TWO-STATE STRESS TEST

Significance of indicator

The de facto breakdown of agreed political rules of the game and the absence of a shared framework for a national liberation movement between Fatah in the West Bank and the Hamas-led authority in Gaza present a key obstacle to the internal and external coherence of Palestinian political goals. The inability of Palestinian political actors to present a unified front also constitutes a challenge for future political agreements concerning Palestinian statehood. Yet, so long as the PLO is not effectively rehabilitated to make it more inclusive, representative, and accountable, it cannot credibly claim to legitimately represent the Palestinians and is less likely to pursue effective liberation strategies or be able to win acceptance for any agreements that it might reach with Israel. Given that current visions of a Palestinian state within a two-state dispensation still notionally rest on both the West Bank and Gaza, the breakdown of a unified political authority between the two areas limits the ability to conclude a binding settlement. Not only does the de facto political separation reinforce the physical isolation between the two halves of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), but the longer it continues the more difficult the prospects for converging competing factions and centres of political authority become.

Scoring guide

0 – National reconciliation efforts produce agreements on a reformed PLO, a Palestinian Authority unity government for both the West Bank and Gaza, and an agreed national platform that allows for the option of a two-state outcome. Unity agreements are implemented in practice. Where relevant and agreed, authorities hold elections for Palestinian institutions.

1 – National reconciliation talks produce progress on PLO reform and at least an agreed transitional Palestinian Authority unity government, with options for elections to be agreed on in the future. Talks on an agreed national platform continue.

2 – Agreements for reconciliation between West Bank and Gaza authorities are in place and relevant authorities deploy mechanisms for their implementation. No agreements are yet reached on PLO reform or on elections, but talks on these issues continue.

3 – Third parties seriously engage and broker talks on Palestinian Authority reconciliation, without specific progress but without breakdowns. Palestinian factions significantly de-escalate mutually hostile rhetoric. West Bank and Gaza authorities increase technical level co-operation. PLO reform is not yet being negotiated.

4 – No serious reconciliation negotiations are taking place, and no broker is seriously engaged. The West Bank-Gaza division remains entrenched. Tension in rhetorical terms between Fatah and Hamas shows signs of escalation.

5 – No reconciliation talks are taking place, and tensions between the main Hamas and Fatah factions witnesses an escalation into occasional displays of internal violence, arrests, and harassment of each other’s activists in respective Palestinian Authority areas of control. Regional actors act to heighten tensions. Talk of a breakaway PLO being established returns to the agenda.

Findings

Despite successive agreements, in Cairo in May 2011, in Doha in February 2012, and again in May 2013 in Cairo, to set a deadline to form a unity government within three months, there has been no progress to date in implementing any of these deals. Although one meeting of senior Fatah and Hamas officials took place in Gaza in June 2013, statements from Fatah and Hamas leaders since then do not suggest that prospects for reconciliation are improving.

Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar have all previously sought to play constructive roles in bridging the political divide between Hamas and Fatah, but domestic and regional developments have significantly challenged their ability to do so and would seem to make reconciliation far less likely at this stage. The ouster of President Mohammed Morsi and the subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, are likely to complicate the role that Egypt can now play in reconciliation efforts. The downfall of the Brotherhood in Egypt threatens Hamas, which is not likely to trust Egypt’s mediation efforts going forward. At the same time, Qatar has lessened its regional broker role since a leadership change in Doha, and there appears to be no regional actor currently available with both the motivation and the ability to work with both sides of the Palestinian divide.

If anything, distrust has increased over the administration of Gaza and its relationship with the outside world, although the regional circumstances turning against Hamas have led to some speculation that Hamas may agree to a unity deal on terms more acceptable to Fatah – so far there is no evidence of this being realised. PLO reform is less on the agenda at the end of 2013 than it was at the start of the year.

Score: 4

Significance of indicator

The PLO (specifically the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and the Executive Committee) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) (comprised of the office of the president and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)) are the main forums for Palestinian political representation, with the PLO and its elected institution, the PNC, being of broader and greater significance for a two-state agreement with Israel. Regular, free, and fair elections to institutions of leadership are key benchmarks of their popular legitimacy. However, for self-defined national liberation movements, this legitimacy is to a great extent also determined by the success of their national liberation strategies. In theory, the right to participate in PNC elections extends to Palestinians everywhere, while in the case of PA presidential and PLC elections, only Palestinians living in the OPTs can participate.

Both Fatah and Hamas have reasons to be wary of national elections. Fatah is concerned that Hamas’ participation in PA institutions – even if the party does not repeat its PLC election victory of 2006 – will allow it to accumulate interests and entrench itself in the institutional bureaucracy. Hamas is wary of electoral politics both as a product of Fatah’s determination to keep Hamas members from holding office after the 2006 elections (a wariness reinforced by the fate of the Brotherhood in Egypt next door) and also because Hamas fears that elections may confirm that their popularity is in fact waning domestically. For both, the PLO is the bigger prize, and Fatah has so far jealously guarded its PLO monopoly.

Even if Palestinian elections are credible and deemed free and fair in their implementation, there is no guarantee that Israel and international actors will recognise their practical outcomes. Progress on elections is both another indicator of the ability to overcome current divisions and re-establish agreed rules of the game and is crucial to having shared Palestinian decision-making and implementation and even referendum structures in place for any progress in negotiations/approval of a deal reached. Elections will re-invest Palestinian negotiators with greater domestic legitimacy and create more robust avenues for accountability and interaction with the Palestinian constituency impacted by the talks.

Scoring guide

0 – Elections are held for the PNC. They feature high participation from Palestinians inside and outside the OPTs, and the parties respect the election outcomes. Elections are held for the PLC and PA presidency in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, with high participation rates in the OPTs. The key Palestinian factions participate in elections.

1 – Elections take place for either the PNC, the PLC, or the PA presidency, with participation at rates similar to past elections in the OPTs and with elections made possible in other Palestinian population centres if for the PNC. All key factions participate and respect the outcome, and credible international observers endorse the results.

2 – Palestinian authorities announce that elections will be held in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem for either or both the PLC or/and the PA presidency, with all factions agreeing to participate and an agreement for international observer oversight.

3 – No elections are held or agreed on, but negotiations for elections are ongoing, and the basic framework and institutions for conducting elections are functioning and making progress (i.e. there is some co-operation on the composition of the Palestinian Central Elections Commission, registration process, etc.).

4 – No elections are held and no progress is made to that end, or elections are held in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem for either or both the PA presidency and/or the PLC but are boycotted by one of the major factions, and/or the outcome is disputed, or elections are held by only one major faction for only one PA area (i.e. either the West Bank or Gaza but not both).

5 – No Palestinian elections are held and the modalities for holding elections are unilaterally modified by one party. Without consultation or agreement, a non-elected authority re-defines the nature of elections and re-organises the election commission, oversight, and the nature of Palestinian bodies or powers; or elections are indefinitely postponed and removed from agenda.

Findings

PLC elections that should have taken place in 2010 were scheduled and subsequently delayed three times, most recently in October 2013.

Fatah and Hamas have not pursued the tentative agreement reached in May 2013 that would have allowed for new PNC elections, and the agreement appears to have been shelved indefinitely. No preparations are currently being made for PNC elections. No progress has been made either on PLC or PA presidential elections, although preparatory measures have been taken or discussed. Nevertheless, while Hamas had agreed in January 2013 to allow the Central Elections Commission to register voters in Gaza, it subsequently backtracked in July 2013 before work could commence, in part due to what it called unfair treatment of Hamas supporters in the West Bank.

Occasional suggestions have persisted regarding West Bank-only PLC elections. In August 2013, for example, Fatah officials raised the possibility of unilaterally calling for PLC and PA presidential elections “as soon as possible”, with Abbas reportedly threatening to suspend the transfer of PA funds to Gaza should Hamas fail to agree. Were elections to take place in the West Bank only, then, far from re-establishing a popular mandate, this would on balance have had the effect of entrenching divisions and further undermining the capacity for collective and inclusive decision-making over the legitimisation of any two-state negotiation or agreement.

Score: 4

Significance of indicator

Alongside considerations of political representation and electoral legitimacy are questions of how Palestinian political actors exercise power and whether the Palestinian public is confident that the de facto authorities do so according to the rule of law as well as whether leaders are in a legitimate position to take decisions on peoples’ future. Though grievances around corruption have always been high amongst the public, the last decade has seen the proliferation of other abuses of power in both the West Bank and Gaza. These peaked during and after the internecine conflict, which significantly worsened following the 2006 elections, establishing a pattern of impunity for the respective authorities in the OPTs, with PLC parliamentary oversight largely in abeyance.

Scoring guide

0 – Levels of public confidence in the Palestinian leadership remain high. Authorities investigate and prosecute instances of serious human rights violations, diminishing the frequency in which they occur. Authorities strengthen the independence of the Palestinian judiciary. They put in place effective measures to curb corruption and prosecute those who engage in corruption. This leads to diminishing public perceptions of corruption.

1 – Levels of public confidence in the Palestinian leadership grow. Authorities increasingly investigate and prosecute instances of serious human rights violations, leading to fewer occurrences. Authorities put in place effective measures to curb corruption.

2 – Public confidence in the Palestinian leadership steadily or slightly increases. There are fewer instances of serious human rights violations. Authorities take effective measures to curb corruption, leading to declining public perceptions of corruption.

3 – Public confidence in the Palestinian leadership declines slightly. Serious human rights violations occur intermittently and with impunity. Authorities take some effective measures to curb corruption.

4 – Public confidence in the Palestinian leadership declines. Serious human rights violations occur frequently and with impunity. Authorities take no visible measures to curb corruption.

5 – Public confidence in the Palestinian leadership and in Palestinian institutions falls significantly. High numbers of serious human rights violations occur with impunity. Serious and credible new corruption allegations come to light.

Findings

In June 2013, a public opinion poll found that 48 percent of Palestinians were satisfied with the presidency of Abbas. The same poll found that 41.2 percent approved of the performance of the Hamas-led authority in the Gaza Strip. In June 2012, these figures stood at 53.5 percent and 55.9 percent respectively.

According to the most recent data for 2013 (January-October), the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (PICHR) recorded a range of serious human rights violations by authorities in the West Bank and Gaza, including the following (2012 data in parentheses):

·         Issuance of death sentences: 12 (6)

·         Torture and ill treatment: 315 (306)

·         Arbitrary detention: 674 (176)

·         Deaths in detention: 2 (11)

In June 2013, polls showed that 77 percent of Palestinians believed that corruption exists in the West Bank, and 61 percent believed that corruption exists in Gaza. In December 2012, these figures stood at 74 percent and 53 percent respectively.

In their most recent report, the Palestinian public watchdog, Transparency Palestine (AMAN), documented common ongoing forms of corruption in the form of nepotism, favouritism, cronyism, tax evasion, and misuse of public property in 2012. The latest World Bank report on the OPTs, published in March 2013, also underscores the need to address institutional corruption.

Score: 3

Significance of indicator

Support for a two-state solution among Palestinians is crucial for the outcome of negotiations conducted by the PLO to that end. Simultaneously, it is important to measure the public’s confidence in the possibility that a two-state solution may be the result of a negotiation rather than achieved through other means, be they non-violent struggle or armed struggle. Finally, on a more granular analysis, it must be assessed whether support for the two-state solution and for a negotiated outcome involves also the expectation that the former can be delivered through the latter in a reasonable amount of time.

Scoring guide

0 – A significant majority of Palestinians support a two-state outcome; they largely support negotiations as the main vehicle to achieve a two-state outcome; and they believe that the negotiations have a realistic short-term or mid-term chance of success.

1 – A significant majority of Palestinians support a two-state outcome, and they largely support negotiations as the main vehicle to achieve a two-state outcome. But they do not believe that the negotiations will result in two states in the immediate future.

2 – A slim majority of Palestinians support a two-state outcome, and Palestinians largely support negotiations as the main vehicle to achieve a two-state outcome. But they do not believe that negotiations will ever result in two states.

3 – Palestinian opinion is split around 50/50 on support for a two-state outcome in principle, but they do not believe that negotiations will ever result in two states. A significant minority of Palestinians support a return to armed resistance as the primary vehicle to end the occupation.

4 – A sizeable minority of Palestinians support a two-state outcome, but a slim majority support a return to armed resistance as the primary vehicle to end the occupation. A strong majority oppose continued negotiations.

5 – The majority of Palestinians reject a two-state outcome, reject negotiations, and support a return to armed resistance as the primary vehicle to end the occupation.

Findings

While public opinion polls still reflect majority support in principle among Palestinians for a two-state settlement, these numbers have declined over time: support for a negotiated settlement was much higher – at 75 percent in 1999 versus 55 percent in 2013.[1]

Whereas public confidence that negotiations were a correct and necessary strategy for national liberation ran high in the 1990s (in 1995, 74.9 percent expressed support for negotiations), this view diminished sharply by 2013, with 66.2 percent expressing pessimism about whether there could be a peaceful settlement at all, according to a poll conducted in March.[2] More recently, according to the findings of a November 2013 poll, 50.5 percent of Palestinian respondents said that the PLO should not have agreed to restart talks, while 33.8 percent voiced their support for talks. In another poll conducted in November 2013, when asked whether they think that the current talks will lead to an agreement, 11 percent said that this would happen in one year, 19 percent predicted that this would happen in five years, and 22 percent said that an agreement is inevitable but that it would take more than five years; 47 percent, meanwhile, said that they did not believe that a peace agreement would ever be reached.

 In the course of the second intifada, public opinion was evenly divided in support for both violent and nonviolent forms of resistance, seeing them both as a legitimate response to the occupation.[3] According to a March 2013 poll, a large majority of Palestinians (78.9 percent) said that nonviolent resistance efforts should be intensified.[4] More recently though, following the resumption of peace talks, only 27.1 percent of Palestinians polled in November 2013 considered nonviolent resistance the most useful approach, versus 29.3 percent of Palestinians who backed armed resistance.

Score:  3