Sliding doors: One Trump crisis, two possible futures for Europe
Summary
- Every time European governments accommodate American pressure, they teach Washington that European sovereignty is negotiable and invite the next demand.
- A two-scenario story illustrates this point. Using a single plausible crisis—American pressure on a European ally over an Arctic territory—it traces two possible futures: one in which European leaders appease, delay and distract Donald Trump; and one in which they refuse his demands, build a coalition and deploy economic leverage.
- In the first, accommodation produces a hollow outcome. European leaders concede to avoid political and economic costs, leaving European credibility damaged and the next confrontation more likely.
- In the second, resistance is costly, but European countries emerge with greater solidarity and leverage—better placed than when the crisis began.
- Three lessons follow: a wedge strategy only works when European leaders allow it; coalitions built around shared interests hold better than those demanding unity; and leverage must be mapped before a crisis, not improvised during it.
The art of not dealing
When Donald Trump creates a crisis, European governments seek whisperers to flatter him or pageants to distract him—trying to avoid escalation and buy time in the hope that the pressure passes. But the reflex of appeasement is a costly posture: it teaches Washington that European sovereignty can be negotiated down under sufficient pressure. For all of Trump’s seizure of the daily news cycle, the real issue is more about Europe than about him. Every crisis becomes a test of whether Europeans can act with enough unity, speed and leverage to prevent Washington from defining the terms of the confrontation.
Europe’s Trump problem—or more accurately, its America problem—will not go away soon. Although prediction markets and pollsters agree that Democrats have a decent chance of retaking the House in the 2026 midterm elections, a Democratic majority in the US Congress would still struggle to constrain presidential action in foreign policy, trade, sanctions and alliance management. Congress has spent years relinquishing the very oversight powers it would need to push back.
This matters beyond the midterms. Second-term presidents typically become lame ducks: barred from running again, they lose political leverage as allies look to the next administration. Trump is an exception. His hold on the Republican Party is unusually tight—by May 2026, 62% of self-identified Republicans described themselves as MAGA Republicans, up from 38% in September 2022. That grip gives him both room and motive. Because his base will not abandon him regardless of the fallout, provocative action costs him little domestically—and the spectacle it generates, seizing headlines and wrong-footing opponents—is precisely what keeps him culturally and politically relevant. A strategy his former adviser Steve Bannon once called “muzzle velocity” executive action captures the logic: deliberately flooding opponents with so many moves at once that none can be countered.
Trump operates in an era in which social media has made outrage and novelty the primary currencies of political power—the “attention age”—and there is no surer way to command attention than unilateral foreign-policy decisions, unchecked by Congress, that dominate headlines across the world. Europeans should therefore plan for Trump to remain the decisive actor in US foreign policy until 2028 and be relatively unrestrained in his actions.
The question, then, is whether the EU will be better prepared when the next crisis arrives. This paper uses a “sliding doors” method to explore the problem that Trump will continue to present. The metaphor comes from the 1998 film “Sliding Doors”, starring Gwyneth Paltrow, in which a woman’s life splits into two parallel stories depending on whether she catches or misses a London Underground train. The device works because the difference between the two futures does not lie in the character of the protagonist or the structure of the world around her. It lies in one contingent moment that sends the same person, with the same constraints, into two very different futures.
One plausible crisis, two possible futures
The paper takes one plausible crisis over the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, in the Arctic Circle, and runs it through two alternative timelines. Svalbard is the setting because it is a wildcard. When the Trump administration began its threats to annex Greenland in early 2026, the crisis seemed like a one-off—idiosyncratic and unlikely to be repeated. Svalbard is different because there have already been disputes about its treaty and sovereignty. In any case, European leaders did not expect Trump to go after Greenland. They likely are not expecting a threat to Svalbard from the US either.
In addition to the setting, the initial conditions for both scenarios remain the same: a vulnerable European pressure point, a legal ambiguity, a set of divided European governments and a White House willing to use trade, sanctions, technology and security threats as instruments of coercion. What changes is the sliding door of the European response.
The first scenario, “appease, delay, distract”, shows what happens when European leaders treat the crisis as an isolated problem to manage rather than a contest to shape. They seek time, avoid escalation, preserve some unity, and hope that restraint and Trump’s limited goodwill might protect the wider alliance. In the short term, this approach placates Trump and reduces the temperature. In the longer term, it teaches the Trump administration that the EU can be pressed into narrowing its own sovereignty, softening its regulatory power and sacrificing weaker member states and institutions in order to avoid a rupture with Washington.
The second scenario, “consciously uncoupled”, borrows Gwyneth Paltrow’s 2014 euphemism for her split from singer Chris Martin. This Paltrowian concept, applied to geopolitics, calls for Europe to undertake a careful, deliberate separation from US dependency. The scenario follows the same crisis from the same Arctic starting point, but European policymakers take a different strategy. They name the coercion early, Europeanise the issue, align economic, technological, regulatory, diplomatic and security tools, and create coalitions that are willing to defend leverage at the expense of real short-term costs. This approach involves short-term pain. It brings escalation, market reactions, political backlash and a more openly transactional relationship with America. But it also stops Trump turning European dependence into European submission. It forces Washington to negotiate because European governments have made clear that pressure will produce counter-pressure.
The purpose of the comparison is therefore strategic rather than predictive. The sliding doors show that the easiest course of dealing with Trump is often the most costly. A strategy built around appeasement, delay and damage limitation may preserve the appearance of the transatlantic relationship while proving that Trump’s intimidation works. A strategy of conscious uncoupling, by contrast, does not mean breaking with America for its own sake. It means reducing the forms of dependence that allow an American president to coerce the EU across domains. It means building and using leverage before the crisis arrives, not improvising once Trump has already set the terms.
In that sense, the paper is less about Svalbard than about Europe’s Trump problem. Even still, it is less about Europe’s Trump problem than Europe’s Europe problem. The far-north archipelago provides the setting, but the real subject is how Europeans should behave when the United States uses alliance dependence and political intimidation as bargaining tools. The two scenarios show that both reactions carry costs, but only one leaves Europe stronger.
Day 0
This crisis begins with a map.
It appears first as a post on X, imagined by Tom Dans, a Trump adviser with business connections to Arctic energy interests. Shipping lanes across the Arctic are traced in thick lines across the Barents Sea. Svalbard is circled. A caption asks why the fate of the Arctic in the twenty-first century should depend on “a 1920 treaty written for a different world”.
That afternoon, the conservative Heritage Foundation think tank releases an explainer about coal and mineral deposits on Svalbard.
Day 3
Washington’s treaty review
The post acquires bureaucratic form. Washington announces a formal “review” of access and security arrangements under the Svalbard Treaty. The US, the administration insists, fully recognises Svalbard as Norwegian territory. But it also argues that existing interpretations of the treaty are “outdated” and “inconsistent with present Arctic realities” given changes in energy and supply chain security.
European officials treat the announcement as manageable. Trump, they have learned, is looking for attention. Give him that attention, and the issue will dissolve naturally.
Day 3
Washington’s treaty review
The post acquires bureaucratic form. Washington announces a formal “review” of access and security arrangements under the Svalbard Treaty. The US, the administration insists, fully recognises Svalbard as Norwegian territory. But it also argues that existing interpretations of the treaty are “outdated” and “inconsistent with present Arctic realities” given changes in energy and supply chain security.
European officials treat the announcement as manageable. Trump, they have learned, is looking for attention. Give him that attention, and the issue will dissolve naturally. Norway, however, is about to test that assumption.
Day 5
A tweet and a cautious response
Then Trump tweets. “Norway has been VERY WEAK for a long time! The people of Svalbard are GREAT people, incredible people, and they’re being treated very badly. Time to MAKE THE ARCTIC GREAT AGAIN! 🇺🇸❄️ #MAGA”.
The State Department press release comes out hours later, detailing a “productive conversation” between the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and the governor of Svalbard, Lars Fause.
Norway responds cautiously. For decades, Norwegian policy over Svalbard rested on a delicate balance: firm sovereignty, minimal military footprint and strict adherence to treaty language to avoid escalation. America is now just another plate to spin. Norwegian officials decide that internationalising the issue too aggressively could turn an attention-seeking social media stunt into a full-blown geopolitical confrontation.
The Norwegian prime minister, Jonas Gahr Store, picks up the phone and calls his Danish counterpart, seeking some guidance but receives mostly commiseration. There is no effort to bring the issue to other Nordic leaders or to expand consultations. The two leaders briefly discuss it but determine that a meeting amongst the Nordics—or even the Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8), the consultative grouping of the five Nordic and three Baltic states—is ill-equipped to handle the crisis. No other European political group seems better equipped to manage it.
Day 5
Norway refuses to negotiate
Then Trump tweets. “Norway has been VERY WEAK for a long time! The people of Svalbard are GREAT people, incredible people, and they’re being treated very badly. Time to MAKE THE ARCTIC GREAT AGAIN! 🇺🇸❄️ #MAGA”.
The State Department press release comes out hours later, detailing a “productive conversation” between the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and the governor of Svalbard, Lars Fause.
Norway is caught off balance. For decades, Norwegian policy over Svalbard rested on a delicate balance: firm sovereignty, minimal military footprint and strict adherence to treaty language to avoid escalation. The American move threatens that balance. The Norwegian prime minister denounces the move, calling it an “affront to Norwegian sovereignty”. Norway will not negotiate the Svalbard treaty.
Day 7
Norway accommodates
The crisis falls between cracks. NATO has no clear mechanism for adjudicating treaty disputes among allies. The EU struggles to classify the issue: it is not trade, not sanctions, not defence in any conventional sense—and Norway, not being an EU member, falls outside the bloc’s normal instruments.
Given institutional constraints, the government in Oslo determines the most reasonable path forward is managing the White House through restraint, private diplomacy and selective accommodation.
The legal architecture, such as it is, provides America with surprising cover. The US attorney general, Todd Blanche, declares that America, as an original signatory to the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, holds broad rights to commercial activity, infrastructure development and activities “ensuring the security of its nationals” on the archipelago. The argument is controversial but has plausible legal footing.
Day 7
Norway mobilises allies
The Norwegian government begins a widespread campaign in European capitals. Diplomats fan out to Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Warsaw, engaging leaders in parallel, making the case that the issue be treated not as an Arctic dispute, but as a European sovereignty test—a Greenland 2.0.
Oslo does not stop there, and pushes the issue through smaller, faster, more-established channels. At Norway’s request, the foreign ministers of the NB8—the Nordic-Baltic grouping of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden—convene within 72 hours to align diplomatic strategies and map potential retaliation plans.
Day 10
Coercion behind closed doors
Behind closed doors in European capitals, the American message sharpens: oppose us on Svalbard and face tariffs, sanctions or troop withdrawals.
Poland is spooked by these threats, particularly the troop withdrawals. The Polish government reframes the crisis as an opportunity to evict the 400 Russian citizens who live and work in Barentsburg, a Russian-run mining town that is Svalbard’s second-largest settlement and Moscow’s last permanent foothold on NATO-adjacent territory. Officials in Warsaw do not consult officials in Berlin, Paris or the Nordic capitals (including Oslo) before the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, holds a press conference on the “Arctic issue” because there is no forum in which such a consultation would even occur.
France issues a sharp diplomatic note invoking European strategic autonomy. Germany’s chancellor, Friedrich Merz, favours a negotiated framework with Trump—a middle ground that emphasises continued dialogue with America rather than forcing a choice. He proposes creating the “Svalbard Contact Group” as an ad hoc forum to coordinate European positions and keep negotiations with Washington alive.
Day 10
Solidarity in 72 hours
By the end of the summit, the outlines of a common position are already visible. No NB8 member will negotiate bilaterally with Washington. Any pressure placed on Norway will be treated as pressure on the wider group. In return, the Nordic states pledge to fill any security gaps collectively should the US remove its troop deployments from the Baltics or pause arms sales. In that case, the Norwegian and Swedish governments would press their respective defence contractors, Kongsberg and Saab, to prioritise deliveries within the NB8.
With the NB8 moving first, Trump’s tweet is framed as less about the obscure archipelago, and more about the precedent an American takeover would set. France and Germany release a coordinated response saying such.
Marco Rubio holds a press conference and insists allies are “overreacting to a routine treaty review”, warning that “there will be consequences” should they impede the process. In private, US State Department officials start making their rounds across the continent, first to Sofia then to Rome, signalling that flexibility will be “recognised and rewarded”.
Day 20
Trump rewards the obedient
The Trump administration announces three initiatives in quick succession: subsidised direct flights from New York to Svalbard’s capital, Longyearbyen; a new federal fellowship programme placing American researchers on the island; and a unilateral reinterpretation of the Norwegian-US tax treaty making Svalbard essentially a tax haven for American nationals.
EU governments display their ire to one another but avoid direct confrontation with the White House. German diplomats urge Norway not to “overreact to symbolic measures”. France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, openly denounces the moves of the Trump administration. Norwegian officials ultimately issue official objections and a call for diplomacy, deliberately keeping rhetoric restrained.
The strategy appears to be somewhat successful. Trump tweets “Germany and Norway have been VERY SMART on Svalbard. They understand the United States needs FAIR treatment in the Arctic. We can work something out! Macron is acting like a MADMAN talking about ‘European sovereignty’ while Europe can’t even defend itself. SAD. The French always want confrontation, then call America when things get tough. NOT GOING TO HAPPEN ANYMORE!”
Day 20
The coalition holds
The Trump administration announces three initiatives in quick succession: subsidised direct flights from New York to Svalbard’s capital, Longyearbyen; a new federal fellowship programme placing American researchers on the island; and a unilateral reinterpretation of the Norwegian-US tax treaty making Svalbard essentially a tax haven for American nationals.
The combination of the initiatives is strategic and aimed at testing the edges of European solidarity before a common position is fully set.
The response holds. A statement of solidarity turns into material commitments. European leaders recognise that they must compete with the US to shape the future of Svalbard. Denmark’s prime minister announces a Nordic-led research and infrastructure package, with French and German co-financing. Hungarian and Italian objections at the EU level slow a formal funding vote on a Swedish-introduced package aimed at strengthening Arctic resilience, but they cannot stop the minilateral commitments already in motion. The Polish delegation expresses concern at Rubio’s threat, but they cannot impede the coalition’s initiatives either.
Day 30
The Svalbard Contact Group
Having won the battle for Trump’s goodwill, Germany leads the first meeting of the Svalbard Contact Group. Its membership is broad: every interested EU state (which is not many), plus Norway and Canada. Leaders in attendance are optimistic about what the group can achieve. After Trump’s latest tweet on the issue, the objectives are straightforward: preserve room for negotiation and avoid direct retaliation from the Trump administration.
As the summit drags on, a common frustration emerges—had the group met six months earlier, they would be enforcing a shared position. Instead, they are trying to define one. Thus, the outcome of the summit is a vague plan to steer Trump towards a negotiated equilibrium by avoiding escalation tactics and keeping the dispute compartmentalised.
Rubio escalates anyway. Speaking in Warsaw, he warns that “efforts to restrict US access to Svalbard are illegal and will have consequences for the alliance”. A threat that is clearly aimed at the working group but seen as aggressive in rhetoric and toothless in practice.
European leaders argue that this strategy is working. Despite threats to do so, Trump has imposed no tariffs on Norway, pulled out no troops and left NATO intact. Careful not to anger the president, the German chancellor and the Norwegian prime minister hint at how their plan to please Trump has effectively turned down the temperature. They are praised widely in the European press for deftly navigating the crisis.
Day 30
Real money, real speed
While fights in Brussels ensue over the funding, Nordic, German and French business delegations head to Longyearbyen and Tromso, Norway’s principal hub for Arctic research and governance, to discuss reinforcing European economic engagement.
Telecommunications, energy and logistics firms attend, and governments signal long-term financial support. The minilateral format is doing what the EU cannot—moving fast and committing real resources.
Day 45
Svalbard slips away
Washington sends a set of proposals to Oslo. These include preferential conditions for American commercial actors and a more ominous element—regulatory carve-outs and “special arrangements” for US nationals and firms operating on Svalbard.
Incrementally, the crisis begins reshaping European behaviour. No government supports Trump’s ultimatum, but no leader is willing to draw Trump’s fire (tariffs, troop withdrawals, a frozen bilateral relationship and the like) for the sake of a Norwegian archipelago. Each government waits for another to move first, and collective action stalls. Norway knows it cannot take America on alone so does what it can: it slows negotiations while continuing engagement. Preserving a workable relationship with Washington matters more than forcing confrontation at this moment.
While Norway and the US administration negotiate, the Svalbard Contact Group meets three more times, mainly to serve as a sounding board for Oslo. Fewer states show up each time. Discussions shift away from ideal outcomes towards a narrower objective: stabilising relations with Washington while limiting further concessions. Everyone agrees that the concessions had to stop somewhere. No one agrees where—or who—would enforce that line.
Day 45
Imperfect, but there
The result is patchwork and partial, but visible enough to matter. Where Washington tries to establish a foothold, the coalition moves to ensure it is not uncontested. The campaign is not coherent in the way an EU-wide effort would be, but prior coordination during the Greenland crisis equipped these states to move faster and form a coalition that is more durable.
Day 75
Grey zone exploited
The regulatory and tax grey zone on Svalbard becomes greyer, and a small number of American firms begin to test the boundaries. OpenAI, X, and several high-profile tech companies establish a presence on the island and structure parts of their operations to take advantage of Svalbard’s now-ambiguous legal status. Longyearbyen residents hear talk about potential data centre plans for the far side of Spitsbergen, the only permanently inhabited island in the archipelago.
As American activity on the island expands, the question of jurisdiction becomes harder to avoid. EU regulators assert that existing rules continue to apply to American firms operating in Svalbard, but there is little agreement on how to enforce them.
Svalbard is outside the EEA, Norway is outside the EU, and this crisis is outside what policymakers deemed possible.
Day 75
Subsidising a distant rock
In mainland Europe, the costs of defending Svalbard are coming under scrutiny. The Nordic-led infrastructure package, the fast-tracked security reinforcements and the business subsidies committed earlier are beginning to show up in budget debates—and critics are starting to ask whether a remote archipelago is worth it. Energy and food prices are already elevated; the idea of governments redirecting funds towards an island most Europeans could not find on a map feeds a growing domestic backlash.
On Svalbard, a small number of American firms slowly start expanding and begin testing the boundaries. OpenAI, X, and several high-profile tech companies establish a presence on the island and internal memos explain how they might be able to take advantage of Svalbard’s somewhat-ambiguous legal status.
Day 100
A leak surfaces
A Le Monde story breaks with a leaked memo from X detailing how the firm has used Svalbard to loosely skirt EU regulation. The journalist shows that Palantir, Coinbase and a smattering of other American tech firms have begun buying property on the islands as well.
Day 100
A fight on the information front
As American activity on Svalbard expands, European governments start looking for ways to impose costs on America. They turn towards the regulatory domain. European officials fear that the Trump administration will press American tech and social media firms, such as X or OpenAI to tweak their algorithms and shift the information environment to break European solidarity.
Day 102
Inquiries go unanswered
The story dominates newspapers across the continent. An unnamed Norwegian official confirms that the Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Governance has sent eleven compliance inquiries to US firms, but received only two responses, both from outside legal firms. The Greens in the European Parliament draft an emergency resolution.
Day 102
Regulators move in
Data protection authorities across aligned member states announce accelerated investigations into major US tech firms, focusing on free speech protections, and compliance with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation and Digital Services Act.
Day 105
Trump is enraged
Trump tweets, “Europe is going after great American businesses trying to MAKE THE ARCTIC GREAT AGAIN. We are following the rules—the European Union is not. DISGRACE!”
Day 105
Capitals lead, Brussels follows
The European Commission releases a statement saying it is looking into moving the timeline up for enforcement for its new AI Act. Critically, the regulatory action is presented and coordinated by national authorities first—the commission consolidates rather than leads.
Day 107
Sanctions released
Again, the tweet becomes policy. An updated sanctions notice appears on the US Treasury Department website. Deep in the list are eight names from France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, most of whom work for the EU: a senior digital regulator, a competition authority official and a ministry director involved in drafting new technology rules. They are accused of actions that “undermine US technological leadership” and “threaten national security through discriminatory regulatory practices”. Their US-based assets are frozen. Any dealings with US persons are prohibited. Travel restrictions follow within days.
Day 107
Sanctions released
This move hits a nerve. An updated sanctions notice appears on the US Treasury Department website. Deep in the list are eight names from France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, most of whom work for the EU: a senior digital regulator, a competition authority official and a ministry director involved in drafting new technology rules. They are accused of actions that “undermine US technological leadership” and “threaten national security through discriminatory regulatory practices”. Their US-based assets are frozen. Any dealings with US persons are prohibited. Travel restrictions follow within days.
US officials brief industry groups that further designations remain possible if “hostile regulatory behaviour” continues.
Day 112
Spain stands alone
EU member states debate response options under pressure. Reciprocal sanctions risk escalation. Silence risks establishing a new normal in which US sanctions become an instrument for coercion. The European Commission considers legal countermeasures, but existing tools are not designed to handle the current situation. A lack of consensus ultimately turns into a lack of action.
Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, takes the hardest line, largely alone. The Spanish Ministry of Finance announces targeted audits focused on the tax arrangements of major American companies operating in Spain. The ministry of digital transformation issues new guidance demanding European sourcing for public-sector cloud and tech contracts, directly affecting US firms.
Spanish officials in Brussels push for a coordinated EU response, including using the anti-coercion instrument, an EU trade-defence mechanism that allows the bloc to impose countermeasures on countries that use economic pressure to coerce member states. “We have seen this before,” one senior official notes. “If we do not act now, the coercion will not stop here.”
Day 112
The line holds
The Spanish prime minister Pedro Sanchez and French president Emmanuel Macron release a joint statement encouraging supermarkets not to stock Republican state goods on their shelves. Behind the scenes, they work with the Belgian delegation to bring the issue to the EU-level.
Ursula von der Leyen holds a press conference and announces that the European Commission is working to determine whether Trump’s sanctions would constitute economic coercion. The commission president says: “The EU is a regulatory superpower and the sanctions on our government workers and regulators is a threat to sovereignty of the EU. This is clearly America trying to coerce us on Svalbard, and we will not back down.”
The persecution of bureaucrats does not necessarily have a rally-round-the-flag effect, but leaders largely understand that being a “regulatory superpower” relies on the ability to enforce that regulation. By sanctioning individuals who design and implement that regulation, the Trump administration has threatened the very power of the EU. The commission considers triggering the anti-coercion instrument, the EU’s tool for retaliating against economic coercion by third countries.
Day 117
Washington retaliates
The US trade representative announces a review of Spain’s trade status, followed by the imposition of tariffs on Spanish goods—olive oil and niche pharmaceuticals mainly. US commerce secretary Howard Lutnick announces new sanctions on two additional Spanish officials.
The pressure then extends to the security domain. Pete Hegseth, the US defence secretary, announces a “reassessment” of US force posture in Europe, including whether to move 6th Fleet destroyers out of Rota—the joint US-Spanish naval base in Andalusia that hosts American ships—to “other, more suitable” ports. That would be a significant shift in US military presence on the Iberian Peninsula and leave gaps in Europe’s missile defence.
France matches Spain’s rhetoric, but not its actions; Macron joins Sanchez in calling for a coordinated European response but does not enact measures of his own.
Day 117
The right rises
Protests pop up across Europe. The far-right Alternative for Germany party frames the EU’s response as overly escalatory. France’s National Rally argues the costs of retaliation will fall on Europeans. Other populist parties also complain. Italy’s Five Star Movement and Hungary’s Fidesz join in. A common slogan circulates: “No war for permafrost”.
The Trump administration views the protests as a sign that its wedging strategy might work. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent adds several senior European Commission officials to the sanctions list, and announces tariffs on German cars and auto parts, French and Italian luxury goods, and Spanish olive oil.
Von der Leyen and Macron, along with German chancellor Friedrich Merz and Alex Stubb, the president of Finland, head to Washington to try to negotiate, but they understand that this is just a show to fulfil consultation requirements for the anti-coercion instrument—the negotiations last two hours and finish with a spectacle that makes the 2025 meeting between Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and Trump in the Oval Office seem cordial.
Day 123
Brussels is threatened
Belgium’s reaction is sharper and more anxious. As the host of the EU institutions, Belgium treats the US sanctions as both a national affront and a direct threat to the European system itself. Brussels pushes for EU-level trade countermeasures, including export taxes and tariffs on US goods. The White House takes note: if Brussels is willing to fight, it can be made to pay.
Day 123
A European offensive
On the plane back to Brussels, von der Leyen announces that the new tariffs coming from the US have killed the Turnberry deal, the July 2025 agreement under which the US capped tariffs on EU goods at 15% and the EU dropped duties on US industrial goods to zero. The EU had also frozen its $109bn retaliatory tariff package as part of that bargain; with the deal now dead, von der Leyen says, there is no basis for keeping it on ice. The EU will activate the retaliatory package immediately.
Then, the EU doubles down on offence: it announces an initial 20% tariff on targeted US imports, 30% for goods coming from states with a Republican senator. The EU will no longer sign contracts with US firms for public procurement. The Council, convening in emergency session, votes to formally authorise the anti-coercion instrument.
Day 127
Trump pushes for NATO relocation
Trump tweets a video captioned “Donald J. Trump NATO Headquarters”—a mock-up of a rebranded alliance building, transplanted from Brussels, where NATO has been headquartered since 1967, to Warsaw. The skyline of the Polish capital can be seen in the background, flanked by golden statues of the American president.
European leaders read the tweet as a signal rather than satire. Yet despite the cost to Belgium, some quietly hope Trump follows through—a relocated headquarters to a “friendlier” European country might be the cheapest way to keep the US inside the alliance.
Day 127
Recession fears mount
The costs loom large. Economists warn that Europe could fall into a recession as trade contracts. The German and French bond markets show acute signs of faltering upon opening.
Day 133
Alliance in question
That hope is quickly dashed. Rubio says that America will be reviewing its commitment to NATO given the “hostile regulatory behaviour” facing American companies critical to US security in the EU. The next day, the Pentagon announces that it will not be sending the next rotation of US military planners to the NATO headquarters in Brussels.
Privately, American officials say that continued escalation could lead to US withdrawal from the alliance and retrenchment of forces in Europe. The issue is no longer specific to Spain and Belgium, or digital regulation.
Day 133
Article 5 in doubt
Right-wing-led no-confidence efforts begin to gain real traction across the continent.
But America does not escape the fallout. Europeans begin telling US firms not to bid for lucrative public contracts.
Financial markets have a few bad days and pundits speculate the economy will turn. A handful of Republican senators break ranks with Trump as tariffs hit their states. The administration finds coercing Europe harder than expected—instead of splitting countries with strong right-wing movements off from the bloc, European leaders have doubled down.
Day 140
Retaliation to appeasement
Belgian authorities shift from retaliation towards damage control. Calls for the anti-coercion instrument are softened, efforts to push forward coordinated retaliation cease. The European Commission, under pressure from particularly vulnerable member states, introduces a package of “technical adjustments” to show “goodwill towards companies vital to transatlantic cooperation”. None of these changes are presented as concessions, but the timing is not lost on the European public and American officials.
Day 140
NATO rotations paused
Trump then turns to his tried-and-true coercive tool. He tells a press gaggle, “I told Norway I wanted Svalbard, and they said no, and now they’re screwing us. To tell you the truth, they can go to hell. They can’t fight the US economically and expect us to protect them. As far as I’m concerned Article 5 is dead.”
The Pentagon quietly pauses several NATO rotations and delays exercises to show their resolve to the president’s decision. NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte flies to Washington immediately to try and repair the damage. Alex Stubb is on the same flight out: “A lot can be fixed with a good game of golf.”
Day 148
The pressure lifts
Washington responds selectively. The NATO billets are posted. No additional sanctions are announced. The tariffs targeting Spain remain but are not expanded.
Day 148
Europe plays its cards
European leaders are resolute. The commission proceeds with the implementation of its countermeasures. Prior enforcement actions are not rolled back. Von der Leyen announces a 25% export tax on components for US weaponry and on active pharmaceutical ingredients. The EU accounts for 60% of US pharma imports and manufactures 43% of active ingredients in US brand-name drugs. Raising the price on American consumers would impose incredible costs to an already-expensive healthcare system. Moreover, European firms are so integrated into American defence supply chains that any rising prices threaten production speed and cost. Patriot missile-defence systems alone involve 21 different European suppliers.
Von der Leyen’s move carries real weight and spooks even Trump’s closest allies. American pharma and defence firms issue desperate statements as their stocks fall.
Day 150
The crisis fades
The immediate crisis subsides. European leaders breathe out. The worst did not happen—NATO holds, no territory changed hands, no government fell. But something harder to name has shifted.
Day 150
America tastes its own medicine
American pharmaceutical giants Eli Lilly and Pfizer warn of supply disruptions in press releases. Hospital associations in 18 states send a joint letter to Congress.
Lockheed Martin representatives tell their defence department contacts that without some work-around, they might need to slow production at their Patriot facility in Arkansas. The S&P 500, America’s main share index, drops 4.2% over three days.
North Carolina’s senator, the Republican Ted Budd, breaks rank first. The state’s pharma sector employs 75,000 people; he calls for “renewed dialogue”. A few other senators from the affected states follow suit. As pressure mounts, Trump starts to climb down. As ever, he reframes the reversal as a win. In a Truth Social post he declares that America has been “screwed by the EU, but this time, we screwed them back. I will never stop fighting to Make America Great Again!”
Day 160
Spin cycle
European media coverage emphasises how EU leaders “saved NATO”. The Spanish government is criticised across Europe for triggering a confrontation that could have ended the alliance. Media in Spain lambast Sanchez because the tariffs have continued and the crisis has brought no benefit. By contrast, French leaders, who never acted upon their threats, and Italian leaders, who made no fuss at all—are praised for their restraint and “strategic patience”.
Day 160
The fire dies down
Slowly, the confrontation loses intensity. Sanctions quietly lapse. Some tariffs are lifted. The EU’s anti-coercion instrument is rolled back piece by piece in sequence with US actions. Trump and Rutte shake hands at their next meeting. Rubio conducts backchannels with von der Leyen and Rutte. And, ahead of that summer’s NATO summit, he tweets one line: “America is committed to NATO.”
Technical discussions between Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff, the EU, and different European leaders focus less on Svalbard and security and more on stabilising the economic relationship.
Day 180
Six months later – A hollow victory
Across Europe, the effects are more subtle but enduring. Regulatory frameworks remain intact formally, but, in practice, their power has shifted. Enforcement becomes more cautious, more selective, and more contingent on geopolitical contexts. The first sign comes quietly: a planned investigation into a large American platform company is shelved after a call from Washington. No announcement is made.
Spain and Belgium did not officially reverse course, but the system around them adjusted. EU member states retain individual authorities, but they no longer exercise them with the same confidence or consistency.
EU institutions are saved, but the power they once wielded is lost.
—
Day 180
Six months later – Wounded, but stronger
The outcome is not clean and the damage it left in its wake smoulders—European GDP has contracted by 0.4%. No-confidence votes in Germany, Denmark and France force snap elections in which right-wing parties gain more seats in parliament than before. The transatlantic relationship is weaker, more transactional and more uncertain than before.
Europe does not win the crisis, but it keeps its leverage. By holding their ground as a minilateral grouping at first, and then as a formidable bloc, European leaders prove Europe can be a force to be reckoned with.
—
Day 3
Appease, Delay, Distract
Washington’s treaty review
The post acquires bureaucratic form. Washington announces a formal “review” of access and security arrangements under the Svalbard Treaty. The US, the administration insists, fully recognises Svalbard as Norwegian territory. But it also argues that existing interpretations of the treaty are “outdated” and “inconsistent with present Arctic realities” given changes in energy and supply chain security.
European officials treat the announcement as manageable. Trump, they have learned, is looking for attention. Give him that attention, and the issue will dissolve naturally.
Consciously uncoupled
Washington’s treaty review
The post acquires bureaucratic form. Washington announces a formal “review” of access and security arrangements under the Svalbard Treaty. The US, the administration insists, fully recognises Svalbard as Norwegian territory. But it also argues that existing interpretations of the treaty are “outdated” and “inconsistent with present Arctic realities” given changes in energy and supply chain security.
European officials treat the announcement as manageable. Trump, they have learned, is looking for attention. Give him that attention, and the issue will dissolve naturally. Norway, however, is about to test that assumption.
Day 5
Appease, Delay, Distract
A tweet and a cautious response
Then Trump tweets. “Norway has been VERY WEAK for a long time! The people of Svalbard are GREAT people, incredible people, and they’re being treated very badly. Time to MAKE THE ARCTIC GREAT AGAIN! 🇺🇸❄️ #MAGA”.
The State Department press release comes out hours later, detailing a “productive conversation” between the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and the governor of Svalbard, Lars Fause.
Norway responds cautiously. For decades, Norwegian policy over Svalbard rested on a delicate balance: firm sovereignty, minimal military footprint and strict adherence to treaty language to avoid escalation. America is now just another plate to spin. Norwegian officials decide that internationalising the issue too aggressively could turn an attention-seeking social media stunt into a full-blown geopolitical confrontation.
The Norwegian prime minister, Jonas Gahr Store, picks up the phone and calls his Danish counterpart, seeking some guidance but receives mostly commiseration. There is no effort to bring the issue to other Nordic leaders or to expand consultations. The two leaders briefly discuss it but determine that a meeting amongst the Nordics—or even the Nordic-Baltic 8 (NB8), the consultative grouping of the five Nordic and three Baltic states—is ill-equipped to handle the crisis. No other European political group seems better equipped to manage it.
Consciously uncoupled
Norway refuses to negotiate
Then Trump tweets. “Norway has been VERY WEAK for a long time! The people of Svalbard are GREAT people, incredible people, and they’re being treated very badly. Time to MAKE THE ARCTIC GREAT AGAIN! 🇺🇸❄️ #MAGA”.
The State Department press release comes out hours later, detailing a “productive conversation” between the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and the governor of Svalbard, Lars Fause.
Norway is caught off balance. For decades, Norwegian policy over Svalbard rested on a delicate balance: firm sovereignty, minimal military footprint and strict adherence to treaty language to avoid escalation. The American move threatens that balance. The Norwegian prime minister denounces the move, calling it an “affront to Norwegian sovereignty”. Norway will not negotiate the Svalbard treaty.
Day 7
Appease, Delay, Distract
Norway accommodates
The crisis falls between cracks. NATO has no clear mechanism for adjudicating treaty disputes among allies. The EU struggles to classify the issue: it is not trade, not sanctions, not defence in any conventional sense—and Norway, not being an EU member, falls outside the bloc’s normal instruments.
Given institutional constraints, the government in Oslo determines the most reasonable path forward is managing the White House through restraint, private diplomacy and selective accommodation.
The legal architecture, such as it is, provides America with surprising cover. The US attorney general, Todd Blanche, declares that America, as an original signatory to the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, holds broad rights to commercial activity, infrastructure development and activities “ensuring the security of its nationals” on the archipelago. The argument is controversial but has plausible legal footing.
Consciously uncoupled
Norway mobilises allies
The Norwegian government begins a widespread campaign in European capitals. Diplomats fan out to Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Warsaw, engaging leaders in parallel, making the case that the issue be treated not as an Arctic dispute, but as a European sovereignty test—a Greenland 2.0.
Oslo does not stop there, and pushes the issue through smaller, faster, more-established channels. At Norway’s request, the foreign ministers of the NB8—the Nordic-Baltic grouping of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden—convene within 72 hours to align diplomatic strategies and map potential retaliation plans.
Day 10
Appease, Delay, Distract
Coercion behind closed doors
Behind closed doors in European capitals, the American message sharpens: oppose us on Svalbard and face tariffs, sanctions or troop withdrawals.
Poland is spooked by these threats, particularly the troop withdrawals. The Polish government reframes the crisis as an opportunity to evict the 400 Russian citizens who live and work in Barentsburg, a Russian-run mining town that is Svalbard’s second-largest settlement and Moscow’s last permanent foothold on NATO-adjacent territory. Officials in Warsaw do not consult officials in Berlin, Paris or the Nordic capitals (including Oslo) before the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, holds a press conference on the “Arctic issue” because there is no forum in which such a consultation would even occur.
France issues a sharp diplomatic note invoking European strategic autonomy. Germany’s chancellor, Friedrich Merz, favours a negotiated framework with Trump—a middle ground that emphasises continued dialogue with America rather than forcing a choice. He proposes creating the “Svalbard Contact Group” as an ad hoc forum to coordinate European positions and keep negotiations with Washington alive.
Consciously uncoupled
Solidarity in 72 hours
By the end of the summit, the outlines of a common position are already visible. No NB8 member will negotiate bilaterally with Washington. Any pressure placed on Norway will be treated as pressure on the wider group. In return, the Nordic states pledge to fill any security gaps collectively should the US remove its troop deployments from the Baltics or pause arms sales. In that case, the Norwegian and Swedish governments would press their respective defence contractors, Kongsberg and Saab, to prioritise deliveries within the NB8.
With the NB8 moving first, Trump’s tweet is framed as less about the obscure archipelago, and more about the precedent an American takeover would set. France and Germany release a coordinated response saying such.
Marco Rubio holds a press conference and insists allies are “overreacting to a routine treaty review”, warning that “there will be consequences” should they impede the process. In private, US State Department officials start making their rounds across the continent, first to Sofia then to Rome, signalling that flexibility will be “recognised and rewarded”.
Day 20
Appease, Delay, Distract
Trump rewards the obedient
The Trump administration announces three initiatives in quick succession: subsidised direct flights from New York to Svalbard’s capital, Longyearbyen; a new federal fellowship programme placing American researchers on the island; and a unilateral reinterpretation of the Norwegian-US tax treaty making Svalbard essentially a tax haven for American nationals.
EU governments display their ire to one another but avoid direct confrontation with the White House. German diplomats urge Norway not to “overreact to symbolic measures”. France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, openly denounces the moves of the Trump administration. Norwegian officials ultimately issue official objections and a call for diplomacy, deliberately keeping rhetoric restrained.
The strategy appears to be somewhat successful. Trump tweets “Germany and Norway have been VERY SMART on Svalbard. They understand the United States needs FAIR treatment in the Arctic. We can work something out! Macron is acting like a MADMAN talking about ‘European sovereignty’ while Europe can’t even defend itself. SAD. The French always want confrontation, then call America when things get tough. NOT GOING TO HAPPEN ANYMORE!”
Consciously uncoupled
The coalition holds
The Trump administration announces three initiatives in quick succession: subsidised direct flights from New York to Svalbard’s capital, Longyearbyen; a new federal fellowship programme placing American researchers on the island; and a unilateral reinterpretation of the Norwegian-US tax treaty making Svalbard essentially a tax haven for American nationals.
The combination of the initiatives is strategic and aimed at testing the edges of European solidarity before a common position is fully set.
The response holds. A statement of solidarity turns into material commitments. European leaders recognise that they must compete with the US to shape the future of Svalbard. Denmark’s prime minister announces a Nordic-led research and infrastructure package, with French and German co-financing. Hungarian and Italian objections at the EU level slow a formal funding vote on a Swedish-introduced package aimed at strengthening Arctic resilience, but they cannot stop the minilateral commitments already in motion. The Polish delegation expresses concern at Rubio’s threat, but they cannot impede the coalition’s initiatives either.
Day 30
Appease, Delay, Distract
The Svalbard Contact Group
Having won the battle for Trump’s goodwill, Germany leads the first meeting of the Svalbard Contact Group. Its membership is broad: every interested EU state (which is not many), plus Norway and Canada. Leaders in attendance are optimistic about what the group can achieve. After Trump’s latest tweet on the issue, the objectives are straightforward: preserve room for negotiation and avoid direct retaliation from the Trump administration.
As the summit drags on, a common frustration emerges—had the group met six months earlier, they would be enforcing a shared position. Instead, they are trying to define one. Thus, the outcome of the summit is a vague plan to steer Trump towards a negotiated equilibrium by avoiding escalation tactics and keeping the dispute compartmentalised.
Rubio escalates anyway. Speaking in Warsaw, he warns that “efforts to restrict US access to Svalbard are illegal and will have consequences for the alliance”. A threat that is clearly aimed at the working group but seen as aggressive in rhetoric and toothless in practice.
European leaders argue that this strategy is working. Despite threats to do so, Trump has imposed no tariffs on Norway, pulled out no troops and left NATO intact. Careful not to anger the president, the German chancellor and the Norwegian prime minister hint at how their plan to please Trump has effectively turned down the temperature. They are praised widely in the European press for deftly navigating the crisis.
Consciously uncoupled
Real money, real speed
While fights in Brussels ensue over the funding, Nordic, German and French business delegations head to Longyearbyen and Tromso, Norway’s principal hub for Arctic research and governance, to discuss reinforcing European economic engagement.
Telecommunications, energy and logistics firms attend, and governments signal long-term financial support. The minilateral format is doing what the EU cannot—moving fast and committing real resources.
Day 45
Appease, Delay, Distract
Svalbard slips away
Washington sends a set of proposals to Oslo. These include preferential conditions for American commercial actors and a more ominous element—regulatory carve-outs and “special arrangements” for US nationals and firms operating on Svalbard.
Incrementally, the crisis begins reshaping European behaviour. No government supports Trump’s ultimatum, but no leader is willing to draw Trump’s fire (tariffs, troop withdrawals, a frozen bilateral relationship and the like) for the sake of a Norwegian archipelago. Each government waits for another to move first, and collective action stalls. Norway knows it cannot take America on alone so does what it can: it slows negotiations while continuing engagement. Preserving a workable relationship with Washington matters more than forcing confrontation at this moment.
While Norway and the US administration negotiate, the Svalbard Contact Group meets three more times, mainly to serve as a sounding board for Oslo. Fewer states show up each time. Discussions shift away from ideal outcomes towards a narrower objective: stabilising relations with Washington while limiting further concessions. Everyone agrees that the concessions had to stop somewhere. No one agrees where—or who—would enforce that line.
Consciously uncoupled
Imperfect, but there
The result is patchwork and partial, but visible enough to matter. Where Washington tries to establish a foothold, the coalition moves to ensure it is not uncontested. The campaign is not coherent in the way an EU-wide effort would be, but prior coordination during the Greenland crisis equipped these states to move faster and form a coalition that is more durable.
Day 75
Appease, Delay, Distract
Grey zone exploited
The regulatory and tax grey zone on Svalbard becomes greyer, and a small number of American firms begin to test the boundaries. OpenAI, X, and several high-profile tech companies establish a presence on the island and structure parts of their operations to take advantage of Svalbard’s now-ambiguous legal status. Longyearbyen residents hear talk about potential data centre plans for the far side of Spitsbergen, the only permanently inhabited island in the archipelago.
As American activity on the island expands, the question of jurisdiction becomes harder to avoid. EU regulators assert that existing rules continue to apply to American firms operating in Svalbard, but there is little agreement on how to enforce them.
Svalbard is outside the EEA, Norway is outside the EU, and this crisis is outside what policymakers deemed possible.
Consciously uncoupled
Subsidising a distant rock
In mainland Europe, the costs of defending Svalbard are coming under scrutiny. The Nordic-led infrastructure package, the fast-tracked security reinforcements and the business subsidies committed earlier are beginning to show up in budget debates—and critics are starting to ask whether a remote archipelago is worth it. Energy and food prices are already elevated; the idea of governments redirecting funds towards an island most Europeans could not find on a map feeds a growing domestic backlash.
On Svalbard, a small number of American firms slowly start expanding and begin testing the boundaries. OpenAI, X, and several high-profile tech companies establish a presence on the island and internal memos explain how they might be able to take advantage of Svalbard’s somewhat-ambiguous legal status.
Day 100
Appease, Delay, Distract
A leak surfaces
A Le Monde story breaks with a leaked memo from X detailing how the firm has used Svalbard to loosely skirt EU regulation. The journalist shows that Palantir, Coinbase and a smattering of other American tech firms have begun buying property on the islands as well.
Consciously uncoupled
A fight on the information front
As American activity on Svalbard expands, European governments start looking for ways to impose costs on America. They turn towards the regulatory domain. European officials fear that the Trump administration will press American tech and social media firms, such as X or OpenAI to tweak their algorithms and shift the information environment to break European solidarity.
Day 102
Appease, Delay, Distract
Inquiries go unanswered
The story dominates newspapers across the continent. An unnamed Norwegian official confirms that the Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Governance has sent eleven compliance inquiries to US firms, but received only two responses, both from outside legal firms. The Greens in the European Parliament draft an emergency resolution.
Consciously uncoupled
Regulators move in
Data protection authorities across aligned member states announce accelerated investigations into major US tech firms, focusing on free speech protections, and compliance with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation and Digital Services Act.
Day 105
Appease, Delay, Distract
Trump is enraged
Trump tweets, “Europe is going after great American businesses trying to MAKE THE ARCTIC GREAT AGAIN. We are following the rules—the European Union is not. DISGRACE!”
Consciously uncoupled
Capitals lead, Brussels follows
The European Commission releases a statement saying it is looking into moving the timeline up for enforcement for its new AI Act. Critically, the regulatory action is presented and coordinated by national authorities first—the commission consolidates rather than leads.
Day 107
Appease, Delay, Distract
Sanctions released
Again, the tweet becomes policy. An updated sanctions notice appears on the US Treasury Department website. Deep in the list are eight names from France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, most of whom work for the EU: a senior digital regulator, a competition authority official and a ministry director involved in drafting new technology rules. They are accused of actions that “undermine US technological leadership” and “threaten national security through discriminatory regulatory practices”. Their US-based assets are frozen. Any dealings with US persons are prohibited. Travel restrictions follow within days.
Consciously uncoupled
Sanctions released
This move hits a nerve. An updated sanctions notice appears on the US Treasury Department website. Deep in the list are eight names from France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, most of whom work for the EU: a senior digital regulator, a competition authority official and a ministry director involved in drafting new technology rules. They are accused of actions that “undermine US technological leadership” and “threaten national security through discriminatory regulatory practices”. Their US-based assets are frozen. Any dealings with US persons are prohibited. Travel restrictions follow within days.
US officials brief industry groups that further designations remain possible if “hostile regulatory behaviour” continues.
Day 112
Appease, Delay, Distract
Spain stands alone
EU member states debate response options under pressure. Reciprocal sanctions risk escalation. Silence risks establishing a new normal in which US sanctions become an instrument for coercion. The European Commission considers legal countermeasures, but existing tools are not designed to handle the current situation. A lack of consensus ultimately turns into a lack of action.
Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, takes the hardest line, largely alone. The Spanish Ministry of Finance announces targeted audits focused on the tax arrangements of major American companies operating in Spain. The ministry of digital transformation issues new guidance demanding European sourcing for public-sector cloud and tech contracts, directly affecting US firms.
Spanish officials in Brussels push for a coordinated EU response, including using the anti-coercion instrument, an EU trade-defence mechanism that allows the bloc to impose countermeasures on countries that use economic pressure to coerce member states. “We have seen this before,” one senior official notes. “If we do not act now, the coercion will not stop here.”
Consciously uncoupled
The line holds
The Spanish prime minister Pedro Sanchez and French president Emmanuel Macron release a joint statement encouraging supermarkets not to stock Republican state goods on their shelves. Behind the scenes, they work with the Belgian delegation to bring the issue to the EU-level.
Ursula von der Leyen holds a press conference and announces that the European Commission is working to determine whether Trump’s sanctions would constitute economic coercion. The commission president says: “The EU is a regulatory superpower and the sanctions on our government workers and regulators is a threat to sovereignty of the EU. This is clearly America trying to coerce us on Svalbard, and we will not back down.”
The persecution of bureaucrats does not necessarily have a rally-round-the-flag effect, but leaders largely understand that being a “regulatory superpower” relies on the ability to enforce that regulation. By sanctioning individuals who design and implement that regulation, the Trump administration has threatened the very power of the EU. The commission considers triggering the anti-coercion instrument, the EU’s tool for retaliating against economic coercion by third countries.
Day 117
Appease, Delay, Distract
Washington retaliates
The US trade representative announces a review of Spain’s trade status, followed by the imposition of tariffs on Spanish goods—olive oil and niche pharmaceuticals mainly. US commerce secretary Howard Lutnick announces new sanctions on two additional Spanish officials.
The pressure then extends to the security domain. Pete Hegseth, the US defence secretary, announces a “reassessment” of US force posture in Europe, including whether to move 6th Fleet destroyers out of Rota—the joint US-Spanish naval base in Andalusia that hosts American ships—to “other, more suitable” ports. That would be a significant shift in US military presence on the Iberian Peninsula and leave gaps in Europe’s missile defence.
France matches Spain’s rhetoric, but not its actions; Macron joins Sanchez in calling for a coordinated European response but does not enact measures of his own.
Consciously uncoupled
The right rises
Protests pop up across Europe. The far-right Alternative for Germany party frames the EU’s response as overly escalatory. France’s National Rally argues the costs of retaliation will fall on Europeans. Other populist parties also complain. Italy’s Five Star Movement and Hungary’s Fidesz join in. A common slogan circulates: “No war for permafrost”.
The Trump administration views the protests as a sign that its wedging strategy might work. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent adds several senior European Commission officials to the sanctions list, and announces tariffs on German cars and auto parts, French and Italian luxury goods, and Spanish olive oil.
Von der Leyen and Macron, along with German chancellor Friedrich Merz and Alex Stubb, the president of Finland, head to Washington to try to negotiate, but they understand that this is just a show to fulfil consultation requirements for the anti-coercion instrument—the negotiations last two hours and finish with a spectacle that makes the 2025 meeting between Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and Trump in the Oval Office seem cordial.
Day 123
Appease, Delay, Distract
Brussels is threatened
Belgium’s reaction is sharper and more anxious. As the host of the EU institutions, Belgium treats the US sanctions as both a national affront and a direct threat to the European system itself. Brussels pushes for EU-level trade countermeasures, including export taxes and tariffs on US goods. The White House takes note: if Brussels is willing to fight, it can be made to pay.
Consciously uncoupled
A European offensive
On the plane back to Brussels, von der Leyen announces that the new tariffs coming from the US have killed the Turnberry deal, the July 2025 agreement under which the US capped tariffs on EU goods at 15% and the EU dropped duties on US industrial goods to zero. The EU had also frozen its $109bn retaliatory tariff package as part of that bargain; with the deal now dead, von der Leyen says, there is no basis for keeping it on ice. The EU will activate the retaliatory package immediately.
Then, the EU doubles down on offence: it announces an initial 20% tariff on targeted US imports, 30% for goods coming from states with a Republican senator. The EU will no longer sign contracts with US firms for public procurement. The Council, convening in emergency session, votes to formally authorise the anti-coercion instrument.
Day 127
Appease, Delay, Distract
Trump pushes for NATO relocation
Trump tweets a video captioned “Donald J. Trump NATO Headquarters”—a mock-up of a rebranded alliance building, transplanted from Brussels, where NATO has been headquartered since 1967, to Warsaw. The skyline of the Polish capital can be seen in the background, flanked by golden statues of the American president.
European leaders read the tweet as a signal rather than satire. Yet despite the cost to Belgium, some quietly hope Trump follows through—a relocated headquarters to a “friendlier” European country might be the cheapest way to keep the US inside the alliance.
Consciously uncoupled
Recession fears mount
The costs loom large. Economists warn that Europe could fall into a recession as trade contracts. The German and French bond markets show acute signs of faltering upon opening.
Day 133
Appease, Delay, Distract
Alliance in question
That hope is quickly dashed. Rubio says that America will be reviewing its commitment to NATO given the “hostile regulatory behaviour” facing American companies critical to US security in the EU. The next day, the Pentagon announces that it will not be sending the next rotation of US military planners to the NATO headquarters in Brussels.
Privately, American officials say that continued escalation could lead to US withdrawal from the alliance and retrenchment of forces in Europe. The issue is no longer specific to Spain and Belgium, or digital regulation.
Consciously uncoupled
Article 5 in doubt
Right-wing-led no-confidence efforts begin to gain real traction across the continent.
But America does not escape the fallout. Europeans begin telling US firms not to bid for lucrative public contracts.
Financial markets have a few bad days and pundits speculate the economy will turn. A handful of Republican senators break ranks with Trump as tariffs hit their states. The administration finds coercing Europe harder than expected—instead of splitting countries with strong right-wing movements off from the bloc, European leaders have doubled down.
Day 140
Appease, Delay, Distract
Retaliation to appeasement
Belgian authorities shift from retaliation towards damage control. Calls for the anti-coercion instrument are softened, efforts to push forward coordinated retaliation cease. The European Commission, under pressure from particularly vulnerable member states, introduces a package of “technical adjustments” to show “goodwill towards companies vital to transatlantic cooperation”. None of these changes are presented as concessions, but the timing is not lost on the European public and American officials.
Consciously uncoupled
NATO rotations paused
Trump then turns to his tried-and-true coercive tool. He tells a press gaggle, “I told Norway I wanted Svalbard, and they said no, and now they’re screwing us. To tell you the truth, they can go to hell. They can’t fight the US economically and expect us to protect them. As far as I’m concerned Article 5 is dead.”
The Pentagon quietly pauses several NATO rotations and delays exercises to show their resolve to the president’s decision. NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte flies to Washington immediately to try and repair the damage. Alex Stubb is on the same flight out: “A lot can be fixed with a good game of golf.”
Day 148
Appease, Delay, Distract
The pressure lifts
Washington responds selectively. The NATO billets are posted. No additional sanctions are announced. The tariffs targeting Spain remain but are not expanded.
Consciously uncoupled
Europe plays its cards
European leaders are resolute. The commission proceeds with the implementation of its countermeasures. Prior enforcement actions are not rolled back. Von der Leyen announces a 25% export tax on components for US weaponry and on active pharmaceutical ingredients. The EU accounts for 60% of US pharma imports and manufactures 43% of active ingredients in US brand-name drugs. Raising the price on American consumers would impose incredible costs to an already-expensive healthcare system. Moreover, European firms are so integrated into American defence supply chains that any rising prices threaten production speed and cost. Patriot missile-defence systems alone involve 21 different European suppliers.
Von der Leyen’s move carries real weight and spooks even Trump’s closest allies. American pharma and defence firms issue desperate statements as their stocks fall.
Day 150
Appease, Delay, Distract
The crisis fades
The immediate crisis subsides. European leaders breathe out. The worst did not happen—NATO holds, no territory changed hands, no government fell. But something harder to name has shifted.
Consciously uncoupled
America tastes its own medicine
American pharmaceutical giants Eli Lilly and Pfizer warn of supply disruptions in press releases. Hospital associations in 18 states send a joint letter to Congress.
Lockheed Martin representatives tell their defence department contacts that without some work-around, they might need to slow production at their Patriot facility in Arkansas. The S&P 500, America’s main share index, drops 4.2% over three days.
North Carolina’s senator, the Republican Ted Budd, breaks rank first. The state’s pharma sector employs 75,000 people; he calls for “renewed dialogue”. A few other senators from the affected states follow suit. As pressure mounts, Trump starts to climb down. As ever, he reframes the reversal as a win. In a Truth Social post he declares that America has been “screwed by the EU, but this time, we screwed them back. I will never stop fighting to Make America Great Again!”
Day 160
Appease, Delay, Distract
Spin cycle
European media coverage emphasises how EU leaders “saved NATO”. The Spanish government is criticised across Europe for triggering a confrontation that could have ended the alliance. Media in Spain lambast Sanchez because the tariffs have continued and the crisis has brought no benefit. By contrast, French leaders, who never acted upon their threats, and Italian leaders, who made no fuss at all—are praised for their restraint and “strategic patience”.
Consciously uncoupled
The fire dies down
Slowly, the confrontation loses intensity. Sanctions quietly lapse. Some tariffs are lifted. The EU’s anti-coercion instrument is rolled back piece by piece in sequence with US actions. Trump and Rutte shake hands at their next meeting. Rubio conducts backchannels with von der Leyen and Rutte. And, ahead of that summer’s NATO summit, he tweets one line: “America is committed to NATO.”
Technical discussions between Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff, the EU, and different European leaders focus less on Svalbard and security and more on stabilising the economic relationship.
Day 180
Appease, Delay, Distract
Six months later – A hollow victory
Across Europe, the effects are more subtle but enduring. Regulatory frameworks remain intact formally, but, in practice, their power has shifted. Enforcement becomes more cautious, more selective, and more contingent on geopolitical contexts. The first sign comes quietly: a planned investigation into a large American platform company is shelved after a call from Washington. No announcement is made.
Spain and Belgium did not officially reverse course, but the system around them adjusted. EU member states retain individual authorities, but they no longer exercise them with the same confidence or consistency.
EU institutions are saved, but the power they once wielded is lost.
—
Consciously uncoupled
Six months later – Wounded, but stronger
The outcome is not clean and the damage it left in its wake smoulders—European GDP has contracted by 0.4%. No-confidence votes in Germany, Denmark and France force snap elections in which right-wing parties gain more seats in parliament than before. The transatlantic relationship is weaker, more transactional and more uncertain than before.
Europe does not win the crisis, but it keeps its leverage. By holding their ground as a minilateral grouping at first, and then as a formidable bloc, European leaders prove Europe can be a force to be reckoned with.
—
Getting through the sliding doors
The two scenarios are not inevitable or necessarily likely, but they are plausible—drawn from crises Europeans have already lived through, among them the Greenland crisis and the US sanctioning of Thierry Breton, a former EU internal market commissioner. What they show is less about Trump’s erraticism than about the choices Europeans make when pressure arrives. A strategy of appeasement may reduce the temperature in the short term, but over time, it teaches Washington that European sovereignty is negotiable.
European policymakers should draw three lessons from these scenarios.
Beware the wedge strategy
The first is that the White House, over the last 18 months, has employed wedge strategies to divide the EU27 and any ad-hoc European coalition that opposes its goals. These strategies have been largely effective because of European unpreparedness. Trump’s tool of choice since his second inauguration has been weaponising European dependence. His proclivity towards coercion will not change until the administration changes.
This has already happened. In 2026 alone, the Trump administration threatened Spain and berated Britain for not being supportive enough during Operation Epic Fury, the US military campaign against Iran. Then, a memo was leaked from the Pentagon that laid bare the punitive measures the US could take to “punish” NATO allies that withheld support for American operations. A few weeks later, when Merz publicly criticised America for the war in Iran, saying Washington “obviously has no strategy”, Trump used the comment as cover to announce the retrenchment of 5,000 troops from Germany. After that announcement, NATO’s Rutte said that Europeans had “gotten the message” from Trump and they would ensure all bilateral basing agreements are implemented. This essentially walked back earlier efforts by European leaders to stand up to the White House.
Because Europeans have continued to acquiesce, Trump has continued to push. Take his threats that America might not defend NATO allies as an example. When the White House makes any threat against NATO, as demonstrated by the “appease, distract, delay” scenario, European governments tend to abandon whatever collective coordination exists and focus on prioritising national interests—to the detriment of European strength. For example, Italy’s prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, broke with the EU position on retaliatory tariffs in March 2025 in response to Trump seeking to impose tariffs on most US trading partners; German auto manufacturers held their own bilateral talks with the White House in response too.
If this is the mechanism through which Trump’s wedge strategy operates, it also points to the conditions under which Europeans can resist US coercion.
Build coalitions around interest, not unity
The second lesson is that European leaders should stop trying to get all member states to agree on foreign policy or defence. Portugal and Poland, for example, will not see eye to eye, because Warsaw’s threat environment is not Lisbon’s, just as Tallinn’s is vastly different from Rome’s. Instead, like-minded states should band together to push ahead on salient issues where they can. The goal is not to manufacture EU27 unity, but to support coalitions that share interests and foster their ability to act on them.
This changes what European cohesion requires. On any given issue, only a subset of states will have both the will and wherewithal to push back against Washington. Iberian states may align on trade and migration where Poland will not; the NB8 may move one way on defence industrial questions where the southern European states would go another.
These coalitions should be flexible, but to be sustainable, they cannot be ad hoc. Crises move faster than coalition building, and a coalition assembled in the middle of a disaster is already losing ground. The minilateral formats that exist—the Weimar Triangle, the NB8, the Visegrad Group, the E3 (Britain, France and Germany) or the E5 (those three plus Italy and Spain)—should serve as standing forums for coordination on trade, technology and defence, not be convened only when Washington forces the issue or when a new EU funding package is passed. New formats should be built where existing ones do not fit the problem. The work is dull and duplicative, but duplication may just create fail-safes where there are none.
To combat a hostile White House, the states inside any given coalition will need to absorb the costs of resistance—and the states outside that coalition should try, at a minimum, not to undercut the resistance efforts. This obligation is where Europeans have failed. When Washington exerts pressure on an exposed coalition, the temptation of unaffected states is to quietly improve their own standing with Trump by signalling acquiescence or availability. While this temptation is rational, it teaches the administration that any coalition can be disregarded by simply going around it. For instance, when Britain blocked America from using its bases to strike Iran, the US air force flew to Bulgaria instead.
What remains is a less satisfying vision of European power than the one usually invoked—no stirring communiques, no leaders in front of 27 flags. But it may be the only viable model. Europe will not act like a single entity, because it isn’t one. Smaller coalitions, institutionalised in advance and organised around specific goals, may succeed where a wider effort cannot. This is a way to preserve European power by changing its form.
Map leverage before the crisis arrives
The third lesson is that these institutionalised coalitions must map the leverage they have—and decide what they are willing to deploy—before a crisis arrives. Building the coalition is the first battle; knowing what it can actually bring to bear is the second. That mapping cannot, and should not, be crisis-specific. After all, coalitions will not have the luxury of choosing which crisis they face. Furthermore, Trump does not confine pressure to one domain—a territorial issue can quickly transform into a trade dispute or a fight over NATO. A coalition that has inventoried leverage only in the area in which it expects trouble will find itself outmanoeuvred as the conflict shifts ground.
The leverage has to be comprehensive. European policymakers should count economic, industrial and security together so no action can go uncontested. The transatlantic relationship is unbalanced, but it is not one-sided. Europeans tend to internalise the asymmetry, which is precisely what makes coercion appealing for Washington. A coalition that has not done the work of inventorying its own leverage will discover, in the middle of a crisis, that it does not know what it can offer or threaten.
Europeans need to do this mapping at the coalition level, not the national or the EU level. Most individual European states are too small to move Washington on their own, but a coalition can combine leverage into something Washington has to take seriously. Norway, acting alone, is unlikely to hold leverage that meaningfully brings the US to the table. Coordinated with Sweden and Denmark, however, the calculation changes. Norway has the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund of its kind; Sweden brings a serious defence industrial base and one of Europe’s most consequential telecoms infrastructure companies; Denmark is home to a pharmaceutical industry the US depends on. None of those states is decisive alone, but together they are hard to route around. The focus now, even while crises arise, should be on auditing what leverage states have and how a combination might affect the US. Without that inventory, the leverage is theoretical.
The other part is political: deciding how a coalition uses what it holds. Washington does not confine pressure to the domain in which a dispute originated—a trade fight becomes a basing fight, and then a security fight. Coalitions that limit themselves to in-kind responses will be outmatched on whichever terrain Washington chooses. Should the US invade Svalbard, a Nordic coalition can answer with economic measures. Where the US hits with economic coercion in the Nordics, Finland could stop the sale of military icebreakers (80% of the world’s icebreakers are designed and built there). The coalition must decide in advance under what conditions it will act, and signal those conditions clearly enough to shape American behaviour before a crisis arrives.
A European choice
The choice is no longer between a unified Europe and a fragmented one. That question will not be settled any time soon. The choice now is between coalitions that prepare before the next crisis and coalitions that improvise during it. The last 18 months have shown what improvisation looks like: capitals pressed one at a time, resistance quietly softened, and concessions interpreted in Washington as evidence that coercion remains effective. None of the three lessons set out here requires total European unity. All of them require the same discipline: preparation before the crisis arrives and the resolve to draw on that groundwork when accommodation looks easier. Europe, as it stands, is some distance from that. The question is whether some states within it are willing to close the gap.
About the author
Nevada Joan Lee is a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in the Washington office. Her research focuses on European security and defence, US foreign policy, the transatlantic relationship and NATO.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the many people who helped with this paper. First and foremost, Kat Fytatzi brought thoughtful and careful editing that greatly sharpened the piece. Jeremy Shapiro was instrumental in forming the ideas at its core and strengthening the argument considerably through his multiple rounds of feedback. Chris Herrmann, Majda Ruge and Tobias Gerke offered generous comments on earlier drafts. Nastassia Zenovich gave this piece its visual life through her extraordinary creativity and Chris Eichberger through beautiful visuals. Martin Tenev completed the circle by bringing the article to our browsers. I am also grateful Rory Gates’s support of ECFR, without which this work would not have been possible. Any questionable predictions that come to pass are entirely coincidental—though the author will not hesitate to claim credit for predicting those that do.
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