While Europeans have in the past focused on China, they are also increasingly seeking to strengthen relations with other countries in Asia, some of which are at the same time making efforts to engage Europe. In March 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Brussels for the first time – a “historic” first, in the sense that dealing with the EU was formerly the domain of the Chinese prime minister. But Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (who has visited eight EU member states since his return to power in December 2013) and Korean President Park Geun-hye (who has visited six European countries since her election in February 2013) also made stops in Brussels this year. And the EU continued the negotiation of a free trade pact with Japan.
Nonetheless, relations with China, particularly those concerning investment, still dominated. The results were underwhelming, perhaps because the European Commission, which the previous year had set the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda, was something of a lame duck. Several high-level meetings took place: three high-level dialogues, three rounds of negotiations of a BIT, and even, in the final days of the year, a very discreet human rights meeting.
But it was Europeans that made concessions – for instance, the EU dropped its anti-dumping enquiry into Chinese telecom firms. No EU member state government met the Dalai Lama in 2014.
Most member states’ governments focused above all on Chinese investment. A few years ago, there was a division in Europe between a mercantilist and a liberal approach to trade with China. But today, member states are simply competing for Chinese investment and for a share of the market in offshore RMB trading. There seems to be little coordination, which could hamper the negotiation of the BIT. Not much was done to defend European companies in the context of a deteriorating business environment in China for foreign firms. A number of EU companies were the targets of anti-monopoly investigations by the NDRC, some of which were deemed discriminatory by the EU Chamber of Commerce. The new European Commission should also pay attention to the future opening of China’s rapidly growing service sector and of key public markets such as telecoms.
There are a number of other issues for Europeans. How much will the “16+1” summit between Central and Eastern European countries and China, and subsequent investment moves, actually confirm or undermine EU rules?How vocal are the 16+1 in addressing the Ukraine crisis? But the “race to the bottom” is by no means limited to these countries. EU member states have been quite outspoken and united about human rights situations in North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Thailand. But they have been clearly unwilling to raise human rights issues with – or to criticise – China. Thus, reactions to the life sentence for Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti and to the more general crackdown on dissenting voices have been limited. Most EU member states have relied on the EU to deal with human rights issues, with Germany and a dwindling number of Northern European countries notable exceptions.
China’s economic weight has also influenced the EU’s reaction to increasing tensions in the East and South China Seas in 2014. As China continued its assertive approach in its neighbourhood, some countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines looked for US and EU support. But, seeing little upside to involvement on the issue, EU member states restricted themselves to advocating peaceful resolution of disputes within the framework of international law. The exception was a rare comment in favour of Vietnam in the context of the oil rig incident with China in the spring of 2014. Given the arms sales to Asian countries by some member states (in particular, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK), an earlier joint statement by the EU High Representative and the US Secretary of State, and the EU-Japan summit in December 2013, the EU might be missing a chance to use its experience and positioning to defuse tensions. Instead, it has insisted repeatedly on the necessity for ASEAN to take a more central role in the dispute resolution.
Conversely, the EU did not obtain much from China in exchange for its informal “neutrality” on Asian issues. China’s reaction to the deteriorating situation in the Middle East was limited: it acknowledged the threat posed by ISIS but ruled out engagement. Despite the EU’s unity on Ukraine, it was unable to cajole China into showing greater support: China sided with neither Russia nor the EU, abstained in votes on Ukraine at the UN, and took advantage of sanctions against Russia to conclude major economic and energy agreements with it, notably a $400 billion gas deal. On the other hand, the EU had slightly more success in engaging China on climate change, especially in preparation for the 2015 COP21 conference in Paris – maybe as a result of increased environmental difficulties and concerns within China.
There was a mixed picture in the EU’s relations with the rest of Asia. Interesting though unpublicised developments took place in relations with Vietnam and South Korea – for example, an agreement with South Korea on joint action in managing global security crises and participation in peacekeeping. Europeans had an open attitude towards India’s Narendra Modi before the general election in May, but were less visibly active than China, Japan, and the US in developing good relations with him after he became prime minister. Free trade negotiations with India remained frozen and no high-level meetings were held between India and the EU.
Relations between the EU and Pakistan continued based on the Five-Year Engagement Plan agreed in 2010. The two parties held a number of high-level meetings in 2014 and the EU remains Pakistan’s main trading partner and aid donor. Pakistan was granted the GSP+ status by the EU – the first formal channel for the two partners to discuss human rights issues.
