Colombia

Climate action

Mats Engström

Last year was the hottest year since records began, and by a long way. To Europeans, and the rest of the world, it is painfully clear that current climate commitments are not enough. Although there has been some progress in the United Nations climate convention and other multilateral settings, it is in the European Union’s key interest to do more to avoid damage at home and ensure security abroad.

Since the EU only contributes 7 per cent of global emissions, Europeans need to promote efforts in other parts of the world through stronger multilateral cooperation to have a meaningful impact. At the same time, Europe needs imports of critical raw materials and green hydrogen to achieve its own low-carbon transition. As such, the EU needs more alliances, particularly with low- and middle-income countries, to reduce emissions within its own borders and outside of them.

Last year’s UN climate conference (COP28) showed that Europe is still a global leader. In Dubai, EU negotiators forged a broad alliance to counter oil-producing states’ efforts to water down commitments – and countries such as Colombia and Chile were important partners in achieving this. European states are also active in coalitions of the willing. For example, France, together with Morocco, recently took the lead in the Breakthrough Agenda for the decarbonisation of buildings. Expanding partnerships with countries like Chile, Colombia, and Morocco will be crucial to achieving climate commitments within the current geoeconomic and geopolitical landscape.

However, leaders of richer states have failed to meet their promises of climate finance for the most vulnerable countries in time. And tensions over other issues such as access to vaccines, increasing debt in poorer countries, and the legacy of colonialism are making cooperation more difficult. The EU has also been criticised over some measures such as the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which many in the global south have criticised as ‘green protectionism’. Europe needs to close this trust gap between richer and poorer parts of the world to move the multilateral climate agenda forward.

Certainly, there is an awareness of climate risks in many parts of the world. This is true for several of the countries analysed here. Nigeria and the Philippines are, for example, among the countries most vulnerable to climate change. At the same time, for low- and middle- income countries, promoting economic development to reduce poverty and ‘catch up’ with OECD countries is often the most important priority. Without addressing such concerns, it is difficult for the EU to strengthen its partnerships

Another factor is China, by far the biggest emitter today and at the same time deeply involved in many parts of the global south through its Belt and Road Initiative, as well as other instruments. Current EU programmes such as Global Gateway are framed as providing an alternative for low- and middle-income countries, but it is unclear to what extent this will be successful. To close the trust gap and provide these countries with real alternatives to dependency on China, the EU should design more supportive and long-term offers for cooperation when it comes to low-carbon transitions and economic development.

In this respect, it is important Europeans listen to the needs of potential partners in the global south. Our research and interviews for the Multilateral Matchmaker showed a clear interest from Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstan for intensified cooperation on clean energy, green industrial development, and technology cooperation. There are also good reasons to deepen existing relationships with key countries in Latin America such as Chile and Colombia. Moreover, Mexico might, after the upcoming presidential election in the United States, once more become an important ‘bridge’ between richer and poorer countries: Mexico has historically played such a role in international environmental governance, and would likely be more interested in cooperation with the EU if somebody like Donald Trump pursues a confrontational line towards its trade partners.

Ultimately, climate change is an example of today’s strategic interdependencies, to which Europe is no exception. As such, it needs to improve its offer to the global south, both on ‘horizontal’ topics such as access to finance, support for infrastructure, and technology cooperation, and through individual measures in relation to each of the countries analysed here – for its own sake as much as its partners’.

By such efforts and skilful joint diplomacy between EU institutions and member state governments, European leaders can forge stronger alliances for upcoming climate negotiations. COP30, to be held in Brazil in 2025, will be particularly important as states are obliged to present revised national plans for climate action. In parallel, coalitions of the willing with good representation from the global south can build momentum for more far-reaching measures. In particular, intensified partnerships with the countries identified here can significantly contribute to such a crucial development.

Development

Anthony Dworkin

The global south has long been urging the rich world to change its approach to development cooperation. No issue has done more to erode trust in the West among many low- and middle-income countries, which feel that current financial arrangements are unfair and that the rich world, including Europe, has failed to meet its promises and obligations. European leaders say they have understood the global south’s concerns over the inequity of the system, which the covid-19 pandemic brought into sharp focus. For European policymakers, development efforts are a way to fight global challenges and reset relations with an increasingly influential group of countries, while promoting development in an inclusive, transparent, and sustainable way. Their challenge now is to work with low- and middle-income countries and emerging powers to shape a new vision of development cooperation that will cater to the aspirations of the global south while remaining true to Europeans’ interests and values.

The reform of the international financial system will be a dominant multilateral issue in 2024. Countries in the global south are looking to Europe as well as the rest of the rich world to make good on their pledges to deliver more funding for development and fighting climate change, as well as to move quicker on restructuring the debts burdening many low- and middle-income countries. However, global south countries want not only for promised funding to be delivered, but greater integration into capital markets and a larger role in shaping decisions about global financial structures. This aspiration was evident from their strong support for a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly to begin negotiations on a UN tax convention – a measure that most European countries opposed, because they wanted to keep discussions within the OECD.

Nevertheless, the European Union and its member states have embraced the principle of reforming the global financial architecture. French president Emmanuel Macron’s summit for a new global financial pact in June last year was a high-profile display of support for this agenda. But difficult negotiations lie ahead to reconcile the varied demands of global south countries with the steps that the EU is willing to take. In doing so, Europeans will need to carve out a new space away from the United States, which even under President Joe Biden is reluctant to cede any of the West’s leadership of international financial institutions. Reaching agreement with low- and middle-income countries is crucial for the EU to retain support for an integrated global system. Agreement will also be necessary to more effectively mobilise the financial resources needed to promote development and stability.

For these negotiations to progress without resentment, it is crucial to have genuine European engagement alongside constructive participation from influential countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The EU and its partners must reach a compromise on a range of measures, including making the governance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank more inclusive; creating a more effective debt resolution architecture; reforming the global tax system; and changing the business models of multilateral and public development banks to increase lending. The potential partners we have identified in the Multilateral Matchmaker could prove key to reaching such compromises. Notably, we have excluded Barbados, which already has a high profile on the issue, and instead focused on “untapped” countries. Some have played an active role in multilateral events such as Macron’s summit or the African Climate Summit. Others have shown their relevance by playing a leadership role in mobilising global south initiatives, even when European governments opposed them, as with Nigeria’s tabling of the global tax resolution. Other countries, such as Mexico, Indonesia, and Morocco have potential as bridge-builders between Europe and the wider global south, even if they are not currently playing this role.

We have also looked for countries that are aligned with the EU’s vision of development, as expressed in their commitment to implementing the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs), voting alignment on UN resolutions on development, or the quality of their development support. Chile, Colombia, Ghana, and the Philippines all scored highly for their governments’ commitment to the SDGs. At a time when development cooperation is becoming more competitive – as China and other emerging powers court the global south with their own partnership offers – it is important for Europeans to preserve a vision of cooperation based around human dignity and empowerment. For the EU to stay true to this vision without coming across as paternalistic, it will need to form new development partnerships with countries that share these ideals.

Finally, Europe’s success in rebuilding ties with the global south will depend on delivery. Our interlocutors for this project repeatedly stressed that Europe’s hopes of making an attractive offer to development partners are undercut by over-promising and by slow and burdensome processes. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative could be a valuable avenue for moving forward with a new, mutually advantageous form of cooperation, but it will need real resources put behind it, or it could instead deepen suspicions of Europeans’ insincerity.

Internet

Carla Hobbs

From socialising to banking, governing to protesting, the world’s dependency on the internet only seems to grow. At the same time, the internet is becoming more restricted, unfree, insecure, and inaccessible. Online shutdowns and AI-enabled censorship and surveillance are increasingly common and are worsening internet freedom, which fell for the 13^th consecutive year in 2023. Already dangerous misinformation and disinformation is now turbocharged by AI – a concerning trend for 2024 when over half the world’s population will head to the polls. Moreover, a significant increase in cyber-attacks undermines security, while the continuation of digital divides leaves 2.6 billion people unconnected. Not only are we far from enjoying open, free, secure, and accessible internet – we are moving further away from it.

This trend threatens the health of Europe’s economies and democracies, and endangers its citizens. To safeguard against this, the European Union favours a rights-based democratic model of technology development and has introduced a raft of regulation to protect the open internet at the domestic level. But against the heightened geopoliticisation of technology, this has proved only partly effective. Rather, greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation is needed to ensure the EU’s vision of an open and global internet prevails over competing authoritarian state and private market-driven approaches.

This has prompted the EU to sign a flurry of digital partnerships with third countries including Japan, Singapore, Canada, and South Korea; establish the first bi-regional Digital Alliance (with Latin America and the Caribbean); and create policy coordination mechanisms such as the EU’s Trade and Technology Councils with the United States and India. At the multilateral level, the EU has supported new initiatives ranging from the Declaration for the Future of Internet to the United Nations’ ongoing Global Digital Compact (GDC) process of which Sweden is a co-facilitator.

Such multilateral internet governance efforts are, however, notoriously complex. Until recently, Europeans and their fellow advocates of the open internet have favoured a multi-stakeholder model. But the global south largely perceives established forums and groups, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, to be dominated by elite Western interests. This risks fuelling the establishment of alternative governance systems, while states such as China deploy more aggressive means of defending their preferred, state-driven model. For such states, multilateral forums give them a stronger hand to advance their own goals due to the nature of the voting systems and reduced barriers to participation.

Despite these challenges, Europeans should engage in the multilateral system with all potential partners to ensure credible and legitimate decisions on internet governance are reached and to prevent a further splintering of approaches. To do so, the EU will need a broader coalition that goes beyond the usual suspects dominating Western-centric multi-stakeholder discussions. Instead, it should seek out partnerships with countries that sufficiently share a belief in an open, accessible, and secure internet, and that could encourage others to join a coalition in support of it.

The present Multilateral Matchmaker research revealed several countries the EU could collaborate with more on internet governance at the multilateral level. Of the 12 countries in our shortlist, Chile, Colombia, Kenya, the Philippines, and Mexico are especially well aligned with the EU and sufficiently relevant actors to merit greater cooperation on defending the open internet at a multilateral level.

The presence of several Latin American countries is perhaps unsurprising given it is a region dominated by democracies supportive of multilateralism and rights-based frameworks. However, while many of these countries are aligned with the EU, a lack of resources leads to significant connectivity gaps and digital divides. Similarly, inadequate funding and investment weakens internet security, with many Latin American countries dependent on Chinese technology and weak cyber-security frameworks. This keeps such countries frustratingly low in global value chains.

EU efforts to cooperate with these countries on internet governance should therefore cater first towards their domestic needs bilaterally, creating the necessary foundations for ambitious multilateral action. This holds for other countries such as Kenya which, though broadly supportive of multilateral efforts to develop common internet governance principles – as seen in its support for the GDC process – requires significant investment in meaningful connectivity, including through more infrastructure and enhanced digital skills.

In providing these countries with the tools they need at the bilateral level, the EU can empower such countries to influence internet governance debates at the global level. Fertile cooperation in multilateral forums could take the shape of coordinated action in the negotiations on the drafting of the GDC over the coming year, ahead of its launch at the Summit of the Future in September. The EU can also cooperate with others on standards at the UN’s International Telecommunication Union, among other possibilities. Only through joint multilateral action can the EU and its partners protect the safe and secure internet they rely on.

Security

Rafael Loss

The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, Iranian-backed Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and Russia’s hacking of Ukrainian satellite terminals have forced Europeans to refocus their attention on securing and governing two global commons of growing importance: the ocean and outer space. To create and sustain the required mechanisms to achieve this, multilateral security cooperation is key.

Two new EU strategies – the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy and the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence – take account of this urgency by prioritising new partnerships. For the European Union, achieving effective security governance through such multilateral mechanisms which detect, deter, and respond to transgressions could also help recoup some legitimacy lost as a result of slow or inadequate responses to security threats in Ukraine, the Red Sea, and elsewhere.

The March 2022 and February 2023 votes in the United Nations General Assembly, which demanded Russia’s immediate withdrawal from Ukraine, demonstrated that much of the world aligned with Europeans on their interpretation of the war’s aggressor and victim. Few, however, concluded that they should also impose sanctions on Russia or supply Ukraine with humanitarian or military aid.

Nevertheless, countries’ voting behaviour in the UN and other multilateral forums does indicate an openness to working with Europeans to develop and codify formal norms. There is also an appetite to find multilateral solutions for challenges, risks, and threats in these domains. For example, the adoption of the High Seas Treaty in mid-2023 closes some regulatory gaps in the UN’s ocean governance framework. But other gaps are still waiting to be addressed. Most UN states (including the European Union and its members) want to continue discussions on norms of responsible behaviour in space, despite hurdles from Russia and others blocking the outcome document of the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats (OEWG), for example.

Unsurprisingly, geography largely determines countries’ stakes and hence their involvement in ocean governance. Although many landlocked countries contribute to advancing maritime law, those with maritime borders tend to lead and resource multilateral initiatives, especially when their economies depend on maritime trade or when they are involved in maritime boundary disputes or conflicts. From our list of 12 countries, Chile, Ghana, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines scored particularly high. Experts and policymakers in these countries, however, were generally less concerned than the EU about threats to critical undersea infrastructure. Rather, illegal fishing, piracy, and other illicit activities at sea as well as the effects of climate change on marine ecosystems and coastlines topped their lists of national priorities. As such, the EU should consider becoming an observer in the 23-nation Indian Ocean Rim Association, while also encouraging current association members to deepen their engagement with the EU’s Shared Awareness and Deconfliction forum on counter-piracy best practices. Such maritime security cooperation aligns well with the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which aims to expand connectivity infrastructure in the Indian Ocean (and in the future could be extended into south-east Asia) with EU participation.

Alongside the EU, a greater number of countries and actors are claiming a stake in outer space governance, coinciding with the rapidly declining costs associated with accessing outer space and space-related services. Expert communities exist in many countries – this became evident in our interviews – but many governments in the global south are only now recognising the economic and societal benefits of a more structured and sustained engagement with space, such as space-based earth observation for agriculture and climate action. Many governments are also just realising the national security risks that come with neglecting this domain. In our list of 12 countries, the United Arab Emirates is the top scorer; Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are also paying increasing attention to space. These countries’ active engagement with the OEWG could provide a foundation for more robust bilateral, multilateral, and region-to-region cooperation with Europeans on outer space governance. Capacity building, data sharing for common space situational awareness, and exchange programmes for policy, legal, and technical experts working on space-related challenges, for example, would all help to ensure a more equal and inclusive debate on space governance between Europe and its global partners.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine led Europeans to recognise and begin to address their varied vulnerabilities in the space and maritime domains. Our interviews made clear that the EU’s priorities are not necessarily shared elsewhere. Nevertheless, new partners can help Europeans advance their interests and values for multilateral security governance in at least three ways.

Firstly, strong bilateral relationships can serve as a nucleus for testing new governance solutions and cooperation mechanisms (for example, for pushing back against Chinese maritime lawfare). At the same time, greater demonstrations of European investment can entice other regional players to join existing cooperation formats or deepen their own bilateral relationships with Europe. Secondly, the EU should engage more with regional organisations to give potential partners more political weight and thereby grant greater legitimacy to cooperating with the EU in the eyes of their populations. In particular, as south-east Asian countries move into and up the space value-chain, cooperating with the Europeans could foster regional integration and align visions on space governance between the EU and ASEAN. Finally, at the UN and other international forums, one country brings one vote; but some countries’ regional sway might bring others along to advance key initiatives in Europe’s interest.

Trade

Pawel Zerka

As the climate changes, so too should global trade. Europeans have long been defenders of the existing trading system, with the multilateral governance of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at its centre. At the same time, the European Union recognises that this system must reform if it is to be compatible with the need to decarbonise. Achieving this has become a high priority for European policymakers. But, when using trade policy to serve its ambitious climate agenda, the EU has at times risked undermining its multilateral credentials.

For example, the most prominent of the EU’s initiatives in the trade-plus-climate area, its carbon border adjustment mechanism – which will apply higher tariffs on carbon-intensive goods entering the bloc – is proving highly controversial among the countries of the global south (like India and South Africa). So too are recent directives on deforestation and corporate sustainability due diligence. The EU’s agricultural subsidies (which are seen by many countries, especially those in Africa, as unfair and hampering their economic growth) are also weakening its credibility when it seeks to discuss trade-plus-climate policies with others.

Still, unlike the United States – whose climate actions frequently clash with the rules of the WTO – the EU is at least trying to ensure that its climate-related trade instruments do not undermine multilateralism. The EU is also seeking to align the trade and climate regimes, an issue that the WTO has so far struggled to provide solutions to, despite some efforts. But the EU needs partners to jointly set out how to reconcile trade and climate policies, for instance, when it comes to carbon pricing and green subsidies.

The EU has already invested in building some stronger and more diverse coalitions. Alongside Ecuador, Kenya, and New Zealand, it co-sponsored the recently established Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate, which promisingly includes eight African states. But most countries are neither strongly aligned with the EU on trade-plus-climate matters; nor are they particularly relevant for reconciling these two agendas. The EU should therefore pay particular attention to countries that are either well aligned with the bloc on these matters, or that could be influential in addressing its trade-and-climate concerns, or both.

Among our list of “untapped” countries, Mexico, Morocco, and Colombia score particularly high in terms of their existing alignment with the EU on these matters. But so far, only Colombia is part of the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate, which is symptomatic of the others’ more limited involvement in these debates.

Conversely, countries that are the most relevant for tackling the trade-plus-climate challenge (such as South Africa, Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, and India) tend to be very weakly aligned with the EU on these issues, making them unlikely partners. However, there are promising exceptions – such as Kazakhstan and Malaysia (and Mozambique, which, due to lower scores in most other areas, did not make it to our final dozen) – whose involvement would not only make a significant difference to decarbonisation efforts but which also appear to be within the EU’s reach, given their reasonable alignment with the EU. And finally, there are countries like Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria, whose high relevance would justify efforts to seek closer cooperation, despite weak alignment.

The EU understands the relevance of building more inclusive partnerships. This is evident in its Global Gateway initiative on deforestation-free value chains, as well as its participation in Just Energy Transition Partnerships with Indonesia and South Africa.

But in its effort to build stronger partnerships, the EU will need to pursue more diverse strategies tailored to the country in question. Some countries – like Indonesia or Nigeria – may be suspicious of the EU’s climate plans but could be open to closer cooperation as long as it serves their development objectives (for instance, in terms of energy security, support for green industrial development, or access to the EU market). Others – like Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Kazakhstan – do not need to be convinced by the relevance of fighting climate change and defending an open trading system. But they do need the EU to prove its commitment to broader bilateral relations, if they are to become dedicated allies in overcoming the trade-plus-climate challenge.

Chile

Deeper partnerships between Chile and Europe could enable both to tackle global challenges, but the EU will have to make a competitive offer to contend with Chinese admirers

Carla Hobbs

Chile has long been heralded as Latin America’s success story. The country is characterised by strong macroeconomic stability, commitment to the rule of law, and robust democratic institutions. However, it also suffers from rampant inequality under its free-market economy. President Gabriel Boric, elected in 2021, promised to bury such neoliberal policies, but his government has faced several internal challenges in implementing its reform agenda.

Boric has nonetheless continued to project Chile at the regional and international level. In December, Chile and the European Union signed ambitious trade and political agreements, drawing to a close six years of negotiations, while earlier last year, the EU and Chile signed a memorandum of understanding on critical raw material supply chains.

Chile’s existing relations with the EU have strong potential to be strengthened. For example, Chile broke with Latin America’s strategic non-alignment, speaking out against Russian aggression in Ukraine. This is not to say, however, that Chile firmly aligns with the EU and United States. Its top trading partner is China and its ties with Beijing have only deepened in recent years, a trend US officials have voiced concerns over. Rather, Chile’s strategy has been to maintain equidistance, pragmatically engaging with both the US and China. Nonetheless Chilean interlocutors have expressed frustration at being squeezed between the US and China, citing when the US applied pressure on Santiago to cancel a contract to have passports produced by the Chinese company Aisino. Many also voiced a preference for working more closely with the EU as a “way out” or “third way”, highlighting Chile’s greater alignment with the EU in some areas and desire to offset China’s influence. However, some noted that “the EU just isn’t there”, or at least not in a meaningful way. In response, the EU needs to boost direct investments and achieve some quick victories to prove its commitment.

One such quick victory could be cooperating to maintain an open, free, secure, and accessible internet. Chile stands out for its strong advocacy of digital rights, which it has included in its draft constitutions, aligning significantly with the EU. It was also the first Latin American country to introduce data protection regulation, and has the highest internet and mobile connection penetration of the region. As such, the scope for cooperation at the multilateral level is significant.

To convince Chile of its commitment and value, the EU should properly leverage Global Gateway to support the country’s “last mile” connectivity efforts, making the internet accessible to geographically and socio-economically marginalised groups. The EU could also provide technical assistance to help Chile achieve data adequacy with the EU, opening the door to enhanced data flows. It can effectively leverage the recently signed critical raw materials agreement to support Chile in its efforts to capture more value from its trade and ascend global value chains. This would help Chile diversify away from China, which has deeply penetrated its digital architecture and supply chains.

Many of these critical raw materials are vital for the digital and green transitions. With regards to the latter, climate action is another fertile area. The EU and Chile have begun cooperation on green hydrogen, with the European Commission announcing a Team Europe Renewable Hydrogen Funding Platform to support Chile’s growing renewable hydrogen industry. The newly signed EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement has also established a framework for bilateral climate cooperation, with the first High Level Dialogue on Climate and Environment taking place in October 2023.

Chile is also a promising partner for the EU in the area of maritime security. Chile – with its long Pacific coastline – proactively monitors international fishing fleets against the backdrop of China’s extensive deep-sea fishing in the South Pacific. It is active in numerous multilateral maritime security initiatives, for instance, the Council of the International Maritime Organisation.

Finally, our research has also shown development to be a fertile area for enhancing cooperation. With a dual role as both beneficiary and provider of development assistance, Chile engages in strategic north-south, south-south, and south-global cooperation, giving it credibility as a global south actor that has progressed to high-income status. As a country that no longer receives official development assistance, it is active in so-called development in transition debates, and established a bilateral fund for development in transition with the EU to support the wider Latin American region. The EU should seek to build on such efforts, working with Chile to advance their shared solidarity-based vision of development. Yet as it works to scale up multilateral cooperation, the EU will once again need to show its credibility bilaterally, responding to Chile’s domestic needs and helping it achieve its own national development goals. As our interlocutors pointed out, even if the 2025 presidential election brings in a right-leaning president, public demands for greater equality cannot be ignored by a new government nor Chile’s new development model reneged upon. A successful transition from a neoliberal economy to a socialist democracy could position Chile as a new model for an internationalist welfare state in Latin America, free from the pernicious populism of many administrations in the region. But it will need Europeans’ support in navigating this transition.

Colombia’s multilateral and green credentials have made it an attractive partner for the EU. Yet there is ample scope for the EU to ramp up its cooperation in the areas of internet, trade, and development

Carla Hobbs

Bridging central and south America, Colombia is uniquely positioned for a closer partnership with Europe. Its history as a reliable partner, strong democratic institutions, and multilateralist convictions also make it well aligned with European values. For governments in Bogotá and the European capitals, maintaining an open internet, implementing a solidarity-based vision of development, and reconciling trade with climate goals should be considered key areas for deepening cooperation.

Colombia has long been active in multilateral forums and supports regional groupings such as the Andean Community and the Pacific Alliance. Historically one of the staunchest US allies in the region, cracks in the relationship are now emerging under left-wing president Gustavo Petro, who has begun strengthening ties with China, stressing their importance in an “increasingly multipolar world”. Petro has also somewhat distanced Colombia from the United States and the West more broadly by arguing “We are not with either side; we are for peace,” with regards to Ukraine and in vocally calling out the West’s “double standards” in the Gaza conflict.

Despite this, there is much room for Europeans to expand existing cooperation with Colombia on climate action and peacebuilding to other areas as well. For instance, Colombia’s government is committed to boosting domestic digital access, champions an open and secure internet, and has demonstrated interest in multilateral tech cooperation with the EU (such as by hosting the launch of the EU-Latin American and Caribbean Digital Alliance). The EU could extend this cooperation not only at the bi-regional level by spearheading implementation of the alliance, but in international debates and forums addressing internet governance.

For this partnership to prosper, the EU must provide Colombia and the wider Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region with viable alternatives to Chinese technology and investments, harnessing Global Gateway to compete with China’s Digital Silk Road. Though favouring an open, free, and secure internet, Colombia and others in the region risk being lost to China’s digital sphere of influence in the absence of other options.

Beyond cooperation on internet governance, the EU should work with Colombia to advocate an approach to international development with developing low- and middle-income countries that caters to their aspirations. Historically a net recipient of development cooperation primarily due to the intense armed conflict in the country, today Colombia plays a dual role, receiving assistance while also providing triangular and south-south cooperation to LAC countries and Africa. Colombia has also contributed to international development discussions, hosting, for instance, the 2023 Finance in Common summit, an innovative form of development cooperation which seeks to bring new actors together by connecting public development banks. Given this experience and profile, Colombia could make a strong LAC ally on development for the EU.

As for climate action, opportunities for collaboration with Colombia are already under exploration. For example, a 2021 EU-Colombia agreement featured an ambitious joint agenda on the environment, climate change, resilience, and biodiversity as one of five key priorities. EU climate cooperation with Colombia at the local level is also on the horizon, with Global Gateway funding to be channelled into initiatives such as greening Bogotá’s public transport. And multilateral cooperation on climate is under way, with Colombia and the EU strongly aligned at the United Nations climate conference last year, together pursuing progressive and ambitious action. Less explored, however, is how the EU and Colombia can work together to reconcile open trade with their climate goals. The government in Bogotá has introduced green industrial policies to transition its economy, including the pioneering development of a local green bond market, a national green taxonomy, and guidelines for green infrastructure projects. It has also applied carbon pricing mechanisms, with 80 per cent of revenue channelled towards an environmental fund. The latter measure in particular indicates a willingness on Colombia’s part to reconcile trade and climate goals, reinforced by its membership of the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate. Were Colombia and the EU to advance this agenda together at the international level, it would lend the EU greater credibility among global south countries distrustful of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism and other climate-related trade instruments.

Challenges undoubtedly remain to ramping up collaboration. These range from the governability difficulties faced by the current Colombian administration, which lacks a robust political coalition, to the EU’s underinvestment when compared to Chinese investment. The EU will need to ensure it not only invests in securing its relationship with this multilateral ally but scales it to maintain its attractiveness as a partner in the face of rising global challenges.

Ghana

Punching above its weight in multilateral forums, Ghana is an important sub-Saharan African partner. But Europeans need to work on their credibility by pursuing meaningful cooperation on development and security issues

Rafael Loss

Ghana’s strength in multilateral institutions and its leadership among the global south makes it a highly valuable partner for the European Union. While Nigeria tends to receive more attention than other countries in the region because of its size and economy, Ghana often punches above its weight in multilateral forums such as the United Nations – notably, Ghana’s Kofi Annan served as the first and so far only UN secretary-general from sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, the country has also been a leader in decolonisation, spearheading the non-aligned movement and advancing pan-African cooperation and integration, especially in west Africa under the Economic Community of West African States.

Ghana is also one of the freest, best-governed, and least fragile countries on the continent – scoring better than Nigeria and Kenya, the other two “untapped” sub-Saharan African partners. But, despite the adoption of an economic partnership agreement with the EU in 2016 and generally positive relations with the bloc and its member states, interlocutors described other players as more present in and important to Ghana: primarily the United States and China, but increasingly also Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. To keep this strategic partner, Europeans should embrace deeper cooperation, particularly on development and security governance.

In doing so, Europeans should look to build on existing EU development programmes which aim to boost Ghana’s inclusive growth, green transition, and agribusiness. In principle, these align well with President Nana Akufo-Addo’s “Ghana Beyond Aid” agenda. The Bank of Ghana is also among the few African financial institutions to have joined the World Bank’s Sustainable Banking and Finance Network, which advances sustainable development finance, financial market deepening, and stability. Ghana could thus be a valuable partner for the EU in greening international financial institutions, development cooperation, and debt relief.

Global Gateway serves as an organising framework for the EU’s engagement with Ghana. However, from our interlocutors’ perspectives, this has underdelivered. The 2022 EU-AU Summit raised expectations for a sea change in Europeans’ engagement with Ghana and other African partners, only for promised funds to be redirected to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion. Similarly, the EU long discouraged African partners from investing in fossil-fuel infrastructure, only to reverse its position when Europeans scrambled to diversify their energy imports away from Russia. The dent these caused in the EU’s credibility is yet to be repaired.

To work on its credibility issues, the EU should pursue deeper and more committed cooperation with Ghana. A good place to start is security cooperation, where Ghana is a particularly relevant partner for Europe. While the country has largely been spared the violent extremism engulfing other west African countries, concerns about regional instability and forced displacement led Ghana, along with Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo to create the Accra Initiative. Headquartered in Ghana’s capital since 2017, the initiative aims to prevent the spillover of violent extremism from the Sahel. These threats also extend to the maritime domain. Instability and diminishing economic opportunities have caused a rise in piracy and narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea. Illegal fishing by Chinese trawlers operating off the coast of west Africa and rumours about a future Chinese naval presence in Equatorial Guinea have also resulted in Ghana bringing maritime security up its list of priorities and looking for new partners. EU countries have provided some financial support to regional maritime security initiatives and occasionally deployed military vessels to the region. But going forward, a more robust presence would be welcomed by Ghana and other countries along the Gulf of Guinea, particularly given that continued Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea are pushing companies to opt for the longer route around the southern tip of Africa and along west African shores.

Ghana is keen to deepen cooperation with the EU and European states in order to advance development and maritime security governance. In turn, Europeans should look to Accra – for its stake in these issues and longstanding leadership in regional and global governance – to find a multilateral ally with regional sway. But the EU must stop flip-flopping and repackaging funds under grandiose-sounding names if it wants to gain credibility as a serious partner for Ghana.

Indonesia

Despite ongoing trade disputes, Europeans cannot afford to overlook Indonesia’s economic and geopolitical weight. To get the ball rolling, the EU should pragmatically pursue climate and security cooperation

Rafael Loss

With a population of almost 278 million, Indonesia’s relevance as a European partner is hard to overlook. It is also south-east Asia’s largest economy, accounting for around one-third of the combined GDP of members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Despite this, it is only the European Union’s fifth largest trade and investment partner among the ten ASEAN countries. While negotiations for an economic partnership are ongoing, disputes over deforestation and nickel exports recently led a senior Indonesian official to accuse the EU of “regulatory imperialism”. Our interlocutors lamented the poor state of EU-Indonesian relations and did not expect their country’s general election this year to alter things. To work on overcoming this, the European Union should pursue pragmatic cooperation in areas with strong potential, namely climate and security.

It would be foolhardy of Europeans to approach their relationship to Indonesia with the goal of drawing the country into any kind of Western club – Indonesia is unlikely to divert from its traditional policy of non-alignment. But Indonesia’s strategic location, connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans, and its leadership in south-east Asian integration and south-south cooperation make it an important regional and global player, as evidenced by its effective steering of the G20 during the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With this in mind, selective engagement can advance both European and Indonesian interests and, by also working with Malaysia and the Philippines (the region’s other “untapped” partners), strengthen EU-ASEAN relations.

The EU and Indonesia already work together, but the relationship largely revolves around trade, overlooking climate and security as areas for partnership. Indeed, positive experiences in these areas may make up for the outsized effect that the trade deadlock – resulting from unresolved disputes over palm oil, deforestation, and the export ban on nickel – has on relations. And to resolve such disputes, the EU should invest in keeping not only the extraction, but also the processing and refinement of other minerals, cement, and steel in Indonesia so its economy can benefit. Europeans could also do so with an eye towards decarbonising these industries. Such an investment would set Europe apart from China, which dominates in nickel ore extraction and refinement in the country. Along with the EU-Indonesian-Malaysian task force on deforestation, this could also help to overcome reservations that exist among the Indonesian public, according to our interlocutors. It would provide reassurance that the export of raw materials to Europe can also boost Indonesia’s economy.

There is significant room for greater climate cooperation between the EU and Indonesia. As ASEAN works to move from a free-trade area to a single market, the EU should align its vision with the group on how to reconcile global trade with climate action. This could build significant momentum for worldwide reform. But with coal mining accounting for 3-4 per cent of Indonesia’s GDP, the green transition lacks economic appeal for many Indonesians. International financial support for existing green projects, including the Just Energy Transition Partnership, which has European participation, pales in comparison to the economic weight of the fossil-fuel sector. EU-Indonesian climate cooperation – possibly in concert with Japan and the United States, which also partner with Indonesia on this front – would thus need to develop a compelling narrative, mechanisms, and funding streams to build public support.

Through ASEAN, Indonesia cooperates with partners to combat Islamic extremist movements operating in the region as well as illicit maritime activities, such as illegal fishing and piracy. While Indonesia welcomes European support for these efforts and the occasional presence of various European navies in the region, the government in Jakarta views Australia, Japan, and the US as being more present and consequently more important to its security interests. For Europe, however, Indonesia could be an important partner in security forums and institutions – the country’s proactive, non-aligned diplomacy gives it a seat at many tables. In addition, the EU’s and Indonesia’s shared frustration that US-Chinese competition is obstructing security governance could open more doors for cooperation. For example, the EU has already backed Indonesia’s efforts to accelerate ASEAN-Chinese negotiations to develop a South China Sea Code of Conduct. Indonesia’s politics of non-alignment and disputes over trade rules and EU regulations have limited the potential for improving relations, and there is no easy way to resolve this. But for its population size, economic weight, strategic location, and political gravitas, Indonesia should be a priority target for European diplomats’ daily grind.

Kazakhstan

To fully unlock Kazakhstan’s potential for a closer trade and climate partnership, Europeans should recognise its role as a rising multilateral player

Pawel Zerka

Kazakhstan is the European Union’s closest economic and political partner in central Asia. For the past three decades, trade and investment have been the main glue in this relationship: on both fronts, the EU is Kazakhstan’s largest partner, purchasing, most notably, large quantities of its oil and uranium. But three events – the war in Ukraine, China’s rise, and the EU’s digital and climate ambitions – provide an opportunity for a much closer geoeconomic and geopolitical partnership, especially in the areas of climate and trade. In doing so, Europeans should keep in mind that the government in Astana has other options and will only work with the EU when it suits its interests.

The EU may find in Kazakhstan a reliable multilateralist. Since the 1990s, the country has been a vocal advocate of nuclear non-proliferation, for example. Its president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, is an outspoken supporter of multilateralism more broadly, having said that “there is simply no viable alternative to globalization, interdependence and the international rules-based order”. In recent years, Kazakhstan has shown an ambition to play an active international role – as evidenced by its participation in UN peacekeeping missions, its organisation of the Astana International Forum, and its hosting of the “Astana format” talks (involving Russia, Turkey, and Iran) as part of the Syrian peace process.

In particular, Kazakhstan is a promising partner on climate as it is especially vulnerable to a warming planet. It has already shown commitment by participating in the Global Methane Pledge. And thanks to the country’s vast sunny and windy areas, it is a prospective supplier of green energy, as well as rare earths.

For its part, Kazakhstan, fond of its multi-vector diplomacy, may find the EU a useful hedge against Russian influence and growing reliance on China, as well as a valuable source of investment and technologies. But the EU should not take this partnership for granted: several other players (like Turkey, the Gulf countries, and India) are also actively seeking closer relations. Still, mutual interest between the EU and Kazakhstan has grown recently and the EU should continue down this path. At the end of 2022, the two sides agreed to a strategic partnership on raw materials, batteries, and renewable hydrogen. Since then, European companies – Total and Svevind – have launched major green energy projects in Kazakhstan. High-level meetings have also intensified in the past year – including visits from the German and French presidents and the European Commission’s vice-president, while Kazakhstan is believed to be on the EU’s “priority country” shortlist for political re-engagement. The first EU-Central Asia Summit, at the heads-of-state level, is scheduled to take place this year in neighbouring Uzbekistan.

However, infrastructural gaps cast a shadow over this relationship, and this will grow especially if the EU focuses heavily on green energy supplies. Kazakhstan is seeking to expand a major connectivity project, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, to escape its reliance on Russian-controlled transit routes. The EU – alongside China, Turkey, and Azerbaijan – has demonstrated its interest in developing this project, as have the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Still, the progress of this project is far from certain. The EU should also turn to other areas in which it can nurture a closer partnership.

For example, the EU could help Kazakhstan build multilateral initiatives to boost central Asia’s water security, which is in part threatened by Afghanistan’s canal project. For now, France and Kazakhstan have agreed to co-chair this year’s One Water Summit, to be organised on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. But Kazakhstan may also welcome the EU’s support in hosting a Regional Climate Summit in 2026 under the auspices of the UN. Through such initiatives, the EU could help Astana strengthen its leadership position in central Asia, which is not yet widely accepted in the region.

For the sake of its partnership with Kazakhstan, the EU should not only focus on rare earths and green energy – but simultaneously recognise the country’s importance in supporting multilateralism more broadly, and show how it can help realise Astana’s ambitions too.

Kenya

Already a close Western ally, Kenya has the potential to serve as a catalyst for the EU’s relationship with the rest of Africa – notably on climate action and development policies

Pawel Zerka

As one of Africa’s most multilaterally active countries, Kenya is already a crucial partner for the European Union. Since gaining independence in 1963, Kenya has generally remained politically and economically close to the West. It became a host to several UN agencies, including the United Nations Environment Programme and its Human Settlements Programme. But all this has also contributed to Kenya’s reputation as Africa’s ‘Western darling’, placing limits on its influence among less Western-friendly governments in the region. Today, both the EU and Kenya have an interest in overcoming this reputation, particularly as Kenya has the potential to serve as a catalyst for the EU’s relationship with other parts of the continent. In doing so, the EU should pay close attention to climate and development policy cooperation.

Kenya’s president, William Ruto, is an outspoken supporter of climate action, largely aligning with the EU. He also seeks to challenge narratives that portray Africans as passive victims of climate change, and is active in international debates about the new vision of development. On his watch, Kenya organised the Africa Climate Summit, which – with its Nairobi Declaration – has sought to establish the continent’s unified voice. In doing so, Kenya has strong ambitions to be a voice for the global south, and for Africa, on global environmental issues. It is also the EU’s important ally in rethinking the climate-plus-trade nexus (alongside Ecuador and New Zealand, it co-leads the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate). Despite this, Kenya’s climate leadership still fails to convince some of the other key players in Africa – as demonstrated, for example, by the absence of South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola among the signatories of the Nairobi Declaration.

With several other players (China, the United States, Russia, India, Turkey, and the Gulf countries) competing for the attention and favours of African countries, the EU needs partners like Kenya which could help it show the region why aligning with Europe pays off. This could help it get other African countries on board with its multilateral initiatives. It would help Kenya’s standing among its neighbours if it shows that working with the EU benefits key African interests, particularly those related to development.

With its Global Gateway projects, for example, the EU has the opportunity to help Africa tackle its major connectivity issues while gaining better access to Africa’s natural resources, which it is interested in for the green and digital transition. Kenya is part of two such initiatives, aimed at modernising east Africa’s trade route and developing the Lobito corridor. But the EU’s rebranding in Africa requires these flagship projects to be completed successfully and with major European involvement.

In the meantime, there are additional ways the EU could nurture a closer relationship with Kenya – and, through it, with the African continent more broadly. For example, according to our interlocutors, it would open several doors if Europeans were ready to support the government in Nairobi to request a more prominent role for African countries in multilateral institutions. For instance, the EU should back an African seat at the UN Security Council and greater African representation in the World Bank and IMF – and be ready to confront the US on the latter if necessary. It would also help European and Kenyan interests if Kenya could be showcased as benefitting from close cooperation with the EU in terms of its access to finance and technology. This would demonstrate that the EU can serve as a hedge against growing Chinese influence in African countries, especially as China’s no strings attached approach is increasingly under question.

Malaysia

European relations with Malaysia remain strong, despite ongoing trade disputes. In the areas of internet governance and maritime security, the EU should further strengthen its ties, while working on resolving these disputes

Rafael Loss

With a population of around 33 million, Malaysia is considerably smaller than the other two south-east Asian countries in our list. Yet, its large economy – well above the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) average – makes it a particularly relevant partner for the European Union. The EU has pursued this in part, concluding a partnership and cooperation agreement in 2023. However, discussions on a free trade agreement have stalled since 2012, not least because of a dispute over palm oil and deforestation. Nevertheless, unlike Indonesia, our interlocutors said this has not soured European-Malaysian relations at large. As such, there is significant room to deepen the relationship, especially in areas such as trade, digital governance, and maritime security.

Most economic indicators paint a positive picture of EU-Malaysia relations. Malaysia is the EU’s third largest trading partner in ASEAN, ahead of Indonesia and the Philippines. In turn, the EU is Malaysia’s fourth largest trade partner and EU countries are among the top investors in Malaysia. Yet, the late adoption of the partnership and cooperation agreement – the EU signed such agreements with five other ASEAN members before concluding Malaysia’s – and ongoing struggles to adopt a free trade agreement, suggest that sustained attention will be required to realise its potential.

In 2023, the EU and Malaysia, together with Indonesia, created a joint task force to resolve the dispute over the EU’s deforestation regulation and improve common understanding of its supply chain traceability and transparency requirements. Resolving this dispute would not only advance negotiations with Malaysia (and Indonesia) towards a bilateral free trade agreement with the EU but could also lay the foundation for a future EU-ASEAN agreement (which was paused in 2009 to focus on bilateral trade agreements). An EU-ASEAN free trade agreement would boost trade between the two regions that are already each other’s third largest trading partners. Moreover, as the United States and China are both the EU’s and ASEAN’s top two trade partners, an EU-ASEAN agreement would also enhance their resilience to disruptions stemming from US-Chinese competition.

The partnership and cooperation agreement also seeks to advance cooperation on connectivity, cyber-security, and digital innovation. Almost half of Malaysians enrol in tertiary education, placing it third among ASEAN countries, and its per capita GDP is above the ASEAN average. Malaysia’s relatively affluent, highly educated, and digitally connected population make it a particularly well-suited south-east Asian partner to advance technology and connectivity governance solutions in the region. However, if the EU wishes to benefit from such a partnership, it will need to allocate more financial resources to its Global Gateway initiative, and make these resources more readily available.

Malaysia also serves as a hub for undersea fibre-optic cables in the region. Past accidents have illustrated the vulnerability of this form of infrastructure and the need to keep it secure. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea and rising Chinese belligerence could jeopardise plans to further expand undersea infrastructure and could undermine south-east Asia’s security, connectivity, and economic prospects. Recent European efforts to protect maritime infrastructure, such as obliging member states to carry out regular risk assessments, should incentivise EU-Malaysian cooperation in this domain. But as Malaysia’s ocean economy primarily depends on shipping, tourism, and fishing, combatting illicit activities in these more traditional areas of maritime security is still a bigger priority for Kuala Lumpur. But Malaysia is also welcoming EU technical and financial support for ASEAN’s various maritime security initiatives and collaboration in formats such as Enhancing Security Cooperation In and With Asia and Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific II. These could, in the future, provide a basis to cooperate on best practices to protect undersea critical infrastructure and to push back against China’s challenge to the law of the sea.

While there are real hurdles that complicate moving the EU-Malaysia relationship forward – the trade disputes in particular – once these are overcome (or genuinely worked out) Malaysia could become a key partner for Europeans in south-east Asia, especially considering its 2025 chairmanship of ASEAN.

Mexico

A manufacturing powerhouse, Mexico’s most important economic relationship is with the US. But increasing US-China competition may create space for the EU to boost its partnership with the country

Carla Hobbs

With the second-largest economy in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), institutional stability, and a proven commitment to multilateralism, Mexico is a partner the European Union should pay close attention to. The country’s most important relationship continues to be with the United States, underpinned by the historic 1994 north American free trade agreement (NAFTA). But this does not necessarily translate into geopolitical alignment. Mexico – like many LAC nations – instead tends to adopt a policy of non-interventionism and strategic non-alignment in global affairs. This has heightened under President López Obrador, who has pursued a largely insular foreign policy, focused more on domestic priorities with some intermittent interest in Peru and Venezuela.

Mexico’s slight retreat from the international arena should not dissuade the European Union. The country’s presidential election in 2024 may alter its foreign policy given Obrador cannot run again. Furthermore, according to interlocutors, Mexico remains an “anchor of stability” in LAC, a quality they argued sets it apart within the region and continues to make it an attractive ally for the EU. Should the Republican party win the 2024 elections in the US, Mexico may also seek to diversify its political relationships, opening space for the EU to become a more important partner, particularly in trade, climate, and development.

On trade, NAFTA helped turn Mexico into a modern manufacturing powerhouse. Today, it is the most open economy of the LAC region, boasting 14 trade agreements with 50 countries around the world and a manufacturing sector firmly embedded in the global value chain. This has enabled it to benefit from nearshoring efforts, overtaking China in 2023 to become the United States’ leading trade partner. It could similarly help the EU reduce its reliance on China and boost its strategic interdependence by exporting machinery, mineral products, and appliances to the EU. This could be facilitated by the ratification of the delayed EU-Mexico trade agreement. Here, the EU should seek to support Mexico in its reindustrialisation and in moving the country up global value chains, which is a key priority of the Mexican government.

Historically a champion of climate multilateralism, today, Mexico’s climate track-record is less positive. The country’s heavy reliance on fossil fuels has increased in recent years, as the Mexican government has prioritised economic development to reduce poverty over climate commitments. Reconciling Mexico’s significant trade openness with climate goals may be tricky. Going forward, the EU could help Mexico pursue a decarbonisation path by framing it as an economic opportunity given it will future-proof the country’s exports against climate-orientated trade instruments and enable it to compete in the green economy.

In leveraging its prominent trade profile, manufacturing know-how, and significant renewables potential, Mexico has the potential to spearhead a green transition at home and overseas. This has not gone unnoticed by Beijing, with three of China’s largest electric vehicle producers reported to be preparing to build factories just south of the US border. US officials have expressed concerns that these companies will use Mexico as a “back door” to access the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement (UMSCA). Mexico, cautious of upsetting the US, will likely tread carefully. As a more attractive alternative, the EU should not miss this opportunity to invest in electric vehicle production, among other manufacturing opportunities, allowing it to not only compete with China but also benefit from the United States’ inflation reduction act tax credits while accessing USMCA.

On development cooperation, Mexico has a unique position as a bridge between the global north and global south, bolstered by the credibility it enjoys in the latter. Europe and Mexico have already conducted triangular cooperation between the EU countries and Mexico, central America, and the Caribbean, which they can build on. Europeans may also benefit from Mexico facilitating engagement with central America and the Caribbean on development matters.

However, when attempting to boost cooperation on development at the multilateral level, the EU should also pay heed to Mexico’s domestic development agenda. Interlocutors argued that the EU must avoid imposing its own priorities on Mexico and recognise that the country’s key priority is currently to improve social welfare. Indeed, Mexico’s open and export-fuelled economy has not proved powerful enough to overcome structural deficiencies and inequalities, leaving many behind. This prompted the present Mexican government to focus on championing “a new paradigm of cooperation, with the aim of improving people’s welfare and development”. The EU should be mindful of this priority, not only aligning itself with Mexico in championing development at the multilateral level but simultaneously catering towards Mexico’s development needs in its bilateral outreach. In doing so, it will help lay the foundations for cooperation with Mexico on an array of global challenges and support its return to the international stage.

Morocco

An influential diplomatic power among the global south, Morocco is ideally positioned to be a valuable European partner, particularly on climate, internet governance, and development

Anthony Dworkin

Morocco is an established bilateral partner of the European Union, and of Spain and France in particular, but it is also becoming an increasingly ambitious multilateral actor. Its hosting of the 2023 meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund showed Morocco’s commitment to establish itself as a leading participant in international institutions. It is an active and energetic diplomatic power with longstanding ties to the West, but also promotes itself as an influential force in Africa and the global south more broadly. As such, Morocco is ideally positioned to be a valuable multilateral partner with Europe, particularly on climate, internet governance, and development.

Among the countries of North Africa, Morocco has gone furthest to pursue green and digital transitions, to diversify its economy and to integrate itself into global industrial trade. In contrast to its neighbour and rival Algeria, Morocco has limited hydrocarbon resources, but it does have ample potential for renewable energy. The government has launched a plethora of national strategies to advance its energy transition, including a strategy for sustainable development and a climate change plan mapping policies through to 2030. Renewable energy accounts for 38 per cent of Morocco’s electrical capacity. In multilateral climate negotiations, it co-leads the Buildings Breakthrough initiative with France and recently joined an international campaign to phase out coal. Its role as an influential African country that has embraced international cooperation on climate change makes it a promising partner for the EU.

Morocco has the highest level of internet use in Africa and is also one of the highest-scoring African countries in the Global Innovation Index behind only Mauritius and South Africa. It recently launched a national commission for digital development and has invested significantly in the digitisation of public services. It has also shown commitment to trade liberalisation and negotiations, including through trade and investment agreements with the EU, United States, Turkey, and North African countries, and through involvement in the development of the African Continental Free Trade Area. In all these areas, there is scope for Morocco to become more active in multilateral forums, where it would be likely to adopt positions broadly compatible with European views, supporting openness and climate action.

However, the Moroccan government still faces a domestic challenge to deliver on the ambitious agenda it has set out. Its infrastructure needs to be further developed and regulatory barriers to competition removed, according to a World Bank report. For the country to deliver on its reforms to address unemployment, lack of skills, and the low participation of women in the workforce, as set out in the country’s new development model, the EU should equip Morocco through targeted investment and projects, and provide a solid platform for international engagement.

Morocco’s complicated relations with sub-Saharan African countries may limit its capacity for diplomatic cooperation. Morocco has been active in the African Union since it rejoined the organisation in 2017, but some countries led by South Africa continue to oppose Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara and support the claim to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. Morocco’s position on Western Sahara could also threaten its trade relations with Europe, if the European Court of Justice decides in a forthcoming judgment that the territory cannot be included in trade and fisheries agreements between Morocco and the EU without Sahrawi consent. Morocco is also thought to operate a sophisticated system of surveillance over internet users and has pressured journalists who write on sensitive subjects. Morocco is a promising partner, ambitious to increase its international role, but it also remains a complicated one in some respects. In working with Morocco, the EU should focus on the areas where there are common interests and avoid positions or initiatives that undermine its commitment to human rights and the rule of law.

Nigeria

Nigeria’s emergence as a significant international player warrants closer European engagement. But for such cooperation to succeed, the EU still needs to demonstrate its usefulness as Nigeria’s partner

Pawel Zerka

Nigeria is a major emerging power. It is currently the world’s sixth most populated country – and the United Nations projects that, by 2050, its population will grow to third place, on par with the United States, behind only India and China. Nigeria is also active in multilateral forums, especially on development issues. It led an initiative to bring international tax cooperation to the UN and is the largest contributor to the African Development Bank. A Nigerian economist heads that bank, as is the case with the World Trade Organisation, led by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala since 2021. It is also a dominant economic player in west Africa, where it leads integration efforts through the Economic Community of West African States.

At the same time, Nigeria is a promising partner for the European Union because of its diplomatic non-alignment. Over the past decades, Nigeria has favoured the G20 as a forum for its international activity. It has also tried to avoid getting involved in geopolitical rivalries, lest it should jeopardise its efforts to secure financing for its massive development needs. The country has taken a neutral position in response to the war in Ukraine, and it is not part of any alliance – although its government is currently seeking to enter the extended BRICS, taking advantage of a place vacated by Argentina. With over half of its population identifying as Muslim, Nigeria frequently aligns itself with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries on the global stage. This, at times, risks complicating Europe’s relations with Nigeria – as has become evident recently, with their differing reaction to the ongoing conflict in Gaza.

Despite strong cooperation in some respects (especially on security, where Nigeria also relies on US support), it will require a major effort on the part of Europeans to convince Nigerians that a closer partnership is in their interests. In part, Europe’s colonial legacy gives European diplomats a difficult task. Diverging short-term objectives do not help matters. This is clearly seen on climate, with Nigeria being not just among the countries most vulnerable to climate change, but also most opposed to a rapid phase-out of fossil fuels, as it gains much of its income from its oil and gas. This creates tensions when the EU is pushing for an ambitious green transition which many Nigerians perceive as the West’s problem, according to our interlocutors.

To overcome these difficulties, Europeans should demonstrate they can be helpful in solving Nigeria’s practical problems – starting with energy security, which is the government’s priority. Providing access to electricity for all of its population requires a major investment, and the EU has an interest in ensuring as much of it is done using renewable energy sources. Otherwise, Nigeria will likely privilege the cheapest technology, being natural gas, to the detriment of the country’s contribution to global action climate change. Current cooperation between the EU and Nigeria in the form of Global Gateway is a significant step, but more is needed. Beyond energy and climate, physical security and social sustainability issues (such as food security, youth unemployment, and linking businesses to global value chains) could also serve as areas for nurturing a closer relationship. But, according to our interlocutors, it will be hard to tackle these without a major rethink in the way the EU does its trade with Africa more broadly, as advocated by Nigeria’s previous president. In particular, Nigerians perceive the EU’s agricultural subsidies as detrimental to African economies. Without a greater European effort on the economic and security fronts, Nigeria risks being tempted closer to the anti-Western orbit (especially if it does not consider the US as sufficiently committed either).

The Philippines

As the Philippines’ new presidency moves the country back towards the West, Europeans should seize the opportunity to pursue deeper cooperation on maritime security, trade, and development

Rafael Loss

With the election of President Bongbong Marcos in May 2022, Philippine foreign relations swung back towards a more internationalist and pro-Western outlook. Under Marcos’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, the country had turned to China after the European Union and other Western governments condemned the mass killings and human rights violations of Duterte’s “war on drugs”. Now, the new government is making a concerted effort to reach out to the Philippines’ traditional allies and partners, as evidenced by high-level visits by European leaders to Manila and Philippine delegations travelling to EU countries. Europeans should seize this opportunity to renew and deepen relations with south-east Asia’s second-most populous country, particularly in maritime security, but also in trade and development.

The leadership change, however, was not the only cause for the recent shift in the Philippines’ outlook. Disenchantment with China first set in with the intensification of territorial disputes in the South China Sea in the 2010s. Philippine policymakers and experts welcomed the EU’s vocal support for international law after the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected Chinese claims to the waters around the Second Thomas Shoal reef. However, our interlocutors noted that Manila in part felt compelled to bring the position before the court because of the failure of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to adopt a joint position backing the Philippines. Then after his election in 2016, Duterte’s government sought to avoid antagonising Beijing by downplaying the ruling’s significance.

Our interlocutors saw the EU’s positive record as a foundation to further strengthen maritime security cooperation and governance in the region through joint military exercises and capacity building, especially in light of the Chinese maritime militia’s growing belligerence. To help build more support for cooperation with the EU among the broader public, Europeans should visibly work with the Philippines’ civilian authorities to emphasise the non-military dimensions of maritime security, combat illicit activities, and protect marine ecosystems. The price of fish is more tangible than the law of the sea, and the relationship between the two is not necessarily self-evident for many Filipinos (and others) whose livelihoods depend on fishing.

There is also some disappointment in the Philippines over Chinese infrastructure investments in the country. The recent conclusion of the EU-Philippines free trade agreement after close to a decade of negotiations could now position Europe as the more reliable partner of Philippine businesses and industries. The covid-19 pandemic accelerated the Philippines’ digitalisation from a pre-covid regional slump, making it a more attractive partner for European tech collaboration. Our interlocutors described cooperation through the EU’s Global Gateway in broadly positive terms. However, they also remarked that where Europeans still hesitate due to concerns over the rule of law, Europe’s like-minded partners, including the United States, Australia, and Japan, were more responsive and understanding of the new government’s inability to rectify all inherited liabilities overnight. Europeans should follow in their footsteps in this regard.

On the climate front, too, ambitious domestic policies are in development with a view to expanding renewables. The Philippines is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world, and tropical cyclones, flooding, and landslides are set to intensify further as climate change accelerates, putting at risk livelihoods and agricultural output. Unsurprisingly, the Philippines is a leader on climate disaster relief in the context of the United Nations climate framework and seeks to host the Loss and Damage Fund. European backing for the plan would likely be welcomed by Manila and could unlock a fruitful north-south partnership on climate action. Our interlocutors shared their impression that the EU was only gradually rediscovering the Philippines as a valuable partner. They had hoped for a more enthusiastic embrace from Europeans after the 2022 election brought to power the new, pro-Western government. As the EU tightens its position on China, it will find in the Philippines a relatively aligned partner in south-east Asia. Proactive engagement by the EU in these policy areas could produce and perhaps even lock in some mutually beneficial gains for European-Philippine relations before the next election in 2028, and with an eye towards the ASEAN chairmanship of the Philippines in 2026.

The United Arab Emirates

The increasing geopolitical and economic influence of the United Arab Emirates offers significant opportunities for EU cooperation in areas like space and maritime security, climate action, and trade. But its engagement with diverse partners necessitates a pragmatic European approach

Carla Hobbs

There is significant scope and motive for the European Union to strengthen its cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), particularly in the areas of space and maritime security, climate action, and trade. In recent years, the UAE has been more actively pursuing multilateral cooperation and diplomacy to enhance its geopolitical and economic influence. This has positioned it as an increasingly attractive partner for the European Union, given its expanded capacity to act as a mediator in the region, its international presence, economic openness, and policy stability. But the EU must compete with other global players for the UAE’s affections: rather than aligning with one power bloc, the UAE seeks diverse partnerships with actors from the United States to China, India, and Russia.

Currently, the EU-UAE partnership pales in comparison to EU member states’ bilateral relations with the country, especially those of France. UAE interlocutors cite as major hindrances a lack of understanding on how to engage with EU institutions and frustration at the slow-moving nature of its bureaucracy. Emirati interviewees also stated that the EU’s insistence on including human rights in negotiations has derailed cooperation on other issues upon which alignment is possible.

Security governance in the space and maritime domains is one such issue. The UAE runs the Middle East’s most ambitious space programme, consisting of multiple research centres, an astronaut training programme, and a growing aerospace-industrial ecosystem, resulting in the first Arab spacewalk and Mars probe. As such, the UAE has a considerable stake in outer space governance, making it a highly relevant potential ally for the EU. Moreover, the UAE is one of only five countries that is both a signatory of the US-led Artemis Accords and a member of the expanded BRICS club, giving it seats at two tables that could well establish customary space norms for the future. For Europe, the UAE’s ambition to strengthen cooperation on space with African countries could also contain the nucleus for tri-regional capacity building, training, and investment between Africa, Europe, and the Arabian peninsula.

With regards to maritime security, the UAE’s economy, which is upheld by trade and shipping, hinges on the stability of the Arabian Peninsula’s maritime straits. Boosting maritime security is a cornerstone of the UAE’s foreign policy and the country has been heavily involved in regional and multilateral efforts to reduce threats to global navigation and trade. In the past, this has included being an active member of US-led coalitions in which EU member states also participated. However, growing UAE scepticism towards the US prompted Abu Dhabi to withdraw from one such US-led Gulf maritime coalition, the Combined Maritime Forces, in May 2023. Meanwhile, the UAE – along with the rest of the United States’ Gulf and Arab allies, apart from Bahrain – is notably absent from Operation Prosperity Guardian, launched in December 2023 by the US to protect ships in the Red Sea following attacks by Iran-backed Houthis. In response to the UAE’s recent distancing from the US, the EU should try to re-engage with the Gulf state without the US, offering a less America-centric approach.

The most fertile area for multilateral cooperation is the energy transition. As the seventh largest oil-producing nation, the UAE’s hosting of the 28^th United Nations climate conference raised many eyebrows. And yet, the UAE surprised everyone by pushing to add, for the first time in official UN documents, a historic commitment to “transitioning away from fossil fuels”. Moreover, the UAE emerged as a global leader in the magnitude of its pledges to climate finance, including helping push the Loss and Damage Fund across the finish line. The UAE also supported the EU in its initiative to treble renewable energies and double energy efficiency by 2030. Much like the EU, the UAE perceives the energy transition as an opportunity for sustainable and high-tech economic growth. This is what the EU-UAE climate partnership should focus on. The EU should continue implementing the joint energy cooperation priorities defined in September 2023, which includes investments in clean technologies and energy technology trade.

In doing so, much will depend on reconciling the UAE’s trade imperatives with its climate goals. The UAE aims to position itself as a global commerce and logistics hub through which large trade flows can pass unimpeded. Measures such as the carbon border adjust mechanism are therefore a point of contention with the EU. Europeans should instead focus efforts on supporting the UAE’s green transition through measures such as liberalising trade on technologies and services that will promote clean and efficient energy use. It should also encourage the UAE to pursue climate-friendly trade and investments overseas, particularly in Africa where it has become a leading energy sector investor, including through trilateral cooperation in renewables.

Should the EU engage the UAE on these specific issues and recognise Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical multi-alignment, it could gain a powerful ally; one that is diplomatically agile, has strong regional clout, is committed to multilateralism, and has the capacity to tackle global challenges in partnership with the EU. It will simply require a heavy dose of pragmatism.

Multilateral Matchmaker: Exploring Europe’s potential partners

Overview

Why this tool?

Areas

Climate action

Development

Internet

Security

Trade

Countries

Chile

Colombia

Ghana

Indonesia

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Malaysia

Mexico

Morocco

Nigeria

The Philippines

The United Arab Emirates

Methodology

Acknowledgments

The team

Share

Overview

Why this tool?

Areas

Climate action

Development

Internet

Security

Trade

Countries

Chile

Colombia

Ghana

Indonesia

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Malaysia

Mexico

Morocco

Nigeria

The Philippines

The United Arab Emirates

Methodology

Acknowledgments

The team

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The BRICS summit and Europe’s China challenge: A better EU offer for the global south