TWO-STATE STRESS TEST

Significance of indicator

The majority of Palestinian refugees live in three countries adjacent to Israel/Palestine: Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Their standards of living and legal status differ greatly among the three host countries and depend to a great extent on historically determined policies implemented over decades by the three respective governments.

The standards of living of these refugee communities and the prospects for their improvement can impact the possibility for and sustainability of a two-state outcome in light of the limited number of refugees who would likely be allowed to return to Israel or practically be able to settle in the new State of Palestine. Worsening standards of living in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan further strain the option of more permanently rehabilitating refugees in these countries, making it more problematic and costly. Nevertheless, the absorption capacity of the current host countries is also a political rather than just an economic decision. Finally, refugees’ standards of living will, until there is a deal, still depend on UNRWA’s effectiveness as an organisation as well as the level of co-operation it receives from host countries. This data can provide useful insights into the stability of the current situation concerning Palestinian refugees in the region and the prospects for a “morning after” integration of refugees if an agreement is reached.  

Scoring guide

0 – Social indicators for Palestinian refugees and host country citizens are comparable, with similar levels of education and healthcare provision for refugees. There are indicators that there is no discrimination against Palestinian refugees in all three countries, and there is a likely greater ease of long-term absorption.

1 – There are limited differences in social indicators between Palestinian refugees and host country citizens, reflecting marginally lower levels of education and healthcare provision for Palestinian refugees. There are indicators of limited discrimination against Palestinian refugees in not all of the three countries, while longer-term absorption appears possible.

2 – There are moderate differences in social indicators between Palestinian refugees and host country citizens, reflecting lower but adequate standards of service provision for Palestinian refugees. Country performance on discrimination is mixed, with some displaying higher levels. Greater challenges to long-term absorption emerge.

3 – There are significant differences in social indicators between Palestinian refugees and host country citizens, reflecting significantly lower levels of education and healthcare provision for Palestinian refugees. There are indicators of widespread discrimination against Palestinian refugees across at least two host countries. Clear strains on the future absorption of Palestinian refugees in at least one country emerge.

4 – The ongoing deterioration of the socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees occurs to a degree that makes long-term absorption very difficult. In at least one host country, the human security of Palestinian refugees is also in danger, which has the potential to cause a crisis in the existing Israeli-Palestinian situation.

5 – The ongoing deterioration of the socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees occurs to a degree that threatens not only long-term absorption but also the short-term human security of Palestinian refugees in all of the host countries, which has the potential to cause a crisis in the existing Israeli-Palestinian situation.

Methodological note: to assess changes in the standards of living among different refugee communities, UNRWA statistics for Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (except for those who do not use UNRWA facilities) are compared to national statistics in the same countries. Four social indicators, including levels of education and healthcare, have been selected. Together, these will provide the country assessment. The general assessment is based on a total of 12 items (four for each country).

Findings

Score: 3

Significance of indicator

The capacity of the Palestinian body politic to accept compromises on the refugee issue – based on parameters proposed in the past – depends in significant measure on the approach to the issue in Palestinian public discourse and on the willingness of the Palestinian leadership and public opinion to demonstrate flexibility in this regard. Recent events have demonstrated that public acknowledgment by Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officials of at most a limited right of return to Palestine can strengthen the position of opponents of this outcome. It has previously been assumed that Palestinian gains on other aspects of negotiations (particularly territories and East Jerusalem) might offset uncomfortable compromises on the refugee issue in terms of public and political acceptance by Palestinians. It is therefore important to analyse several aspects within Palestinian public discourse on refugees in order to assess whether the current situation strains or sustains prospects for a negotiated solution to the refugee problem. To this end, two factors are taken into consideration: polls of the Palestinian public and statements by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and PLO leadership.

Scoring guide

0 – The Palestinian leadership openly discusses the refugee issue, acknowledging the compromise that can be reached; this resonates constructively with the Palestinian public, which considers trade-offs with other dossiers in a two-state context.

1 – Palestinian officials discuss the refugee issue publicly and hint at relevant compromises with general public acceptance and/or lack of interest.

2 – Palestinian officials discuss the refugee issue occasionally and refrain from ruling out compromises. Public opinion is not mobilised against relevant compromises and is more interested in other dossiers.

3 – Palestinian officials rarely discuss the refugee issue and avoid referring to any compromise. The issue is a contentious one in public disagreements between political parties and factions, but opinion polls indicate broad acceptance of compromise on the issue in the context of other dossiers related to a two-state solution being positively resolved for Palestinians.  

4 – The Palestinian leadership avoids the refugee issue when giving statements on the two-state solution, or leaders address the refugee issue in ways that rule out any compromise. Public opinion displays high sensitivity regarding compromises or shifts in the PLO’s position. 

5 – Palestinian national positions re-focus on refugee rights and practical return as the central theme, ruling out standard two-state solution options and mobilising the Palestinian public around these themes. Palestinians generally acknowledge that no compromise can be reached.

Findings

Opinion polls conducted among Palestinians living in the OPTs highlight the importance of the issue of refugees, which nonetheless appears as subordinate to their desire for Israel to return to the 1967 borders, for an end to the occupation, and for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Forty-two percent of those polled in June 2013 noted these issues as priorities, while 34 percent stated that the most vital goal was the right of return for refugees “to their 1948 towns and villages”.

A December 2013 poll, conducted jointly among Israelis and Palestinians, explored the extent to which the latter are ready to compromise. The vast majority insisted on the recognition in principle of the right of return, with varying degrees of approval for the different options for its implementation: 73 percent gave a 5-to-10 rating to the proposal that refugees be allowed to settle either in Israel or in Palestine, but 66 percent would still give the same rating if only a small number would be permitted to settle in Israel and 55 percent would find it “tolerable” if refugees were allowed to return only to Palestine. Regarding recognition in principle of the right of return, only 8 percent were ready to compromise on it “if all the other issues are settled to my satisfaction”.

If one looks at public statements made by the Palestinian leadership, the first half of 2013 witnessed relative quiet on the issue of refugees. This is in stark contrast to November 2012, when Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas suggested that he was personally flexible on Palestinians’ right of return to Israel in an interview with Israel’s Channel 2 News. The move elicited considerable criticism amongst Palestinians (including members of Abbas’ ruling Fatah party). Abbas later explained that his comments represented merely his personal views, with an aid restating the Palestinian leadership’s commitment to the right of return. For its part, Hamas has maintained, “it is not possible for any person, regardless of who he is, a person, a president, government, or authority, to give up Palestinian land or to give up the right of return”. All of this suggests that the Palestinian leadership has not adequately prepared the public for the kinds of compromise that they appear willing to accept on this issue in negotiations.

The Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership did not draw public attention to the refugee issue in the first months of 2013 during which time Abbas mentioned refugees only twice; Salam Fayyad, while still prime minister, only once and in the context of their exemption from having to pay utilities; and his successor, Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, has not mentioned refugees at all to date. Nevertheless, PLO negotiators, more than PA leaders, have the responsibility to discuss the refugee issue as part of the two-state solution. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, for example, has spoken more openly about the refugee issue. In an interview with Voice of Palestine Radio in June, Erekat stressed the need to protect Palestinian refugees from sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Syria and stated, “Any Palestinian who insists on [...] the return of refugees and the release of prisoners, will confront an Israeli position that will not consider him as a real partner”, thus acknowledging that this dossier is among one of the most rigid red lines for the current Israeli coalition. He mentioned the issue again on the eve of the first prisoner release in August, listing refugees as a core issue to be discussed along with Jerusalem, borders, settlements, water, and security. This statement, however, seems to be designed more as a way to fill in the gap left by the absence of clear terms of reference rather than a willingness to prioritise this issue over others.

Score: 3

Significance of indicator

The refugee issue is a highly sensitive one in Israel too, because most Zionist Israelis and their leaders link it to the preservation of the Jewish character of the state. Although often neglected in public discourse as an issue, it comes into the fore as part of the wider issue of the Jewish identity of Israel or as part of the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. Israel would need to show flexibility on two different levels in order to move toward the parameters that are considered necessary for a solution. If this is to be an “end of conflict and claims” deal, then this would include Israel’s willingness to allow for the entry of even a symbolic number of Palestinian refugees and to be involved in a broader compensation scheme for refugees, in addition to the likely need for some acknowledgement by Israel of its role in the injustice done to Palestinians in the creation of the refugee problem.

Scoring guide

0 – Statements by Israeli officials explicitly accept and prepare the Israeli public for flexibility on the refugee issue regarding limited return or the entry of refugees, acknowledgment of injustice, and the need to provide compensation. Public opinion responds positively or at least accepts the shift.

1 – Statements by Israeli officials indicate a willingness to pursue compromise on all three aspects of the file – limited entry, acknowledgement of historic injustice, and compensation, without being explicit. Public opinion is increasingly accepting of compromise, and, in the context of an overall peace package, there is a clear pro majority.

2 – Israeli leaders address the refugee issue and display empathy for Palestinian refugees and flexibility on one or two of the three aspects of the file. Public support for a compromise remains a minority but is growing and scraping 50 percent.

3 – Israeli leaders avoid statements on the issue of refugees that rule out compromise, or they avoid discussing the issue altogether. A sizable minority of the public supports compromise on this issue. And, in the context of a comprehensive two-state deal, the lack of support for compromise on refugees does not bring down the percentage of those who support the overall package below 50 percent.

4 – Israeli leaders rule out compromise on at least two of the three aspects of the file, and a strong majority of the public also oppose compromise. Flexibility on the refugee issue lowers support for an overall two-state package to well below 50 percent of the public.

5 – Israel’s leadership explicitly rules out a compromise on any entry of refugees, any historic acknowledgement, and compensation. Public statements raise these points frequently and forcefully. Public opinion overwhelmingly rejects compromise.

Findings

Given the lack of available polling data, ECFR commissioned the Guttman Center of the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) to include two questions on refugees in its Peace Index, which surveyed 601 Israeli citizens (both Jewish and Palestinian citizens) in the last week of September 2013. Results are shown below:

In your opinion, in return for a permanent-status agreement, should or should not Israel agree to the return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel?

In return for a permanent peace agreement, would you support or oppose Israel accepting its partial responsibility for the suffering that was caused to the Palestinians – for example, for creating the refugee problem?

The highest percentage of those in favour of a limited Palestinian refugee return was found in the 18-24 age group (29.7 percent) and slightly less (29.5 percent) among those between 25 and 34 years old. Surprisingly, among those defining themselves as ultra-orthodox (Haredi), 20.3 percent said that they are either sure that Israel should agree to a limited return or think that it should. This number is significantly higher than in other religious groups and outpaces even secular Jews, 17.3 percent of whom agree with these positions.

In July 2013, IDI recorded similar overall results. The July poll found that, of all the issues pertaining to the generally agreed parameters for a two-state solution, the Jewish Israeli public is least supportive on the refugee issue. Even when a right of return is confined only to the State of Palestine, as it was in the poll undertaken in December 2012, Jewish public opinion was evenly split at 49-49 percent – between those who support the right of return to Palestine and those who do not support it.[1]

In the future, it will be worth examining whether references to “right of return” or “return” as opposed to less loaded terminology such as “entry to or absorption in Israel” would produce more supportive results among Israelis. A large majority of Israelis do not seem to accept the language currently used. According to a December 2013 poll, Jewish Israelis are not keen to recognise in principle the right of return. Forty-five percent of all Israelis (and 37 percent of Jewish citizens) agreed with the statement “I have no problem with acknowledging a right of return as long as all refugee claims are resolved without a significant number of refugees returning to Israel, and there are no further claims in the future.” Conversely, 55 percent of all Israelis and 63 percent of Jewish citizens agreed with the statement “I would never accept an agreement that acknowledges a Palestinian right of return, even if all other issues are resolved to my satisfaction.”

Few polls have dealt in the past with Israel’s acknowledgement of any historic responsibility in creating the refugee problem. One relevant poll, conducted in 2009, asked Jewish Israelis the following question: “If the Palestinians officially take partial responsibility for the Nakba of the 1948 war, would you support/oppose Israel recognising its partial responsibility for the suffering caused to the Palestinians, for example, the creation of the refugee problem?” Only eight percent of the 431 Jewish Israelis polled stated that they were certain to support this solution, while 22 percent would consider supporting it. Forty-six percent said that they were certain to oppose it, with an additional 21 percent leaning towards opposing it.[2]

During 2013, public statements on the issue of refugees by Israeli political leaders and cabinet members have been scant but not insignificant. When speaking about his diplomatic plan in the settlement of Arielon 22 January, Yesh Atid leader and then parliamentary candidate Yair Lapid (currently Israel’s minister of finance) listed the right of return and the indivisibility of Jerusalem as the two issues on which Israel should not compromise. When publicly discussing the terms of reference for talks in July, Likud Minister for Regional Development Silvan Shalom asked rhetorically, “Had the matter of borders and territory been given over, what incentive would they [Palestinians] have had to make concessions on the matter of refugees or Jerusalem?”, indicating that firmness on the former would guarantee success on securing far-reaching Palestinian compromises on the latter, which appeared to be Israel’s red lines. In his speech at Bar-Ilan University on 6 October, Netanyahu stated that in order to achieve peace, Palestinians had to give up their right of return.

Score: 4

Significance of indicator

UNRWA’s continued ability to effectively carry out its mandate can be considered important to maintaining an environment in which a two-state outcome might be possible. First, a collapse in UNRWA service provision would likely have a knock-on destabilising effect on Palestinian economic, security, and political realities. Second, UNRWA resource availability in the interim impacts refugees’ standards of living and by extension influences future resources needed to rehabilitate or relocate refugees. A lack of financial support for UNRWA adds unpredictability to the overall trajectory of what happens on the Palestinian side and could hamper future plans for the integration of refugees into host countries. The level of UNRWA assistance is a basic guarantee for the most vulnerable of Palestinian population groups, and the composition of funding is also important given that the diversification of sources leads to greater stability. And finally, the dire conditions of Palestinian refugees as a consequence of the conflict in Syria (with spill-over effects also on those living in Lebanon) add further unpredictability to the issue.

Scoring guide

0 – Funding availability matches needs, including population growth and unexpected/urgent crises such as the Syria situation. UNRWA does not face a cash deficit, and funding sources are diversified, with Arab League states at least meeting their 7.8 percent target for contributions to the general fund.

1 – Funding is in line with needs and population growth, and any end-of-year cash deficit is minimal (less than $10 million for the general fund). UNRWA maintains its services at at least current levels. Funding is diversified, and there is a trend towards more diversification. Arab League states are within two percentage points of the 7.8 percent target for general fund contributions.

2 – Budget for core activities barely keeps pace with population growth, resulting either in an end-of-year cash deficit in the low tens of million dollars or ongoing and unplanned cuts in services. The US and the EU and its member states provide most of the funds, with little diversification, while funding from Arab League states decreases to around 2 percent of the general fund.

3 – Funding for core activities falls short of existing needs and of population growth, resulting in an end-of-year cash deficit of more than $50 million as well as significant unplanned cuts in services. UNRWA does not diversify its funding sources, and Arab contributions are minimal.

4 – Funding for core activities is so stretched that UNRWA begins to withdraw from some basic service provision and runs a deficit in the high tens of million dollars. Major MEPP stakeholders significantly reduce their donations

5 – Due to a sharp drop in funding, UNRWA is unable to carry out its core activities in key service provision and in different geographical locations; this leads to refugee unrest and instability among the refugee population.

Findings

UNRWA is now essentially faced with three emergency situations: Syria, Gaza (where the poor economy makes a large proportion of the population more dependent on UN assistance), and Lebanon, where unrest and the influx of new refugees from Syria are making already poor conditions for older refugee communities much worse.

UNRWA’s core programme budget in 2013 was $675.3 million, up 3.01 percent from the previous year, when the figure was $655 million.The number of registered refugees grew by 2.54 percent in the same period, and therefore funding outpaced population growth. Nevertheless, the updated July forecast is an end-of-year deficit of $70.5 million in 2013, a slightly better figure than previously forecasted thanks to an extra $1.2 million from Saudi Arabia. Also, thanks to earlier than expected contributions from the EU, the UK, the Netherlands, the US, Switzerland, and Italy, total donor income increased by $107 million.[1 ]It is widely recognised that UNRWA’s financial position is unsustainable, but equally that it is very difficult for the agency to actually prioritise or cut services because of security risks and the sensitive relationships it has with host authorities. As of early December 2013, UNRWA was incapable of paying monthly salaries to its local workers in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the OPTs.

Although UNRWA has intensified its efforts to diversify its sources of funding, the US and the European Commission in 2012 provided 47.7 percent of the funds, with three other European countries (United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway) figuring in the top five.[2] Saudi Arabia was the largest Arab donor (ranking 14^th), which amounted to slightly smaller donations than Belgium. Emerging powers such as Turkey and Brazil ranked 17^th and 18^th respectively.

Score: 3