Occupational therapy: Frozen conflicts, Russian aggression and EU enlargement

Summary

• Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has offered a membership perspective to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.
• This gives the bloc new potential to resolve or stabilise “frozen conflicts” in eastern candidate states.
• The breakaway and occupied regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are undergoing a process of de facto annexation by Russia.
• The EU should draw up a policy to deal with Russian annexation actions, prevent Moscow from effectively vetoing candidates’ accession, and embed this in its evolving approach towards Russia.

New policy for new times

For many years, the EU has lacked a coherent strategy for addressing security and political challenges arising from protracted conflicts in countries to its east. But since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the bloc has gained the ability to play a meaningful role in addressing such challenges, including in Abkhazia in Georgia and in Transnistria in Moldova. However, it has not yet capitalised on this, or perhaps even understood the extent of its newfound potential.

As part of its response to Russia’s war, the EU made offers of membership to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In this transformed context, enlargement could, once again, become a key geopolitical instrument for the bloc. Yet, granting membership perspectives to countries at war, and with territories occupied or effectively controlled by Russia, requires an integration path that extends beyond the Copenhagen criteria—the official conditions necessary to join the bloc, which were developed in a very different era. Russia retains the capacity to destabilise these countries through its influence in these territories. This means that eastward enlargement will confront the EU with unprecedented challenges. It also comes at a time when American reluctance to act as a security guarantor in Europe complicates the EU’s efforts to ensure regional stability and resolve conflicts—though it may also catalyse a greater EU role in security and crisis management on the continent. 

So far, the bloc’s approach to these regions remains fragmented and reactive. The EU and its member states tend to treat these conflicts as secondary security concerns (except for Ukrainian regions where war is raging). They have also played a cautious role in international mediation formats dedicated to these conflicts.

This policy brief examines the EU’s role in resolving conflicts in breakaway and occupied territories within eastern candidate countries. In particular, it looks at the current situation in Abkhazia to warn that Russia is gradually annexing the region—an act that could entrench Moscow’s influence even more deeply. The paper explores the lessons learned from the EU’s past engagement with these territories and countries, and offers recommendations for a more effective strategy. It draws on desk research and interviews with conflict experts, EU officials and representatives from the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission.

The paper argues the EU should draw up a strategy that directly accounts for the breakaway and occupied regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria as part of eastern candidate countries’ membership journey. Alongside this, the EU and its member states will need to become more assertive partners, acting independently of the United States, the United Nations, the OSCE and potentially even NATO when it comes to dealing with these territories. The EU should aim to counterbalance Russia in the occupied regions and move firmly away from the “caution first” imperative that guided European policy towards Russia for most of the last 30 years. It must offer local populations a tangible, attractive European-led alternative, making clear that these regions have a future in the EU as part of Georgia and Moldova—and that this way forward heralds the security, prosperity and dignity that Russia can never provide.

Russia’s influence

The EU’s decision to grant membership perspectives to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created a historic opportunity—not only for these countries’ European integration but also for the prospect of resolving long-term conflicts in their occupied or breakaway regions. EU membership is a powerful incentive for reform, stability and reconciliation. For Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria it could even help reshape the political and economic realities of these territories and could fundamentally alter their relations with central governments.

Yet something is missing: the EU’s accession process lacks a roadmap dedicated to addressing protracted conflicts in breakaway and occupied territories in candidate countries. The bloc must tackle this, first to prevent the unresolved status of these regions from scuppering applicant countries’ accession. Second, the EU will want to minimise the opportunity for Russia to exploit its presence and influence in these regions, including making sure to deny Moscow an effective veto over these states’ accession to the EU. Finally, the bloc must place policy towards these regions and countries within its broader strategic approach to Russia.

Frozen but evolving

Russia is currently on course to annex, or retain full control over, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.

For the last 30 years, Moscow has systematically exploited local tensions in some former Soviet states to create and prolong “frozen conflicts”, assert military influence and block its neighbours’ Euro-Atlantic integration. The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia date from the early 1990s, when both regions declared independence from Georgia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This led to violent conflict involving significant displacement of people and loss of life. Despite ceasefire agreements, tensions persisted—largely due to Russia’s involvement as a “mediator” and “peacekeeper”, culminating in its 2008 invasion of Georgia. After the war, Russia formally recognised both regions as independent states and deployed military forces to them. Russia controls around 20% of Georgian territory, which enables it to exert significant political and economic influence.

In all three regions, there is a strong Russian military presence, with troops in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. Since early 2024, satellite images have shown Russia building a naval base in the southern Abkhazian city of Ochamchire, thereby bolstering its military presence in the Black Sea.

Notable differences exist between the occupied and breakaway regions. In South Ossetia and Transnistria, both the elite and the broader population show strong loyalty to Moscow, marked by close political and economic ties to Russia and open support for eventual incorporation into the Russian Federation. In these two regions, and in contrast to Abkhazia, political leaders have expressed support for the idea of becoming part of Russia, even holding a referendum (or attempting to hold a referendum) on the issue.

Abkhazia, on the other hand, maintains a more complex relationship with Russia. It is heavily dependent on Russia economically and politically, but it continues to emphasise its desire for independence rather than unification with Russia. Its governing institutions are fairly developed and geared above all towards separatism rather than adherence to Russia.

Another key differentiator lies in Russia’s selective recognition strategy: it has officially recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was an outcome of the 2008 invasion. And prior to the annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” in 2022, it had also recognised these two Ukrainian regions as “people’s republics”. Moscow has refrained from such actions in Moldova because Russia lacks a direct physical border with Transnistria, making annexation logistically impractical, especially with war raging in Ukraine. Non-recognition also allows Moscow to preserve strategic leverage over Moldova, maintain economic and military influence, avoid diplomatic backlash and retain a powerful frozen conflict as a tool of regional control.

Russia’s post-2014, and especially post-2022, actions suggest that Moscow would be more interested in the formal annexation of these pro-Russian regions, as opposed to keeping them “independent.”

Abkhazia: Annexation in progress

Abkhazia is located in north-western Georgia on the Black Sea coast and borders Russia to the north. Its estimated population of around 240,000 people includes 50% Abkhaz, 17% Armenians, 17% Georgians and 9.1% Russians. Many ethnic Georgians live in the Gali district in the south-east of the region. Following a short war with Georgia between 1992 and 1993, Abkhazia gained effective independence. It has its own president, parliament, military and administrative structures but remains heavily dependent on Russian political, military and economic support.

Russia’s annexation of Abkhazia has unfolded not through formal declarations, but via a slow, structured absorption of the region’s sovereignty, infrastructure and institutions—a textbook case of “annexation by stealth”. The process began in earnest after the 2008 war and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia as an independent state. It accelerated significantly following Georgia’s and Ukraine’s signing of association agreements with the EU in 2014. Russia’s response at that time was twofold: the outright annexation of Crimea; and the intensification of Abkhazia’s de facto incorporation into the Russian state. The latter issue has gone under the radar of the international community.

A pivotal moment was the Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership signed in November 2014 by Vladimir Putin and Abkhazia’s de facto leader Raul Khajimba. The treaty subordinated Abkhazia’s security and customs systems to Russian control. It established a “joint defense and security space,” whereby Russian forces assumed effective control over Abkhazia’s “borders” and military infrastructure. The treaty also mandated the creation of a Combined Group of Forces, integrating Abkhazia’s military into the Russian armed forces, and granting Russian officers leadership roles within Abkhaz units.

The next domain targeted was law enforcement. In November 2016, an agreement was signed between the Russian interior ministry and the Abkhaz authorities to create a joint information system and coordinate law enforcement operations. A follow-up agreement in 2017 enabled joint Russian-Abkhaz patrols, intelligence exchange and cross-border police operations. This effectively brought Abkhazia’s internal security under Russian control.

In parallel, economic and financial dependence was institutionalised. Through annual “investment programmes” and federal subsidies, Russia now funds up to 70% of Abkhazia’s budget. Large segments of the economy—especially energy, infrastructure and telecommunications—are now owned or managed by Russian companies or supported by Russian funding.

In 2018, a new agreement placed Abkhazia’s customs system under the jurisdiction of Russia’s Federal Customs Service, and Moscow began pushing for the harmonisation of Abkhaz laws with Russian legislation. In 2020, yet another “integration plan” was adopted, expanding Russia’s jurisdiction into civil registration, education standards, taxation and judicial practices. The “Programme for the Formation of a Common Social and Economic Space with Abkhazia” formalised plans to align currency policies, banking regulation, land use rights and property laws with Russian norms. Key provisions included: the introduction of Russian standards in civil registration and land ownership; the expansion of dual citizenship rights and residence permits for Russians; simplified procedures for Russian companies to operate in Abkhazia; and full integration of pension and social protection systems.

In a clear manifestation of Russia’s de facto annexation of Abkhazia, Moscow formalised control over the strategic Bichvinta dacha complex through a 2022 agreement with the region’s de facto authorities. They transferred ownership of the estate and leased 186 hectares of surrounding land and maritime territory to Russia for 49 years for a symbolic one rouble per year. The deal granted Russia full diplomatic immunity, extraterritorial jurisdiction and exclusive control over the compound and its personnel—effectively legalising what had been an informal Russian occupation since the 1990s. Public opposition and a ruling by Abkhazia’s “constitutional court” initially delayed ratification. But after two years of pressure—including financial threats and a demand that “Putin needs Bichvinta”—the de facto parliament ratified the treaty in December 2023. Russia subsequently protested at the protective amendments adopted by Sukhumi and demanded full compliance. In such ways does Moscow use legal instruments, coercion and diplomatic leverage to convert strategic assets into permanent territorial control.

Yet perhaps Russia’s most controversial move was the proposal to allow its citizens to own land and property in Abkhazia. This triggered a widespread backlash from Abkhaz political elites and society, culminating in public protests between 2023 and 2024. The reforms were perceived as a direct threat to Abkhaz national identity and the fragile demographic balance.

The crisis escalated in early 2024, when the Abkhaz president, Aslan Bzhania—a key ally for Moscow in Sukhumi—moved forward with the land and citizenship reforms. This encroachment by Russia has led to stronger resistance from local elites and nationalist groups. In 2024, protests in Sukhumi against Russian interference forced Bzhania’s resignation. However, the subsequent election in February 2025 saw pro-Russian candidate Badra Gunba win, reflecting Moscow’s intolerance for political dissent. This was the first time Russia had intervened directly in Abkhaz elections through financial, political and campaign tools. It offered financial aid, uses electricity dependence as leverage, established an air link between Sukhumi and Moscow and expressed direct political support for its preferred candidate. Critics were stripped of Russian citizenship and labelled “foreign agents”, effectively locking them inside Abkhazia, since without Russian citizenship they cannot travel abroad or receive the benefits that Abkhaz are entitled to from Moscow. This was also the first time that Russia leveraged citizenship for political reasons.

The Abkhaz discontent of 2024 was not a strategic setback for Moscow—it was a tactical regrouping, which led to the ultimate triumph of its favoured candidate. 

In short, Abkhazia is now a satellite of the Russian Federation in all but name. While maintaining the façade of a “sovereign state”, its autonomy is functionally hollowed out. What began as military occupation and diplomatic recognition in 2008 has evolved into a layered and sophisticated annexation model—legalistic, gradual and insulated from international backlash.

The EU and Abkhazia

Russia’s shift in strategy in Abkhazia presents the EU with a challenge. This annexation by stealth undermines the sovereignty of an EU candidate state and erodes the credibility of the bloc’s enlargement and neighbourhood policy. It therefore demands a shift from a policy of non-recognition towards an active anti-annexation approach.

The EU’s approach to Georgia’s occupied regions has long been shaped by its Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP), which it adopted after the August 2008 war. This policy aims to uphold Georgia’s territorial integrity and counter Russia’s recognition efforts while maintaining engagement with the populations in the occupied territories. The EU took this approach because anything resembling recognition of the breakaway regions was a red line for Tbilisi, which remains the case even today. The EU pursued its NREP and played a role in countering Russian efforts pushing for recognition for Abkhazia in regions like Africa, the Caribbean and Oceania. Only four states joined Russia in recognition (Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela), with two (Tuvalu and Vanuatu) later reversing their positions. After 2014—especially following the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas—Russia largely abandoned these efforts and shifted toward de facto annexation. Overall, the EU has consistently upheld its non-recognition principle, but it refrained from explicitly labelling Georgia’s regions as occupied territories until after 2022, when it began using terms such as “occupied breakaway regions”.

The EU has engaged sporadically with Abkhazia, within the bounds of this non-recognition policy. However, EU activity has made limited impact. Since 2008, the bloc has invested over €80m in humanitarian projects, primarily in Abkhazia, and nearly €100m in the Enguri Hydro Power Plant, which is vital for Abkhazia’s electricity supply. EU aid remains project-based and intangible for the broader population. It lacks a clear public relations component, in contrast to Russia’s tangible financial support, which comes in the form of salaries, budgetary support, investments, pensions and social programmes. This disparity undermines the EU’s influence and visibility in the region and fails to position it as a credible counterweight to Russia.

Similarly, despite Abkhaz resistance to Russian dominance, the EU has missed opportunities to leverage this dissatisfaction. In the 2000s, the EU held some influence in Abkhazia. Following the adoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, Abkhazia tried to position itself as a region of interest for the EU. However, the 2008 war and Russia’s recognition moved Abkhaz focus away from the EU. But, in 2020, Abkhazia adopted its Foreign Policy Concept, which named relations with EU member states as a priority. According to the concept, Abkhazia: “is interested in establishing and developing relations with the countries of the European Union in all possible areas of cooperation. Given the limited political engagement with EU member states, the Republic of Abkhazia seeks to enhance interaction in the humanitarian sphere. This primarily concerns freedom of movement, access to European education, medical care, and cultural-humanitarian cooperation.” (EU member states are listed as the sixth priority, after Russia, Georgia, “states that recognise Abkhazia’s independence”, Turkey, the Commonwealth of Independent States and Eurasian Economic Union states.)

This still presents a potential opening for the EU to engage more substantively with Abkhaz society. By focusing on practical issues highlighted in Abkhazia’s own Foreign Policy Concept—such as freedom of movement, access to European education and healthcare, and culture—the EU can position itself not merely as a distant mediator or negotiation facilitator, but as a tangible actor with real on-the-ground impact. Targeted engagement in these areas would make Europe more visible and attractive to Abkhaz citizens, offer a credible alternative to Russia’s dominance and gradually grow the EU’s influence through soft power and societal ties.

Georgia today

Doubtless, robust engagement with Abkhazia is currently constrained by the erosion of the EU’s leverage over Georgia, which stems from the authoritarian turn of the Georgian Dream government. For now, the EU continues to avoid engagement with Abkhazia without the consent of Tbilisi—a government that increasingly portrays the EU as a “global war party” seeking to destabilise Georgia through a colour revolution and entangle it in war with Russia. While Georgia has not formally abandoned its policy of the peaceful reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its growing alignment with Russia and deliberate distancing from the EU significantly complicate Europeans’ ability to act.

However, the EU should not allow its approach to Abkhazia to be held hostage by the short-term trajectory of Georgia’s domestic politics. The current government’s political direction is a serious but potentially reversible development in the coming years. European policymakers must therefore begin exploring creative avenues for engagement—ones that respect Georgia’s territorial integrity while preparing for more favourable conditions in the future. Even if political relations with the Georgian leadership remain difficult, technical cooperation with the Georgian bureaucracy can continue, allowing the EU to quietly maintain a foothold and readiness to act when opportunities arise.

The EU and its eastern neighbourhood

The EU’s approach towards frozen conflicts to its east was long governed by a reluctance to upset Russia; and by a lack of interest in enlarging to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

Prior to 2022, the EU relied primarily on its soft power to encourage the alignment of eastern neighbours by promoting democratic transition, the rule of law and greater economic cooperation. It remained attached to its identity as a norms-driven actor and eschewed any bolder geopolitical role. The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy provided a framework to engage with countries that were unlikely to become candidates for membership. This approach was strongly shaped by the bloc’s broad objective of improving relations with Russia. Until 2022, EU accession for eastern partners was not even a practical consideration, even though several EaP participants had concluded association agreements which acknowledged membership aspirations.

EU policy in the period before 2022 did little to support conflict resolution and reintegration efforts. Even within the EaP, the bloc did not develop specific instruments or initiatives to engage with breakaway and occupied territories. In theory, the benefits of existing policy could have helped attract residents of occupied territories. In practice, these benefits remained out of reach for them, blocked by physical and political barriers, Russian propaganda and practical issues such as impediments to the movement of goods and people.

The main occasion that the EU played a prominent role in conflict resolution in the eastern neighbourhood was when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. The EU assumed this role under the French presidency. The result was a Six Point Ceasefire Agreement brokered on August 12th 2008 and accepted by Georgia and Russia. The agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces to their pre-conflict positions and the opening of international discussions on security agreements—also known as the Geneva International Discussions (GID). This agreement also laid the ground for the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia.

Prior to this, in 2003 the EU appointed a special representative (EUSR) for the south Caucasus. The goal was to increase EU political engagement in the region and enhance the visibility of the bloc’s external action. However, insufficient political backing from the outset undermined the EUSR’s ability to contribute meaningfully to conflict resolution. Authorities in Sukhumi remained unpersuaded by European peace initiatives during this period, such as the 2008 Steinmeier plan. This aimed to resolve the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia through a phased approach, including the return of the displaced persons, economic reconstruction and eventual negotiation of the political status of Abkhazia within Georgia.

All in all, the EU’s bold engagement in Georgia around the time of the war was short-lived. As one interviewee remarked, “It began and ended in 2008”.[1] The EU’s diplomatic efforts, especially through the GID, have equally yielded little progress. Russia and its proxies have blocked substantive talks in that format, framing conflicts as bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian issues. As a result, the GID has become ineffective; no resolution is in sight on key issues such as the non-use of force guarantees and the return of displaced persons. Meanwhile, the EUMM lacks access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, limiting its effectiveness. Its role is now confined to documenting ceasefire violations and managing a crisis hotline. As another interviewee remarked, “raising an issue in Geneva often ensures it won’t be resolved”.[2]

Recommendations to stop annexation

The EU’s post-2022 shift in approach and policy marks a new level of commitment to deeper engagement in the region. By granting membership perspectives to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU gave itself, for the first time, real leverage to drive transformation and contribute more meaningfully to the security and stability of its eastern partners.

The EU accession perspective presents candidate countries with new opportunities and leverage towards occupied breakaway regions. In contrast to the policy that went before, reforms and alignment with the EU’s values and legislation should contribute to greater economic cooperation and connectivity with the EU. But, to realise this potential, a more strategic and visible EU role in these territories could help unlock the transformative power of accession and contribute to long-term stability. The membership perspective alone is unlikely to shift the status quo.

The EU now needs a new strategy for regions at risk of continued Russian domination or outright annexation in candidate countries. It is true that some of the most effective ways forward would require full engagement from the candidate states. For countries like Georgia, this will be challenging, as the direction of the Georgian Dream government limits the EU’s ability to engage fully. However, if the EU approaches the development and implementation of such a new strategy as a long-term priority, this will allow it to outlast the current ruling regimes and political crises in Georgia or elsewhere. Drawing up this new approach will demonstrate the bloc’s determination to stay the course.

The EU must develop a unified, long-term strategy for engaging with these territories—one that balances non-recognition with proactive engagement, supports people-to-people contact and access to education and healthcare, and strengthens resilience against Russian influence. The EU must develop a clear policy on integrating the breakaway and occupied regions as part of its enlargement framework and broader neighbourhood policy objectives. Differentiated approaches are necessary, but they should be embedded in a strategic vision that treats these territories not as peripheral anomalies but as critical elements of the EU’s unfinished mission.

If the EU relinquishes its presence and influence, it effectively cedes the space to Russia, reinforcing the logic of force over the rule of law. EU commitment in Abkhazia is not a favour to Georgia—it is an investment in long-term stability, normative consistency and the credibility of EU foreign policy in its own neighbourhood.

European leaders should therefore pursue the following six policies.

Design an anti-annexation policy 

As the EU deepens its engagement with eastern candidate countries, it must develop a comprehensive anti-annexation policy that aims to make these states “annexation-proof”. This means enacting concrete policies that strengthen the resilience, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova through security-related measures. It also means identifying annexation-related activities and taking action against those who undertake them.

First and foremost, the EU must invest more decisively in the security and defence capacities of its eastern partners. This includes expanding security sector reform programmes, increasing the scope of the European Peace Facility (and deepening candidate countries’ cooperation with this facility), providing defensive military assistance where appropriate and integrating these countries into EU early warning systems and cybersecurity coordination mechanisms. Enhancing candidate states’ deterrence and defence capabilities can help the EU ensure future Russian military incursions—whether conventional or hybrid—meet stiff resistance.

Second, and equally important, is the need for the EU to identify and name subtler forms of annexation and respond accordingly. In regions like Abkhazia, Russia has employed a strategy of “legal annexation by stealth”—including harmonisation of legislation, alignment with Russian foreign and defence policy and the issuing of Russian passports. These actions blur the line between de facto occupation and de jure integration into the Russian Federation. The EU must call out these policies for what they are: systematic violations of international law and direct assaults on the sovereignty of its partner countries. It must adopt targeted countermeasures in consequence. These may include: placing sanctions on individuals and entities involved in implementing integration policies in occupied regions; placing restrictions on EU-based companies operating in or trading with such territories; and pursuing diplomatic initiatives aimed at reinforcing the non-recognition policy globally.

Ultimately, the EU must embed its new anti-annexation policy within its broader enlargement and neighbourhood strategy. A state cannot be truly prepared for membership if it remains vulnerable to foreign subjugation or dismemberment. Making candidate countries “annexation-proof” is not just a moral and geopolitical imperative—it is a prerequisite for a secure, stable and integrated Europe. Further Russian annexation of these territories would benefit only Moscow.

Incorporate conflict resolution and stabilisation mechanisms into the European integration process

The EU’s enlargement methodology is based on the Copenhagen criteria and a framework of 35 negotiating chapters grouped into six clusters. The first cluster, “Fundamentals”, covers what the bloc currently considers to be the most critical aspects of accession reforms, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights. However, there is no dedicated chapter that provides guidance or sets criteria for integrating countries that have breakaway and occupied regions within their borders.

The EU must adapt its integration process in order to incorporate conflict resolution mechanisms more explicitly in the accession roadmaps for eastern candidates. It should not make this a formal accession requirement—this is to avoid creating an additional obstacle that Russia could exploit to block these countries’ accession path. However, the European Commission should establish a dedicated plan to address conflict-related challenges in candidate countries, in close cooperation with EEAS and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions on the ground. This plan should focus on how to enhance the monitoring capacities of the security situation in breakaway, occupied and adjacent territories. It should also introduce a conflict-monitoring annexe to the enlargement reports, covering issues such as the status of human rights, access for humanitarian actors, Russia’s military activities and security and ceasefire violations.

The EU should also establish a task force to work with actors in candidates’ central governments. Its goal should be to prepare for negotiations to normalise relations with the authorities in breakaway and occupied regions. Under this plan the EU would promote a regular dialogue involving stakeholders from Western Balkan and eastern European candidate countries, participants from breakaway and occupied territories, and those in EU member states to exchange best practices and ideas on conflict resolution mechanisms. The EU should support specific confidence building projects targeting societies in these regions. By more clearly integrating such efforts into the EU accession framework, candidate countries will receive greater support to develop realistic, context-specific strategies for unresolved conflicts.

Design a status-neutral engagement policy for occupied breakaway regions in Georgia and Moldova

The EU should design a “status-neutral engagement policy” (SNEP) tailored specifically for the occupied breakaway regions in Georgia and Moldova. Its goal should be to create openings for pragmatic, people-centred engagement that can help gradually reduce Russian influence and foster reintegration from the bottom up. The basis of this new policy must be strict adherence to status neutrality—meaning engagement by the EU should not imply recognition of these territories’ claims to independence; nor should it require these regions to formally reintegrate into Georgia or Moldova as a precondition for cooperation.

This approach will reposition the EU from being a distant geopolitical player into a relevant and constructive actor while reinforcing the message that a European future is open to the inhabitants of each region. The policy should also be cautiously differentiated, reflecting the varying degrees of political autonomy, institutional development and Russian dependency in each region. A more ambitious engagement policy would suit Abkhazia well, as it contains relatively established and functional institutions. The EU can capitalise on the demands there for ending isolation and reducing dependence on Russia. In contrast, opportunities are more limited in South Ossetia, where governance is entirely reliant on Moscow. Transnistria could warrant a moderately ambitious engagement strategy, falling somewhere between the Abkhaz and South Ossetian cases.

The EU should closely coordinate initiatives under the SNEP with the central governments of Georgia (when engagement with the Georgian authorities becomes more favourable) and Moldova, and embed these initiatives within these countries’ existing reintegration strategies. However, efforts made under the SNEP must be flexible enough to bypass obstructive political elites in the breakaway regions and reach local communities directly. In this context, flexibility means having the ability to meet without formal engagement, to be able to spend money without formal contracts and to engage Abkhaz civil society and media. 

The EU should back this up with status-neutral funding mechanisms that have simplified procedures allowing for rapid response by the EU and without having to go through central governments for every step. This requires a careful balancing act between non-recognition, efficiency and engagement, but it is feasible with strong political will, principled diplomacy and operational creativity.

These initiatives should aim to address human needs such as education, healthcare and the environment rather than issues related to political status. EU-funded scholarships, vocational training programmes, public diplomacy campaigns and humanitarian aid can all serve as bridges between local populations and the European integration project. For example, the EU should strive for improved communication around the Erasmus+ programme to encourage participation by individuals and higher education institutions from the occupied territories. The EU should also create a scholarship fund for students living in these regions, as well as for those in adjacent territories. Equally, the EU can support vaccination campaigns and health screening initiatives, coordinating closely with the World Health Organization. It can launch vocational learning centres in adjacent areas offering training and certification in digital skills, trade, green energy and more, and create a micro-grant programme for young entrepreneurs and those displaced from occupied territories.

As trust and cooperation grow, the EU should consider more advanced mobility arrangements. One politically sensitive but highly practical tool would be the issuing of EU status-neutral travel documents—an initiative that would allow residents of occupied or breakaway territories to travel to the EU without relying on Russian-issued passports, and without legitimising statehood claims. This would give freer movement to thousands of people, especially younger generations, who are otherwise trapped in isolation by the geopolitics of non-recognition.

To underpin the SNEP, the EU will need a dedicated, status-neutral financial instrument that provides meaningful support to populations living under the de facto control of Russian-backed regimes—again, without legitimising claims of independence or undermining the sovereignty of the parent states.

One model is the EU’s long-standing engagement with northern Cyprus, where the bloc provides financial assistance through a dedicated regulation that respects the legal status of Cyprus while supporting socio-economic development and reconciliation. A similar approach could help deliver support to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria through the broader Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument or the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance frameworks for Georgia and Moldova. Alternatively, policymakers could establish a new, standalone stabilisation and engagement facility for conflict-affected territories.

A central pillar of the SNEP must be the promotion of dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive economic engagement. Carefully integrating these regions into the EU’s economic space would expose them to rules-based trade and raise living standards, laying a foundation for future reintegration into national systems. The social and economic tracks would be mutually reinforcing: dialogue gains credibility when linked to financial benefits, while trade and connectivity help shift public sentiment and normalise ties.

On the societal level, the EU should expand people-to-people initiatives, confidence building programmes and Track 1.5 diplomacy, which involves bringing together civil society, former officials, academics and community leaders across divides. These informal platforms can foster empathy, address sensitive issues and explore solutions beyond rigid formats like the GID. Youth exchanges and joint community projects for Abkhaz and Georgians can help shape shared narratives around peace and coexistence.

Economically, the EU should enable status-neutral access to European markets for producers in breakaway regions, particularly Abkhazia and Transnistria, under the deep and comprehensive free trade area frameworks with Georgia and Moldova. Through flexible mechanisms—such as status-neutral certificates of origin and adherence to EU standards—local businesses could trade directly with the EU, bypassing Russian intermediaries and reducing economic dependence on Moscow. To make sure trade with these regions avoids enabling criminal activities, the EU would need to conduct strict due diligence on supply chains and gain intelligence to ensure it does not engage with individuals or companies involved in illicit activities.

Empower the EUSR and the CSDP to promote conflict resolution

The EU should revisit the existing conflict resolution toolbox and upgrade it for the new security context. This will require moving beyond maintaining only a symbolic presence in negotiation frameworks like the GID. It should empower instruments such as the EUSR and its CSDP civilian missions in the three candidate states to act as genuine agents of peace, deterrence and long-term conflict transformation. The EU must strategically recalibrate these tools and give them political standing to help prevent further annexation and improve the bloc’s standing in these regions.

First, the EU should elevate the EUSR from a diplomatic interlocutor role to a high-level political envoy who enjoys a clear mandate and robust support from both EU institutions and member states. This means giving the EUSR political clout—such as by including the EUSR in high-level visits of the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, and ensuring that the post-holder is consulted and their considerations are incorporated while drafting key policy and strategic documents for the region. The Foreign Affairs Council should invite the EUSR to report more regularly. The EU ought to bolster the position with more resources by providing a bigger team of legal, political, security and regional experts. It can make the EUSR’s mandate more flexible and extend it to incorporate the topics of energy and infrastructure connectivity, which are crucial for integrating candidate states and meeting the EU’s interests in the region. The high representative should also task the EUSR with building synergies between the EU’s diplomatic, economic and security tools in the region, becoming a key driver of a comprehensive conflict strategy rather than an isolated facilitator of the GID.

Second, the EU should further empower the CSDP civilian missions in the three candidate states to be able to respond more effectively to security challenges. They should be conceived as long-term missions and receive larger, more sustainable budgets, rather than short-term missions with renewable mandates of only two or three years. The EUMM—currently the only international presence on the ground in Georgia—must be revitalised and expanded. Despite its crucial role in monitoring ceasefire violations, facilitating incident prevention mechanisms and maintaining situational awareness, the mission is hamstrung by its inability to operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Currently, the mission faces obstruction from Russia and Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto authorities, which refuse to grant access to EU actors. The EU should increase diplomatic pressure, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to push for access to these territories. At the same time, it should enhance the mission’s mandate, strengthening its mobile units to patrol areas adjacent occupied territories. It can boost the mission’s technological capabilities by providing satellite and drone monitoring capabilities and the capacity to report early signs of annexation or military build-up.

Strengthening technological capabilities and increasing the number of personnel to boost the capacity of the mobile units would also benefit the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM). This is particularly true since the closure of field offices in Mariupol and Kharkiv, which has further reduced the EU’s capacity to monitor the security situation in eastern Ukraine, and it would support the stabilisation and reintegration of Ukraine’s liberated and adjacent territories.

In Moldova, the mandate of the EU Partnership Mission—established in 2023—focuses on building resilience to hybrid threats and strengthening the country’s crisis management structures. This new mission should work closely with the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) to revitalise the conflict resolution dimension of EUBAM, which has been largely ineffective since the suspension of the 5+2 negotiation format on Transnistria in 2022.

Convene a coalition of states to revitalise conflict resolution

The EU should convene a coalition of states made up of EU members and key non-EU partners to revitalise conflict resolution efforts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. Coalition members’ goal should be to drive innovative mediation and post-conflict development. This would help supporters of conflict resolution in these regions to move beyond existing formal international frameworks, which are too often hampered by vetoes or inertia.

Participants could include Britain, Canada, Turkey and potentially India, alongside EU members such as the Baltic and Nordic states, France, Germany and Poland. Drawing on their distinct capabilities and bilateral relationships, this coalition could play an effective and coordinated role while maintaining a status-neutral approach where needed. This coalition would not be monolithic but organised by division of labour. For example, Baltic states could lead on education, youth exchanges and digital literacy. Turkey could facilitate trade, logistics and infrastructure development, and India could support healthcare reconstruction and public health systems. Nordic countries could focus on e-governance, telecommunications and civic technology. Britain and Canada could take on Track 1.5 diplomacy, reconciliation and civil society engagement. The model would combine diverse soft power tools—economic aid, education, technology and diplomacy—and have the flexibility to adapt to local conditions. Unlike traditional peace processes in rigid multilateral structures, this would allow experimentation with formats, incentives and entry points.

This coalition would signal that the Euro-Atlantic community (and its partners) is not retreating but adapting. It would reposition the EU not just as a supporter of peace processes, but as a leader in building innovative, collaborative platforms for reconciliation, resilience and reintegration.

Prepare for accession amid ceasefire lines and partial occupation

Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are unlikely to regain full territorial control in the near term. Russian occupation, frozen conflicts and hybrid aggression have created de facto boundaries likely to outlast current EU membership negotiations. The EU must therefore develop a legally sound, politically coherent framework for accession under conditions of partial territorial control.

The story of European integration without full territorial control is as old as the EU itself; it is part of the bloc’s DNA. In 1951, West Germany became a founder member of the European Coal and Steel Community. Forty decades later, circumstances allowed for German unification, a process that automatically extended European Economic Community membership to the former East Germany once it was legally established as an integral part of the federal republic.

In the EU’s modern and more complex integration policy, Cyprus provides another example of a divided country integrating into the EU while lacking full control of its territory. When the country joined in 2004, a specific clause was included in Cyprus’s treaty of accession: Protocol 10. This stipulates that EU law (acquis communautaire) is suspended in the northern part of the territory where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise control, but that this will be lifted when a peaceful settlement to the conflict is found.

In the same way, conditioning membership on conflict resolution (as is effectively the case for the accession of Serbia and Kosovo) would not be the right approach for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. Doing so would give Russia a direct say (read: veto) in the accession process for Georgia and Moldova. Instead, the EU should adopt a pragmatic approach that enables accession with occupation lines in place, while maintaining a long-term goal of full territorial integrity. This requires tailored accession clauses, building on the Cyprus precedent, but adjusted to each country’s unique context.

For Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the EU must prepare similar arrangements that:

• affirm the non-recognition of occupation and explicitly state that EU law will only apply in areas under effective control, pending peaceful reintegration.
• include specific derogations or transition periods for the occupied territories while allowing the rest of the accession country to fully participate in EU institutions, funding mechanisms and legal commitments.
• provide post-accession instruments to facilitate the eventual reintegration of these territories into the EU legal framework, including the flexible application of the acquis, technical support and phased infrastructure integration.
• create status-neutral instruments that gradually open the benefits of European integration and the four freedoms (freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and workers) to the residents of the occupied breakaway regions, even without full conflict resolution and restoration of the territorial integrity of the partner states. 

Such flexibility must be paired with strong political messaging: these arrangements are temporary and reversible (until territorial integrity is restored), and in no way signal compromise on sovereignty.

Equally important is the need to co-design these mechanisms in close partnership with candidate governments, ensuring national ownership and consistency with each country’s reintegration strategies. While cooperation with the Georgian Dream government will pose challenges, this should not delay the EU’s strategic planning. The bloc must take a long-term view, recognising that conflict resolution and reintegration efforts inherently extend beyond any single political cycle.

Institutionally, the EU should also establish a dedicated task force within the European Commission or the Council to manage these complex accession cases. This task force would combine expertise in legal affairs, conflict resolution, external relations and enlargement. It could also coordinate with international partners, local experts and legal scholars to ensure that accession under partial control respects EU treaties and international law.

Preparing for accession under partial control does not mean legitimising occupation. On the contrary, it will enhance the strategic resilience of the accession countries. It demonstrates integration is possible despite unresolved conflicts, and it denies Russia a veto over EU enlargement.

Beyond managed ambiguity

The EU faces an important choice about how to define—if not rescue—its eastern neighbourhood policy. The recalibration of American foreign policy has left the EU increasingly alone in managing the stabilisation and European integration of eastern candidate countries. As Washington shifts its attention towards ending the war in Ukraine in ways that may not meet Europeans’ interests, European decision-makers must acknowledge they may soon bear primary responsibility for both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the broader security architecture of eastern Europe and the south Caucasus. This new geopolitical reality demands that the EU shift from a reactive posture towards a forward-looking strategic framework, especially on issues that have long been ignored—namely, the future of occupied breakaway territories in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

Until now, the EU’s approach to these conflicts has been fragmented, overly cautious and shaped more by risk aversion than strategic ambition. Mediation platforms have stagnated, while Russia has entrenched its influence in all three regions examined in this paper, often through hybrid methods of annexation that exploit economic dependency, legal harmonisation and political manipulation. Meanwhile, the EU’s soft power tools—trade access, educational exchange and financial aid—have failed to reach the residents of these territories in meaningful ways. With the accession processes of Ukraine and Moldova accelerating and Georgia’s future hanging in the balance, European leaders cannot afford to treat unresolved conflicts as technicalities to be left until later.

Ultimately, to address the unresolved conflicts in candidate states, the EU must choose between offering tangible, status-neutral engagement for occupied and breakaway territories that counters Russian influence and lays the groundwork for future reintegration; or consigning these regions to lasting division, leaving them to be footholds for Russia to undermine stability and EU influence in the region. The EU must move beyond managing ambiguity and begin shaping outcomes. The future of its eastern neighbourhood, and the bloc’s own security, depends on it.

Methodology

This policy brief is based on a combination of desk research, including academic literature, media articles, policy documents and official EU communications, and semi-structured interviews with nine participants. These participants included experts and analysts based in Tbilisi and Abkhazia, along with officials from the EEAS and DG NEAR/ENEST.

About the authors

Tefta Kelmendi is the former deputy director of the Wider Europe programme at ECFR. Prior to joining ECFR, Kelmendi worked as a diplomat at the embassy of Kosovo in France, where she was responsible for further advocating Kosovo’s international recognition, developing relations with French-speaking countries and enhancing Kosovo’s integration into international organisations. Before that, she served as an adviser at the ministry of European integration in Kosovo, focusing on policy alignment related to minority rights and their integration in Kosovo’s institutions.

Sergi Kapanadze is professor of international relations and European integration at Ilia State and Caucasus Universities in Tbilisi, Georgia, and an editor of the monthly Georgian foreign policy magazine Geopolitics. Kapanadze is the founder of a Tbilisi-based think-tank GRASS. He was a vice-speaker of the parliament of Georgia between 2016 and 2020 and a deputy foreign minister between 2011 and 2012, when he was Georgia’s chief negotiator at the Geneva International Discussions.

Acknowledgments

This policy brief was produced with the support of the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) Group. Its contents do not reflect the views of AFD; they represent the views of the authors alone.

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[1] Interview with a Tbilisi-based regional expert, online, April 2025.

[2] Interview with a Tbilisi-based expert, online, March 2025.