TWO-STATE STRESS TEST

Significance of indicator

Each individual settlement plays several overlapping roles: a community of Israeli citizens naturally tending to be opposed to their eviction; a core of a multi-layered security zone that affects Palestinians’ freedom of movement, their housing, and their daily lives in a radius far beyond the settlement’s physical boundaries; a hub on a network, necessitating links with other settlements and Israel proper through often segregated roads, infrastructure, and military patrols; and it is a progenitor of further points of settlement, with many existing settlements throwing out extensions beyond their original residential areas.

While all settlements in the West Bank are illegal according to international law, Israeli law and public discourse make a distinction between “settlements” and “outposts”. The latter comprise relatively small communities often set up on public or private Palestinian lands, all established since 1993 and during the peace process and usually without formal government sanction, although successive Israeli governments have retroactively legalised some of these outposts.

Like settlements, many of these outposts enjoy state services, such as connection to the water and electricity grids (under various pretexts or the blind eye of authorities as documented in the 2005 “Sasson Report”) and protection from the Israeli Defense Forces. With the exception of the eviction of residents from four settlements in the West Bank as part of the 2005 disengagement plan, outposts are the only Israeli-Jewish settlements in the West Bank to be occasionally evicted or even demolished; however, the geopolitical effect of such rare evictions is negligible compared to the “retaliatory” construction of new outposts and serve largely to constrain public debate to the issue of outposts, rendering discussion of evicting larger, recognised settlements practically moot.

Scoring guide

0 – Pending mutually-agreed and comparable land swaps between Israelis and Palestinians, Israeli authorities gradually eliminate outlying settlements and outposts, offer incentives for settlers to relocate to Israel proper, and freeze all settlement construction. Consequently, the settler population decreases.

1 – The Israeli government publicly declares and imposes a moratorium on settlement construction. It announces its commitment to remove outlying settlements and begins that process and/or sets up a task force for that purpose. Consequently, there is no significant rise in settler numbers and even a decrease.

2 – The Israeli government imposes significant limitations on settlement construction. Authorities remove a limited number of outposts. Population growth is similar to demographic trends within Israel. 

3 – Settlement construction continues at a steady pace, albeit without construction spikes or new settlements being established. New construction plans progress apace and no outposts are removed. The settler population growth remains higher than in Israel.

4 – Settlement construction increases, making the elimination of existing settlements ever less likely. The government advances significant construction plans and retroactively legalises some outposts. Population growth remains notably higher than in Israel.

5 – The government allows for the building of new settlements and the conversion of outposts into full settlements or the linking of settlements into new blocs. This further severs the West Bank into barely connected areas. The government advances the abolition of Israeli planning requirements for settlers and encourages the establishment of new outposts. Settler population growth is significantly higher than in Israel.

Findings

According to figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics quoted by the daily Israel HaYom, in July 2013, the total number of settlers in the West Bank was 367,000, including 7,700 new residents who moved there between the months of January-July 2013. If these estimates are confirmed, this would show a 6.68 percent increase over 2012 when, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 341,400 settlers lived in the West Bank and is significantly higher than population growth in Israel proper which was 1.8 percent in 2012, in line with previous years.

The first half of 2013 saw a 70 percent increase in new construction starts in settlements compared to the same period in 2012. This comprised starts on 1,708 new settlement units compared to 995 for the same period in 2012. In total, 2,840 housing units were started, under construction, or completed during this period. According to Peace Now’s calculations, this translates into 14,000 new settlers based on the assumption that each housing unit will be inhabited by a family of five.

In parallel, the Ministry of Defense approved significant settlement expansion in two waves: the first occurred between November 2012 and March 2013 and included plans for 6,200 housing units in 15 different settlements; the second, between March and July of this year, included 2,487 units. According to data obtained through a Freedom of Information Act submitted by Peace Now, the units approved in the second wave would be located as follows: 386 housing units in Beit El – in compensation for the state’s demolition of houses in the Ulpana neighborhood – 277 units in Elei Zahav, 290 units in the Har Ephraim neighbourhood of Kedumim, 550 units in Talmon, and a total of 984 units in two areas of Givat Ze’ev.

On 12 November, the Minister of Housing Uri Ariel announced tenders for the planning of an additional 20,000 housing units in the West Bank, which was withdrawn two weeks later, on 29 November, in response to pressure from Netanyahu, according to reports. The plan included 1,200 new housing units in the contested E1 area adjacent to the Ma’ale Adumim settlement. The United States and the EU have repeatedly highlighted this area as vital for the territorial continuity of a future Palestinian state.  

However, other quite major settlements have been allowed to grow in the shadow of the headlines generated by this announcement. For example, on 25 November, Israel approved the construction of 799 additional housing units in the settlements of Givan Ze’ev, Shiloh, and Nokdim and in the outpost of Givat Sal’it, where housing units and a commercial centre will replace prefab homes.

In May 2013, the Israeli government legalised four West Bank outposts – Maale Rehav’am, Giv’at Asaf, Mitzpe Lachish, and Haroeh. The government evicted residents of one small, temporary outpost (Eviatar, set up to commemorate the victim of a stabbing at Tapuach junction) within a day of the outpost’s construction, also in May 2013.

Score: 4

Significance of indicator

Israel retains complete authority over construction permits in Area C. The lack of approved planning and zoning against which permits can be issued means that most construction in Area C of the West Bank is illegal in Israeli eyes and as such can be demolished. Demolitions demonstrate a lack of Palestinian agency, increase Palestinian hardship, and limit Palestinian social and economic development. While some of the structures demolished are used for public or commercial purposes, most are residential, resulting in the expulsion of hundreds of people every year. Others are expelled without their homes being demolished.

Scoring guide

0 – Israel cedes planning and building authority, including enforcement powers, in Area C to the PA in advance of a full two-state deal. Israeli authorities do not evict Palestinian residents and they do not demolish Palestinian homes.

1 – Israel incorporates “illegal” Palestinian construction into new outline plans, which include an adequate response for Palestinian development needs. Parts of Area C are designated for Palestinian planning and construction. Israeli authorities carry out demolitions only in dangerous structures and provide replacement housing. The policy is the same as that for Jewish-Israeli citizens.

2 – Without ceding its authority, Israel announces a cessation to demolitions and a selective enforcement of construction laws. The authorities continue to carry out limited evictions, but do not provide replacement housing. They allow only very limited Palestinian building in Area C.

3 – Israeli authorities continue at a low frequency to demolish Palestinian homes and evict Palestinian residents in isolation from broader development plans for increasing Jewish-Israeli presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Authorities do not allow any new Palestinian construction.

4 – The Israeli government increasingly enforces construction laws, including in order to clear lands for public use or for private settlement development, with dozens of houses, including donor-funded structures, demolished.

5 – Israeli authorities conduct broad demolition campaigns in specific areas in tandem with the eviction of Palestinian residents or the revocation of their residencies. They also demolish donor-funded structures.

Findings

Israeli authorities demolished a total of 413 structures in Area C of the West Bank between January and September 2013, resulting in the displacement of 615 Palestinians. International donors financed 99 of the 413 demolished structures; this number is up from a total of 79 donor-financed structures that were demolished in 2012. The monthly rate of demolitions in the same period (January-September 2013) was 49, while the number of displaced people each month was 68. This shows a very slight upward trend compared to 2012, when these figures were 45 and 67 respectively.

Score: 4

Significance of indicator

The PA has very little control over the freedom of movement of people and goods within and between the West Bank and Gaza and between the OPTs and third countries. A Palestinian state will depend on territorial contiguity and freedom of movement, not just in the West Bank but between the West Bank and Gaza, the latter of which has been acutely constrained since the Gaza blockade. The freedom to move beyond the borders of the OPTs is also critically important. Ultimately, mobility restrictions hamper the development of Palestine-wide civil society, economic life, integration, and national politics, with clear implications for statehood.

Scoring guide

0 – Freedom of movement within and between the West Bank and Gaza and to third countries is unobstructed.

1 – Freedom of movement within the West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza and to third countries experiences a low level of interference.

2 – Freedom of movement within the West Bank faces limited numbers of obstacles, while there is increased movement between the West Bank and Gaza and to third countries.

3 – Freedom of movement within the West Bank faces significant numbers of obstacles, and there is low movement between the West Bank and Gaza or to third countries.

4 – Freedom of movement within the West Bank faces high numbers of obstacles, and movement between the West Bank and Gaza or to third countries is highly restricted, or there is none at all.

5 – Israel imposes a full closure policy in the West Bank, and there is almost no movement between the West Bank and Gaza and to third countries.

Findings

The Israeli government continues to enforce the separation between the West Bank and Gaza (with Palestinian support in some respects). In October 2013, 5,908 Palestinians exited Gaza via the Erez crossing, and since the beginning of 2013, a total of 41,768 Palestinians exited through Erez. This is in line with the figures for the second half of 2012 when 24,394 crossed through Erez, but it is still a fraction of the pre-second intifada levels, when more than 500,000 Palestinians exited from Gaza each month. These figures, however, also include a number of Palestinians whose destination was Israel rather than the West Bank, mainly for medical reasons.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), between January and October 2013 Israeli authorities in the West Bank erected 2,400 flying checkpoints, amounting to an average rate of 240 per month, up from an average of 213 in the last quarter of 2012.

The total number of permanet and manned checkpoints is 61, the same as in 2012. Nevertheless, these are not the only barrier to freedom of movement in the West Bank. As of September 2012, permanent physical barriers to access and movement in the West Bank numbered 542, but there has been some improvement in travel between some of the key urban centres, like Nablus, Tul Karm, Salfit, Ramallah, Hebron, and Jericho. However, Palestinian movement in Hebron, the second largest city in the West Bank, still remained heavily constrained, with 123 barriers in the city protecting the five main Israeli settlements. At the same time, Israeli administrative restrictions (road prohibitions, permit requirements, and age restrictions) around the West Bank are not easing. Palestinian travel to third countries occurs only under Israeli supervision (and that of Egypt when it comes to Gaza) and is based on a permit procedure.

Score: 4

Significance of indicator

Israel’s strictures on access and movement across the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), especially those that prevent the PA from administering and developing Area C, are core impediments to advancing closer to a two-state reality on the ground given that most of the Palestinian state will be in land that is today Area C. Future economic growth in the OPTs is also contingent upon resources in Area C; extending Palestinian presence and control in Area C in the interim period is therefore also crucial for the Palestinian economy.  

Scoring guide

0 – The PA has full civil and security control in Area C.

1 – The PA has significant civil and security control in large parts of Area C.

2 – The PA has significant civil control in large parts of Area C and a limited security presence in some parts of Area C.

3 – The PA has no control over Area C, although it is allowed a significant civilian presence in parts.

4 – The PA has a very limited civilian presence in Area C.

5 – The PA has no presence in Area C.

Findings

To date, the PA has not extended its jurisdiction into any part of Area C. Area C remains under full Israeli military and civil control.

According to the March 2013 report of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, in the limited area where Israel has allowed some Palestinian civilian presence, 20 schools and health care centres are being developed and a further 17 are in planning. However, since 2010, Palestinians submitted an additional 32 planning schemes to Israeli authorities but they have not been approved and no planning or permissions, required to address the needs of most of the 220 Palestinian communities living in Area C, are envisioned.

Score: 4