What Europe should do about a bad Ukraine deal

On the positive side, the Ukraine-Russia peace plan advanced by the US government earlier this week shows that President Donald Trump remains committed to securing a deal.

On the negative side, however, the list is rather longer. Apparently cooked up by American and Russian envoys Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev—though the exact authorship remains murky—the deal would blow through a series of red lines long held in Europe and, until recently, the US too. Borders cannot be changed by force? All countries are equally sovereign and free to choose their foreign partners and alliances? No third party should hold a veto over who becomes a NATO member? All gone in the 28 points shared by US officials, which seem to stem from a different assertion: the strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must.

28 steps … to the next war

But more than principle is at risk in this deal. In practice it would create a material threat to Ukraine’s independent existence: from capping the numbers of its armed forces personnel to forcing Kyiv to both abandon the territories it still controls in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and recognise Russia’s control over them. Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donbas and that region’s demilitarisation would create the ideal circumstances for Moscow to attack Ukraine again in a few years. It would strip Kyiv of its defensive “fortress belt” in the Donbas. And it would send a powerful signal of impunity by instituting an amnesty denying justice to Ukrainian victims of Russian war crimes. In short, it would erect a giant, eastward-facing “come back soon” sign over the entire country.

Some in Europe question how much this would matter to the rest of the continent’s security. In fact, quite a lot: the proposal would tie its censure of Ukrainian NATO membership (which the deal would write into the country’s constitution) to a total stop on future NATO expansion of any sort. That would affect not just current candidate states like Bosnia and Herzegovina but also ones where there is an ongoing debate on their neutrality and potential NATO application, like Austria or Moldova.

Other shifts codified in the proposed deal are more subtly worded. To agree that “European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland” suggests that American ones—deployed under this or future US administrations—cannot be there. To propose a new pact between Russia, Ukraine and Europe that settles “all ambiguities of the past 30 years” evokes Moscow’s demands to move NATO infrastructure as far away from its own western borders as possible, effectively eliminating the alliance’s deterrence on its eastern flank. All this would create dangerous precedents affecting the whole of Europe. The success or failure of Europeans to revise it will shape not only Ukraine’s future but also that of the rest of the continent.

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The reported architects of the deal, Witkoff and Dmitriev, are both real estate investors and strangers to international law and norms. Both serve strongmen leaders sensitive to losing face. In those origins lie weaknesses that Europeans can exploit:

• Vladimir Putin has not yet fully accepted the text (calling it a “basis” of a deal). That may be because the Kremlin is sceptical of the Trump administration’s ability to stick by its promises, or because it fears Dmitriev as a businessman has focused more on commercial matters than the security ones that matter most to Putin.
• There also seem to be doubts on the American side. Some Republicans have already criticised the outline deal. Unpredictable as ever, Trump has himself described it as not the “final offer”.
• Trump and Germany’s chancellor Friedrich Merz have reportedly agreed a working group to review the deal’s text and E3 advisers met with the Ukrainians and the US over the weekend of November 23rd—further showing that Europeans have time remaining to shape the final terms. There is an opening for them to achieve that, if they are focused and united enough to do so.

Ceci n’est pas un deal

There is, then, an opening: a chance for Ukrainians and Europeans to say to Trump “yes, but”. They have learned from experience that it is better to say this, and then try to change the US president’s mind behind the scenes.

But the duration of that opening may well be short. For all the objections to the 28 points among American officialdom, the Trump administration has made it clear that it is impatient for a deal and that Kyiv should not expect a better one if it seeks to wait it out. Behind this lies an implicit but serious threat: the US could halt its intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance support for Ukraine, with immediate and grave implications for Kyiv’s ability to defend itself or hit targets inside Russia.

In the next few days and weeks, Europeans will try to make the final deal better than the one currently on offer. As they do so, they should adopt these three priorities:

1. Challenge America’s judgment on the war’s trajectory

From US statements about the proposed deal, it is clear that Washington believes Russia’s position will not worsen in the next months, while Ukraine’s will deteriorate. This analysis risks tipping into fatalism, and Europeans can help push back against that by weakening Russia economically, militarily and on the actual battlefield.

Economically, Europe can continue to seek out and sanction Russia’s “shadow fleet”, its transport ships with concealed identities, much more thoroughly than it is doing now. That would cut the country’s oil revenues and thus its military budgets. The EU should intensify inspections of suspected ships in member-state territorial waters and should bring forward its plans to ban more shadow-fleet vessels.

Militarily, Europe can do more to disrupt Russia’s war infrastructure. Ukraine’s needs are broad, but one thing would make a particular difference. In recent months Kyiv has increased its attacks inside Russia, including on oil-refining facilities, undermining the Kremlin’s effort to shield its population from the impact of the war and thus limit the domestic backlash. Currently, Ukrainian strikes happen on a roughly biweekly basis, which is a long enough time interval to let Russian authorities conduct quick fixes and repairs. Europe could enable Ukraine to reduce those intervals greatly by providing additional long-range artillery capabilities and support for Ukraine’s own production capacity. 

On the battlefield itself, Europe can ensure Ukraine’s crucial ability to keep defending itself while negotiations with Russia are ongoing. Much of the talk in the past few months has focused on Ukraine’s amazing drone advances. But as the winter approaches and the weather worsens, drone use is decreasing and the need for battlefield artillery, including 155mm-calibre weapons, becomes more acute. Front-loading more such supplies now would help Kyiv hold the line and deny Moscow further advances, challenging Trump’s perception of the war’s trajectory. Europe can also help Ukraine become more self-sufficient in drone components. It still buys some of these from China, but some of the Ukrainian drone companies privately confirm that they already produce as much as 80% themselves—and could do more with the right support.1].

European leaders talking to Trump should not just present the above measures to the US president as possible acts, but as commitments that will happen irrespective of his actions. Only thus do they have a chance of changing the administration’s perception of Ukraine’s prospects.

2. Use all available bargaining chips—and do not give them up without the right assurances

An US-Russia deal will leave many Europeans feeling powerless. But they should resist that reaction. The continent has significant leverage, and must now use it to maximum effect.

Naturally this includes European financial support for Ukraine, which now greatly exceeds the American contribution. But the core of this leverage is Russia’s frozen assets. The US-Russia deal proposes to transfer $100bn of these to a Ukrainian reconstruction vehicle controlled by the two external powers. But of the frozen Russian assets, the US holds no more than $5bn in value where Europe holds almost $200bn. So Trump’s plan, even as it currently stands, would require European cooperation.

EU talks on using those frozen assets are currently stalled due to opposition from Belgium, where many of them sit, and whose government fears legal repercussions if the assets are seized. Germany’s Merz, on the other hand, is now using real political capital to argue for using them to support Ukraine.

Of the frozen Russian assets, the US holds no more than $5bn in value, where Europe holds almost $200bn

Europe can meaningfully shape the proposed peace deal if it moves fast on this topic. That means Merz and others brokering agreement and overcoming Belgian concerns. They should tie this action to critical scrutiny of the commercial dimensions of the US-Russian proposal, insisting that European publics would accept the use of European-based Russian assets to stabilise Ukraine and/or backfill European spending on the country’s defence—but it would be hard to accept that these will just generate mega-profits for American investors.

Relatedly, Europeans also need to spell out more clearly their commitment to Ukrainian security guarantees in the event of peace.

3. Come to the table with clear red lines upholding European sovereignty

European cooperation with any Ukraine peace deal must be conditional on a series of red lines upholding the continent’s own sovereignty. Europeans’ starting point should be that they will not curb their support for Ukraine, or agree to concessions on Ukraine, in the event of a deal that weakens their overall right to protect Europe’s own security.

As such:

• Decisions about which fighter jets are stationed on European territory will be made in democratic European states themselves rather than in Washington or Moscow.
• Likewise, changes to the constitutions of European countries will be made in those states and not imposed on them from the outside.
• Europe will not accept the precedent of external powers setting caps on a European country’s armed forces. It will also refuse to recognise territorial changes achieved through force, not least as doing so would potentially spell destabilisation not just in Ukraine, but also in the Western Balkans.
• Where Moscow officials and propagandists rant about the “Nazi” regime in Kyiv, Europeans will judge partner governments not by the barbs and prejudices of others, but by relevant UN and Council of Europe conventions.

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The US-Russia proposal begs many other questions. But what it lacks most of all is an answer to this one: what is the US actually ready to offer, besides acting as a broker of a capitulation deal for Ukraine, to secure peace?

It may sound facetious, but it is not. For this is the fundamental question before Kyiv and its European backers as the Trump administration moves towards a sell-out to Moscow. The US has already curbed its support for Ukraine. Much as it has been irresponsibly slow in investing in Ukraine and in its own defence and resilience, Europe has helped to fill the gap.

So today, what is the US actually putting on the table? What will Trump do if Ukraine signs up to the plan? How will he ensure that the country will not face a new, bigger war a few years down the line? Those are the questions Europeans need to ask themselves as they respond to a bad plan from America that will define the future of their own continent. They have been too slow. Their power is less than it should be. But they do have agency in this situation, and must use it.

It is said that Dean Acheson, as American secretary of state, once proclaimed the following of the Vietnam war: “It is worse than immoral, it is a mistake”. The US-Russia deal as it now stands would be just that.

It would, of course, be immoral: telling the world that democratic sovereignty and self-defence can be overridden with few lasting consequences. But more than that, it would also be a mistake. It would embolden an endemically revisionist Russia, teaching Moscow all the wrong lessons. It would weaken Europe as a whole. It would trade a bad war now for a worse one within a few years. Europeans and Ukrainians can help prevent that next war—if they act together now.

The author thanks her ECFR colleagues Jim O’Brien and Nicu Popescu for their input on this commentary.

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[1] Private discussion with Ukrainian drone producer, 2025

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