TWO-STATE STRESS TEST

Significance of indicator

Israelis see the ability to ensure security as a litmus test for any future peace agreement with the Palestinians. While the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has officially renounced the use of violence, other Palestinian groups as well as elements/factions within the PLO continue to view armed resistance as a legitimate struggle and under certain circumstances use violence to “spoil” peace agreements that they view as surrendering Palestinian rights. For the purposes of this stress test, we have chosen to adopt the view that Palestinian violence weakens prospects of achieving a two-state solution. We do, however, acknowledge that an alternative view holds that such violence has, in the past, achieved results in generating concessions from Israel and in forcing a re-think – a line of argument that views developments such as Madrid, Oslo, the Road Map, and the Gaza withdrawal as having been driven by periods of serious unrest and violence. This is not the line adopted for the purposes of this stress test.

Scoring options

0 – No violence: there are no Israeli civilian casualties in Israel or the OPTs, and Palestinian armed groups do not perpetrate fatal violence against Israeli citizens. Palestinian factions fire no projectiles from Gaza.

1 – Low violence: there are no Israeli civilian fatalities; non-fatal violence is limited; and Palestinian factions fire under 50 projectiles from Gaza in a six-month period.

2 – Low-mid violence: single-digit Israeli civilian fatalities occur (a level akin to the 2010 average), and Palestinian factions fire 50-200 projectiles from Gaza in a six-month period. Israeli and Palestinian security services regularly foil terrorist attacks.

3 – Medium violence: low double-digit Israeli civilians fatalities occur, and Palestinian factions fire 200-500 projectiles from Gaza and/or carry out one to five bombings targeting Israel in a six-month period (a level akin to the first intifada).

4 – Mid-high violence: double-digit Israeli civilian fatalities occur, and Palestinian factions fire 500-1,000 projectiles from Gaza (a level akin to pre-“Pillar of Defence”). Palestinian armed groups use external theatres from which to operate (Sinai, Golan Heights, Lebanon) and/or carry out five to ten suicide bombings targeting Israel in a six-month period (levels akin to 2005-2008), and/or occasional firefights between the Israeli Defence Forces and members of Palestinian armed groups break out in the West Bank.

5 – High violence: Palestinian violence results in triple-digit deaths among Israeli civilians. Palestinian factions fire over 1,000 projectiles from Gaza (a level akin to pre-“Cast Lead”), the West Bank, and external theatres and/or carry out ten or more suicide bombings targeting Israel in a six-month period (a level akin to the second intifada), and/or regular firefights between the Israeli Defence Forces and members of Palestinian armed groups break out in the OPTs.

Findings

According to Israel’s Shin Bet, 2012 was the first time since 1973 that no Israelis were killed in the West Bank.This year, however, witnessed a rise in lone-wolf attacks by Palestinians unaffiliated with political goals or with Palestinian armed groups, resulting in the death of eight Israelis (one in April, two in September, and five in October). Also, a Palestinian worker employed in the Israeli town of Afula stabbed an Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) soldier in November. The rise in Israeli fatalities has led Israeli security officials to accuse the PA of “complete incompetence”.

While Palestinian militants demonstrated for the first time their ability to hit population centres as far afield as Tel Aviv in rocket strikes from Gaza during the November 2012 flare-up, Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile defence system has proven largely effective; although some 2,327 high trajectory launchings killed six Israelis. Since the beginning of 2013, Palestinian factions have fired a total of 87 projectiles towards Israel from Gaza and Sinai. This represents 3.42 percent of those fired in 2012 – a decrease of 96.58 percent.

In June 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the Shin Bet had prevented five suicide bombings and 30 attempted kidnappings of soldiers since the start of 2013. In comparison, authorities reportedly thwarted 100 “serious” terror attacks in 2012, according to the Shin Bet. In addition, Israeli authorities reportedly arrested 2,300 terror suspects during the same year, leading to 2,170 indictments.

Score: 2

Significance of indicator

Israeli violence undermines the prospects for a two-state solution. By weakening the central authority exercised by the PA in the West Bank and by Hamas in Gaza, it jeopardises the ability of Palestinian authorities to maintain security co-operation with Israeli authorities (in the case of the PA), adhere to ceasefire agreements (in the case of Hamas), and the ability of both entities to reign in smaller, more radical Palestinian groups. As such, the IDF’s use of violence against Palestinians ultimately heightens the chances of instability in the OPTs and the security risk to Israel and undermines Palestinian public support for peace efforts.

Scoring options

0 – No violence: no significant violence occurs; there are minimal IDF incursions into PA areas.

1 – Low violence: single-digit Palestinian fatalities occur in a six-month period (a level akin to the post-“Operation Cast Lead” period). Israel effectively investigates complaints filed by Palestinians and human rights organisations and follows up with prosecutions as appropriate.

2 – Low-mid violence: low double-digit Palestinian fatalities occur in a six-month period (a level akin to the Oslo period). Israel shows its readiness to investigate instances of violence against Palestinian civilians but opens few indictments against IDF soldiers.

3 – Medium violence: high double-digit Palestinian fatalities occur in a six-month period (a level akin to the first intifada). The Israeli government dismisses complaints filed against it and instead launches its own investigations but opens no indictments against IDF soldiers.

4 – Mid-high violence: triple-digit Palestinian fatalities occur in a six-month period (a level akin to the second intifada). Israel is reluctant to open investigations into the conduct of its soldiers and prosecute accordingly. The government passes legislation relaxing the IDF’s rules of engagement. Israeli security forces regularly use potentially lethal weapons to disperse Palestinian protestors.

5 – High violence: a protracted armed conflict develops, resulting in the death of over 1,000 Palestinians in a six-month period (a level akin to “Operation Cast Lead”). Israel launches regular airstrikes in Palestinian populated areas and regularly uses live fire. Israel’s political narrative openly advocates the use of disproportionate force against Palestinians.

Findings

This year has seen comparatively low levels of Israeli state violence against Palestinians, with 19 Palestinians killed (five in Gaza and 14 in the West Bank) and 3,427 injured (3,376 in the West Bank and 51 in Gaza). Should this trend continue, it will represent a major improvement from 2012, when Israeli forces killed 266 Palestinians (255 in Gaza and nine in the West Bank) and injured 4,860 (1,829 in the West Bank and 3,031 in Gaza). It also represents a reversal from last year, which saw higher casualty rates in Gaza where a significant number occurred during Israel’s November 2012 offensive “Pillar of Defence”. However there has been an increase in violence and deaths in the West Bank which is a trend that should be monitored in the coming period.

In 2012, Israeli military police received 240 complaints against IDF members, leading to the opening of 103 investigations (including 78 based on complaints filed in 2012 and a further 25 based on complaints filed prior to 2012). According to data from Yesh Din, the year saw one indictment based on an investigation initiated in 2011 and the continuation of two cases following indictments served prior to 2012. The IDF has not yet released data for 2013.  

Score: 2

Significance of indicator

Israeli violence against Palestinians is not limited to state action, and there is little accountability from the Israeli government for the violence committed by its settler citizens. The inability or unwillingness of the Israeli state to confront and control radical Israeli settlers compromises the prospects for dismantling Jewish settlements in the West Bank as part of any peace agreement with the Palestinians and could potentially lead to a significant upsurge in settler violence directed at Palestinians. The impunity with which Israeli non-state actors perpetrate violent actions leads to increasing confrontation and strife with local Palestinian populations and could act as a trigger for overall escalation, threatening a Palestinian backlash, stability, and prospects for a political settlement.

Scoring options

0 – No violence: Israeli settlers perpetrate no significant violence against Palestinians. Israel adopts a zero-tolerance policy towards violence by individuals and groups and rigorously implements the rule of law.

1 – Low violence: Israeli settlers perpetrate under 50 incidents of violence against Palestinians in a six-month period, and there are no casualties. The Israeli government shows a determined ability/willingness to restrain individuals and groups conducting violent attacks against Palestinians in the OPTs.

2 – Low-mid violence: Israeli settlers perpetrate between 50-100 incidents of violence against Palestinians in a six-month period (a level akin to pre-2005 rates), but these acts are mostly limited to the destruction of property and include no casualties. The Israeli government passes legislation cracking down on settler violence but remains unwilling or unable to effectively implement its laws.

3 – Medium violence: Israeli settlers perpetrate between 100-300 incidents of violence against Palestinians in a six-month period (a level akin to 2005-2007 rates), including frequent stone throwing, but which cause no casualties. Damage to property and agricultural land is quite extensive. Israeli security forces do not intervene against individuals conducting violent attacks.

4 – Mid-high violence: Israeli settlers perpetrate between 300-500 incidents of violence against Palestinians in a six-month period (a level akin to 2008-2012 rates), including the frequent use of direct non-lethal physical violence. The Israeli Knesset passes legislation relaxing conditions in which settlers can employ deadly force against Palestinians. Single-digit Palestinian fatalities occur.

5 – High violence: Israeli settlers take part in unprecedented levels of violence, perpetrating 500 or more incidents against Palestinians in a six-month period, including frequent shootings involving casualties. The IDF area commander relaxes rules of engagement for settlers, and Israel’s political narrative hints at the condoning of settler violence. Double-digit Palestinian fatalities occur.

Findings

A UN international fact-finding mission on settlements concluded in a 2013 report that the failure of Israeli authorities to enforce the law by investigating incidents of settler violence represented “institutionalised discrimination against the Palestinian people”. In an internal official Israeli report the same year, Israel’s State Comptroller Joseph Shapira raised concerns about the maintenance of the rule-of-law in Israeli-controlled areas of the West Bank, which the report described as “completely lacking in regulatory or investigatory authorities”.

According to the most recent data for 2013, there were 290 incidents of settler-related violence, 75 of which resulted in Palestinian injuries (predominantly from stone-throwing and physical violence), with the remainder inflicting property damage. By comparison, 2012 registered a total of 359 incidents, 98 of which led to Palestinian injuries. While the levels of settler violence are comparable to 2012, they form part of a continuing trend that saw settler violence grow by 315 percent between 2007 and 2011.

According to data from Yesh Din, the Judea and Samaria police district opened 121 investigations in 2012, leading to six indictments. This compares to 72 investigations and five indictments in the first half of 2013. While these figures have remained relatively constant, they reflect a current low trend in which only 8.5 percent of investigations ended in the indictment of Israelis suspected of harming Palestinians and their property between 2005 and 2013.

Score: 3

Significance of indicator

While the preferred reality is one in which the security branches of the PA maintain order and a monopoly on the use of force in the transition to statehood, the current West Bank/Gaza split precludes this. As such, the current duopoly in which the PA exercises control over the West Bank and Hamas over Gaza is seen as preferable for the two-state outcome to a security vacuum in the OPTs and the ensuing state of chaos that this would likely provoke.

In any final settlement, the ability of central authorities to regulate the behaviour and ultimately disband armed groups is also of primary importance. This is especially the case given the latter’s potential to undermine the ability of Palestinian central authorities to guarantee the implementation of security protocols agreed with Israel and any potential Status Of Forces Agreements with third-party forces likely to be stationed in Palestine to oversee a two-state deal. While Hamas’ ability/willingness to keep smaller, more radical factions under control in Gaza is also vital to any ceasefire with Israel, maintaining such a ceasefire is also contingent on Israel refraining from provocative actions, including assassinations and missile strikes.

Likewise, the willingness of Palestinian security forces to pursue security co-operation with Israel is undermined by the occupation and daily humiliations visited upon the Palestinian population by Israel’s control of Areas B and C of the West Bank and incursions into Area A. To many ordinary Palestinians, Israeli security measures in the OPTs, therefore, tend to depict the PA as kowtowing to Israel, consequently weakening its legitimacy in the absence of productive negotiations or other major changes. 

Scoring options

0 – The PA retains an uncontested monopoly on the use of force in Gaza and the West Bank, with Palestinian security forces able to arrest/disrupt and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis. Israel transfers responsibility for security over additional territory to the PA and refrains from conducting incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas.

1 – The PA retains an uncontested monopoly on the use of force in Gaza and Area A of the West Bank and engages in security co-operation with Israel. Palestinian armed groups are unable to perpetrate violence against Israelis. 

2 – The PA and Hamas retain an uncontested duopoly on the use of force in Area A of the West Bank and Gaza respectively. Palestinian fringe armed groups in the West Bank and non-Hamas groups launching rockets from Gaza perpetrate minimal violence against Israelis.

3 – Rival Palestinian factions contest the PA and Hamas’ duopoly on the use of force, but both groups retain overall authority in Area A of the West Bank and Gaza respectively, with little deterioration in the overall security situation in the OPTs. Palestinian fringe armed groups in the West Bank and non-Hamas groups launching rockets from Gaza perpetrate sporadic violence against Israelis.

4 – Rival Palestinian factions undermine the PA and Hamas’ duopoly on the use of force, leading to intra-Palestinian clashes. Palestinian fringe armed groups in the West Bank and non-Hamas groups launching rockets from Gaza perpetrate regular violence against Israelis. PA security forces are in retreat.

5 – PA security forces collapse, with no central authority able to exert control over Palestinian territory. Palestinian armed groups are largely unimpeded by PA security forces or Hamas in acting against Israelis. Israeli security forces reassert greater direct control over Area A of the West Bank and/or Gaza.

Findings

Non-Popular Struggle Front-affiliated armed groups did not commit violence against Israelis in the West Bank in 2012 or 2013. While Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades reportedly took responsibility for the stabbing to death of a settler in the West Bank in April, the validity of this claim has been disputed, and it appears to have been a solo act. This represents a trend of an increasing number of Palestinian lone-wolf attacks against Israelis in the West Bank and Israel. In another potentially new development in November, the IDF reportedly killed three members of a Salafi Jihadi cell in the southern West Bank for allegedly planning attacks on Israelis and PA targets. This followed reported clashes between Salafis and PA security forces in previous months.

In Gaza, Salafi jihadi groups claimed responsibility for the majority of the 44 projectiles fired towards Israel in the first half of 2013. While Hamas is not considered to be responsible for the pattern of relativity low-level projectile fire witnessed in 2013 and most of 2012, reports indicate that the group was responsible for the majority of the 1,731 projectiles fired during the November 2012 conflict with Israel.

So far in 2013, intra-Palestinian violence in Gaza has resulted in eight injuries, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Tensions between Hamas and Islamist factions in Gaza rose following rocket fire against Israel on 24 June, which was seen as an act of defiance by Islamic Jihad following the death of a fighter during clashes with Hamas security forces. No fatalities or injuries were reported in 2012 as a result of intra-Palestinian violence.

According to UNOCHA data made available to ECFR, intra-Palestinian feuding in 2012 resulted in the kidnapping of one Palestinian and, in 2013, the injury of 16 Palestinians (including three during demonstrations).

Since 2000, Israel has not carried out Further Re-Deployments and continues to exert control over 82.8 percent of the West Bank (areas B and C).

Score: 3