New tools: How the EU can show China it means business

This year the EU and China are marking 50 years of formal relations. China remains the EU’s largest trading partner in terms of imports, but the EU’s position towards the country has shifted in recent years, especially within the European Commission. The problem facing Europeans is that they lack credibility in the eyes of Beijing. To address this they need to find a strong collective voice—and this month’s EU-China summit in Beijing presents an important opportunity to do this. Europeans must dispel the Chinese view that they are little more than America’s dutiful lapdog.

Europeans have a long list of grievances about China’s policy stances. They are worried about Chinese overcapacity—the looming danger that products made in huge numbers and subsidised in China, will flood the European market, undercutting domestic production and driving deindustrialisation in different sectors and regions. They are anxious about recent Chinese acts of economic coercion whereby Beijing has placed export restrictions on the critical raw materials essential for sectors such as the automotive and renewable energy industries. Europeans have also long requested equal access to the Chinese market, but there remains a lack of level playing field for European firms in China. Finally, there is Beijing’s partnership with Moscow and effective support for Russian aggression in Ukraine. These concerns play out differently in European capitals—given how local sensitivities differ from country to country—but the direction of travel is clear: the EU believes China to be an increasingly disruptive international player.

China lately appears to have permitted a select few gestures of goodwill. For example, on April 30th the European Parliament announced  Beijing had partially lifted sanctions on a number of MEPs. In May, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and French president Emmanuel Macron agreed to attempt to end a cognac trade dispute initiated by Beijing several months earlier. However, these are minor developments that give the impression of granting concessions while little changes in reality. At the same time, the Chinese side continues to insist on pursuing the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment—a deal that was blocked by the European Parliament back in 2021 and even then deemed to be outdated. EU senior officials have been clear they have “no intention” of reviving the deal, yet Chinese counterparts persist. At the same time, senior Chinese figures dismiss overcapacity as a “fake concept”.

The two sides are on course to continue talking past each other

All the signs are that the two sides are on course to continue talking past each other. The underlying dynamic—and problem for Europeans—is that the Chinese leadership regards such European concerns and demands as little more than the result of US pressure aiming to “use” Europe to help slow China’s global rise.

“Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented all-round containment and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to the country’s development.” Xi here explicitly singles out the US as rallying its partners against Beijing; he gives voice to a deep-seated conviction about global power relations.

This “total America” mindset finds expression throughout Chinese foreign policy reporting and accepted thinking. State-affiliated media draw parallels between European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s rhetoric on China and that of American politicians, accusing her of using China as a “bogeyman” to score political points in Washington. And a recent report on global strategic and security risks in 2025 by China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)— a prestigious think-tank with close links to the party-state—argues US policies lie behind most international tension points. It cites conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, disruptions in international value chains and constraints on technology cooperation, to name but a few. Beijing views mitigating these developments as its overriding interest; and conversations held by the present author with foreign policy specialists in the country suggest many of them see themselves as alone in an existential fight with Washington.

What to do

The EU’s lack of strategic unity and leadership makes it vulnerable to China’s traditional “wait and see” approach, which has historically benefited Beijing. China does not feel obliged to act on the demands of Europeans, presuming that intra-European divisions will prevent the EU from building a united front to respond to Beijing’s actions. Europe is often perceived in China as weak and fragmented, and without overall political leadership and resolve. Beijing thus prefers to deal with member states bilaterally—to make pragmatic moves to “divide and rule”. The Chinese leadership has little reason to believe that this time will be different. A string of European leaders and foreign minister making their own, individual, trips to China over the last year in pursuit of gains to show off domestically has hardly helped present a different image.

Europeans should take the opportunity of the forthcoming summit to be unambiguous about their core concerns vis-à-vis China’s actions. Their message should be clear: Europe has its own interests, which, historically happened to often overlap with US interests in China policy; but correlation is not causation. Brussels should strengthen its external messaging towards China to make sure this logic is heard in Beijing.  In recent years, the bloc has significantly expanded its policy toolkit, especially in economic security. The EU’s new options include its anti-coercion instrument, investment screening mechanisms, export controls and trade defence policies (tariffs and anti-subsidy investigations). If Beijing fails to acknowledge any of the many European concerns, sooner or later the EU will use these tools. Perhaps then it may be taken seriously in China.