Disintegrated deterrence: What Trump’s National Defense Strategy means for Europe

Trump’s defence blueprint

The Trump administration has released the unclassified summary of its long-delayed National Defense Strategy (NDS). The document attempts to reconcile three national security camps staffing the government—primacists, prioritisers and restrainers—while relating their views to the president’s own, often mercurial, urges. It is a strategy full of internal contradictions that reveals even more inconsistencies when measured against the administration’s actions.

If Russia is a “manageable threat” to “NATO’s eastern members” only, why does Trump state that he needs to “own” Greenland to defend it against Russia? If the president wouldn’t defend what he doesn’t own, why should allies count on the “limited US support” the NDS promises?

And if the US is no longer willing to deploy significant conventional forces to extend deterrence to allies, especially in Europe, why should adversaries believe that it would risk nuclear war on its allies’ behalf?

Managing defence without America

There is little use in Europeans urging the Trump administration to clear up these inconsistencies. In any case, with Trump disputes are never settled—only deferred. But one red thread weaves throughout American rhetoric and actions: unburdening the US from defending Europe.

This calls for Europeans to:

1. Replace US contributions to NATO’s regional and domain-specific defence plans

Europe needs to be able to execute these plans even if “limited US support” is not forthcoming. They must make the still “critical” US contributions to NATO, such as intelligence, command and control, and long-range strike capabilities, uncritical, since these especially would give Trump leverage over Europeans in a crisis or conflict with Russia.

2. Build European defence structures that can link up to—but also work independently of—US contributions

European defence will need to be organised around regional and functional coalitions, enabling prompt response to crisis and conflict as NATO’s political cohesion frays. Multinational army corps, navy fleets, and air forces should engage in the full spectrum of military activities—even when the North Atlantic Council has not (yet) formed a consensus decision to act.

This will require some duplication of structures and roles, which allies had so far avoided, to staff both NATO’s integrated military command and the new European command systems.

3. Evolve British and French nuclear forces toward a European deterrent architecture

Maybe the residual risk of Trump aiding Europe’s defence against a Russian attack is enough to sober Russian leaders. But if not, Europeans would be faced with a Russian threat backed by hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons.

British and French nuclear forces look how they do (relatively small in number and not postured for limited employment and damage limitation) because the US has deeply invested, over decades, in extended deterrence through NATO. This condition eroding means that European leaders need to interrogate their long-held assumptions about deterrence requirements.

To paraphrase and adapt one key finding of the latest US Strategic Posture Commission: structural and Trump-specific changes in US defence strategy likely require European nuclear forces that are either larger in size, different in composition, or both.

From the NSS to the NDS

The NDS, like the National Security Strategy (NSS), appeared on the internet one random evening. It lacked any of the roll-out activities previous administrations have used to rally Congress, and US allies and partners, behind their vision. The NDS’s prescriptions largely flow from the NSS, though without the latter’s culture-war laden language and statements on burden-shifting. It remains unclear whether subordinate strategy documents, like a Nuclear Posture Review, will follow this time.