For much of the last few years, European leaders have been happier providing a running commentary on the failings of the Bush administration than taking responsibility for global problems themselves. Barack Obama's election brings that era to a decisive close. When he arrives in Europe for his first trip as president, European publics will line the streets, while their leaders queue for photo-ops. But Obama’s visit will also pose a profound challenge to the comfortable introversion of many European governments.
Many pundits have predicted a crisis of expectations. No matter how liberal Obama’s administration will be – it will still be more impatient, more focused on national security, and more willing to use military force than its European partners. But tensions are as likely to be driven by the relative ambitions of the two blocs as by any differences in ideology.
The biggest shock to Europeans will be the discovery that the natural corollary of Obama’s determination to break with Bush’s unilateralism is a desire for tangible assistance from Europeans.
Obama famously wants to shift resources from the ‘bad’ war in Iraq to the good one in Afghanistan. But, no matter how much European governments try to manage down expectations on what they can deliver, he is unlikely to be satisfied with a re-badging of existing commitments. If Europe remains unwilling to make the necessary military contribution to ISAF – and the US becomes forced to “surge” unilaterally, as it did in Iraq – an Obama administration could conclude that Europeans have little to offer as a war-fighting support.
On Iran, the EU is delighted that Obama has signalled a willingness to engage with the mullahs, but they will also need to contemplate much tougher sanctions if diplomatic overtures fail to deliver.
Europeans are asking Obama to begin his presidency with a push for peace in the Middle East rather than waiting till the end of his term. But are they ready – or even able - to supply the blood and treasure needed to be a “co-sponsor” of a deal.
On issue after issue – from Darfur to climate change – Obama will expose the gulf between European rhetoric and capability. Even when it comes to closing Guantanamo Bay, Europeans will be called on to absorb those detainees – around 50 - that the US would like to release, but who cannot be returned to their home countries because they would be likely to be tortured.
When Warren Christopher made his first trip to the Balkans as Secretary of State for President Clinton, he asked European leaders what their vision was for the Balkans. He was not prepared for the awkward silence that followed. The French Presidency has worked hard to ensure that Obama’s envoy has a less shakey start. European foreign ministers have agreed on a letter to the new president of the United States that sets out four shared European priorities. But media reports suggest that the issues they have chosen – and the meagre resources they have put on the table – are more likely to lead to a crisis of expectations than a trans-Atlantic honeymoon.
European leaders have just 72 days between the election and the inauguration to close the gap between rhetoric and reality; to work out what they want to do in the world, and what resources they are willing to commit. It is vital to start a structured process now - amongst Europeans - so that the EU can approach the incoming administration with a shared plan of action – backed by European commitments – rather than a shopping list of complaints.
In a series of articles over the next few weeks, ECFR fellows will suggest areas that the EU should focus on. We will end by setting out some ideas on how European leaders could re-wire the institutions of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
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2 Comments
Mark and Daniel:
Surely Obama’s most important task will be to manage the political tensions involved in the inevitable loss of US Hyper-Power aspirations. The relative decline in US economic, political and military power is irreversible. But Obama can lay the basis for a far healthier transition to a constructive American committment to building a multi-lateral system of global governance. As far ahead as it is sensible to try and see, the shift in global economic, political and military power to the east will continue. The big challenge in the US is to manage this decline in ways that minimise any bitter internal backlash from the right.
Obama’s rhetoric is very encouraging in this respect. But there do appear to be limits to his “new realism” - as witness his apparent belief that some kind of NATO coordinated “surge” will transform the prospects for “victory” in Afghanistan. Far better that Obama and the EU coordinate the already existing dialogues taking place with some of the Taliban elements both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Obama does seems to understand the need for serious negotiations with Iran. Alas his reluctance to break with the Bush Administration’s unquestioning support for Israel diminishes the prospects of a breakthrough in this crucial area.
EU foreign ministers meeting in Marseilles last week appear to have agreed a reasonable framework for future political cooperation with the US which will require Washington to accept a stronger leadership role for the Europeans. But, as you rightly say, this will add to the pressures on the EU to deliver what it promises.
John,
Although you are correct that recent years have shown a dramatic shift in the political power base to your side of the Atlantic, I think it is quite a stretch to suggest that the EU will become any sort of military leader any time soon. The EU’s Common Foriegn and Secirty Policy has laid out such a massive beauracracy that it is amazing they can get anything done (e.g. the complete failure to generate any sort of concensus on Iraq). Furthermore, the EU is still decades behind the US in military hard power, evidenced by the fact that all 27 EU nations combined only spend about 40% of what the US does on National Defense.
Ultimately, I think we can and should see a NATO led “surge” in Afghanistan led by the US military, who are experts in this sort of warfare and have simply been overburdened by having to fight in Iraq simultaneously.