Trump meets Putin: Why the Alaska summit is no Yalta—yet

As of August 15th, Vladimir Putin’s period of international isolation will be effectively over. Despite not delivering on any of President Donald Trump’s demands to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine, he is having a get-together with his American counterpart. The two will debate Ukraine and European security with neither Ukrainians nor the Europeans in the room—and in Alaska, around 5000 miles away from Europe itself. This is another good outcome for the Kremlin. It fits into Putin’s vision of the world in which great powers decide the fate of the smaller ones—the exact opposite of Europe’s vision.

Most Europeans, especially Ukrainians, have been rightly alarmed about such a prospect. The flurry of diplomatic activity, phone calls and virtual meetings this week shows that Europeans are aware of the high stakes of the summit and the risks associated with it. Yet despite the quick wins Putin has already pocketed before the summit has even begun, it may be too early to start floating Munich or Yalta analogies. First, the Trump administration has played down the potential for a breakthrough on Ukraine, referring to the meeting as a more of a “listening exercise”. Second, Ukrainians and EU leaders seem to have succeeded in getting Trump’s ear in advance of the summit. After they spoke to him, he agreed to push for a ceasefire in Ukraine before other discussions on conflict settlement take place and, crucially, to include the Ukrainians in any such conversations.

Going into the summit, the Kremlin likely assumes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, and so if it can not extract concessions diplomatically, it can just continue to plough forward in Ukraine. But Russia’s leader will have to tread carefully and somehow respond to Trump’s ambition to become a peacemaker between Ukraine and Russia. If Putin shows no flexibility at all, that might prompt the US president to finally deliver on his threats of more sanctions on Moscow and its allies.

Putin’s most preferred realistic outcome would be the neutralisation of the US on Ukraine. In other words, decreased US involvement in efforts to end the war and a cessation of military aid to Ukraine. To achieve this, Putin will likely float all kinds of possibilities for joint US-Russian energy and other business, including tapping the Arctic resources, to entice Washington into cooperation. He may argue that the US does not need to cut itself off from economic opportunities just because of a conflict in Europe which, in Trump’s view, the previous US administration is responsible for anyway. Feeding the US president’s desire for a Nobel Peace Price, Putin may as well offer new arms control talks. Most of these have already lapsed or the parties have withdrawn, so it would be a logical step and one that plays well into Putin’s project of Russia as a geopolitical superpower on par with the US. With such offers, Trump could go for the arms control as well as for the economic cooperation.

The US cannot end the war in Ukraine on its own, especially as Trump has been unwilling to impose harsher punishment for Russia’s continued aggression

But the US cannot end the war in Ukraine on its own, especially as Trump has been unwilling to impose harsher punishment for Russia’s continued aggression. The Alaska summit may open the door to longer-term negotiations which may eventually lead to a ceasefire. But for now, Putin has two options, and neither of them are catastrophic for the Kremlin: he either gets a deal on Ukraine with Trump, which is likely to be rejected by Kyiv and the rest of Europe, making it unimplementable. Or he doesn’t, and continues his military campaign. Recent advances of his troops in eastern Ukraine may make him think he can just continue. (Spoiler: he can’t. While the war of attrition is taking a bigger toll on Ukraine, Russia’s economy is increasingly strained.)

This begs the question what role Europeans can actually play. As argued in a recent ECFR policy brief, in whatever way the conflict ends, the EU will be far more affected than the US. It matters greatly to Europe whether in a few years Ukraine is a stable and prosperous country (even if it fully doesn’t control all of its territory) or if a bad deal turns it into a weak, unstable state vulnerable to Russia’s hybrid or conventional attacks. The spectre of Trump and Putin alone deciding the future of Ukraine and, in effect, of European security has already prompted EU leaders to ramp up their defence spending, double down on military aid to Ukraine and diplomatically engage with Trump and his team to get across their messages and red lines. Recent calls with Trump show that they have been largely successful, at least in the short-term. But the key to avoid being neglected next time the US discusses a European war with the country that caused it, is for Europe to use all its levers—and not just ahead of the summit. Preparing a longer-term plan for Ukraine, including boosting the country’s resilience in a ceasefire scenario, ramping up more pressure on Russia by using at least a portion of its frozen assets and further boosting its defence production would go a long way. And it may finally prove to the US administration that the EU not only has cards, but it is ready to play them.