Wider Europe has been centre stage for European foreign policy in 2014, as Europe faced the fundamental challenge of supporting countries that were facing a steep price for their European aspirations. When the Vilnius summit ended in late 2013, many were ready to declare the Eastern Partnership dead. Instead, it was kept alive by the protests in Kyiv and has evolved from a rather technical process to an existential crisis both for the eastern neighbourhood and for the EU. [...]
The Association Agreement process itself saw a dramatic reversal from the slow and unsteady pace of 2013. The political provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement were signed on 21 March. Ukrainian exporters were given immediate duty-free access to EU markets in April, though other economic aspects of the agreement were delayed until after the presidential elections in May. On 27 June, the EU held a triple signing ceremony for Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, to support all three in the face of mounting Russian pressure.
Yet despite the Association Agreement progress, the Ukraine crisis continues, with much of it beyond the EU’s control. So far, the EU has been more effective at penalising Russia than at helping Ukraine. Sanctions help Ukraine only indirectly; while they may have kept Vladimir Putin from escalating further, they do nothing to improve the deteriorating security situation. Despite Berlin adopting a harder line on Russia, it ruled out any military option at the onset of the crisis. Germany has prioritised achieving a ceasefire and has pushed round-table negotiations that risk legitimising Kyiv’s self-appointed opponents. Little has been done to provide Ukraine with lethal, or non-lethal, military aid, or to rebuild its corrupt and incompetent security sector. The EU advisory mission sent to Kyiv in December 2014 largely concentrated on the legal sector. However, when Ukraine (and by extension some member states) faced a gas crisis in winter, the EU, led by European Commission Vice-President Günther Oettinger, intervened decisively to broker a “winter package” between Moscow and Kyiv. Even so, economic assistance remains stalled for understandable reasons, as the new government has yet to devise a coherent reform plan to clean up the mess left by Viktor Yanukovych. Political progress in Ukraine now seems more possible than before, but ten years of failure should make us aware of the difficulties – of which the state of the economy is the gravest and most immediate.
The picture elsewhere in the region is highly contradictory. It is increasingly clear that the six countries of the Eastern Partnership are moving in different directions at different speeds, thanks to pressure from Moscow and their own internal weaknesses. Moldova’s pro-European parties narrowly won the elections in November 2014. Azerbaijan used the regional crisis as an excuse to crack down hard on local civil society. Armenia began to have second thoughts about joining Russia’s Eurasian Union, which launched in January 2015, but its need for Russia’s security umbrella eventually trumped economic doubts. Belarus demanded a high price for continuing with the Eurasian Union project. Georgia continued to fritter away the fruits of the radical reforms of the Saakashvili era (2004–2013). Aside from expediting the Association Agreement signing, the EU has not been very proactive, but has in the end united to support the “European Choice” where it is still being made. That said, if Russia retaliates against Moldova or Georgia as extremely as it did against Ukraine, it is unclear what kind of support the EU or member states are prepared to offer.
In the Western Balkans, meanwhile, European policy was a mix of continuity, rollbacks, and attempts at re-engagement. In a fractious EU political context, the prospect of enlargement was on life support. Progress in the Balkans was hamstrung by spillovers from the Ukraine crisis and by widespread perceptions of EU disengagement (with the new Commission leadership declaring that no Western Balkans country will be joining the EU in the next five years). There was some backsliding, even in candidate countries. Still, in the final stretch of the year, European powers attempted re-engagement, led by Germany, which convened a regional conference and tabled, with the UK, a proposal to stem Bosnia’s downward trend.
The year 2014 was also tumultuous for the EU’s relations with Turkey. While the member states were united in their concern over Ankara’s anti-democratic tendencies, they were divided on how to address it and they found themselves with limited leverage. Neither were they in agreement on their approach to Turkey in the context of the Syria crisis, particularly on the question of regime change. Some progress was made on addressing the refugee crisis and the problem of foreign fighters travelling through Turkey, but not enough to meet either side’s needs. Perhaps most worryingly, Ankara did not cooperate with European sanctions against Russia, instead stepping in to profit from the void opened up by EU companies’ retreat and Moscow’s counter-sanctions. With seemingly intractable blocks on the Turkish accession process, Europe finds itself with little leverage over Ankara, but with no appetite to adapt its policy goals to the new environment. This weakness is not helped by the turmoil in Turkey’s neighbourhood.
There is little sign that any of these tensions will lessen in 2015. Thus, much like the past year, 2015 will be a year in which wider Europe will be the central testing ground for EU foreign policy. From armed conflict in the Donbas to economic reform in Kyiv, from Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries to ongoing challenges to reform in the Western Balkans and Turkey, all this will test Europe’s cohesion, its commitment to its values, and its ability to multitask.
