Pavel Slunkin speaks in the podcast about his experiences in 2015 at Minsk and his thoughts on the impact of the invasion on Lukashenko and Belarus as a whole
Media mentions – Belarus
Moreover, a ‘reliable and secure base for the Russian army in Belarus” could be more valuable at the moment from the Russian point of view than “an unpredictable second front in Ukraine’
It is to make people afraid. It is to demoralize them and to make them feel unprotected — that this can happen to anyone at any time
Lukashenko’s messages are becoming more and more radical, but in the end it is not what he says but what he does that is crucial
Putin’s nuclear arms are his main weapons with which he can threaten the West, the US, the whole world. If he loses the conventional war, the only argument he has to threaten the rest of the world is
The Russians are trying to pin down as many Ukrainian forces in other places as possible, by posing latent threats to them
Lukashenka’s task is to stick to this process, no matter in what status – just to achieve his personal presence
Pavel Slunkin comments on Lukashenka’s desire for Belarus to be represented at the peace negotiations between Ru and UA
It seems that Mr Lukashenka is testing the limits in his relations with Moscow. The change in rhetoric from a full support for the Russian invasion to “we are neutral” happened in just three weeks
Pavel Slunkin explores Lukashenka’s change in attitude towards Russia following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine