

LAW OF DUTY: THE CASE FOR A US-INSPIRED EU PREPAREDNESS ACT

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SUMMARY

- Europe faces an era of geopolitical uncertainty, demanding a stronger response to security threats. Increased defence spending is essential but not enough. To be truly prepared, the EU needs a whole-of-society approach.
- An EU Preparedness Act, partly inspired by the US Defense Production Act (DPA), would empower the EU to mobilise industrial capacity, protect critical infrastructure, safeguard supply chains and ensure access to raw materials during crises.
- Current EU emergency tools fall far short of the scope of the DPA because they lack the command-and-control authority needed to address systemic disruptions.
- While the DPA cannot be replicated wholesale, some of its provisions could be adapted to the EU legal context.
- The adoption of an EU Preparedness Act finds legal basis in existing treaty provisions and adheres to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.

Power, preparedness and peace

Si vis pacem, para bellum [If you want peace, prepare for war]

The French statesman Jean Monnet, credited by John Maynard Keynes with shortening the second world war by at least a year, was not a military strategist and never set foot on a battlefield. Yet, his commercial and financial expertise, international connections and efforts to coordinate Allied economies and ramp up American industrial production proved decisive in the Allies' victory over the Third Reich.

His contributions show that wars are not won solely on the battlefield but also through economic planning, preparation and prowess. A strong and well-equipped army is indispensable, but military success depends on many other factors, including financial resources, manufacturing capacity, access to raw materials, infrastructure, energy security and logistics. Achieving victory—or, better yet, preventing conflict—requires a whole-of-society approach.

The EU is not currently at war. However, as NATO secretary general Mark Rutte and others have observed, it is not living in peacetime either. This “grey zone” demands readiness for what may come. In a November 2024 policy brief for ECFR, Laurence Boone and Nicu Popescu outlined actions the EU should take to navigate a world between war and peace. One of its key recommendations was the adoption of a European Defence Production Act, modelled on the US Defense Production Act (DPA) of the 1950s.

This policy brief examines that proposal in detail, analysing the US law and identifying mechanisms that could be adapted for the European context. It explores the extraordinary powers the act grants the US president and the role these powers play in the management of crises—whether armed conflict, major disruptions or natural disasters.

The objective of the brief is to evaluate the necessity, value and feasibility of such measures within the EU’s legal and institutional framework. This includes identifying regulatory gaps or shortcomings that an EU act could address, and examining the legal implications of granting such extraordinary powers to European institutions under EU law.

The US Defense Production Act

The DPA grants the US president broad authority to direct domestic industry in support of national defence and emergency preparedness. Enacted during the Korean War, it has since been amended and reauthorised multiple times to ensure the availability of critical materials, services and facilities for national security and crisis response.

The US has invoked the act in a range of circumstances, and the extraordinary powers established therein have proven crucial to deal with wars, disasters and health crises. Recently, it was used during the covid-19 pandemic to ramp up production of medical supplies such as ventilators and vaccines. It has also been employed to address semiconductor shortages, bolster energy supplies, secure critical mineral supply chains, and even increase the production of fire hoses to fight wildfires and baby formula to prevent shortages.

At the heart of the DPA is Title I, which allows the federal government to prioritise contracts, redirect production and allocate resources for critical industries. It can mandate stockpiling and prevent hoarding of scarce materials to ensure the rapid production and delivery of essential goods, including military equipment, medical supplies and energy infrastructure components. This means businesses can be legally required to fulfil government contracts before private ones when national security is at stake. Historically, these powers have been used to expand munitions and defence production in wartime and, more recently, to bolster energy security by prioritising materials for critical infrastructure.

Title III of the DPA grants the government the authority to expand industrial capacity. This enables federal authorities to invest directly in key industries through loans, grants and procurement, ensuring that critical technologies and materials remain available. For instance, the Biden administration used Title III to boost domestic manufacturing of semiconductors under the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, aiming to reduce reliance on foreign microchips. The same mechanisms have been deployed to strengthen battery supply chains and secure rare earth minerals, essential for both clean energy and defence.

Title VII of the DPA grants the government administrative and enforcement powers to ensure industry compliance and facilitate cooperation. It allows the government to direct companies to coordinate production efforts without violating antitrust laws. The executive branch is also granted broad investigative powers, meaning it can compel companies to disclose production capacity data, scrutinise foreign investment and acquisitions, and assess supply chain vulnerabilities. These mechanisms have become increasingly relevant as Washington seeks to identify and mitigate risks associated with over-reliance on foreign suppliers for critical technologies. The DPA has been used, for example, to restrict Chinese investment in sectors vital to national security.

Other provisions of the DPA, now repealed, authorised the federal government to requisition and seize private property, including materials, supplies, and industrial facilities needed for

defence. They included powers to fix prices and wages in order to curb inflation during wartime or economic crises, and measures to manage labour supply, including restrictions on strikes that could disrupt essential production. Over time, these functions were deemed excessive for peacetime use, leading to their repeal.

Although originally conceived as a wartime measure, the DPA has evolved into one of the most crucial tools in US economic statecraft. Its application now extends beyond the battlefield, shaping industries from pharmaceuticals to semiconductors. The DPA's ability to direct resources, incentivise production and coordinate private sector efforts is likely to become even more central in an era of uncertainty, crises and heightened geopolitical tensions.

Why an EU Preparedness Act

Like the US, the EU would benefit from a comprehensive legal framework to ensure the resilience of its supply chains, strategic industries and critical infrastructure. The war in Ukraine and escalating tensions with Russia, as well as Europe's excessive reliance on external suppliers for critical military and energy resources, have exposed serious vulnerabilities.

Some member states, like the Netherlands, are already taking steps to counter them. In 2024, the country proposed a Defence and Security-Related Industry Resilience Act that would introduce sector-specific foreign direct investment (FDI) screening, suitability certificates for Dutch firms bidding on foreign defence contracts and regulations to safeguard defence supply chains. It would also designate essential military suppliers as “services of general economic interest” and mandate the stockpiling of key goods.

Extraordinary instruments at the member state level, such as those in the Dutch bill, already have a basis in EU law. However, they are not sufficient to address threats that endanger the entire bloc. A harmonised EU-wide approach would promote greater consistency and a level playing field across the continent.

The European Commission's March 2025 white paper on European Defence Readiness pointed in this direction, asserting the need for increased regulatory harmonisation, focusing "both on rules and procedures that are specific to the defence sector, and on the impact on the defence industry of EU policies and regulations that are not defence-specific". The paper identifies the EU's Defence and Security Procurement Directive and the Defence Transfers Directive as legislation in need of review, and proposes the adoption of a Defence Omnibus Simplification Regulation.

These steps are important building blocks in the EU's broader strategy to strengthen its defence sector and take greater responsibility for its own security. However, they remain fragmented initiatives and do not equate to the direct economic intervention mechanisms established under the American DPA.

The EU needs a more comprehensive approach that mobilises all sectors of society to enhance civil and military preparedness. It cannot afford to rely solely on market forces or voluntary cooperation in a high-intensity conflict. The bloc requires a legal instrument that, when necessary, supersedes or permits deviation from certain general rules, equipping European institutions with the necessary authority to intervene in the economy, secure supply chains, prioritise military production and allocate critical resources in the event of war or a large-scale security crisis.

An EU Preparedness Act could serve as an encompassing solution to these challenges. The European Commission has already began discussing this possibility, as outlined in its March 2025 Preparedness Union Strategy which called to "assess the need and feasibility of an EU Preparedness Law to strengthen the resilience of the vital societal functions". Such a law could help ensure the effectiveness of the mutual assistance clauses outlined in Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in the event of armed aggression, and in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), should there be a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster (known as the "solidarity clause").

However, given the extraordinary scope and reach of the powers in question, any proposal will have to balance the need for increased resilience against the risks of centralisation, overreach and potential concerns over a commission "power grab". To strike the right balance, protect member state prerogatives and respect individual rights, specific safeguards may be needed.

A two-pronged analysis is useful to support and inform this discussion. The first element is an examination of existing EU instruments that were designed to handle emergencies, identifying their gaps, limitations and shortcomings. This analysis leads to the identification

of the potential added value of a new legal act. As the paper shows, current mechanisms offer some crisis response tools. But these lack the centralised authority, rapid deployment capabilities and binding commitments necessary for a genuine wartime preparedness strategy.

The second prong consists of an assessment of whether the powers and instruments outlined in the proposed EU Preparedness Act are compatible with the EU's legal and institutional framework—particularly whether they comply with EU constitutional principles such as conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.

Necessity and value

To assess the necessity and value of a new EU Preparedness Act, this section examines the powers granted under the American DPA and whether similar provisions already exist in EU legislation. Where applicable, it evaluates whether European law fully covers the possibilities outlined in the DPA and which adjustments could be made. It also seeks to identify any legal obstacles or limitations within the EU framework that might hinder the adoption of such measures.

Directing production

The DPA's key authority enables the US federal government to coercively prioritise contracts and direct the production of materials deemed essential for national defence, ensuring their availability during crises. A somewhat similar objective underpins the EU's 2024 Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act ([IMERA](#))—previously the Single Market Emergency Instrument, which was introduced in 2022 after the covid-19 pandemic to address future supply chain disruptions. This legislation allows the European Commission to ensure the continued flow of critical goods and services within the internal market during emergencies.

IMERA, which is set to take effect in May 2026, has two key modes: a “vigilance mode”, which enhances supply chain monitoring and transparency; and an “emergency mode”, which permits rapid intervention to maintain the free movement of goods, services and people. The regulation empowers the European Commission to coordinate crisis response measures, request information from businesses and, in extreme cases, determine the prioritisation of critical production.

However, IMERA's provisions are significantly weaker than those of the DPA. While the regulation allows the commission to prioritise the production of essential goods and expedite their placement on the market, these powers are only activated in the final stage, or

“emergency mode”—that is, as a last resort—and are contingent on voluntary cooperation from businesses. Priority determinations are conceived as requests, not commands. Which means that, unlike in the US, the EU cannot compel private companies to prioritise government contracts over private orders.

Moreover, IMERA was designed primarily to address pandemic-related supply chain disruptions rather than wartime or security crises. Its focus is to ensure the free movement of essential goods and services and not on the production of defence equipment needed to sustain a war effort.

Finally, IMERA’s approach to anticipation is limited to market monitoring and early warning systems. Preparation is only triggered when a disruption is detected, by activating “vigilance mode”, and the strongest intervention powers only kick in during “emergency mode,” when the crisis is already in full swing. In contrast, a dedicated EU Preparedness Act would operate proactively, ensuring the EU is ready to handle crises before they materialise.

The EU Preparedness Act could be used to amend IMERA, focusing on loosening the strict conditions and legal requirements that constrain its most effective powers, especially in the context of defence readiness. Such actions may affect fundamental rights, such as private property and economic freedom, and therefore must be undertaken with care, restraint and proportionality. However, given today’s security landscape, it is justifiable to relax IMERA’s current constraints to enable the EU to act pre-emptively.

Public funding for specific sectors

Another key provision in the DPA is its ability to empower the US government to fund industrial expansion through direct purchases, loans and subsidies, allowing strategic industries such as semiconductors, battery supply chains and defence manufacturing to grow without breaching competition laws.

In the EU, the Recovery and Resilience Facility—the €800bn initiative helping member states recover from the economic impact of the pandemic—could serve a similar function by backing businesses that produce critical supplies. However, this mechanism will expire next year. In April 2025, the commission also proposed raising up to €150bn through bonds to increase investment in Europe’s defence capabilities. On a much smaller scale, the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform, proposed in 2023, provides funding opportunities for the development of cutting-edge technology, particularly in the defence sector. The European Commission has also proposed a regulation to incentivise defence-related investments within the EU’s budget. Additionally, in March 2025 the European Investment Bank amended its

internal rules to expand eligibility for funding security and defence projects.

Nevertheless, any deployment of public funds must comply with Article 107 of the TFEU, which generally prohibits state aid unless an exemption is granted. That said, the Important Projects of Common European Interest mechanism provides a pathway for member states to subsidise large-scale industrial projects that serve strategic EU interests. Additionally, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission introduced the Temporary Crisis Framework to address the subsequent energy crisis and inflationary pressures. Since then, the framework has been amended multiple times, and in 2023, its scope was expanded to facilitate state aid for the energy transition.

This framework is temporary and subject to a set of sunset clauses (which, in the context of EU competition law, is absolutely warranted). But given the current geopolitical landscape and the EU's new focus on security and defence preparedness, it may be appropriate to reconsider this framework for public spending and adapt it to today's realities.

In any case, when it comes to the production of military equipment and the expansion of the defence industrial base, the role of subsidies is not as important as stable orders under long-term contracts.

Agreements with private companies

The DPA also enables the US government to enter into voluntary agreements and develop action plans with the private sector to strengthen national defence. Implementing a similar approach in the EU would require adjustments to comply with competition law. The European Commission already coordinates voluntary industrial agreements, as seen in joint vaccine procurement during the covid-19 pandemic. This experience later inspired the joint purchase of gas, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (adopted in 2023) and the future European Defence Industry Programme (announced in 2023). However, such measures must adhere to EU antitrust rules and are generally limited to pooling demand through competitive procurement, rather than the more extensive coordination allowed by the US model.

Disclosure of information and foreign investment screening

Finally, the DPA grants the US government broad investigatory powers, allowing it to compel companies to disclose information about their production capacity and supply chains, as well as screen foreign investments and acquisitions. In the EU, IMERA provides for similar information requests, but compliance is strictly voluntary. More stringent measures exist in

areas such as trade defence and in foreign direct investment screening under the EU FDI regulation.

These measures, linking economic development and security concerns, are high on the EU agenda. In June 2023, the European Commission and then foreign affairs chief Josep Borell presented a comprehensive European Economic Security Strategy, later followed by a package of five concrete initiatives, one of which is a legislative proposal to strengthen foreign investment screening (and potentially expand it to outbound investments). Nevertheless, as seen in the Dutch bill, the present geopolitical tensions may justify additional sector-specific screening measures, particularly for defence.

Building true power

While the EU lacks a direct equivalent to the US DPA, it has developed a range of market intervention tools that address similar concerns. However, the European Commission itself recognises that “experience has highlighted a number of shortcomings in the EU preparedness framework”, which is “mostly reactive”, “fragmented across different institutions, services and agencies”, and has “limits of scale and resources”.

In short, the EU crisis management toolbox operates within a decentralised and legally constrained system, limiting its effectiveness compared with the broad executive powers granted under the DPA. Crucially, the commission lacks direct command-and-control authority over key industries, instead relying on regulatory frameworks and voluntary coordination.

This underscores the need for a new, special-purpose legal act to ensure that the European economy and society are equipped to withstand major crises. Such legislation should consolidate existing provisions and mechanisms, integrating the patchwork of emergency tools into a single coherent and robust framework. This would empower the EU with strong intervention capabilities and the agility to act swiftly in both preparing for and responding to unforeseen disruptions.

Of course, not all aspects of the US DPA can be transposed directly into the EU legal order—nor should they be. To start with, the US is a federal state, while the EU is not. The EU’s constitutional structure is based on a multi-level system that must respect the competences and prerogatives of individual member states. Nevertheless, in the face of serious security threats that imperil the entire continent, relying on 27 separate preparedness strategies would leave Europeans exposed. Strengthening the EU’s collective resilience demands a degree of central coordination to ensure that if one region is attacked, one

industry falters, or a critical raw material runs short, others can compensate. Referring to a 2024 report on the topic from former president of Finland, Sauli Niinistö (acting then as special adviser to the European Commission), the Preparedness Union Strategy recognises that “preparedness is not only a national responsibility but a shared European endeavour requiring a stronger role for the Union in coordinating and supporting Member States”.

Ultimately, while the EU cannot replicate the DPA model wholesale, it could introduce elements of it into the European legal system, particularly in areas in which the EU is already advancing strategic autonomy—such as defence, semiconductors and energy security. In times of conflict, the EU needs the authority to coordinate industry-wide production efforts, safeguard European manufacturing capacity, ensure access to raw materials and oversee the regular flow of critical supply chains.

The key challenge lies in balancing economic sovereignty with market principles and ensuring that any new powers granted to EU institutions do not undermine the fundamental structure of the single market and competition law. Ultimately, the goal should not be to shift towards a fully-fledged war economy, but to complement and reinforce the market economy with a suite of instruments that enable the EU to face security threats and respond to emergencies. Without such strong mechanisms, Europe risks being caught unprepared in a major conflict, unable to sustain its defence efforts due to fragmented policies and slow bureaucratic processes.

Overcoming the limitations of the current crisis management toolbox requires more than a set of emergency instruments. It demands real authority, enabling the EU to act decisively under extraordinary circumstances. The most effective way to achieve this is through the adoption of an EU Preparedness Act, which would not only enhance security but also send a clear message to allies and adversaries alike that Europe is ready to defend itself with a fully mobilised and resilient industrial base.

Additional elements for the EU Preparedness Act

In addition to powers similar to those envisaged by the US DPA, the EU should incorporate several other measures into a EU Preparedness Act to enhance the bloc’s resilience. Without being exhaustive, here are a few key proposals:

Reform defence procurement rules

The goal is to ensure that, in addition to increasing defence spending, member states also

spend more efficiently. This means at least three things:

- Buying jointly—to achieve economies of scale and lower costs.
- Buying the same things—to ensure interoperability among European armies.
- Buying European—to strengthen European industries, reduce dependencies and enhance strategic autonomy.

Simplify defence processes

This involves harmonising and mutually recognising national certification processes for the production, transfer and sale of military equipment. Such measures would lay the groundwork for gradually establishing a single market for defence, as outlined in the [Letta report](#) and the commission's white paper on European Defence Readiness.

Expand the critical infrastructure resilience framework

The relevant legislation includes the Critical Entities Resilience Directive, the Network and Information Systems Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act and the Digital Operational Resilience Act. They should be expanded to include the defence industrial base and account for potential armed aggression, as suggested in the Niinistö report.

Strengthen the EU Civil Protection Mechanism

This proposal, put forth by the Preparedness Union Strategy, should be implemented through the development of a structured methodology for civil emergency planning (known as “[resilience framework](#)” in the NATO context). It could also incorporate lessons from the energy crisis that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, potentially integrating some of the [emergency measures](#) adopted then into a more stable and predictable framework.

Upgrade stockpiling practices

The approach should extend beyond the existing European reserve of disaster response capabilities (known as [RescEU](#)) and establish strategic reserves of critical goods and defence industrial readiness pools. This aligns with Niinistö’s recommendations and the Preparedness Union Strategy, and should be accompanied by measures to prevent and penalise the hoarding of critical materials and equipment.

Enhance military mobility

Infrastructure improvements should be a priority, particularly those that can serve both civilian and military needs.

Legal feasibility

The EU must examine the EU Preparedness Act for compatibility with the core EU constitutional principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality, which define the legitimacy and legal limits of EU action.

This paper confirms that the EU has the necessary competence to enact such legislation; that EU-level action is justified given the transnational nature of modern security threats; and that the proposed measures, while extraordinary, are proportionate to the risks they seek to mitigate.

Conferral

Under Article 5(2) of the TEU, the principle of conferral dictates that the EU may only act within the powers conferred upon it by member states. The legal basis for an EU Preparedness Act must therefore be found within the TFEU. While defence remains primarily a national competence under Article 4(2) of the TEU, the EU holds significant authority in areas such as internal market regulation, crisis management, civil protection and industrial policy—providing a strong legal foundation for the proposed act.

A viable legal basis for such legislation is Article 114 TFEU, which allows the EU to adopt measures to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market. By ensuring the resilience of critical industries, supply chains and essential goods during a crisis, the EU Preparedness Act aligns closely with this objective. Precedents such as IMERA and the Critical Raw Materials Act, have shown that using Article 114 TFEU to address economic and security challenges with cross-border implications is feasible.

Additionally, Article 122 of the TFEU, which enables the European Council to adopt measures in response to severe supply disruptions and economic crises, offers further legal grounds for the EU Preparedness Act. This provision has previously been used to address energy supply crises and financial instability. Currently, it is being invoked to boost investments in the European defence sector through the SAFE instrument—demonstrating its suitability for economic and industrial interventions of the kind foreseen in the preparedness act.

This reasoning, however, may be challenged due to the permanent nature of the EU Preparedness Act. While Article 122 is intended to deal with temporary crises and economic and societal disruptions, the act would establish a permanent framework aimed at preventing security threats and ensuring the EU's readiness to face them.

Given the growing recognition of security as an economic imperative, Articles 173 and 207 TFEU—governing industrial policy and common commercial policy, respectively—could also serve as complementary legal bases. Together, these provisions empower the EU to act in key areas necessary for strengthening resilience and ensuring security readiness, particularly in response to geopolitical threats and economic disruptions affecting the internal market and strategic industries.

Subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) of the TEU, stipulates that the EU should only step in when certain objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states alone but can be more effectively realised at the union level. Given the scale and complexity of modern security threats—including hybrid warfare, economic coercion, cyberattacks and supply chain disruptions—national responses alone are inadequate. Coordinated EU action is essential to ensure preparedness and resilience across the continent.

A fragmented approach—where member states adopt divergent national preparedness measures—would lead to inefficiencies, regulatory inconsistencies and gaps in crisis response, ultimately perpetuating vulnerabilities. The transnational nature of supply chains, energy security and military mobility demands supranational coordination to prevent exploitation by hostile actors. Recent crises, such as the covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have underscored the necessity of a harmonised approach to economic and industrial readiness, rather than relying on individual national governments.

Moreover, the EU has the capacity to pool resources, provide financial support and establish uniform standards for crisis response—measures that are difficult to achieve through intergovernmental cooperation alone. By creating a structured legal framework for

preparedness, the EU can enhance the collective resilience of member states, ensuring the stability and security of the union as a whole.

Proportionality

Article 5(4) of the TEU enshrines the principle of proportionality, which requires that any action taken by the EU does not exceed what is necessary to achieve its objectives. Although the EU Preparedness Act would grant broad powers to coordinate and intervene in key economic and industrial sectors, it complies with this requirement as it is designed to address exceptional threats.

Security risks in the current geopolitical environment demand strong and proactive measures. The proposed powers, such as the ability to prioritise critical production, secure supply chains and coordinate industrial mobilisation, are not arbitrary or excessive but essential to strengthening the EU's strategic resilience.

While the act would introduce extraordinary measures, safeguards would be incorporated to ensure that such powers are exercised only when necessary, taking into account national realities and in full compliance with fundamental rights. Procedural requirements, member state involvement—particularly through the European Council, which plays a particularly prominent role during crises—and judicial oversight would ensure that both EU and national interests are fully respected and that any restrictions on private economic activity would remain justified, proportionate and temporary.

Considering these factors, the adoption of an EU Preparedness Act is not only legally feasible, but also fully justified under EU constitutional principles. As the EU navigates an era of heightened geopolitical instability, strengthening preparedness and resilience through a dedicated legal framework is both a strategic necessity and a legally sound course of action. The EU Preparedness Act would serve as a cornerstone of Europe's security architecture, reinforcing its capacity to safeguard economic and societal stability in the face of emerging crises.

Unbreakable Europe

Europe's security, resilience and autonomy are under relentless pressure from geopolitical instability, economic dependencies and systemic shocks. These challenges demand not only ambition but also the right legal and institutional tools. While recent efforts to reinforce the EU's defence capabilities are promising, they remain insufficient without a coherent legal

framework for preparedness.

The current legal architecture lacks the operational instruments for proactive, EU-wide crisis coordination. Fragmented mechanisms, ad hoc responses and reliance on voluntary private sector collaboration are inadequate to deal with structural threats. A more integrated approach is needed for timely action, legal certainty and efficient resource mobilisation.

An EU Preparedness Act would fill this gap. By consolidating and reinforcing existing tools and creating new powers for strategic sectors, it would be a permanent, structured framework for crisis response. It would promote manufacturing capacity, safeguard critical supply chains, support key technologies in strategic sectors, manage stockpiles and strengthen the EU's civil-military readiness—all within the boundaries of EU constitutional principles.

The legal basis is already there. What is needed now is the political will to activate it and the legal ingenuity to bring it to life. This is not about undermining member states' prerogatives but harnessing the powers of the treaties to deliver the scale, coordination and deterrence required to protect all Europeans. Without such action, the EU remains exposed to disruptions and dependent on reactive, fragmented and incoherent responses. In an uncertain world, a strong, legally grounded framework for preparedness is key to provide protection, stability and trust.

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