Under party leader Boyko Borissov, GERB has even gained influence in the European Parliament through the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP)—the parliament’s largest and most influential alliance.

Even now, the coalition prime minister, Rossen Zhelyazkov, makes the right noises for the Euro-Atlantic leadership: supporting Ukraine, adopting a moderate tone towards North Macedonia, and having no reservations about meeting new EU and NATO defence spending targets.

European integration and modernisation are little more than a façade, masking deep-rooted governance problems.

However, European integration and modernisation are little more than a façade, masking deep-rooted governance problems. Despite repeated nationwide calls for change and seven elections since 2020, the status quo has proved resilient; alternative parties have struggled to gain a foothold in parliament. Unstable coalitions have come and gone, yet GERB remains the largest party and Borissov retains outsized public influence.

The persistence of Bulgaria’s rule-of-law problems cannot be attributed solely to the prevailing party. The issue runs deeper, rooted in systemic challenges that create opportunities for ambitious individuals to exploit the law for personal gain. Activists have focused much attention on oligarch and media mogul Delyan Peevski as a prominent example of these broader problems. Bulgarians have been protesting against him since 2013, when he was appointed head of the State Agency for National Security with no credentials for the job. The appointment reeked of nepotism and the misuse of state institutions for personal or political gain. By 2021, American and British authorities had sanctioned him for engaging in serious corruption, influence peddling and bribery. Although the Bulgarian Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation in response, it was quietly closed, and the findings were never disclosed.

Peevski is now a power broker even though he is not part of the governing coalition. He leads the Movement for Rights and Freedoms-New Beginning party, one of two parties representing Bulgaria’s Turkish minority. Borissov often relies on Peevski’s MPs to maintain a working majority in parliament and pass legislation. In February, GERB and its coalition allies refused to endorse a proposal to create a parliamentary commission to investigate Peevski’s business interests and his influence in the judiciary. Peevski’s power is growing, which will make it hard for Borissov to outmanoeuvre him.

More than words

Pointing at immoral, corrupt individuals is no longer enough. State capture runs deeper—it is rooted in entrenched networks and shadow loyalties that persist beyond any one person. Dismantling them will take more than political turnover. It requires confronting the system itself.

EU policymakers know there is a problem. In 2020, after three months of nationwide protests over endemic corruption, government abuse of power and judicial interference, the European Parliament passed a resolution in support of demonstrators’ demands. This time, MEPs have proposed sending a fact-finding mission to Bulgaria over Kotsev’s case.

But a one-off mission will not suffice. The EU could do more. Through the recently announced seven-year budget, the EU has the means to link funding to respect for the rule of law—suspending or withholding funds from states that breach it, including in cases involving corruption or judicial interference. It should use it.

The EU should also encourage the enactment of reforms. Successive governments have announced reforms with great fanfare, yet they never meaningfully put them in place. In the next budget cycle, the EU should establish permanent and consistent monitoring mechanisms and closer operational links with local authorities, not ad hoc reviews, to assess results, not just processes.

Crucially, the EPP must uphold the very values it claims to defend. Its leader, Manfred Weber, has publicly declared the EPP  “the party of the rule of law,” a standard that should leave no room for ambiguity. Yet under successive GERB-led coalition governments, Bulgarians have experienced persistent violations of judicial independence and democratic norms, and the EPP has remained conspicuously silent. That silence erodes the credibility of the EPP itself and the EU’s claim to be a genuine guardian of democratic principles.

If Bulgaria’s decay is left unchecked, the country’s democratic backsliding could render its formal arrival at the heart of Europe a hollow achievement. True integration means more than the euro or Schengen; it demands unwavering defence of the values that bind Europe together.