Table of Contents

- EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2015

- Acknowledgements

- Foreword

- Introduction

- Chapter 1: Russia

- Chapter 2: United States

- Chapter 3: Wider Europe

- Chapter 4: Middle East and North Africa

- Chapter 5: Asia and China

- Chapter 6: Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management

- Tables

- Abbreviations

- About the authors

EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2015

STEERING GROUP

Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga (co-chair), Robert Cooper (co-chair)

Lluís Bassets, Franziska Brantner, Heather Grabbe, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Jytte Gutland, István Gyamarti , Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Wolfgang Ischinger, Gerald Knaus, Nils Muiznieks, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Christine Ockrent, Albert Rohan, Nicolò Russo Perez, Marietje Schaake, Klaus Scharioth, Aleksander Smolar, Paweł Świeboda, Teija Tiilikainen, Nathalie Tocci, Antonio Vitorino

ECFR DIRECTOR

Mark Leonard

ECFR RESEARCH TEAM

Susi Dennison (project leader)

Rachel Tausendfreund (project leader / editor)

Dina Pardijs (data management coordinator)

Kadri Liik, Sophia Pugsley (Russia), Thomas Wright (United States), Chi Kong Chyong, Nigar Goksel, Francisco de Borja Lasheras, Vessela Tcherneva (Wider Europe), Adam Baron, Susi Dennison, Julien Barnes-Dacey, Anthony Dworkin, Ellie Geranmayeh, Andrew Hammond, Daniel Levy, Mattia Toaldo, Nick Witney (Middle East and North Africa), François Godement, Agatha Kratz, Angela Stanzel (China), Richard Gowan (Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management)

RESEARCHERS IN MEMBER STATES

Arnold Kammel (Austria), Tim Haesebrouck (Belgium), Marin Lessenski (Bulgaria), Hüyesin Silman (Cyprus), Luka Oreskovic (Croatia and Romania), Vladimír Bartovic (Czech Republic), Christine Nissen (Denmark), Andres Kasekamp (Estonia), Teemu Rantanen (Finland), Caroline Maillard (France), Jonas Kassow (Germany), George Tzogopoulos (Greece), Zsuzsanna Végh (Hungary), Ben Tonra (Ireland), Antonietta Cornacchia (Italy), Diana Potjomkina (Latvia), Laurynas Jonavicius (Lithuania), Astrid Spreitzer (Luxembourg) Daniel Mainwaring (Malta), Sanne Raap (Netherlands), Adam Balcer (Poland), Lívia Franco (Portugal), Teodor Gyelník (Slovakia), Sabina Lange (Slovenia), Álvaro Imbernón (Spain), Jan Joel Andersson (Sweden), Catarina Tully (United Kingdom).

Acknowledgements

Above all, the authors would like to thank the Steering Group for their input and advice throughout the process. Special thanks goes to the chairs, Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Robert Cooper, for their enthusiasm and wisdom in guiding this project.

Several ECFR staff members contributed to the Scorecard project by giving advice and freeing up time for the Scorecard team. Olaf Boehnke, Piotr Buras, Thomas König, Gustav Gressel, Josef Janning, José Ignacio Torreblanca, and Nick Witney commented on parts of the text. Hans Kundnani was especially hands-on with his editorial advice.

Lorenzo Marini designed the excellent new website to go with the Scorecard. Proofreading and fact-checking from Katharina Botel, Justine Doody, and Evanna Folkenfolk was invaluable. Zsófia Tari provided extra research assistance, and Jan Lasocki gave invaluable help with organisation and advocacy. David Carroll’s design has been of constant quality throughout the years.

Even though producing this year’s Scorecard was a collective effort, any mistakes in the text remain the responsibility of the authors.

Foreword

The Compagnia di San Paolo is one of the largest independent foundations in Europe and one of the main private funders of research in the fields of EU affairs and international relations. Over the past few years, the Compagnia has progressively consolidated its profile in these fields, signing strategic partnership agreements with institutions such as the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Our overall goal is to foster a truly European debate on the main issues that the EU faces and to encourage the emergence of a European political space.

It is against this background and as part of the Compagnia’s commitment to support research on the European integration process that we continued the cooperation with the European Council on Foreign Relations on the fifth edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard. We highly appreciate this cooperation with ECFR and we sincerely hope that this project will intensify the dialogue among various European stakeholders – both institutional and from civil society – with the goal of strengthening our understanding of Europe’s role as a global player.

Piero Gastaldo

Secretary General

Compagnia di San Paolo

Preface

This is the fifth edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard, a flagship publication for ECFR that evaluates the European Union’s foreign policy performance over the past year. This is the final year of the first post-Lisbon set-up, and our scores track progress over the whole period. As in previous years, we have adjusted some components to reflect the changing situation; continuity is maintained by retaining the same sub-issues in each chapter.

We continue to assess the performance of EU actors as a collective. Rather than giving an exhaustive list of all EU policies, we have focused our attention on policies on which there were specific decision points in 2015. European policies for each component are assigned scores for “unity” and “resources” (out of five) and “outcome” (out of ten). The sum of these scores translates into a letter grade for each of the 65 components.

Our now-familiar system of identifying member states as “leaders”, “supporters”, or “slackers” has again produced interesting results. There is an unavoidable subjective element in these judgments but we have explained our reasoning in each case in the relevant components.

A full description of the methodology of the Scorecard can be found on ECFR’s website at http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard.

Five years’ experience is a good basis on which to assess our own performance and to consider whether we can do better. We plan, therefore, to review our work on the Scorecard in the first half of 2015. Your views on the Scorecard – whether this year’s or over the whole period – would be welcome and useful to us.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Robert Cooper

January 2015

Introduction

In 2014 Europe found itself surrounded by crises. To the east, Russia annexed Crimea and war broke out in eastern Ukraine. The 2013 landmark agreement between Kosovo and Serbia finished 2014 on much less firm ground, with a worsening of the political and economic situation in both countries and in neighbouring Bosnia. To the south, the self- proclaimed Islamic State made stunning advances across Syria and northern Iraq. Civil war continued in Syria, generating a refugee crisis on a horrifying scale, and began in Libya. And the authoritarian regime in Egypt continued its brutal crackdown against opposition, eliminating any residual hope Europe may still have harboured of democratic progress for the country. The conflicts in the neighbourhood also resulted in an immigration crisis in the Mediterranean, as greater numbers tried to cross to its northern shores, and, sadly, more lives were lost in the process.

Within Europe, too, there was plenty to worry about. Economic recovery remained elusive and member states continued to disagree about how to spur growth. The combination of low growth and low inflation is particularly troubling for high-debt countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. The French economy could not climb out of its slump and the situation in Greece was again critical by year’s end. Even the eurozone’s economic driver, Germany, performed below expectations. The European Parliament election results in May highlighted the extent to which concerns about the impact of austerity policies and immigration have fuelled the rise of the far right and of anti-European Union parties across the continent.

Standing up to Russia was the make-or-break issue in 2014. Despite the EU’s traditional divisions over Russia and strong resistance from some European companies, the EU pulled together around a sanctions policy. Thus, this year’s Scorecard gives higher marks on relations with Russia in 2014, with particularly high marks for unity. Overall, Europeans were united and invested significant resources on the most critical issues of the year. However, everything else was secondary to dealing with the Russian threat in 2014, so, while improved unity brought up scores for relations with Russia and the Eastern Partnership countries (especially Ukraine), the EU paid less attention to the Western Balkans and saw lower scores for outcomes. In MENA, the main story of the year was the EU’s relative powerlessness to counter the influence of the GCC states, Iran, and Turkey. While the scores for EU unity and resources were respectable and often higher than last year, the low scores for outcome brought overall marks down. Closer to home, EU institutional transition and concern about the growing domestic popularity of extremist parties prevented member states from finding the political courage to develop a solid response to the refugee crisis in the Middle East and the immigration crisis in the Mediterranean.

The end of partnership with Russia

Russia’s overt aggression forced an awakening to power politics in Europe. The events of 2014 have shown that the sceptics about Russia were right, and that the meaningless compromise phrases on which EU policy had been based over the last decade were just that: meaningless. The “Partnership for Modernisation” had brought neither modernisation nor partnership, and European and Russian visions for the common neighbourhood had little in common. Europe was unprepared for Moscow’s retaliation against Ukraine’s European choice and ill-equipped to deal with Vladimir Putin’s use of force and explicit rejection of the post-Cold War European order. In retrospect, there were enough indicators that our policies were based on illusions and were not succeeding, as some member states forcefully argued. Surely a sober analysis should have pointed us in the direction of a more reality-based policy than the “partnership and cooperation” between the EU and Russia in the last few years.

In part, the story of Europe’s dashed illusions and re-engagement with power politics is a German one. Moscow’s strongest ally in the EU has been Berlin, where the belief in a “partnership” with a “modernising” Russia and a policy of “change through rapprochement” was deeply entrenched, for historical, political, and economic reasons. As irregular Russian forces began invading Ukraine in early 2014, Berlin initially held to the hope that more communication with Putin could resolve the misunderstanding and ease tensions, and banked on its sway with the Kremlin. It took until the end of the first half of 2014 for Berlin to fully abandon the idea that Russia’s aggression could be countered with diplomatic means alone. But, once it did, Germany asserted impressive leadership to get agreement on a sanctions package and persuade reluctant countries such as Spain and Italy.

The findings of this year’s Scorecard present an even fuller picture of Germany’s growing foreign policy profile. This year, Germany, which has been rising through the leader rankings in the four years that the Scorecard has been tracking, led more than any other member state (17 times) and across all regions – it was categorised as a leader at least once in every chapter. Within Germany, too, 2014 was the year of foreign policy, with President Joachim Gauck and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen prominently proclaiming the need for Germany to assume more foreign policy responsibility at the Munich Security Conference early in the year. Shortly afterwards, Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier launched a review of German foreign policy. [see box BELOW]

Part of the reason for Germany’s leadership is its economic power within the union – notably in the development of sanctions on Russia and in TTIP negotiations with the United States. But Berlin has displayed important political leadership in both these cases. German leadership has also been noteworthy on issues unrelated to its economic power: it supported democratic transition in Tunisia, prevented deteriorating political conditions from derailing the Kosovo-Serbia deal, and spoke out on human rights abuses in China.

Germany’s Foreign Policy Review

In early 2014, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier launched the “Review 2014 – A Fresh Look at German Foreign Policy”, a process of self-assessment and critical analysis. The process was meant to generate a debate within Germany’s political community and wider society on the prospects, interests, and objectives of German foreign policy. ECFR cooperated with the German MFA to organise a series of events in all six non-German ECFR offices in collaboration with the local German embassies. The events focused on the European dimension of German foreign policy, creating platforms for dialogue between senior representatives of the German MFA and important stakeholders of the national (foreign) policy communities, media, and civil society. The debates covered issues such as the current Ukraine crisis, the future of the Eastern Partnership concept, and Germany’s relationship and influence on Russia, as well as Berlin’s role in European security and defence policy and Germany’s perception of the current challenges in the Middle East and North Africa.

Some of the recommendations that came out of the events were that Berlin should be more vocal in NATO, show more defence leadership in the EU, commit to common energy policy, pay more attention to North Africa, and work as a bridge between western and eastern member states. The central take-away from all events was that the EU is ready for more proactive foreign policy leadership from Germany, though other member states also hope Berlin will be a cooperative, consensus-building type of leader.

On 21 November the Berlin office and the German MFA hosted a closed-doors workshop with ECFR senior staff and the policy planning staff and senior leadership of the Europe department in the German MFA to present and discuss the key results of this joint project. This was followed by a final public event on Germany’s foreign policy leadership in Berlin with State Secretary Markus Ederer, his Polish colleague Tomasz Orlowski, and other European experts.

European security

German leadership in EU foreign policy may be novel, but the overall security picture in Europe in 2014 saw us going back to the future. The threat of Russian aggression in Europe’s east has reanimated NATO in Europe. In a post-Cold War Europe supposedly absent of any threat, NATO seemed to be an anachronism that was searching for a new role. For a while, the answer seemed to be “out-of-area or out of business”, as US Senator Richard Lugar put it, but the past decade made that look like a dead-end as well. Meanwhile, as the US “pivoted” to Asia, it was perceived to be less engaged in Europe’s security. But ultimately, when states on the EU’s eastern periphery were clamouring for reassurance, they turned to NATO, which delivered, causing Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite to publicly thank God that her country – unlike Ukraine – was a member. Russia’s continued provocations in Ukraine and elsewhere have even led to increased public consideration of NATO membership in Finland and Sweden – a debate hardly imaginable two years ago. Nonetheless, the re-emergence of the “old” NATO may be short-lived; as the immediate crisis abates, a transatlantic divergence on how to deal with Russia is likely.

Though CSDP seemed to play no role in responding to the Ukraine crisis, member states did launch initiatives to increase security self-reliance outside of an EU institutional setting. A UK-led joint expeditionary force will work with the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as with the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. Britain will focus on operations and will train small units, drawing on its experience in forming a joint expeditionary force with France. The British plan runs in parallel to a German framework nation initiative, in which Berlin will work with some ten East European partner nations to boost their capabilities. By contrast, and partly in consequence, 2014 was a dismal year for the EU's ambitions to play a distinctive security role abroad. As in Mali in 2013, Europeans largely ducked the challenge presented by the crisis in CAR, leaving the heavy lifting to France and the UN. Similarly, the West Africa Ebola epidemic elicited some efforts by individual member states but unfolded without any coordinated EU response commensurate with the crisis.

The EU also struggled to find its role in the southern neighbourhood, where crisis followed crisis. After the high hopes raised by the Arab Awakening in 2011, only Tunisia currently shows realistic prospects of consolidating its nascent democracy. Germany and Sweden have been most active in propping up its efforts. The EU scaled down its programmes in Libya as the country descended into civil war in 2014. The EU and member states largely watched from the sidelines as Yemen’s transition appeared to collapse, and General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi’s government in Egypt now surpasses its pre-Arab Awakening predecessors in authoritarianism. Both the US – which has been drawn back into leading airstrikes in the region against ISIS in the year in which it was trying to complete its withdrawal – and the EU states have been faced with the limits of their power (and appetite) to solve the intricate problems in the troubled MENA region, compared with the preeminent role of regional players. Nevertheless, this does not excuse a lack of strategy for containing a conflict that has created a humanitarian crisis of horrific proportions, and has had spillover effects that are destabilising the region and beyond.

The West and the rest

If Russia shattered the European order in 2014, the world’s reaction to Western sanctions against Russia has revealed cracks in the global order. The “rest” did not side with the West. Some regional powers have shown sympathy with Russia’s justification of its actions in Crimea, comparing it with Western interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, and others have simply turned a blind eye to Russian aggression. Since the EU imposed sanctions, both China and India have strengthened energy ties with Russia – India signed both oil and nuclear reactor construction deals. However, although Japan had courted Russia as a potential ally in its island disputes with China and South Korea had sought Russian cooperation against North Korea, both countries signed up to the sanctions regime against Russia. Turkey, on the other hand, did not – in fact, Putin came to the country on an official state visit in December and began energy talks. In the Middle East, states close to the West such as Egypt, Iraq, and Israel declined to condemn Russia’s invasion of Crimea, while solidifying ties with Moscow.

Although the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the Crimea crisis in March, the large number of abstentions and absences suggested that many countries see this as a struggle between power blocs rather than as a fundamental question of international order. The EU performed worse than in previous years in international institutions, which suggests that the EU is struggling to counter indifference from other regions towards the challenge it now faces from Russia.

Weak EU role, strong member state unity

Five years after the Lisbon Treaty created a new architecture for EU foreign policy, the European voice continues to make itself heard largely through the member states rather than the EU institutions. The ongoing problems in the eurozone and the long transition period following the European elections in May are, perhaps, partly to blame for the low profile of EU institutions in 2014. While EU efforts have been prominent in advancing UN climate change negotiations, in the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme, and in the anti-piracy missions off Somalia’s coast, leadership in 2014 was centred around the large member states, and, above all, Germany – although French leadership fell and Sweden shared second place.

EU foreign policy leadership by big member states presents both opportunities and challenges for the EU’s foreign policy structures. The new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, appears keenly aware of this and has emphasised a role for the EEAS in working with member states’ diplomacy. Interestingly, member state dominance of EU foreign policy-making in 2014 did not result in a failure to take decisions collectively. In last year’s Scorecard, we noted that, while France, the UK, and others were rated leaders the highest number of times, this was activist leadership – taking decisions and putting national resources behind them, but not necessarily taking other member states along with them. Leadership this year was much more about coalition building – perhaps reflecting the style of two of this year’s top leaders, Germany and Sweden.

The UK played a counterintuitive role in 2014. While debate on a possible withdrawal from the EU has reached fever pitch – anti-EU party UKIP polled higher than any of the major parties in the European Parliament elections in May and won two seats in the House of Commons in 2014 – the Scorecard shows that, at a working level, British diplomats have continued to engage constructively. The UK led on 11 issues, the same as in 2013 – which puts it in second place alongside Sweden – and was a “slacker” once fewer than in 2013. However, on issues of immigration and a rescue mission in the Mediterranean, narrow party-political concerns caused Britain to adopt a self-defeating isolationist policy. While some areas of leadership, such as the military response to ISIS, are undoubtedly unilateral, others, such as pushing for a positive conclusion of TTIP negotiations and supporting sanctions on Russia despite the likely impact on the City, spotlight those areas in which the UK has far more clout as part of the EU collective than it does alone. This runs directly counter to the government-level rhetoric on avoiding the constraints of European cooperation.

Sweden’s high score is linked to its activist diplomacy and its commitment to playing an important role in shaping and supporting collective European decision-making. This is notable on themes such as coordinating an EU position towards China, supporting the policy of democratic reform in wider Europe, and supporting a strong European position on climate change. Sweden also remains attached to a values-based European foreign policy. For example, it led in speaking out on human rights abuses in China, was one of the few remaining active supporters of democracy in the MENA region, and was also one of only two member states (the other being Germany) to make significant efforts in 2014 to offer to resettle refugees displaced by the conflict in Syria. This commitment was not across the board, however: Sweden was notably absent from the list of countries who continued to push, even in small ways, for media freedom in Russia.

France fell from the top of the leader board last year to third place, leading eight times instead of 12. As in 2013, French leadership tends to be of the trailblazer variety – that is, taking action unilaterally – rather than investing significantly in creating coalitions of European states. There is a clear pattern of responding to perceived threats to France’s strategic interests, which often coincides with other European member states’ views of where action is required (for example, investment in bilateral aid in Eastern Partnership countries, remaining engaged in Libya, or halting the advance of ISIS). But sometimes, rightly or wrongly, France’s priorities are not widely shared – for example, intervention in CAR. Also, while London and Stockholm both offered significant levels of humanitarian and development aid in 2014, Paris, perhaps because of France’s economic troubles, did not show leadership on these issues. France also refrained from challenging China on human rights abuses.

Overall, Europeans were united on and put significant resources into critical issues in 2014 (see figure 1). For example, we gave a score of five out of five for unity and for resources on sanctions on Russia, four for unity and five for resources on the Iran nuclear talks, and five for unity and four for resources on dealing with the eastern neighbourhood countries. Another high-scoring component was policy towards Somalia, where the EU’s tenacity in the Horn of Africa appears to be paying dividends in terms of combating the pirate problem and weakening al-Shabaab: we gave four for unity and four for resources.

In some of the least successful components, scores on outcome played a strong role in bringing the total down (see figure 3). This was notably the case in components on Syria and Iraq; Libya; Egypt; Yemen; the Sudans, DRC, and CAR; and Bosnia, reflecting the fact that the EU was operating in an extremely difficult environment. However, the juxtaposition of a high score on unity and resources and a low score on outcome raises a question about the effectiveness of some of the policies (or non-policies) around which member states rallied. Egypt might be a case in point here.

Among the components in which Europeans performed worst, the response to the immigration crisis in the Mediterranean stands out. The EU’s failure to grip this issue displays an alarming lack of solidarity with southern member states, which are both most directly impacted by the immigration crisis and also under the greatest economic pressure. Europe’s failure to respond more effectively to the influx of refugees and migrants also has far-reaching negative consequences in terms of Europe’s claim to be a humanitarian actor. The UK, with its very public announcement in October that it would not take part in future search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, in part because of what it described as an unintended “pull factor’’ created by trying to save lives of migrants on wrecked ships, was the most guilty of both these charges.

Similarly, in its response to the refugee crisis in the Middle East, EU member states have, with some honourable exceptions, lacked the political courage to offer asylum to significant numbers of the desperate people currently in camps in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere, to some extent undermining generous aid donations. It is worth noting that these two components in the Scorecard, and others which feature in the bottom ten policies this year (including Yemen, Syria and Iraq, regional security in the MENA region, and supporting rule of law, democracy, and human rights in the MENA region) have major implications for European security and play a role in the narrative used by those within Europe who seek to radicalise young people within Muslim communities. In light of the horrific attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris at the beginning of 2015 and the heightened level of alert for terrorist attacks in other major capitals around the EU, this is a sobering reminder of the interplay between Europe’s foreign policy, instability in the neighbourhood, and major challenges at home.

More strategic patience

Since President Putin’s actions in 2014 surprised almost everyone, including Russian insiders, we should not blame ourselves for not foreseeing them. They demonstrated that even Russia pessimists were over-optimistic. Europe, however, should at least have been more pessimistic. Starting from where we are, the first step for Europe ought to be to recognise its collective failure. The second step is to reach a common understanding of where we went wrong, and to make sure we avoid repeating our mistakes. The third is to work towards a policy based on the realities of the new situation. This should start from the question of whether there are any circumstances under which we might trust commitments from Russia again. The next question is how to transform the sanctions policy into a new Russia strategy.

If Russia ceases to destabilise eastern Ukraine, it will be hard to renew EU sanctions, which will begin to expire in March – not least because of the economic impact on European economies that were already struggling as a result of the euro crisis. Even if EU member states can hold together, sanctions were a tool (perhaps the only one available) to show Moscow that Europe meant business and was taking aggression against Ukraine seriously. For 2014, at least, it did the job. But now, Europe needs to develop a strategy to deal with Russia. The EU will need to engage Russia without abandoning its responsibility to protect the “European choice” where it has been made (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkans).

The year 2014 was one of crises, both internal and external. There is little reason to hope that 2015 will be better. Fighting in Iraq and Syria will continue, with the EU largely a bystander but nonetheless facing blowback. Insecurity throughout North Africa also looks likely to continue, and to worsen – at least in Yemen, where the government fell at the beginning of 2015. The rise of China, the escalation of territorial disputes between it and its neighbours, and the unpredictability of North Korea keep tensions high in Asia.

Last year we argued that the “strategic patience” of the EU had paid off in Kosovo and Iran. Looking forward, Europeans will need similar resilience and strategic patience to make continued progress on most of the big challenges it now faces. In particular, the European Commission and EU member states’ governments will need to make a fresh start in winning public support for TTIP, which faces opposition on both sides of the Atlantic. European leaders will also need to keep working on the two big achievements of 2013, Kosovo and Iran, which were looking more fragile as 2014 drew to a close. At the same time, Europe must grapple with the crisis of the European order and develop a proactive policy towards Russia – which will remain the make-or-break issue for European foreign policy in 2015 as it was in 2014.

Chapter 1: Russia

Introduction

The year 2014 brought a sea change in Europe’s relations with Russia. By annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine, Russia transformed itself from Europe’s problematic “strategic partner” into a serious strategic problem (making a number of our traditional Scorecard components obsolete in the process). Russia challenged the European order that had been in place not just since 1989/1991, but in large part since the end of the second world war. The EU, which has traditionally seen enlargement, transformation, and cooperation as its best policy tools, is now forced to confront power politics.

The EU was caught by surprise by the whole chain of events that preceded Russia’s aggression: the refusal of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013; the Euromaidan protests that erupted in reaction; Yanukovych’s indecisive but bloody attempts to crack down; and the regime’s sudden fall in February, followed by the swift annexation of Crimea by Russia.

The EU’s response up until the summer of 2014 could be characterised as slow and reactive. Many dignitaries visited the Maidan before the events took a violent turn. These visits did not contribute to a political solution, but instead confirmed Moscow’s view that the protests were Western-sponsored. During the violent phase, the EU watched helplessly, offering statements of “concern”. Europe had no adequate response when Russia took Crimea and ignited a rebellion in much of eastern Ukraine, finally establishing – with the help of its regular army and firepower – a rebel stronghold in parts of the Donbas.

Europe, it seems, should have done more. But it is unclear that it had realistic alternatives. Perhaps Europe should have mediated for peace between the protestors and Yanukovych earlier. However, while the protestors were determined, they lacked leadership, whereas  Yanukovych lacked determination and faced heavy Russian pressure, a combination that left him without a strategy. The peace deal negotiated by the Weimar ministers on 21 February was useful, in the end, since its provisions provided a framework for the transfer of power after Yanukovych fled the country a day later. But that was an unintended rather than planned result.

One could ask whether a rapid deployment of a strong observer mission in eastern Ukraine – something that the EU or member states at least in theory could have attempted – might not have changed the course of events there. But it is hard to see how anyone could have prevented the annexation of Crimea: diplomatic outreach to the Kremlin did not do the trick, and military action was simply neither feasible nor desirable.

The EU might have been in a better position to influence events if its own earlier Russia policies had been different. But during much of the last decade, economic interest gained the upper hand over a more principled approach. Moscow faced no consequences after its 2008 war with Georgia, which may have led Vladimir Putin to expect similar passivity about Ukraine. Thus, the EU’s track record made its warnings unconvincing.

The initial sanctions package was equally unconvincing. Sanctioning individuals – regardless of whether they were foot soldiers or belonged to Putin’s assumed “inner circle” – was unlikely to reverse policy in Moscow. But the so-called sectoral sanctions adopted in July were more serious and their effects were felt in Russia. Combined with falling oil prices, the sanctions have drastically damaged Russia’s economic outlook, which is likely to be affecting the leadership’s calculations.

Moscow is also starting to realise the depth of policy change in Europe. Germany has emerged as the driving force behind the sanctions and the leader – even if occasionally an unprepared one – of the EU’s Russia policy. The European Commission played an important role in devising common ground for sanctions. France has, for now, delayed the sale of Mistral warships, but may cancel it altogether – which would constitute a significant sacrifice. The UK has implemented measures to limit Russia’s access to capital. Counter-intuitively, post-communist EU member states Slovakia and Hungary were among the most stubborn opponents of sanctions, but in the end, they too subscribed to the common approach.

For the first time, there is also a greater common line on energy policy towards Russia and a greater apprehension of dependence on Russian gas. This has given new momentum to diversification efforts, propelling Poland’s initiative for an Energy Union high on the agenda. The South Stream pipeline, which would have brought gas to Europe through the Black Sea, was cancelled. Member states also increased capacities for LNG regasification.

With Europe absorbed by the new conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, no progress was made on the protracted conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh or South Ossetia. Other issues such as human rights and political freedom in Russia also took a backseat this year, with the sanctions policy eliminating whatever leverage Europe might have had to affect domestic policy in Russia.

In the months to come, the challenge will be to manage and balance the multiple and sometimes contradictory aims in the EU’s new agenda with Russia. These include reaching a settlement in the Donbas, averting the destabilisation of the rest of Ukraine, protecting neighbouring countries’ freedom of choice, anticipating Russia’s actions, and – hardest of all – finding a new framework for living with a combative and uncooperative Russia.

This task is complicated by Moscow’s deluded worldview and the brittle nature of Putin’s regime. Many in Moscow believe that the West harbours aggressive designs against Russia, which could lead to dangerous misinterpretations. Contrary to Moscow’s claims, regime change in Russia has not been the aim of the EU’s policies, nor should it be. However, while the collapse of Putin’s regime due to economic hardship and domestic oppressiveness remains unlikely, it is no longer unthinkable. And Moscow will, whatever happens, see the West as the agitator behind its problems and will continue to foment anti-Western sentiment to bolster the regime at home.

The instability with Russia will continue to create risks for the neighbourhood. In Ukraine, it erupted into violence, but the battle of influence between Russia and the EU is quietly going on in Moldova, in Georgia, and, in particular, in the Balkans. The EU has entered a dangerous and demanding period in its relations with Russia.

1 – Sanctions and trade with Russia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

5

5

5

5

Resources /5

3

3

4

4

5

Outcome /10

5

8

5

5

7

Total / 20

12

16

14

14

17

Grade

B-

A-

B+

B+

A-

The EU demonstrated impressive (if slow) unity when imposing sanctions against Russia, but making them work as a policy tool will be a challenge.

In 2014 EU made a U-turn in its aims for trade relations with Russia. In previous years, the EU had called for trade liberalisation, but now, the EU found itself imposing sanctions on Russia to try to change Moscow’s behaviour in Ukraine.

The first set of EU sanctions was agreed on 17 March, one day before Putin announced the annexation of Crimea. They targeted individuals and associated entities accused of committing actions “against Ukraine’s territorial integrity”. In practice, those targeted were generally subordinate officials without policymaking authority, and the sanctions had no obvious impact. The sanctions adopted on 31 July were more serious, limiting technology transfers and, crucially, Russian companies’ access to international financial markets.

Germany, not itself a strong proponent of harsh sanctions, was the clear leader in consolidating a common sanctions policy, especially after mid-summer. The European Commission was key in preparing a package of sanctions acceptable to major member states. Others states that pushed hard for sanctions (often despite heavy costs) included Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, UK, and the Baltic states. France deserves recognition for halting the sale of Mistral warships. Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Spain were reluctant to sign on to sanctions, but eventually agreed.

The sanctions have been at least partially effective, their impact magnified by the fall in oil prices. In November, Russia reported its first GDP contraction in five years, and its foreign reserves are dwindling fast. This must be changing the Kremlin’s calculations. However, though the threat of more sanctions may have prevented Moscow from further (overt) escalation, the policy has not yet brought about a political reversal. Eastern Ukraine remains contested terrain. The EU now needs to develop a policy to convert economic pressure into results on the ground.

The EU is still trying to hold Russia to its WTO commitments, with Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia particularly active. But the idea of further trade liberalisation under a bilateral agreement (to replace the old Partnership and Cooperation Agreement) is dead for now.

2 – Visa policies with Russia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

4

5

3

5

Resources /5

3

3

3

3

5

Outcome /10

3

4

4

4

5

Total / 20

10

11

12

12

15

Grade

C+

B-

B-

C+

B+

Visa liberalisation with Russia was suspended. The EU used visa bans to punish the officials whom it saw instrumental in aggression against Ukraine.

The EU’s visa liberalisation with Russia was another policy area that saw a change in direction in 2014. On 17 March the European Council officially suspended visa liberalisation with Russia – which had already run into obstacles in 2013 – and spent the rest of the year imposing visa bans on people whom it saw as being complicit in aggression against Ukraine. The targets formed a diverse group, including thuggish power-holders from Crimea, the members of the Russian parliament’s upper house who authorised the use of force in Ukraine, Russian “volunteers” in Donbas, and business leaders with close links to the Kremlin. The country’s chief anti-Western propagandist, Dmitry Kiselev, was also banned. Altogether, around 130 people have been banned from entering the EU.

If the aim of the visa bans was to influence the Kremlin’s policies, then it probably did not work. Most of the people targeted have no real impact on policymaking. The few who have are unlikely to turn against the president. The wisdom of banning journalists – even if they are journalists in name only – could also be questioned. All in all, the impact of visa bans on the elite’s calculations has been much less significant than the economic sanctions, especially the sectoral ones.

Visa bans are a strong moral statement and, as such, are justified, even if the choice of targets could have been better. Some countries were able to have “friends” removed from the list; Slovakia and Cyprus were less successful in their attempts to protect Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister, from being banned.

3 – Rule of law and human rights in Russia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

3

4

4

4

Resources /5

2

2

3

2

2

Outcome /10

2

2

2

2

1

Total / 20

8

7

9

8

7

Grade

C

C-

C+

C+

C-

The human rights situation in Russia did not improve, instead reaching a few new lows. The EU lacks the means to influence the situation.

Amid an overall atmosphere of xenophobia and suspicion, the human rights situation in Russia continued to deteriorate. The new development in 2014 was the “export” of abuses to foreign territory with foreign citizens. The bleakest spot in this regard was Russian-occupied Crimea, where the Crimean Tatar population in particular has been subjected to many types of harassment, up to and including disappearances and torture. Russia’s obligation as an occupying power is to ensure public law and order, which Moscow is clearly failing to do.

In another worrying development, Russia has resumed the practice of kidnapping foreign citizens on foreign territory. Ukrainian pilot Natalia Savchenko and Estonian police officer Eston Kohver were kidnapped from their countries and are being held in Moscow jails under different pretexts. Savchenko has been subjected to involuntary psychiatric treatment.

Russia’s military involvement in eastern Ukraine has resulted in the mistreatment of Russian servicemen. Many Russians who died in Ukraine during the August offensive were later buried in unmarked graves, with their death certificates falsified to indicate a different location and manner of death. In an unusual and brave display of dissent, some such cases were made public by the Kremlin’s Human Rights Council in August. But in many cases, the relatives of the dead were coerced into remaining silent.

The EU’s influence on the human rights situation in Russia has been negligible for years and the official “dialogue” has yielded meagre results. The invasion of Ukraine has diverted some attention from the issue and the disruption of trade and diplomatic links has now stripped the EU of the little leverage that it possessed.

4 – Political freedom in Russia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

4

4

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

1

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

8

7

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

C

C-

The year brought a new wave of restrictions on political freedom. The EU has no influence on the situation inside Russia, but can help organisations that leave the country.

Information warfare is central to the Kremlin’s strategy in Ukraine. Thus, it is not surprising that 2014 brought a new wave of media censorship in Russia. In late 2013, President Putin had announced the reorganisation of RIA Novosti News agency and the Voice of Russia Radio Service into a holding called Rossiya Segodnya, headed by the country’s most prominent propagandist, Dmitry Kiselev. These changes took effect in early 2014. March saw several opposition news websites blocked and the editor of online newspaper Lenta.ru replaced, an action that resulted in a staff walkout. Lenta.ru has now reinvented itself in Latvia as Meduza Project. Russia’s only remaining independent TV channel, Dozhd, has been repeatedly harassed, with measures ranging from being denied access to cable networks to being evicted from offices.

In May, Putin signed a new internet law that stipulates that any website with more than 3,000 daily visitors is responsible for the accuracy of all information it publishes, with fines for violators of up to $142,000. Bloggers can no longer remain anonymous online. October brought a law that will limit foreign ownership of media assets to 20 percent by the beginning of 2017. This will create problems for Russia’s most prominent independent daily, Vedomosti, which is co-owned by a tri-national consortium.

The law on “foreign agents” that was first adopted in 2012 and that discriminates against organisations with foreign links was modified in May 2014, giving the Ministry of Justice authorisation to unilaterally declare organisations “foreign agents”. By early October, at least 17 rights organisations were deemed “agents”, and the list was growing. More than 50 organisations had received warnings, 20 had received notices of violation, and at least 12 were mired in court cases.

The EU lacks leverage to influence the state of political freedoms in Russia, but some countries have managed find ways to help individual organisations, providing financial support or platforms abroad. Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania deserve mention here.

5 – European security reassurance

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

5

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

5

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

5

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

15

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

B+

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reawakened fears in the eastern member states. The nature of security reassurances caused some debate among EU members.

As tensions in Ukraine escalated, Europe was caught flat-footed and watched with “concern” as Moscow seized territory. Especially in the Baltic States the swift occupation of Crimea evoked the memories of Soviet takeover of 1940, and led them to request reinforcements from NATO. Poland and Romania quickly became even more vocal on the issue. At the same time those EU states farther from Ukraine hesitated to make robust gestures of solidarity for risk of inciting Moscow.

The US' swift deployment of military reinforcements sent to Baltic States in early March and the results of the NATO Summit in September have helped assuage fears on the periphery. For a while, division within the EU looked stark, with Poland advocating a permanent deployment of NATO troops in Central and Eastern Europe, but finding only limited support. Germany in particular was – and is - determined to stick to the letter of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act in which NATO promised to refrain from establishing bases on the territory of the new member states “in the current and foreseeable security environment”- despite the fact that Russia’s actions have clearly changed that environment.

The differences, however, at least for the time being, are more about form than substance. The acute security concerns of the EU’s “frontier” states were admirably addressed by the US, which sent planes within days of receiving a request in early March. For now, the US has based troops in each of the Baltic States, Poland and Romania as well. To avoid a conflict with the 1997 Act, they are not called bases, but NATO maintains that they will stay “for as long as needed.”

NATO – with Germany in the lead role – is also investing a lot in the Multinational Corps North East, based in Szczecin, Poland, seen by Berlin as a good substitute for the bases in the Baltics. The UK has taken the lead in developing a rapid-response “spearhead” force, designed explicitly to address the threats from Russia.

6 – Response to Russian actions in the eastern neighbourhood

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

4

4

4

5

Resources /5

2

3

4

4

4

Outcome /10

3

3

3

1

6

Total / 20

8

10

11

9

15

Grade

C

C+

B-

C+

B+

The eastern neighbourhood countries’ right to tighten ties with the EU is the crux of the EU’s current standoff with Russia. The EU is searching for ways to address the challenge.

The right of the countries in the eastern neighbourhood to choose their own path and move closer to the EU if they so wish is at the heart of the current standoff between the EU and Russia. The EU aims to help Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova move along the path envisaged in the Association Agreement, to stop the conflict in Donbas, and to prevent Russian aggression from spreading.

All three countries have now signed the Association Agreement/DCFTA with the EU. Ukraine signed the Association Agreement in Brussels on 21 March and it signed the DCFTA alongside Georgia and Moldova on 27 June. However, in September, it was agreed at President Petro Poroshenko’s request to postpone the implementation of the DCFTA until 2016. The EU made the right move in unilaterally granting Ukraine the sort of access to its markets foreseen under DCFTA. However, the postponement and especially the trilateral negotiations involving Russia – part of the EU’s attempt to address Russia’s concerns and also probably an attempt by Poroshenko to gain time – need careful handling. They may help Ukraine by preventing a full-scale trade war with Russia, but Russia should not be given a veto on the implementation of a bilateral agreement between the EU and Ukraine.

Moscow is still trying to squeeze Georgia and Moldova. Ahead of Moldova’s November elections, seen as a choice of orientation towards Europe or towards Russia, Moscow banned some food imports, stepped up information warfare, and may have tried to influence the elections by funding candidates as well as “street protesters”. Georgia is worried about the implications of a new defence treaty between Moscow and Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia, as well as similar treaties planned with South Ossetia.

The EU is ready to help financially as well as diplomatically, but it has not yet found ways to properly address the countries’ economic and especially security-related vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia. Meanwhile, Russian pressure puts a drag on the frustratingly slow reform processes in the countries concerned.

7 – Relations with Russia on protracted conflicts

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

4

4

4

4

Resources /5

3

3

3

2

3

Outcome /10

4

3

3

2

2

Total / 20

10

10

10

8

9

Grade

C+

C+

C+

C

C+

Tensions continue in the breakaway territories in the eastern neighbourhood, with some viewing Crimea as a useful precedent.

No progress was made in 2014 on the resolution of protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space. The unrecognised territories welcomed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, viewing it as a useful precedent, and some have recognised the Donetsk and Lugansk self-proclaimed “republics” as independent states. Moreover, the fighting in eastern Ukraine has been fuelled by volunteers from several of the region’s breakaway territories.

Tensions spiked in Nagorno-Karabakh in January and August, no doubt fuelled by the Ukraine crisis, with reports of several fatal skirmishes. The Minsk Group (the OSCE conflict resolution mechanism supported by the EU) remained ineffective, mainly due to the parties’ intransigence. However, there was an uptick in talks mediated by various OSCE member states, which were primarily aimed at calming tensions: in March in The Hague, in Sochi in August (called by Putin), and in September with US Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of the NATO summit. Further talks are set for November in Paris. Armenia, with some reluctance, signed up to the Eurasian Union; there was dispute as to whether Karabakh was to be included.

The EU Monitoring Mission continued to observe the administrative boundary in South Ossetia, but as the mission is not allowed on the Ossetian/Russian side, it is of little effect (though symbolically important). Some in the South Ossetian de facto government talked of asking to be incorporated into Russia. The opposition candidate won Abkhazia’s presidential elections in August; in October the new president threatened to close five of six crossing-points with Georgia.

Despite the situation in Transnistria and increased Russian pressure in the form of import bans, Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the EU in June. Transnistria’s relations with Ukraine worsened following the annexation of Crimea. Kyiv feared that the quasi-state could be used as a staging ground for Russian and Transnistrian groups to destabilise south-western Ukraine or to carve out a corridor from eastern Ukraine to Transnistria, cutting off access to the Black Sea.

8 – Diversification of gas-supply routes to Europe

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

2

3

3

2

3

Resources /5

4

4

3

3

3

Outcome /10

5

5

4

2

3

Total / 20

11

12

10

7

9

Grade

B-

B-

C+

C-

C+

Russia aggression against Ukraine produced slightly more shared concern over dependence on Russian gas in Europe.

The Ukrainian security crisis has changed the perception of Russian gas in Europe, helping to increase unity on energy security and diversification. The European Commission produced a comprehensive Energy Security Strategy, which is in line with the recently adopted 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework. This new unity gave impetus to Poland’s proposals for an Energy Union, a plan now reflected in the structure of Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission, which includes a Vice-President for the Energy Union.

The most significant outcome of the new sensitivity to dependence on Russian gas was the cancellation of the South Stream pipeline, which would have enabled Russian gas transits to Europe to bypass Ukraine. Austria and Hungary agreed to cooperate with Russia and Gazprom to build the pipeline in their countries despite the Commission’s instructions to put a pause on construction planning. Bulgaria, the country of the pipeline’s entry into the EU, also initially went ahead with the project, fearing lack of solidarity from other EU states as happened in the 2006 and 2009 gas crises. It was targeted with a penalty procedure from the Commission for holding tenders improperly. However, Bulgaria froze the project in July and was ultimately blamed by Putin for the failure of South Stream. Without Nabucco and now minus South Stream, many in the Balkans see energy dependency on one country (Russia) as having been exchanged for dependence on another (Turkey).

The Shah Deniz consortium agreed this year to commit gas resources to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, which will bring Azeri gas to Europe through Turkey, a modest contribution to the EU’s diversification efforts.

Discussions are still continuing between Russia, Germany, and the Commission on the regulation of the OPAL pipeline, which connects the Nord Stream pipeline to the European gas network. Meanwhile, the floating LNG terminal requisitioned by Lithuania arrived in 2014, offering Baltic states independence from Russian gas.

9 – Relations with Russia on the Greater Middle East

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

5

3

4

Resources /5

n/a

4

4

2

3

Outcome /10

n/a

5

4

6

4

Total / 20

n/a

12

13

11

11

Grade

n/a

B-

B

B-

B-

The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has not translated into new antagonism on MENA issues.

In 2014 Russia became effectively “a single issue country” – the bulk of its diplomatic energy was focused on Ukraine and on relations with the West in the context of European order. The Middle East played a smaller role than usual in Russia’s agenda.

The EU’s relations with Russia were equally focused on the eastern neighbourhood. But fears that Russia might intentionally try to become a “spoiler” to the EU’s policies in the Middle East did not come true. Rather, Moscow is sticking to its old policies, which, however, remain at odds with Europe’s stated values: while the West sees authoritarianism as cause of extremism, Russia sees it as a guard against it.

Russia continued to be an active and constructive member of the EU3+3 framework (Germany, France, the UK, China, Russia, and the US) in negotiating a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. Moscow also made some efforts to step up its bilateral relations with Iran, but these have been met with scepticism in Tehran.

Russia is also supporting Western efforts to fight ISIS in Iraq, but it has not retreated from its pro-Bashar al-Assad position in its Syria policy. The EU has in the past tried to get Russia to exercise its influence on Assad in Syria, a request that Moscow has always rejected. This year, the EU’s own determination to see Assad removed has crumbled, making policy differences with Russia on Syria less urgent and dramatic.

10 – Relations with Russia on the Arctic

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

4

5

4

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

4

3

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

5

3

6

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

13

11

12

Grade

n/a

n/a

B

B-

B-

Russia is stepping up its military presence in the Arctic and so denying the EU its goal of instating cooperative and nature-friendly governance of the Arctic.

The EU’s goals in the Arctic have always been twofold. On a philosophical level, the EU wants to see the Arctic governed in a cooperative manner that takes into account the needs of nature and native peoples. On an institutional level, it wants the Arctic countries – including Russia – to support its bid to become an observer in the Arctic Council.

Russia has been lukewarmly supportive of the EU’s bid since the EU’s vision on Arctic governance moved closer to that of Russia’s own. However, the EU’s observer status in the Arctic Council was rejected in 2013, blocked by Canada because of a dispute over the seal fur trade. By the end of 2014, this dispute was finally on the way towards being solved, so in 2015 the EU will get a new chance to test Russia’s attitudes as regards the EU’s observer status.

In wider questions of Arctic activity, 2014 saw negative developments. Russia increased its militarisation of the Arctic, which it began in 2013. In April, Putin announced plans to build a unified network of military facilities on its Arctic territories to host troops, advanced warships, and aircraft. The Arctic element was present in Russia’s huge military exercises known as Vostok 2014 (which had the Far East as its main focus). Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu announced that Russia “will have military control of the entirety of its 6,200km Arctic coastal zone by the end of 2014”.

The September round of sanctions that focused on energy issues also affected prospects for deep-sea drilling in the Arctic. Western companies are banned from developing new cooperation projects with Russia, but existing projects were not directly affected (although over-compliance may halt some of them).

New disputes may emerge in 2015 on the division of the Arctic’s vast, resource-rich territory, since several littoral states – including Russia and EU member Denmark – have submitted overlapping claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

Chapter 2: United States

Europe’s relationship with the United States in 2014 was dominated by the Ukraine crisis and how to respond to Russia. This unexpected challenge reinvigorated the transatlantic alliance and put paid to any fear that the rebalance to Asia meant the US would no longer be committed to the security of Europe. It may also provide the framework for a new division of labour whereby the European Union plays as important a role in transatlantic security relations as NATO, while Germany takes on a greater leadership role in the alliance.

There were differences between the US and Europe, especially at the outset. The US was proactive and assertive, with senior US officials making high-profile visits to the Maidan during the demonstrations and the US bringing pressure to bear for tough sanctions soon after the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The EU was more cautious and divided. But as the crisis continued, there was a significant transatlantic convergence on what needed to be done. The sanctions were broadened from targeting individuals to limiting technology transfers and denying market access to Russian firms. The EU, and especially Germany, began to take on a leadership role in the alliance’s response to the crisis, and this was welcomed by the US.

There was also mutual recognition of the broader challenge that Russia poses to the European security order, with Europe and the US working together to address it. Washington shared the concern of the eastern EU states that Russia would employ hybrid warfare against a NATO member state – presumably one of the Baltic states – to test the Article V commitment. New NATO exercises followed, as well as consultations with European member states to bolster the conventional deterrent. And US diplomats increased their engagement in Central and Eastern Europe to push back against forces promoting “illiberal democracy” and democratic backsliding.

By the end of the year, the sanctions were having a major impact on the Russian economy, especially when compounded by the fall in the price of oil. EU and US leaders said that they hoped the damage would cause Vladimir Putin to reverse course, but few expected this to happen. This fed into a more general concern, on both sides of the Atlantic, about the prospect of a new Cold War and the absence of a strategy to avoid it. President Barack Obama’s administration launched a review of Russia policy but Putin’s centrality in Russian decision-making was seen as a significant impediment to progress. Compartmentalisation – whereby cooperation with Russia is preserved on non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and other issues – is seen as part of the solution; however, it may not be sustainable.

Russia was not the only issue in transatlantic relations. The rapid rise of ISIS in Syria and Northern Iraq contributed to a perception that the regional order in the Middle East is unravelling. European and US cooperation on the Middle East has been less well managed than cooperation on Russia and Ukraine. Responding to this challenge is complex and it is unclear whether any strategy could have resolved the situation cleanly in 2014. Nevertheless, the ad hoc US response, after the fall of Mosul and the beheading of two Americans, has been unilateral (as was that of the EU states that chose to intervene nationally) and was largely tailored to domestic political constraints. Regardless, the US has increased its engagement in the region significantly.

Matters are not helped by the fact that Europe is divided as to what approach to take in the region, notably towards Egypt and the Gulf Arab states. Five European nations joined the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in operations in Iraq (but not Syria), while others worried that a new war in the Middle East could lead to terrorist attacks at home.

More generally, 2014 was a year in which other initiatives and problems moved along slowly, without much drama relative to what had gone before. The year 2013 was one of contrasts: it saw successes such as the launch of the TTIP and the interim agreement with Iran, as well as failures such as the Snowden crisis and the Syria debacle. When it came to assigning an overall grade to EU relations with the US, this unusual mix of success and failure essentially cancelled itself out. In 2014 Europe and the US avoided major failures but were also unable to build on some of the breakthroughs of the previous years. On these issues, there was a reversion toward the mean.

The crises of 2013 abated a little. The Snowden revelations continue to rankle and there was a new spy crisis with Germany, but the US made progress in addressing some of Europe’s concerns, for example, by suspending spying operations in allied countries. The rise of ISIS and the threat of foreign fighters have also changed the context in which the Snowden revelations are discussed.

Transatlantic diplomatic initiatives have run into difficulty. The TTIP negotiations have not progressed as quickly as many would like. Several problems emerged, especially over the standardisation of regulations and investor protection provisions. The political headwinds are strong, as populists, especially in Europe, campaign against a deal. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic will have to make a more forceful case for TTIP in 2015.

On the Iranian nuclear programme, the E3+3 were unable to reach a deal with Iran by the deadline of 25 November 2014 and talks were extended for seven months. The EU and the Obama administration remained unified throughout the process, but the US is sharply divided on Iran along partisan lines, and the Republican-controlled Congress could yet pass new sanctions that derail the negotiations.

There were also disappointments. The US-led Israel-Palestine peace talks, for which Europe had pressed, fell apart, and transatlantic divisions re-emerged, although divergences were more limited than they have been on many occasions in the past. In October, Sweden recognised Palestine as a state and, by the end of the year, the European Parliament and five other EU states had also passed some form of recognition.

Overall, though, 2014 will be remembered in transatlantic relations as a turning point for European security, when Russia re-emerged as a significant geopolitical challenge.

11 – Relations with the US on NATO, arms control, and Russia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

2

2

2

2

3

Resources /5

2

2

2

2

4

Outcome /10

4

2

5

4

8

Total / 20

8

6

9

8

15

Grade

C

C-

C+

C

B+

After a slow start, Europe took a strong and unified position on sanctions. The US led on bolstering NATO’s Article V.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and its hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, along with its provocative actions against NATO and EU member states, were widely perceived by the US as transforming the European security environment. Russia’s behaviour revived the traditional rationale for the transatlantic alliance: to balance Russian power and protect the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the allies.

The crisis demonstrated that the US commitment to European security remained unchanged. The US was engaged from an early stage. In fact, the Obama administration was criticised by some Europeans for being overly zealous in its support for the Ukrainian opposition and for the wide-ranging sanctions it favoured. However, as the year progressed, there was a convergence in assessments and response on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, the sanctions were broadened and imposed both by the US and by the EU.

The alliance tackled this crisis in a new way. Since the US and Europe ruled out the use of military force in Ukraine, the European response has been mainly directed through the EU rather than NATO. The Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK have led calls for cooperation with the US on this issue. And, in the second half of the year, especially after the downing of MH17, Germany took a leadership role in the alliance on Ukraine and Russia sanctions, which was broadly welcomed in Washington.

If the Europeans played a leading role on Ukraine and the sanctions as the year progressed, the US played its traditional role within NATO. The US perceived a divide in Europe on the extent of the Russian threat to NATO members, with the Baltic and northern European states viewing it more seriously than did some others. Therefore, the US made bolstering Article V a key priority. This included a speech by President Obama in Estonia and diplomatic efforts with western European members of NATO to shore up the alliance’s military presence in the Baltics.

12 – Relations with the US on counter-terrorism

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

4

3

4

4

Resources /5

2

3

3

3

3

Outcome /10

5

7

6

7

7

Total / 20

10

14

12

14

14

Grade

C+

B+

B-

B+

B+

Kidnappings and foreign fighters have emerged as the latest terrorist threat to European and American interests.

The terrorist threat to Europe and the US rose in 2014 as a result of ISIS’s rapid gains in Northern Iraq. There is particular concern, voiced by President Obama among others, about the fact that thousands of Western citizens have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS. Some have returned to their home countries radicalised and remain engaged in terrorist activity. For instance, on 24 May 2014, a French citizen who had fought with ISIS shot four people in a Jewish museum in Brussels. The US has promised full cooperation to tackle the threat posed by foreign fighters. There is also concern that ISIS members who hold European passports could avail of the visa waiver programme to enter the US.

A related problem is ISIS’s kidnapping of foreign nationals for ransom, which has resulted in beheadings that have been videotaped and released to the public. There are two different approaches. Britain and the US refuse to pay or negotiate with the hostage-takers and instead focus on using special forces to free them. Other nations, including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, are understood to have handed over the money, which usually results in the release of the hostages. In an interview, President Obama expressed his frustration with the paying of ransoms.

With regard to the US-led effort against terrorists more generally, President Obama gave a speech in 2013 in which he promised to scale back the use of drones for counter-terrorism. This was welcomed in Europe at the time and appears to have been followed through in 2014. However, the rapid rise of ISIS has created new demands for a light but lethal counter-terrorism strategy, although opinions vary on how this should be achieved.

13 – Relations with the US on intelligence cooperation and data protection

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

5

4

n/a

2

3

Resources /5

5

3

n/a

2

4

Outcome /10

8

7

n/a

2

7

Total / 20

18

14

n/a

6

14

Grade

A

B+

n/a

C-

B+

American spying in Europe continued to damage relations between the US and Germany and could have serious repercussions for US technology companies.

In July 2014 Germany expelled the Berlin CIA station chief after discovering the agency had recruited two agents inside the German government. This compounded the damage done by the US eavesdropping that became public in the Snowden revelations. Germany’s minister of finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, remarked: “so much stupidity just makes you want to cry”. President Obama called Chancellor Merkel and offered to repair US-German intelligence cooperation. The CIA subsequently suspended espionage activities against allied governments in Western Europe, although Germany still increased its counter-espionage efforts against the US. A high-level US delegation led by White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough visited Berlin in late July for discussions on espionage with the Chancellor’s chief of staff. Domestic barriers to privacy reforms within the US remained high, as evidenced by the Senate’s blocking the USA Freedom Act in November, which would have ended bulk data collection and created stricter privacy controls.

The Snowden revelations continued to reverberate throughout Europe, but as a political and governmental matter, it has only been taken up – in a relatively muted way – by Germany and a couple of other countries along with Brussels. Most European governments have not made it a priority in their relations with the US, reflecting different attitudes to surveillance. The European Parliament increased pressure on the US to introduce safeguards to protect EU citizens’ privacy, including by voting for the break-up of Google. This move had no legal impact but strengthened other efforts, driven by Germany, to increase regulation on US technology companies. Meanwhile, Austria and Italy led calls for a collective European policy on privacy and intelligence, with the Czech Republic, Denmark, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK the most reluctant.

The release of the US Senate report on torture in December 2014 raised questions, especially for Poland and the UK, about the extent of European cooperation with the Bush administration. European officials welcomed its publication and noted that the Obama administration had repudiated torture and supported the report’s publication.

14 – Relations with the US on the Balkans and Eastern Europe

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

2

2

4

4

Resources /5

4

4

4

4

3

Outcome /10

7

7

5

8

7

Total / 20

14

13

11

16

14

Grade

B+

B

B-

A-

B+

The US has sought to support EU attempts to counter Russian assertiveness in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was followed by increased diplomatic and political assertiveness in Eastern Europe and the Balkans as Vladimir Putin sought to expand his regional influence. The US has reduced its role in the Balkans over the past 15 years but this shift by Russia may result in greater US engagement in support of efforts by Germany and the EU.

Russia’s assertiveness manifested itself in several ways. Russia sought to exploit Eastern Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, it stoked pro-Russian sentiment in Serbia and Slovenia, and, in November 2014, Russia for the first time in 14 years abstained on the vote at the UN to extend an EU-led peacekeeping mission in the Balkans.

Senior European and US officials have gone public with their concerns. At the G20 meeting in Australia, Angela Merkel said that Russian activities could destabilise the Balkans. US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Victoria Nuland made a series of speeches criticising the “illiberal democracy” model championed by Viktor Orban in Hungary and urging Central and East European leaders to resist Russia’s siren call. Increased US engagement in Eastern Europe and the Balkans is in line with EU objectives to promote and consolidate liberal democracy. The EU will continue to take the lead but the US believes that it may be able to use its leverage as the provider of NATO security guarantees in a way that the EU cannot: it could use military cooperation as leverage to ensure various leaders remain committed to liberal democracy.

Meanwhile, the situation in Bosnia continues to worsen. Riots erupted in early 2014 in response to political dysfunction rooted in the 20-year-old Dayton Peace Accords. The US has been disengaged in Bosnia for the past few years and it remains to be seen whether the increased attention being paid to Europe in Washington will change this.

15 – Reciprocity on visa procedures with the US

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

2

2

2

3

Resources /5

2

2

2

3

3

Outcome /10

3

3

3

5

6

Total / 20

8

7

7

10

12

Grade

C

C-

C-

C+

B-

There was little progress on extending visa-free travel to the four EU states that do not yet have it, but changes on immigration enforcement benefited Ireland and Poland.

The US has visa-free travel arrangements with all EU states bar four: Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus. These countries have lobbied for visa-free travel for some time but it continues to be denied because of the high rate of refusals for visa applications from the four. In February 2014, Bulgaria brought the matter to the EU, which asked the US to allow visa-free travel and promised repercussions if it did not, including introducing visas for US diplomats. However, promises to impose retaliatory restrictions have not been followed up in previous years, and 2014 was no different.

If anything, the prospect of visa-free travel has receded. The Obama administration had suggested that it could be introduced as a part of comprehensive immigration reform, but this is less likely than ever now that the Republican Party has gained control of the US Senate. Moreover, there is increased concern in Congress that ISIS fighters who are also EU citizens may use their visa-free status to travel to the US. Some members of Congress have even called for ending all visa-free travel with the EU, although theirs are isolated voices. This creates much more of a problem for those countries that already have visa-free status (including France and the UK) than for the four that do not have it, but it does mean that liberalisation is a tough sell.

One silver lining of the developments on this issue in 2014 is that President Obama’s executive action on immigration to allow up to 5 million illegal immigrants to stay in the US has benefited a great number of Polish and Irish unauthorised immigrants in the US.

16 – Relations with the US on trade and investment

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

3

4

4

3

Resources /5

2

3

4

5

4

Outcome /10

3

3

7

9

5

Total / 20

8

5

15

18

14

Grade

C

B-

B-

A

B+

TTIP negotiations continued but progress was slower than expected and the treaty faces strong political headwinds.

The launch of TTIP negotiations in 2013 set an ambitious goal for transatlantic cooperation. In 2014, TTIP negotiations focused on standardisation of regulation and promoting investment, and talks appeared to be slower and more difficult than expected.

Political opposition to TTIP increased in 2014. In opinion polls in Europe, majorities tend to support a trade deal in general but oppose specific compromises that would be part of such a deal, including common regulatory standards for cars or food (the “chlorinated chicken” problem) and investor state dispute settlement mechanisms (ISDS). Public concern remains high in Austria and France and, to a lesser degree, in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The necessary secrecy of the negotiations has allowed opposition to grow without an effective rebuttal. Economic stagnation strengthens populist parties that run against globalisation, even though a breakthrough on trade is crucial to increasing demand for Europe’s exports. The governments of Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have worked harder than others to promote this view in the interest of keeping the talks on track.

In the US, President Obama has dragged his feet in pushing for Trade Promotion Authority, which many believe is a necessary pre-condition for concluding negotiations. In his State of the Union address in January 2014, he mentioned it only in passing and it was put on the back burner for the rest of the year, partly because it was unpopular with his party’s base in a mid-term election year. The fate of TTIP is also linked to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is further advanced than TTIP but is also stuck. If TPP fails, TTIP will be harder to ratify. The victory of the generally more pro-trade Republican Party in the mid-term elections may help trade policy.

Ultimately, the challenge to TTIP is the same on both sides of the Atlantic – at a time of economic difficulty, mainstream politicians have found it difficult to make the case for globalisation.

17 – Relations with the US on economic issues

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

3

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

3

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

6

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

7

12

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

C-

B-

Although differences on economic philosophy continue to divide the US and EU, there was agreement on the need for sanctions against Russia.

Since the financial crisis, differences in economic philosophy between the US and some European nations have been laid bare. The US has generally favoured a more expansionist fiscal policy and quantitative easing on monetary policy, an approach influenced by Keynesian ideas. Under German leadership, and in the face of considerable internal opposition, the EU has pursued fiscal austerity, structural reform, and a tight monetary policy. Thus, the West is divided on how to sustain an economic recovery.

In 2013, it appeared that this divide would matter less as the European and American economies recovered, or so political leaders hoped. Unfortunately, 2014 did not bring a sustained recovery in Europe – instead, the eurozone economy flirted with deflation and a triple-dip recession. The US has its own economic problems but it performed better overall. Within Europe, advocates of Keynesian economics have gained ground everywhere except Germany, with many pointing to the US as an example to partially emulate. The divide has, therefore, reasserted itself.

The split is not as damaging as it was at the height of the crisis, primarily because the risk of a eurozone breakup has receded. Nevertheless, Americans and like-minded Europeans worry that Europe might face a “lost” decade, while Germany and its allies become ever more exasperated at what they see as a flawed Anglo-Saxon framework. Setting aside the differences in economic philosophy, 2014 saw one major achievement. After much initial argument, Europe and the US agreed on how to design and implement sanctions against Russia. This was far from guaranteed. The EU has a much greater stake in the Russian economy than the US does, which meant it was correspondingly more sensitive to sanctions. However, if the sanctions push the EU back into recession, divisions could re-emerge.

18 – Relations with the US on Syria, Northern Iraq and the Wider Middle East

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

5

4

4

4

Resources /5

n/a

3

4

3

3

Outcome /10

n/a

6

6

5

5

Total / 20

n/a

14

14

12

12

Grade

n/a

B+

B+

B-

B-

The US has re-engaged in Iraq but is criticised as lacking an effective strategy for Syria as the West struggles to combat ISIS.

The rise of ISIS and its rapid expansion in northern Iraq was one of the biggest stories of 2014. The fall of Mosul and the beheading of American and British citizens in the summer transformed US public opinion and the political debate in Washington. After trying to avoid becoming embroiled in Syria and Iraq, the Obama administration did a U-turn and launched a new military effort against ISIS. After years of neglect, the US re-engaged diplomatically in Iraq and succeeded in brokering the departure of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which was deemed a necessary precondition for action against ISIS.

However, the US strategy for this new war has come under widespread criticism, since there is currently no prospect of scaling up if necessary and there is no political plan for Syria. And in any case, few believe it will be effective. The decision to go to war was also taken unilaterally; allies were only truly consulted after the fact and the strategy did not take their substantive concerns into account. Five European states (France, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium) have carried out airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq; none have been involved in strikes on Syrian territory. Others decided not to participate, although all condemn ISIS.

There is concern on both sides of the Atlantic that Western military action against ISIS may increase the risk of terrorist attacks at home, but the US assessment is that regional powers are unable to carry the load on their own, especially if the West wants to avoid empowering Iran and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad as partners in the fight (which would also alienate Sunni Gulf allies).

As for US policy toward the region as a whole, the discussion in Washington now focuses on two strategic choices: returning to the traditional Gulf allies or greater cooperation with Iran. The former appears more likely. A third option of democratisation and political reform is generally believed to lack viability until stability returns.

19 – Relations with the US on Israel and Palestine

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

2

2

4

2

Resources /5

3

2

3

3

4

Outcome /10

2

2

2

7

5

Total / 20

8

6

7

14

11

Grade

C

C-

C-

B+

B-

Following the collapse of the peace talks, the US and the EU emphasised different priorities.

The collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks represented a significant setback for US and EU foreign policy. However, Europe and the US were relatively united on the conduct of the talks and Europeans generally welcomed the US initiative as well as Secretary of State John Kerry’s singular determination in pushing negotiations forward. The failure of the talks had little to do with US policy and primarily resulted from decisions taken by Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

After the collapse, Palestinian premier Mahmoud Abbas turned to international institutions, including seeking a UN Security Council resolution calling for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank by 2017 and for recognition of Palestine as a state. France backed the resolution while Britain abstained. With an 8–2 vote in favour, it failed to reach the nine votes required for passage (at which point it would have triggered a US veto). The US ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, criticised the resolution as well as Palestine’s efforts to join the International Criminal Court.

Meanwhile, European states moved to recognise the state of Palestine. Sweden was the first to do so officially, while the parliaments of the UK, Ireland, Spain, France, and Luxembourg along with the European Parliament all passed non-binding motions urging recognition. The EU’s policy of non-recognition of the Israeli settlements continued.

There is a difference in emphasis – at least publicly – across the Atlantic on diagnosing the breakdown in the talks. While the Obama administration has also criticised the Israeli settlement policy, more blame is attributed to the Palestinian Authority. For example, the US official view was that the establishment of a national Palestinian Authority government with the support of Hamas triggered the collapse of the talks. Americans tend to see Europe’s recognition of Palestine and pressuring of Israel as one-sided and believe it is unlikely to lead to a breakthrough unless Palestinian leaders can also be persuaded to make compromises that they have hitherto not made.

20 – Relations with the US on Iran and weapons proliferation

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

5

4

4

4

5

Resources /5

5

5

5

5

5

Outcome /10

8

7

8

9

7

Total / 20

18

16

17

18

17

Grade

A

A-

A-

A

A-

Europe and the US continued to cooperate in the Iran negotiations but actions by the US Congress threaten to complicate talks in 2015.

After a year of intensive negotiations, the E3+3 and Iran were unable to reach a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme and instead extended the 2013 interim agreement (the JPoA) for seven months until 30 June 2015. Although an agreement has not been reached, the JPoA continues to freeze Iran’s nuclear programme and the agreement on its extension places additional constraints upon Iran, including unannounced inspections for centrifuge production facilities.

There was little substantive daylight between the EU and the Obama administration on the talks in 2014. Both had similar assessments of what constituted a good deal and remained unified throughout the negotiations. It appeared that the Obama administration would have been willing to support an agreement if it could have been reached, despite vigorous opposition from the Republican Party and from US allies in the Middle East. President Obama wrote to Iran’s Supreme Leader in advance of the deadline. As it turned out, Iran was not willing to make the necessary compromises.

There was some speculation in the US that the Obama administration would seek Iran’s assistance in the fight against ISIS but the White House denied it would coordinate its efforts with Iran. More generally, US officials believed that linking other issues to the nuclear talks would be counterproductive, as Iran would see its help as something to be exchanged for concessions in the negotiations. However, the apparent intention of the Republican Party to impose additional sanctions on Iran has the potential to derail the negotiations and cause the JPoA to collapse. If an agreement is reached, the Republican-controlled Congress could also cause a deal to unravel after it is agreed by the Obama administration. Finally, if the Obama administration concludes that the necessary compromises on both sides are unachievable, the EU and the US may well differ on how to handle the aftermath.

21 – Relations with the US on Asia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

3

3

3

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

2

2

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

7

7

5

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

12

12

10

Grade

n/a

n/a

B-

B-

C+

Europe faced less pressure from the US to engage strategically in East Asia in 2014, but engagement continues to be in its long-term interests.

Now that the transatlantic alliance is preoccupied with Russian aggression and the rise of ISIS, few consider joining the US rebalance to Asia as the way to ensure the alliance’s continued relevance. However, this may be a curse disguised as a blessing. Europe needs to engage strategically in East Asia not to help the US, but because it too has an interest in the region remaining stable and avoiding crises. In this sense, the dissipation of US pressure on Europe to engage strategically in Asia may make it less likely that the EU will do what it should for its own interests.

European nations still treated Asia as a national economic opportunity rather than a strategic issue this year. In 2014, the EU did not attend the Shangri-La defence dialogue, although it had in 2013. There was little interest among member states in raising concerns with Beijing about the South China Sea disputes (about which China was very assertive in the first half of 2014). Europe is also divided about the benefits of transatlantic coordination on this issue, with the UK in favour and France and Germany generally opposed.

The rationale for increased European engagement in Asia is not to keep Washington happy. Rather, it is that tensions in East Asia, which continued to rise in 2014, could threaten European economic and security interests. Although Europe and the US have very different equities in East Asia, both are well served by a stable regional order. East Asian nations are actively seeking a more comprehensive European role. Europe cannot engage militarily but it can engage diplomatically on institution building, upholding the rule of law, solving maritime disputes, and helping Southeast Asian nations to diversify their economic relations beyond China. As the transatlantic alliance balances back to Europe and the Middle East, Europe must not lose sight of the long-term need to engage strategically in East Asia.

Chapter 3: Wider Europe

Wider Europe has been centre stage for European foreign policy in 2014, as Europe faced the fundamental challenge of supporting countries that were facing a steep price for their European aspirations. When the Vilnius summit ended in late 2013, many were ready to declare the Eastern Partnership dead. Instead, it was kept alive by the protests in Kyiv and has evolved from a rather technical process to an existential crisis both for the eastern neighbourhood and for the EU.

The Association Agreement process itself saw a dramatic reversal from the slow and unsteady pace of 2013. The political provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement were signed on 21 March. Ukrainian exporters were given immediate duty-free access to EU markets in April, though other economic aspects of the agreement were delayed until after the presidential elections in May. On 27 June, the EU held a triple signing ceremony for Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, to support all three in the face of mounting Russian pressure.

Yet despite the Association Agreement progress, the Ukraine crisis continues, with much of it beyond the EU’s control. So far, the EU has been more effective at penalising Russia than at helping Ukraine. Sanctions help Ukraine only indirectly; while they may have kept Vladimir Putin from escalating further, they do nothing to improve the deteriorating security situation. Despite Berlin adopting a harder line on Russia, it ruled out any military option at the onset of the crisis. Germany has prioritised achieving a ceasefire and has pushed round-table negotiations that risk legitimising Kyiv’s self-appointed opponents. Little has been done to provide Ukraine with lethal, or non-lethal, military aid, or to rebuild its corrupt and incompetent security sector. The EU advisory mission sent to Kyiv in December 2014 largely concentrated on the legal sector. However, when Ukraine (and by extension some member states) faced a gas crisis in winter, the EU, led by European Commission Vice-President Günther Oettinger, intervened decisively to broker a “winter package” between Moscow and Kyiv. Even so, economic assistance remains stalled for understandable reasons, as the new government has yet to devise a coherent reform plan to clean up the mess left by Viktor Yanukovych. Political progress in Ukraine now seems more possible than before, but ten years of failure should make us aware of the difficulties – of which the state of the economy is the gravest and most immediate.

The picture elsewhere in the region is highly contradictory. It is increasingly clear that the six countries of the Eastern Partnership are moving in different directions at different speeds, thanks to pressure from Moscow and their own internal weaknesses. Moldova’s pro-European parties narrowly won the elections in November 2014. Azerbaijan used the regional crisis as an excuse to crack down hard on local civil society. Armenia began to have second thoughts about joining Russia’s Eurasian Union, which launched in January 2015, but its need for Russia’s security umbrella eventually trumped economic doubts. Belarus demanded a high price for continuing with the Eurasian Union project. Georgia continued to fritter away the fruits of the radical reforms of the Saakashvili era (2004–2013). Aside from expediting the Association Agreement signing, the EU has not been very proactive, but has in the end united to support the “European Choice” where it is still being made. That said, if Russia retaliates against Moldova or Georgia as extremely as it did against Ukraine, it is unclear what kind of support the EU or member states are prepared to offer.

In the Western Balkans, meanwhile, European policy was a mix of continuity, rollbacks, and attempts at re-engagement. In a fractious EU political context, the prospect of enlargement was on life support. Progress in the Balkans was hamstrung by spillovers from the Ukraine crisis and by widespread perceptions of EU disengagement (with the new Commission leadership declaring that no Western Balkans country will be joining the EU in the next five years). There was some backsliding, even in candidate countries. Still, in the final stretch of the year, European powers attempted re-engagement, led by Germany, which convened a regional conference and tabled, with the UK, a proposal to stem Bosnia’s downward trend.

The year 2014 was also tumultuous for the EU’s relations with Turkey. While the member states were united in their concern over Ankara’s anti-democratic tendencies, they were divided on how to address it and they found themselves with limited leverage. Neither were they in agreement on their approach to Turkey in the context of the Syria crisis, particularly on the question of regime change. Some progress was made on addressing the refugee crisis and the problem of foreign fighters travelling through Turkey, but not enough to meet either side’s needs. Perhaps most worryingly, Ankara did not cooperate with European sanctions against Russia, instead stepping in to profit from the void opened up by EU companies’ retreat and Moscow’s counter-sanctions. With seemingly intractable blocks on the Turkish accession process, Europe finds itself with little leverage over Ankara, but with no appetite to adapt its policy goals to the new environment. This weakness is not helped by the turmoil in Turkey’s neighbourhood.

There is little sign that any of these tensions will lessen in 2015. Thus, much like the past year, 2015 will be a year in which wider Europe will be the central testing ground for EU foreign policy. From armed conflict in the Donbas to economic reform in Kyiv, from Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries to ongoing challenges to reform in the Western Balkans and Turkey, all this will test Europe’s cohesion, its commitment to its values, and its ability to multitask.

22 – Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in the eastern neighbourhood

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

4

3

3

4

Resources /5

4

3

4

4

3

Outcome /10

6

1

1

4

8

Total / 20

13

8

8

11

15

Grade

B

C

C

B-

B+

There has been obvious, but difficult, progress in Ukraine. The picture elsewhere in the region is less positive.

Ukraine saw democratic breakthroughs in 2014. These were domestic in origin, but the EU provided essential support. Despite massive Russian military and economic pressure, Ukraine held presidential elections in May and parliamentary elections in October, which were largely given a clean bill of health by the OSCE’s ODIHR. Slovakia has played a coordinating role in pressing for political reform on behalf of EU states. An EU advisory mission on civilian security sector reform, with 50 experts and a budget of €13 million, began its two-year mandate in December. While the importance of security sector reform is not in doubt, the timing of this mission is questionable.

Annexed Crimea has been dispossessed of democracy. Sham elections in September followed the sham referendum in March, and the 270,000-strong Crimean Tatar community face human rights abuses and the threat that their religious and political organisations will be banned and replaced by pro-Russian alternatives. A similar lack of democracy exists in the Donbas, alongside insecurity and a looming humanitarian disaster.

Moldova held elections in November, which were marred by the last-minute banning of the pro-Russian Patria party, and entrenched vested interests remain strong. In Georgia, selective and blatantly political prosecutions have become increasingly common and obviously targeted against the opposition United National Movement. Local elections in June were competitive, but resulted in a clean sweep for the ruling party, Georgian Dream, and a new round of charges came immediately afterwards.

There was talk of liberalisation in Armenia, where the ruling class, which is traditionally linked to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, is growing old in office. Azerbaijan, however, has used the crisis to crack down hard on activists and domestic and foreign-funded NGOs while the world’s attention has been elsewhere. Azerbaijan’s position as Chair of the Council of Europe provided a convenient cover story. In Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenka has used the crisis to widen his political base and has won some support from nationalists anxious about statehood.

23 – Relations with the eastern neighbourhood on trade

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

5

5

4

4

5

Resources /5

4

4

5

4

4

Outcome /10

5

6

7

5

5

Total / 20

14

15

16

13

14

Grade

B+

B+

A-

B

B+

The EU used the prospect of trade agreements well during the Ukraine protests, but missed an opportunity in delaying implementation of Ukraine’s DCFTA.

EU markets were unilaterally opened for Ukraine in April, allowing Ukrainian exporters duty-free access, initially for six months and then until the start of 2016. Questionable Ukrainian statistics report that exports from Ukraine to the EU in the first half of 2014 increased by 25 percent, offsetting the reduction in Ukraine’s exports to Russia (down by 24.5 percent). Ukraine’s Association Agreement was finally signed in June. But then, in June, the EU delayed DCFTA implementation for a year. The initiative for the delay was Germany’s, and the idea was to encourage Russia to back off in Ukraine. However, it deprived the Ukrainian government of a crucial instrument with which to push through other reforms (and even blame the EU for the pain of transition). And it did not appease Russia, which simply pocketed the concession and demanded the renegotiation of the whole agreement.

The EU also fast-tracked the signing of Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova in June to protect both states from Russian pressure. Moldova was, perhaps, marked too highly, given the perceived importance of backing the existing government before elections in November. With Georgia, the move came in spite of political prosecutions and a flat-lining economy.

Armenia has shown some signs of having second thoughts about joining the Russia-led Eurasian Union, largely because Yerevan did not want to set up a customs border with Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s ruling elite is still tightly integrated with the Russian oligarchy and Armenia’s key concern is maintaining the Russian security umbrella.

Overall, trade has scored lower because, while Europe made rapid progress with DCFTAs in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, the rest of the picture is mixed. The Czech Republic, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK deserve mentions for their sustained bilateral assistance in the region. But there is a real question mark over the future health of the Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Georgian economies. EU trade agreements will not protect the three countries from Russian sanctions.

24 – Visa liberalisation with the eastern neighbourhood

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

4

3

3

5

Resources /5

2

3

3

3

4

Outcome /10

5

5

5

6

7

Total / 20

10

12

11

12

16

Grade

C+

B-

B-

B-

A-

Visa liberalisation moved forward with Ukraine and Georgia, and Moldova achieved visa-free status in April.

Visas remain issue number one in terms of public opinion in the six Eastern Partnership states. The EU will probably never move as fast as local opinion would wish, but progress has been made with Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. Given the dramatic circumstances, this is a considerable acceleration of the process.

Moldova has long been ahead of the other five, having done the preparatory work required by its Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP), but it also benefited from the EU’s decision to show political support for governments under Russian pressure during the Ukraine crisis. Moldova was, therefore, granted visa-free status at the end of April, allowing all Moldovan citizens with a biometric passport to travel throughout the Schengen Zone states.

It was not possible to accelerate Ukrainians towards visa-free travel in the same way, as the action plan had been proceeding slowly under Yanukovych. But in May 2014, the EU moved Ukraine onto the second phase of the visa liberalisation process, during which the EU checks on the implementation of laws that have already been passed. Ukraine will introduce biometric passports early in 2015.

Georgia was moved to the second phase of its VLAP in October 2014. An EU-Armenia visa facilitation agreement came into force on 1 January 2014, and a similar agreement was made with Azerbaijan on 1 September.

In January 2014, taking advantage of Belarus’ desire for a more balanced foreign policy, Brussels launched negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission with Minsk. Because it borders Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, Belarus tends to take a high number of Schengen visas (and travel within the region was even more frequent before enlargement in 2004).

25 - Relations with the eastern neighbourhood on energy

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

5

5

3

3

4

Resources /5

4

4

2

2

4

Outcome /10

5

6

3

3

8

Total / 20

14

15

8

8

16

Grade

B+

B+

C

C

A-

Important steps were taken in 2014, notably the European Commission-brokered Russia- Ukraine deal on gas supply to Ukraine.

In 2014 Europe’s energy relations with the eastern neighbourhood were clouded by the events in Ukraine. One issue was the security problem in the east of Ukraine; another, the threat that gas supply to European customers through Ukraine would be interrupted after Ukraine was unable to secure gas from Russia for four and half months. With the help of the European Commission, and particularly the vice-president in charge of energy, Günther Oettinger, Russia and Ukraine signed an interim gas deal to supply gas to Ukraine for the winter of 2014, thus avoiding further escalation and possible interruption of gas deliveries to European consumers.

The EU and its member states worked closely with Ukraine to open up a physical interconnector between Slovakia and Ukraine that would allow the country to import gas from Europe, thereby reducing its dependency on Russian gas and minimising its vulnerability to Gazprom’s pricing policy. All in all, in 2014 Ukraine has moved closer to the European energy framework, aligning its energy market institutions with the EU acquis communautaire on energy.

Meanwhile, Europe’s energy relations with other ENP countries were steadier in 2014 – cooperation with Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro proceeded within the Energy Community organisation. In 2014 these countries amended and adopted various laws and regulation aimed at streamlining their energy sector organisations to match the EU acquis on energy.

26 – Overall progress of enlargement in the Western Balkans

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

4

4

5

2

Resources /5

n/a

4

4

4

3

Outcome /10

n/a

5

6

7

6

Total / 20

n/a

13

14

16

11

Grade

n/a

B

B+

A-

B-

Enlargement in the Western Balkans was put on ice, EU leverage was weakened, and Russia’s influence was felt.

Albania was granted candidate status in June and Serbia’s accession negotiations were launched in January. Aside from that, little progress was made on enlargement in the Western Balkans. European leverage was weakened, as states such as Serbia balanced EU demands with their interests in Russia. The offer of integration seemed ever more unrealistic, confirmed by the EU leadership’s announcement of a five-year-long enlargement freeze. Across the region the political discourse became increasingly illiberal, with continuing deterioration in Bosnia and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the implementation of the EU-facilitated 2013 agreement between Serbia and Kosovo essentially halted.

Poor economic conditions, poor governance, and frustration with ruling elites led to popular protests. Elections in Kosovo in 2014 brought a prolonged political crisis and institutional deadlock. The fairness of the election in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was criticised by the OSCE and the opposition refused to recognise the results. Nationalist tensions continue to run high and hinder reconciliation in the region, with violent outbreaks laying bare the fragility of normalisation efforts and the limits of EU’s transformative power.

European divisions over enlargement were evident, with countries such as the Netherlands, France, and the Czech Republic toughening their stance. The difficulty of achieving consensus was demonstrated during the discussions about whether to grant Albania candidate status, and in whether or not to maintain the linkage between Serbia’s accession talks and the Kosovo question. Differences on conditionality and on the pace of the process also played a role, as member state coalitions shifted depending on the country and issue. The ongoing eurozone problems continue to create weariness with enlargement and its implications in the EU. Nevertheless, the instability in the region and the growing influence of Russia prompted calls by European leaders such as Slovakia’s Miroslav Lajcak and Sweden’s Carl Bildt for a European re-engagement, and high-level visits took place in the second half of the year to confirm continuing European interest.

27 – Kosovo

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

3

4

4

3

Resources /5

4

4

4

4

3

Outcome /10

7

8

8

9

6

Total / 20

14

15

16

17

12

Grade

B+

B+

A-

A-

B-

Kosovo was mired in a post-election political crisis for much of the year and the implementation of the Serbia-Kosovo agreement was halted.

The momentum achieved in 2013 with the EU-facilitated agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was interrupted by elections in both Serbia and Kosovo. Both countries were also distracted by internal election processes and problems, including a challenge of the constitutionality of last year’s agreement before the Constitutional Court in Serbia, and an institutional crisis in Kosovo. The two could not resolve their differences on key power-sharing provisions of the agreement such as the Association of Serb Municipalities. Meanwhile, EU elections caused a long transition in Brussels. For all these reasons, this year saw virtually no progress in implementation and no relevant high-level initiatives, although technical talks continued. Northern Kosovo continued to witness sporadic violence.

In terms of European standards and reforms, Kosovo made limited progress in the fight against organised crime and corruption or on judicial reform. Discontent with corruption and impunity, exacerbated by economic stagnation, was one of the driving factors behind popular and student protests. Parliamentary elections took place in June, for the first time including the Serb-dominated North. The elections were followed by a parliamentary stalemate around the election of the speaker for the new Assembly, leading to institutional deadlock until a deal on government formation was finally reached in December.

The EU’s reputation suffered a blow with corruption allegations against EULEX, and Europeans, with the exception of Germany, failed to invest in sustaining the agreement of 2013. However, the EU succeeded in strengthening the framework for future reforms through the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which was initialled in July. The EU’s Special Investigative Task Force completed its multi-year investigation in July and released its report citing “compelling evidence” of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) leadership after the 1999 conflict. The case will be pursued in a Netherlands-based War Crimes Court, which will be established pending the relevant decisions by Kosovar institutions. Political figures in Pristina criticised the court’s legitimacy and the report’s findings.

28 – Bosnia and Herzegovina

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

3

3

3

3

Resources /5

2

3

3

3

3

Outcome /10

2

2

2

2

2

Total / 20

8

8

8

8

8

Grade

C

C

C

C

C

Bosnia faced widespread protest and a faltering economy. EU states launched a number of initiatives to reverse the country’s downward trend.

Bosnia continued to be plagued by institutional paralysis and economic stagnation. Simmering frustrations with the system, lack of good governance, and socio-economic grievances provided the trigger for popular protests and episodes of violence in February, followed by the establishment of popular assemblies. Though initially seen as a potential catalyst for change, in the wake of the 2013 “Baby Revolution”, the “Bosnian Spring” eventually fizzled out and elections in October returned the same corrupt parties to power.

Overall, Europeans continued to struggle to realise their objectives in Bosnia. The EU recognised Bosnia’s European “standstill” and called off its facilitation efforts with Bosnian leaders to reach agreement on the constitutional reform required by the European Court of Human Rights’ Sejdic-Finci ruling. Instead, Europe tried to tailor its policies to the challenges at play. One such challenge was Moscow’s support for Republika Srpska’s Milorad Dodik, who toyed with a Crimea-style independence declaration. Bosnia’s stance on the Ukraine crisis and EU sanctions against Russia, like Serbia’s, was ambiguous.

The EU renewed its emphasis on the socio-economic situation, including through the EU Compact for Growth and Jobs, a socio-economic reform programme launched under the aegis of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and international partners such as the IMF. Efforts were also made to support the political process. Austria launched a civil society initiative and is taking over from Germany in preparing a second Balkans conference. The Czech Republic was among states hosting discussions on Sejdic-Finci. Crucially, in November, the German and British foreign ministers, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Philip Hammond, launched an initiative to revitalise Bosnia’s European path and end the deadlock, through a “resequencing” of EU conditionality (delaying implementation of Sejdic-Finci as a precondition for entry into force of the 2008 Stabilisation and Association Agreement), in return for a commitment to reform. EU ministers endorsed this refocusing of EU policy in December, though with emphasis on conditionality and Sejdic-Finci’s implementation. Nevertheless, widespread scepticism persists about the initiative’s viability and about European unity on Bosnia.

29 – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

7

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

C-

EU states observed a dramatic deterioration in FYRoM’s stability in 2014, but did not intervene beyond crisis management.

The situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), an EU candidate country since 2005, continued to worsen in terms of the country’s democratic foundation, institutional functioning, and inter-ethnic relations. And in its regional relations, no progress was made on the name conflict with Greece. Overall, 2014 confirmed FYRoM’s stalled Euroatlantic and EU integration prospects and Europeans failed to launch any initiative to break the deadlock.

April’s parliamentary and presidential elections were criticised by OSCE/ODIHR for failing to meet OSCE commitments throughout the campaign, such as separation of state and party, media neutrality, or redress through complaint procedures. The main opposition bloc led by the Social Democratic Party started a boycott of parliament in May, accusing Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s government of election fraud. In December, the country’s political crisis worsened, as a parliamentary committee initiated procedures to oust absent opposition MPs.

Gruevski’s government made little progress in implementing EU accession standards and concerns about democratic rollbacks grew. The European Commission’s Progress Report, in unusually harsh terms, highlighted backsliding in some areas and criticised political interference in judicial powers, media control, and electoral irregularities. However, the Commission repeated its annual (since 2009) recommendation to open accession negotiations, although it did express regret about the “backward steps of the past year”.

Another point of concern was the fragility of inter-ethnic relationships and the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid peace agreement. Amid a general ratcheting-up of ethnic hate speech, the country witnessed major protests by the Albanian community in Skopje and violent incidents in the wake of the Monstra case, in which six ethnic Albanians were sentenced to life imprisonment for the alleged murder of five ethnic Macedonians. A self-proclaimed National Liberation Army movement claimed responsibility for shelling a government building in October. Moreover, the main Albanian parties, the Democratic Union for Integration and the Democratic Party of Albanians, continue to be at loggerheads. European member states, meanwhile, remained relatively disengaged, undertaking some crisis management but otherwise waiting it out.

30 – Bilateral relations with Turkey

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

2

2

3

3

3

Resources /5

2

2

2

3

3

Outcome /10

1

1

2

3

4

Total / 20

5

5

7

9

10

Grade

D+

D+

C-

C+

C+

Relations have gained momentum with the readmission agreement coming into force and the visa liberalisation process getting under way.

Turkey’s accession process remains on standby because of blocks put on certain chapters of the EU’s acquis communautaire for the country by Cyprus, France, and the EU Foreign Affairs Council. With the viability of membership in question, not least because of deteriorating human rights, the EU has little leverage over Ankara. The Italian Presidency significantly moved discussions forward on opening chapter 17. There is also talk in the EU about unblocking chapters 23 and 24, with France’s President François Hollande restating his support for this move. Cyprus, however, is keeping its blocks in place. In the meantime, Paris has not indicated whether it will continue to block negotiation on the other four blocked chapters.

On 1 October 2014, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement entered into force and, simultaneously, a visa liberalisation process was launched. The border management benchmarks that Turkey will need to meet are particularly important for Turkey’s EU neighbours and also for EU countries concerned about asylum seekers reaching their country or about their nationals traveling to Syria to join jihadist groups. Turkish cooperation with EU agencies such as Frontex intensified this year. While a visa-free regime could be within reach for Turkey in two or three years, the Turkish side remains sceptical that EU states will actually agree to let this happen.

Ankara’s rhetoric about rejuvenating the EU accession track increased following the presidential election in August, but it was undermined by political crackdowns. Traditional supporters of Turkey’s EU membership aspirations, including Italy and Sweden, have become disillusioned by Turkey’s democratic backsliding. In the first seven months of 2014, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited a number of European cities, holding rallies to reach out to ex-patriot Turks, expressing frustration with European leaders, and warning the Turks against cultural assimilation. These occasions increased tensions between the Turkish leadership and European countries with ethnic Turkish populations.

31 – Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in Turkey

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

3

3

3

3

Resources /5

2

2

2

2

2

Outcome /10

2

2

2

2

2

Total / 20

7

7

7

7

7

Grade

C-

C-

C-

C-

C-

The EU is united in its concern about Turkish democracy deficits, but is clearly divided on how to respond and so has been left with little influence.

Turkey has largely regressed on the rule of law, civil liberties, separation of powers, and freedom of expression. In 2014, EU member states took note of social media bans, obstruction of the investigation into corruption allegations, and the narrowing of space to express critical opinions of authorities – including a new law on the internet that granted the Telecommunications Directorate the power to block access to websites without a court order. On the Kurdish issue, however, there was some progress. Kurdish language rights were expanded and the controversial criminal Special Authority Courts were abolished and their pending cases dismissed. These reforms were driven by domestic political dynamics but were received positively by the EU.

Though European capitals are united in their concern about Turkish democracy and rule of law, they are divided on what to do about it. Some EU capitals, such as France, recommend opening chapters 23 and 24 to encourage reform and increase EU leverage in Turkey; others are silent or, in the case of the Netherlands, have called for the accession process to be reconsidered. Some EU member states that are supportive of opening new chapters with Turkey are less willing to use political capital for Turkey, reserving it instead for discussions on Eastern Partnership countries. The UK, however, continues to press Cyprus to lift its block on negotiations, which weakens EU leverage regarding human rights in Turkey.

The countries most involved in democratisation in Turkey – whether through engaging Ankara, supporting Turkish civil society, or working towards activating EU conditionality – are Italy, Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The contribution of other EU member countries is mostly limited to EU twinning programmes. In 2014, the Netherlands lobbied unsuccessfully for Turkey to receive lower amounts from the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 2014–2020 budget, but the new IPA budget does allocate more money to strengthening the capacity of rights-focused civil society organisations.

32 – Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

3

3

3

3

3

Resources /5

1

1

2

2

2

Outcome /10

1

1

2

2

2

Total / 20

5

5

7

7

7

Grade

D+

D+

C-

C-

C-

UN-mediated reunification talks resumed in early 2014, but stalled again in the autumn. The Cyprus question continues to undermine EU policy on Turkey.

The Cyprus question creates many challenges to Turkey-EU relations. The EU would like to see it resolved, but neither Brussels nor the member states have made much progress. Turkey shows no sign of implementing the 2004 Ankara Protocol (which would open ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes) and Cyprus continues to block the opening of six chapters of the acquis with Turkey (since 2007). The halt in the accession process undermines the EU’s leverage over Turkey as well as having geostrategic implications: Cyprus has blocked Turkey from EU foreign policy and security mechanisms, and Turkey uses its veto in NATO against cooperation with Cyprus.

UN-mediated reunification talks for an agreement on a bizonal, bicommunal federation resumed in February 2014. However, US involvement was stronger than that of the EU or member states. The European Court for Human Rights plays an indirect role, with decisions regarding individual rights on the basis of Turkey’s “1974 invasion”. The UK continues to be the most active member state in pushing a resolution forward.

In response to the offshore natural gas exploration conducted by Cyprus, in October 2014 Turkey sent a vessel to explore for hydrocarbons in the Cypriot exclusive economic zone. Turkey also deployed a warship to protect its vessel and to carry out surveillance of Cypriot exploratory drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. In reaction, the Greek Cypriot Administration suspended the reunification talks indefinitely. Here, too, Europe had little to say.

Currently, there is no clarity as regards when and how the talks will resume, and neither the EU institutions nor individual EU member states, with the exception of the UK, are expending significant efforts to restart the process.

33 – Relations with Turkey on regional issues

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

2

3

4

4

4

Resources /5

3

3

3

3

3

Outcome /10

2

3

4

3

2

Total / 20

7

9

11

10

9

Grade

C-

C+

B-

C+

C+

Turkey’s management of relations with Russia has diverged from that of the EU and divisions over Syria remain.

Turkey’s neighbourhood is in chaos. Ankara and Europe are faced with crises both to the south and to the east, but cooperation has been limited. There was no effort by the EU to consult Turkey along the way, and Turkey did not sign up to a majority of the EU’s foreign policy positions.

The Syrian National Coalition functions out of Turkey, so Ankara plays a critical role in the Syrian opposition. European states’ engagement has varied. Luxembourg used its UN Security Council seat to prioritise humanitarian aid. France is the EU state most closely aligned with Ankara in its call for a more active pursuit of regime change in Syria, including a no-fly/buffer zone. Though Germany does not share Turkey’s strong line against Bashar al-Assad, it continues to work closely with the Friends of Syria Group, collaborating with the Syrian opposition and Ankara to open a path towards a political solution.

The human tragedy of the war in Syria continues to present a major challenge for Turkey, which now houses around 1.6 million Syrian refugees. Member states have offered some help, but having taken in only around 130,000 refugees (UNHCR estimated 123,000 in summer), Europe is falling short of Turkey’s expectations. Turkey also perceives a pro-Kurd bias in Western aid and involvement (Italy, for instance, focuses its aid on the Kurds), and Turkey’s reluctance to intervene militarily in Kobani was presented in the West as an anti-Kurdish stance.

On Russia, the division has been even starker. Ankara has not joined the EU in applying sanctions against Russia but has instead increased economic cooperation. On the other hand, Turkey plays a role in offsetting Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus with integration projects involving Azerbaijan and Georgia, including on railways and ports. In 2014, construction began on the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which will form the backbone of the prospective Southern Gas Corridor. Turkey has also increased its support for Georgia to receive a NATO Membership Action Plan.

Chapter 4: Middle East and North Africa

For the first year since 2011, the MENA region was not the home of the crisis that will define 2014 for Europe. Nevertheless, the MENA region was characterised this year by conflict, state collapse, the entrenchment and persistence of authoritarian regimes, and the increasingly overt stage management of events by Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the face of which the EU (and, to a large extent, the US) saw the limits of its influence. And although Russian aggression and rewriting of the rulebook of post-Cold War geopolitics took place to Europe’s east, it nevertheless had implications for the EU’s ability to grapple with the spectrum of crises taking place to its south. Feeling keenly the threats on all sides, 2014 was the year in which Europe completed its post-2011 transition to viewing the MENA region predominantly through the prism of security.

The proportion of the MENA region that is immersed in full-scale conflict has expanded this year. Syria’s civil war is now more than three years old. The UN-led Geneva peace talks in January and February fell apart without progress, and as the year drew to a close, 200,000 people were estimated to have died in the conflict, which has also produced over 3 million refugees and 7.6 million internally displaced people. The prospect of a resolution became, if anything, more complex last year, with the expansion of the grip of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) across large swathes of Iraq and Syria. Opinion is divided over whether to prioritise defeating ISIS or resolving the larger Syrian civil war, and the question of how to deal with Bashar al-Assad hangs over both. The influx of foreign fighters into the conflict, including from Europe, highlights the interplay between tensions within Europe that has been reflected in the rise of the far right, itself feeding on growing concerns about the impact of immigration, the erosion of civil liberties, and Europe’s policy towards MENA.

In 2014, Libya’s security situation also dramatically worsened, and by autumn it had descended into civil war. Summer was marked by the outbreak of Israel’s Operation Protective Edge, with over 2,100 – mostly civilian – Palestinian lives lost in Gaza, and 66 Israeli soldiers and 7 Israeli civilians killed. Since the ceasefire, individual killings have taken place in Israel and the conflict has taken on an increasingly religious tone. In Yemen, which started the year as one of the few remaining hopes from 2011’s Arab Awakening for something resembling a political transition, the armed takeover in September 2014 of the capital, Sana’a, signalled the end of the national dialogue.

Many states in the region held elections with varying degrees of credibility, but few heralded genuine political change. The year 2014 in the MENA region made it clear again that elections alone do not equal democracy. Egypt held a constitutional referendum in January cementing the authoritarian rule of General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, followed by presidential elections in May, which returned him with over 96 percent of the vote, with the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood banned from participation. Algeria held presidential elections in April and re-elected Abdelaziz Bouteflika with 82 percent of the vote, re-endorsing a head of state whose ill health allows foreign travel only to France for medical reasons. Libya held parliamentary elections in June, resulting in the emergence of two parliaments vying for control from different parts of the country. In October the Supreme Court in Tripoli ruled that the parliament elected in the June general elections was unconstitutional. Syria held presidential elections in June, returning Bashar al-Assad with 89 percent of the vote, in a manner that bordered on farce given the war echoing all around.

More positively, after worsening political sclerosis in recent years, Iraq held elections in July, with Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi achieving a consensus cabinet in October, in spite of the growing challenge in the country and the surrounding region from ISIS. Tunisia, the last transition standing in the region after the high hopes of 2011, passed another important milestone with peaceful parliamentary elections in October in which Nidaa Tounes won a clear majority, followed by presidential elections at the end of the year which returned Nidaa Tounes’ founding leader, Beji Essebsi.

Where was Europe in this picture? Its scope to play a significant role in these domestic events is clearly limited. This year has reminded us of the extent to which developments in the Middle East are orchestrated from within the region, among the triangle of GCC states, Iran, and Turkey, with even the US reacting to rather than shaping events. ISIS’s shocking advances across the sub-region in summer 2014 were in no small part made possible by initial funds from sources in the Gulf (with the ground prepared by the Western intervention a decade ago), just as the decision to move ahead with US-led airstrikes in August was eased by the agreement of the governments of these same states. The E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) have been vital participants in the nuclear talks with Iran, and Catherine Ashton’s chairing role was praised again this year, but it is no surprise that the side talks between the US and Iran have been critical in ensuring that slow progress continues. The EU has found itself in a position to support or observe rather than to determine outcomes in MENA in 2014.

Tensions with Russia did not prove as great an impediment as threatened in dealing with some of the crucial regional issues, although Vladimir Putin’s relationship with General Sisi further undermined the EU’s already faltering voice on increasing authoritarianism on Egypt. Israel chose not to take sides with regard to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Moscow showed no signs of wishing to play a wrecking role in the nuclear talks with Iran, nor did it make things more complicated than they already were with regard to how the EU positioned itself towards Assad.

These challenges to Europeans promoting their security, interests, and values in the MENA region were not new, although they have crystallised. This year, Europe’s instruments to deal with the region, limited even in times of relative peace and stability, proved inadequate in a situation where its leverage is much more limited than that of regional powers; state structures are collapsing and security threats are higher on the agenda than economic integration. Counter-terrorism has replaced supporting transitions as the watchword for Europe’s policies towards the MENA region, although this has not yet translated into a coherent security-led approach, as the Regional Security component of this chapter sets out. Member states now admit that the new environment requires not just an overhaul of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), but a wholesale new approach that no longer bases policy towards very different types of state on geography but instead genuinely differentiates and invests where Europeans can have impact. Aid levels for the overwhelming refugee crisis in the Middle East have rightly been high, but a willingness to resettle significant numbers of those whose lives have been destroyed in the wider Syrian conflict would make a real difference. In 2014, however, only Sweden and Germany have found the political courage to do this. Spillover from tensions in the region – between ISIS supporters and Kurds in Berlin and between sympathisers with the different sides in the Gaza conflict in a number of European capitals – have also shown the extent to which European foreign policy towards the MENA region has a resonance at home.

In the meantime, the existing ENP has continued to provide the basis for EU interventions in 2014, which has made decisions about where money is spent in the region appear erratic at times. The scores awarded in this chapter have gone down, because not only has the EU failed to begin the work of retooling its policies towards its southern neighbourhood, it has not even always used the existing framework in a logical way. If it continues along its current path, it risks irrelevance at a time when it needs instead to better understand and engage with the volatile region to its south.

34 – Rule of law, human rights, and democracy in the MENA region

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

2

3

2

Resources /5

n/a

2

2

3

3

Outcome /10

n/a

5

4

3

3

Total / 20

n/a

10

8

9

8

Grade

n/a

C+

C

C+

C

EU states remained united in straightforward relationships but a growing group were inclined not to challenge MENA countries of significant strategic interest.

The EU’s objectives on the rule of law, democracy, and human rights are unchanged from 2013, but the operating environment has become more complex. The aim of protecting fundamental rights in countries in which transitions are taking place applied only to Tunisia in the second half of 2014 (after Yemen’s transition took a turn for the worse in August with the Houthi capture of the capital). Sweden and Germany, in particular, have continued to take this role seriously in Tunisia, with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier hosting the Tunisian prime minister and foreign minister for a second round of intergovernmental consultations on the issue in Berlin in June.

In non-transition states, the EU aims to push the governing regimes towards political reform, and it aims to maintain a consistent line on the rule of law with the Gulf States and Iran. These obligations have been fulfilled in a minimal way with critical statements at certain moments, such as the High Representative’s statement on the imminent execution of Reyhani Jabbari in October, but are often secondary to other strategic interests with the country in question. Just as in 2013, the EU’s reluctance to challenge flagrant violations in Egypt, such as the mass trials of protestors in spring and summer, have coloured perceptions of the EU’s commitment to its principles in this region. Egypt is such a key player that the choices that the EU makes there resonate across neighbouring countries, carrying a clear message about what the EU is prepared to tolerate.

Finally, the EU calls for accountability for human rights abuses where there is conflict. While EU statements, including at the Geneva II conference in January, have underlined this commitment, its limited intake of those affected by the refugee crisis resulting from conflict in the MENA region has to some extent undermined it. Member states were divided on whether to support Palestinian calls for Israel to be referred to the International Criminal Court following the Gaza conflict this year.

35 – Regional security in the MENA region

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

2

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

1

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

8

5

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

C

D+

With some (uncoordinated) exceptions, Europe has been largely a bystander as chaos has engulfed its southern periphery.

Conflict and instability have greatly marked the EU’s southern neighbourhood in 2014.

It would be harsh to criticise the EU for its inability to act in the chaos of Syria and Iraq. Five member states (France, the UK, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands) have joined the US air campaign against ISIS, contributing between them 15 percent of the strikes in the Iraq theatre, at the cost of heightened terrorist risks at home. The turmoil in Libya similarly excuses the failure of efforts to help the Libyans improve border control. But the EU has also failed to make any real impact on the other, potentially more tractable conflicts of North Africa and the Sahel. With individual exceptions (such as France and the Netherlands) Europeans have preferred to leave the dangerous work to the UN and the African Union, opting in Mali for an (ineffective) effort to train the army, and in the CAR, after months of delay, for a small bridging force to protect Bangui airport pending the UN’s arrival. (Germany has sent a fine field hospital to Mali.) Unable to prevent or mitigate another Israeli assault on Gaza, the EU will again pay for the damage.

In the Horn of Africa things do look better, with continued EU training for African troops slowly trying to restore order to Somalia. European diplomats also believe they have helped to defuse further conflicts between Southern Sudan and Uganda and in Burkina Faso.

Europeans, severally and collectively, have been generous with their humanitarian aid. But their failure (the British being an honourable exception) to respond quickly enough to the Ebola crisis in West Africa, and their collective refusal to follow the Italian effort in the Mediterranean with a proper search-and-rescue operation for ship-borne refugees, has cost lives and tarnished the EU’s reputation. Overall, 2014 was a year in which Europe opted to respond to turmoil to its south less by reaching out to help than by putting up the shutters.

36 – Egypt

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

4

3

3

Resources /5

n/a

2

3

3

2

Outcome /10

n/a

5

5

3

3

Total / 20

n/a

10

12

9

8

Grade

n/a

C+

B-

C+

C

This year saw the effective consolidation of a repressive political regime in Egypt, leaving the EU struggling to find a coherent and meaningful response.

After seizing power the previous summer, Egypt’s new leadership attempted in 2014 to “normalise” its hold on the country. A new constitution was endorsed in January, and in May, former military leader Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was elected president by a landslide. Since then, Sisi’s regime has cracked down ruthlessly on political opponents and critical voices. Thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members and other protestors have been imprisoned after inadequate trials. The state has tightened its control over civil society and journalists have been convicted and/or imprisoned without any evidence of criminal activity.

The government has been unable to control an escalation of anti-state violence in Sinai and regular terrorist incidents have occurred elsewhere. Protests have continued in universities, but otherwise Sisi appears to have had success in establishing his authority by suppressing opposition. The public has accepted some painful economic reforms with little protest and there are signs of a modest economic revival. But Egypt remains financially dependent on subsidies from the Gulf and no convincing long-term development plan has been made. In foreign policy, Sisi has tried to present Egypt as a regional force for stability and counter-extremism, facilitating talks on Gaza and joining the anti-ISIS coalition. Nevertheless, Egypt has not re-emerged as a key regional diplomatic player and has indulged in a problematic intervention in Libya.

The European Parliament agreed a tough resolution on Egypt in February. But, facing an uncompromising stance from Egypt’s leadership and a strongly nationalist public mood, European countries have softened their critical line. The EU’s observation mission for the presidential election was poorly handled, with the EU admitting that it did not deliver on its mandate in full and Egyptian media claiming EU endorsement for a flawed process. At the end of 2014, Sisi’s visit to Italy and France suggested some member states are prepared to soft-pedal criticism of Egypt. Other European countries remain more critical, but have little idea of how to influence Egypt beyond waiting for the country’s public mood to change again.

37 – Libya

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

4

4

2

Resources /5

n/a

5

2

2

2

Outcome /10

n/a

7

5

5

3

Total / 20

n/a

15

11

11

7

Grade

n/a

B+

B-

B-

C-

Libya plunged into a civil war, European presence on the ground dwindled, and no credible strategy to deal with the conflict emerged.

Since Europe supported the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, the EU has pursued capacity building for the nascent Libyan institutions, with a focus on the security sector and support for the constitutional transition. However, in the current environment, this has been put on hold.

Throughout 2014, Libya gradually descended into a civil war that, by the end of the year, had claimed almost 3,000 lives and displaced over 400,000 of Libya’s 6 million inhabitants. Fighting escalated from May and accelerated after the European-supported parliamentary elections in June. During the summer, rival governments were set up in Tripoli and Tobruk, with the government in Tobruk being formed as the result of elections and therefore retaining international recognition. By the end of 2014 only two EU Member states (Italy and Hungary) retained embassies in Libya.

As a consequence, large European programmes (many of them UK-funded) were significantly scaled down or stopped altogether: these included the training of the Libyan army by the UK and Italy; the French programme for the police forces; the EU Border Assistance Mission; and various institution- and capacity-building programmes. Europeans remained united in support of UN mediation. Italy and Spain organised two international conferences. Nevertheless, the EU and the member states failed to produce a policy capable of insulating Libya from the regional confrontation. A number of regional powers (Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, and Qatar) supported different sides of the fighting and Europeans failed to thwart this interference. Europeans struggled to combine in a coherent strategy their different priorities: support for the Tobruk government; dialogue between the two coalitions in support of the UN mission; concern for the rise of the ISIS and other violent extremists in Libya. France repeatedly emphasised the ISIS situation but failed to gain the support of other EU states. However, thanks to cooperation with the UK, France secured approval for a UN Security Council resolution blacklisting the terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia.

38 – The Maghreb

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

-

-

-

-

4

Resources /5

-

-

-

-

2

Outcome /10

-

-

-

-

5

Total / 20

-

-

-

-

11

Grade

-

-

-

-

B-

Distinctly different paces of reform in the three Maghreb countries have met with standardised treatment under the ENP.

The Maghreb remained the most stable part of MENA in 2014. The EU’s objective has been to support transitions where they are occurring in this sub-region, and where they are not, to at least challenge abuses of human rights and democratic backsliding while maintaining security and energy relationships with the governments in power.

Tunisia, which in 2014 adopted a constitution through an inclusive process and held peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections, is the one post-2011 transition in the region that appears to remain on the road to democracy. If the EU were serious about using diplomatic engagement and investment in the region to recognise political progress, Tunisia could have been expected to have benefited most from relations with its European neighbours. Yet it is not evident that it has. The three Maghreb countries have, if anything, diverged, with no significant changes in 2014 to the control that the Moroccan monarchy wields, and Algeria missing the opportunity of the April presidential elections to begin, if not a path to democracy, then at least a managed handover of power to a new generation. But the EU has maintained indistinguishable relations with all three powers and has invested in them in similar ways. Despite the differences in their readiness to reform, Morocco and Tunisia received similar amounts under the ENP, around €200–250 million in 2014, which was invested in priorities such as inclusive growth and democratic governance. And both are viewed as privileged partners under the revised ENP. Algeria, whose energy importance for Europe has grown further with uncertainties in Russian supplies, and whose mediation between different parties in Mali and relatively constructive intervention in Libya has heightened its security role, continues to discuss an Association Agreement with the EU, but has not been challenged on persistent gaps in the rule of law.

Undifferentiated treatment for different levels of progress and a failure to fulfil commitments to challenge injustice make it hard to assess the impact of EU policies in this sub-region.

39 – Syria and Iraq

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

3

1

2

Resources /5

n/a

3

3

2

2

Outcome /10

n/a

2

2

2

2

Total / 20

n/a

8

8

5

6

Grade

n/a

C

C

D+

C-

As the crises in Syria and Iraq escalated, Europe’s role has remained marginal and impeded by internal divisions, despite limited military action.

The worsening of the Syria crisis, including the ISIS surge into Iraq, marks a continued failure of European aims: initiating a political transition of power and containing the conflict. While Europe has launched military action in Iraq, its role remains marginal and, on Syria, hamstrung by division. ISIS has provoked unity around a counter-terrorism agenda. Fourteen EU states joined the anti-ISIS coalition, with five conducting military action in Iraq. France and the UK made the most significant contributions and Denmark has been active on both the military and political tracks. Germany’s decision to provide armed support to Iraqi Kurds was a significant step for Berlin. But Europe’s contribution has been limited – the US directed strategy and conducted more than 85 percent of air strikes. Despite four EU countries being part of the Friends of Syria group, the US and the Gulf States set the agenda in Syria.

European states have been unwilling to conduct anti-ISIS military operations in Syria. Some, notably France, have pushed for more aggressive action to target Assad; others are focused on supporting the new UN envoy’s approach. European states are cognisant of the need to address the core problem underlying the rise of ISIS – the Syrian civil war – but they have neither leverage nor a common approach to policy. Europe has done little to pursue a political track since the collapse of the Geneva II talks and has failed to engage Iran. Europe’s unquestioning support for military action now risks exacerbating the crisis in both countries, in part by relieving regional actors of responsibility and making the West more of a target for retaliatory acts of terrorism.

The EU – and particularly the UK – is among the biggest humanitarian donors to the crisis, but only Sweden and Germany have accepted significant numbers of Syrian refugees (see Chapter 6). Still, this remains an area in which an underperforming Europe can play a more meaningful role if the biggest humanitarian crisis so far this century is to be managed.

40 – Israel and Palestine

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

3

4

3

Resources /5

n/a

2

3

4

4

Outcome /10

n/a

2

3

6

4

Total / 20

n/a

7

9

14

11

Grade

n/a

C-

C+

B+

B-

The two-state solution slips further away, while the EU-funded conflict management system shows growing cracks.

The collapse of US-led talks in April was followed by the creation of a “government of national consensus” for the Palestinian Authority comprised of technocrats with Hamas support. The EU was supportive, but reconciliation and Gaza-West Bank governance re-unification has stalled. Summer’s 50-day conflict between Israel and Gaza left Gaza devastated and 2,100 Palestinians, 66 Israeli soldiers, and six Israeli civilians dead. Europe was largely marginal to mediation and ceasefire efforts, self-barred from contacts with Hamas and unable to agree a strong line on Israeli. Autumn saw sporadic individual acts of Palestinian violence targeting Israeli civilians in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Israel approved construction of thousands of new homes in the settlements.

Europeans responded to this steadily deteriorating situation in several ways. The policy of non-recognition of the Israeli settlements continued in 2014. Sixteen member states issued business advisories for European companies working in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, with a smaller number, including Germany, Ireland, Romania, Spain, and the UK, making special efforts to implement the EU Guidelines for awarding funding. The Czech Republic showed less willingness to do so. However, Europeans were reluctant to apply non-recognition further, for example by issuing settlement product guidelines. E3 efforts to secure a Security Council resolution on Gaza rehabilitation led nowhere. Europeans pledged $568 million at the donors’ conference in Cairo, but the situation in Gaza remains precarious. Europe’s considerable efforts to provide technical solutions to end the blockade achieved little. Without political progress, that is unlikely to change. Towards the end of the year, High Representative Federica Mogherini made Israel/Palestine her first international visit, E3 pushed for a Security Council resolution to outline the two-state goal and a deadline for achieving it, and several member states’ parliaments (UK, Ireland, Spain, France, and Luxembourg) and the EU Parliament voted to recognise the state of Palestine “in principle” following Sweden’s official recognition. Europe’s growing recognition of its own leverage, notably with the Israelis, has been only narrowly deployed, offset by the Palestinians leadership’s lack of strategy.

41 – Iran

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

4

5

4

4

Resources /5

n/a

3

4

5

5

Outcome /10

n/a

4

3

9

7

Total / 20

n/a

11

12

18

16

Grade

n/a

B-

B-

A

A-

Europeans have so far effectively safeguarded the diplomatic process under way in the Iranian nuclear talks and have begun repairing relations with Tehran.

Europe’s overriding objective on Iran remains a comprehensive nuclear deal within the EU3+3 framework (the EU, Germany, France, the UK, China, Russia, and the US). To a lesser degree, Europeans endeavoured to explore openings for constructive regional discourse with Tehran. Nominal attempts were made to develop EU-Iran human rights dialogue. While Tehran and Washington led the nuclear negotiations, Europe guarded the diplomatic process and was instrumental to implementing the JPoA signed in 2013. With EC oversight, member states designated banks to carry out transactions providing Iran with access to frozen assets and humanitarian relief as prescribed by the JPoA. Despite competing commercial interests and new possibilities for trading with Iran under the JPoA, Europe stayed united on upholding the unilateral sanctions targeting Iran’s oil and banking sectors. Catherine Ashton chaired the EU3+3 effectively (and was asked to continue beyond her mandate),consulting non-E3 member states. But some non-E3 states are concerned that they bear the cost of sanctions, despite having little influence on negotiations. European companies also voiced discontent at the perceived discretionary application of US sanctions, undercutting European trade interests.

Europeans led an intensive effort to strengthen diplomatic relations with Tehran. More than 12 EU foreign ministers visited Iran, as well as Catherine Ashton and Norway’s foreign minister; the UK and Iran met at head-of-state level after 35 years; and parliamentary and exploratory trade delegation exchanges took place. For Europe, a final nuclear deal would have been preferable to extending the JPoA twice in a year, and in the latest phase, greater diplomatic pressure might have been brought to bear to match the economic weight of European sanctions. Nevertheless, the negotiations have contributed to the normalisation of EU-Iran relations. Regionally, Iran was placed in the spotlight by its  military pushback against ISIS and its acceptance of the removal of Nouri al-Maliki as Iraq’s prime minister. But meaningful dialogue between Europe and Iran on de-escalating regional conflicts remains on hold until the resolution of the nuclear issue.

42 – Relations with Gulf Cooperation Council States

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

4

n/a

3

3

Resources /5

n/a

1

n/a

3

3

Outcome /10

n/a

5

n/a

5

5

Total / 20

n/a

10

n/a

11

11

Grade

n/a

C+

n/a

B-

B-

Separate national agendas dominated EU engagement with the Gulf in 2014, preventing the bloc from increasing its leverage on issues affecting it.

During 2014, the EU did not improve engagement with the Gulf States as a united bloc, as different states pursued separate agendas. Western policy was largely dictated by the US on a range of issues including Egypt, Syria, Iran, and ISIS. On ISIS, this lack of leadership has been particularly important, since the phenomenon of foreign fighters returning from jihad in Syria and Iraq as well as radicalisation through the spread of jihadist thought concerns Europe arguably more than any other region in the world. To date, the handling of returning fighters has been a political issue only in Europe, even if the number of those from Arab countries fighting in ISIS’s ranks is greater in absolute terms.

It was Washington that pushed Saudi Arabia to set aside disputes with Qatar over support for the Muslim Brotherhood to enable concerted action in reaction to ISIS. EU policy fully embraced the fait accompli of Egypt’s military coup and the Gulf-bankrolled new order, but did not appear to use its Gulf State connections to lobby for policies that would lead towards reconciliation and stability.

The pursuit of national commercial agendas in the Gulf was again manifest in 2014, with France winning a Saudi-brokered contract to supply arms to Lebanon and the UK trying to maintain Qatari investments in Britain against a backdrop of domestic press attacks over migrant labour rights and Qatar’s hosting of the World Cup. Britain’s close ties to Bahrain also came under scrutiny given the failure of political reconciliation there. EU states benefited from the GCC states’ decision not to intervene to prop up energy prices later in the year. On the other hand, the Gulf States are aware of the key role that Catherine Ashton and the EEAS have played in the Iran nuclear talks. EU states are, however, still not in a position to engage with the GCC on major regional challenges such as ISIS, Syria, or the MEPP, or on more sophisticated strategies for stemming radicalisation.

43 – Yemen

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

4

4

n/a

2

Resources /5

n/a

2

3

n/a

2

Outcome /10

n/a

5

5

n/a

3

Total / 20

n/a

11

12

n/a

7

Grade

n/a

B-

B-

n/a

C-

A purported “model transition” bordered on collapse, with Europe and its partners struggling to respond to a series of complex, overlapping crises.

The second half of 2014 saw the tentative progress in Yemen’s transition gradually disintegrate. The country’s internationally backed political process – trumpeted as a model for similarly conflict-stricken states for much of the transition period – had by year’s end reached the brink of collapse.

The year began with celebrations marking the end of the Conference of National Dialogue, a wide-ranging summit aimed at brokering a new social contract between Yemen’s competing and often warring factions in the aftermath of an uprising that unseated the country’s long-time leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Despite significant international support, the government has yet to make substantive progress in implementing a series of political and economic outcomes agreed to in the talks. President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s rule grew increasingly authoritarian, appearing to take advantage of virtually unconditional international support to concentrate power in the hands of loyalists. But the government’s hold over the bulk of the country has deteriorated. Overtures from Sana’a have failed to mollify increasingly radical separatists in the formerly independent south. The Houthis eventually seized the capital, Sana’a, on 21 September, setting off a political crisis that is ongoing. Many still hold out hope for positive developments from the new cabinet, which was sworn in in November; the previous cabinet was troubled by corruption and deep partisan divisions, despite significant foreign financial and political support.

Even within the G10 – a grouping of Arab and Western nations backing Yemen’s transition – France, the UK, and the EU delegation frequently appeared to be out of sync, pursuing different priorities despite nominal overall unity. The Friends of Yemen is trying to stay engaged, with the UK in the lead in Europe (though much of the $10 billion in aid pledged by its members remains unused). Germany, not in the group, is also a major donor. Yemen’s humanitarian and economic crises have continued, and, further, the country on the whole has often appeared to be an afterthought, at least in comparison to other nations in the region.

Chapter 5: Asia and China

While Europeans have in the past focused on China, they are also increasingly seeking to strengthen relations with other countries in Asia, some of which are at the same time making efforts to engage Europe. In March 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Brussels for the first time – a “historic” first, in the sense that dealing with the EU was formerly the domain of the Chinese prime minister. But Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (who has visited eight EU member states since his return to power in December 2013) and Korean President Park Geun-hye (who has visited six European countries since her election in February 2013) also made stops in Brussels this year. And the EU continued the negotiation of a free trade pact with Japan.

Nonetheless, relations with China, particularly those concerning investment, still dominated. The results were underwhelming, perhaps because the European Commission, which the previous year had set the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda, was something of a lame duck. Several high-level meetings took place: three high-level dialogues, three rounds of negotiations of a BIT, and even, in the final days of the year, a very discreet human rights meeting.

But it was Europeans that made concessions – for instance, the EU dropped its anti-dumping enquiry into Chinese telecom firms. No EU member state government met the Dalai Lama in 2014.

Most member states’ governments focused above all on Chinese investment. A few years ago, there was a division in Europe between a mercantilist and a liberal approach to trade with China. But today, member states are simply competing for Chinese investment and for a share of the market in offshore RMB trading. There seems to be little coordination, which could hamper the negotiation of the BIT. Not much was done to defend European companies in the context of a deteriorating business environment in China for foreign firms. A number of EU companies were the targets of anti-monopoly investigations by the NDRC, some of which were deemed discriminatory by the EU Chamber of Commerce. The new European Commission should also pay attention to the future opening of China’s rapidly growing service sector and of key public markets such as telecoms.

There are a number of other issues for Europeans. How much will the “16+1” summit between Central and Eastern European countries and China, and subsequent investment moves, actually confirm or undermine EU rules? How vocal are the 16+1 in addressing the Ukraine crisis? But the “race to the bottom” is by no means limited to these countries. EU member states have been quite outspoken and united about human rights situations in North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Thailand. But they have been clearly unwilling to raise human rights issues with – or to criticise – China. Thus, reactions to the life sentence for Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti and to the more general crackdown on dissenting voices have been limited. Most EU member states have relied on the EU to deal with human rights issues, with Germany and a dwindling number of Northern European countries notable exceptions.

China’s economic weight has also influenced the EU’s reaction to increasing tensions in the East and South China Seas in 2014. As China continued its assertive approach in its neighbourhood, some countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines looked for US and EU support. But, seeing little upside to involvement on the issue, EU member states restricted themselves to advocating peaceful resolution of disputes within the framework of international law. The exception was a rare comment in favour of Vietnam in the context of the oil rig incident with China in the spring of 2014. Given the arms sales to Asian countries by some member states (in particular, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK), an earlier joint statement by the EU High Representative and the US Secretary of State, and the EU-Japan summit in December 2013, the EU might be missing a chance to use its experience and positioning to defuse tensions. Instead, it has insisted repeatedly on the necessity for ASEAN to take a more central role in the dispute resolution.

Conversely, the EU did not obtain much from China in exchange for its informal “neutrality” on Asian issues. China’s reaction to the deteriorating situation in the Middle East was limited: it acknowledged the threat posed by ISIS but ruled out engagement. Despite the EU’s unity on Ukraine, it was unable to cajole China into showing greater support: China sided with neither Russia nor the EU, abstained in votes on Ukraine at the UN, and took advantage of sanctions against Russia to conclude major economic and energy agreements with it, notably a $400 billion gas deal. On the other hand, the EU had slightly more success in engaging China on climate change, especially in preparation for the 2015 COP21 conference in Paris – maybe as a result of increased environmental difficulties and concerns within China.

There was a mixed picture in the EU’s relations with the rest of Asia. Interesting though unpublicised developments took place in relations with Vietnam and South Korea – for example, an agreement with South Korea on joint action in managing global security crises and participation in peacekeeping. Europeans had an open attitude towards India’s Narendra Modi before the general election in May, but were less visibly active than China, Japan, and the US in developing good relations with him after he became prime minister. Free trade negotiations with India remained frozen and no high-level meetings were held between India and the EU.

Relations between the EU and Pakistan continued based on the Five-Year Engagement Plan agreed in 2010. The two parties held a number of high-level meetings in 2014 and the EU remains Pakistan’s main trading partner and aid donor. Pakistan was granted the GSP+ status by the EU – the first formal channel for the two partners to discuss human rights issues.

44 – Formats of the Europe-China dialogue

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

2

2

3

3

2

Resources /5

2

2

3

3

3

Outcome /10

5

5

5

7

6

Total / 20

9

9

11

13

11

Grade

C+

C+

B-

B

B-

European Parliament elections this year created space for member states to develop bilateral relations with China.

Although no EU-China summit was held in 2014, more high-level EU-China meetings took place in 2014 than in the previous year. In particular, Xi Jinping visited Brussels for the first time in March and, at the tenth ASEM meeting in Milan in October, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met with outgoing European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso. These two visits were also an opportunity for China to visit a number of EU member states. In addition, the fourth EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue took place in Brussels in January, the second EU-China High-Level People-to-People Dialogue was held in September in Beijing, the first EU-China Dialogue on Defence and Security took place in Beijing in October, and the 33rd EU-China Human Rights Dialogue was held in December.

However, despite these highly publicised meetings, there were fewer initiatives between the two partners and fewer outcomes: in 2013 the EU and China adopted the ambitious EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation; this year’s main announcement was a mutual recognition agreement between China and the EU in May that aimed to support intensified customs cooperation and fight against illegal trade. This slowdown in activity was in part because it was a transition year for the EU following the European elections in May and the leadership change in Brussels.

This transition created space for member states to develop their bilateral relations with China, although Finland, Germany, and Poland still made efforts to coordinate within the EU. There was a flurry of bilateral visits, meetings, and talks: Xi visited Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; Li visited the Germany, Greece, Italy, and the UK; and a number of member state leaders and officials went on official visits to China. Above all, central and eastern European member states pursued stronger political and economic links with China, within and outside of the 16+1 forum. A summit held in December focused on investment and Ukraine. Meanwhile, Cyprus followed a similar approach.

45 – Investment and market access in China

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

4

3

5

3

Resources /5

3

3

4

4

4

Outcome /10

5

5

4

6

6

Total / 20

12

12

11

15

13

Grade

B-

B-

B-

B+

B

As negotiations continued on an EU-China BIT, competition intensified between member states to attract Chinese investment.

Europe remained a prime destination for Chinese outward investment in 2014. There were a number of big deals involving Chinese companies: large investments in Portugal’s and Italy’s financial sectors; continued investment in the French and British energy sectors, including the nuclear plant at Hinkley Point in the UK; and Dongfeng’s acquisition of 14 percent of French carmaker PSA Peugeot Citroën. These deals were probably encouraged by increased efforts by – and competition between – member state governments to attract Chinese companies and investment and to develop economic relations with China. For example, competition was intense between London, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, and Paris to obtain RMB offshore trading agreements from China.

At the EU level, investment was also high on the agenda, as three negotiation rounds for the EU-China BIT took place in January, March, and June. The EU aims to negotiate a “new generation” BIT, which will include not only investment protection but also other components, such as market access, rules on the role of state-owned enterprises, and sustainable development. However, many member states, such as the UK, continue to prioritise bilateral trade relations with China.

Meanwhile, the environment for European businesses in China has deteriorated. Not only is there a lack of fairness and transparency, as the EU pointed out in its statement on China’s Fifth Trade Policy Review in July, but European companies have also been the targets of anti-monopoly investigations by the Chinese government, which the EU Chamber of Commerce has denounced as discriminatory. While the EU Chamber of Commerce has lobbied on this issue, little seems to have been done at EU or member state level.

The European Commission and China reached an amicable settlement on the telecoms case over alleged illegal Chinese subsidies to Huawei and ZTE in October and an agreement was reached between the European and Chinese wine industries that put an end to China's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases. No EU-China High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue meeting was held in 2014.

46 – Relations with other Asian partners

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

4

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

6

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

12

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

B-

Although Europeans were less active in engaging with other Asian partners than with China, they strengthened trade relations with Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, and Vietnam.

Europeans have tended to prioritise relations with China over those with other Asian countries, although that is slowly changing, especially on trade issues. In 2014, the EU was less active than other countries in building links with the new Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, and no high-level meeting was held. There was also little progress in negotiations on an EU-India FTA. Overall, member states seemed less eager to develop ties with India than with China, although Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands made more efforts than most.

However, there was a breakthrough on Pakistan when, despite opposition from some MEPs, the EU granted it GSP+ status. This created a formal channel for the EU to engage Pakistan on human rights issues, which were an important area of concern for the EU this year. The EU also continued to engage Pakistan through its Five-Year Engagement Plan agreed in 2010 and held a number of high-level meetings. The EU remained Pakistan’s main trading partner and aid donor in 2014.

In 2014, Japan and Korea sought to engage actively with Europeans and, in particular, to encourage them to play a greater role in Asian security. Although European leaders were less active, some progress was made. In May, the EU and Korea signed a Framework Participation Agreement, which facilitated the involvement of South Korea in CSDP missions and operations. The EU also cooperated with Japan on a number of issues: it presented a joint resolution on human rights abuses in North Korea (see component 47), held a joint counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden, and held four rounds of negotiation on an FTA. The EU also strengthened relations with Vietnam as negotiations on an FTA continued. But despite these encouraging developments on trade liberalisation, Europeans struggled to engage Asian partners on climate change (see component 51) or to find a meaningful role in maritime disputes in Asia (see component 52).

47 – Rule of law and human rights in China and Asia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

2

2

3

2

2

Resources /5

2

1

3

2

3

Outcome /10

1

2

2

4

3

Total / 20

5

5

8

8

8

Grade

D+

D+

C

C

C

While Europeans were united in criticising human rights abuses in Thailand, Myanmar, North Korea, and Pakistan, they were reluctant to discuss human rights with China.

The year 2014 was another disappointing period for the EU on human rights policy towards China. The EU issued a number of statements on freedom of speech and human rights in general, on particular cases such as those of Ilham Tohti and Xu Zhiyong as well as on the democracy protests in Hong Kong. But, fearing retaliation or a deterioration of their bilateral relations with China, most member states were reluctant to support the EU. Member states say they “mentioned” and “raised” human rights in multilateral and bilateral meetings, but direct criticism was rare. Some member states, such as France, went as far as banning certain demonstrations during visits by Chinese officials. Germany, Ireland, and Sweden were the most outspoken on human rights, and Malta was among the least.

However, Europeans took a different approach on human rights elsewhere in Asia. The EU and member states were united in policy towards Myanmar, North Korea, and Pakistan, as well as in response to the coup in Thailand. The EU and member states worked closely with Japan on North Korea and increased both official contacts and people-to-people exchanges with North Korea. But progress might be halted following the submission by the EU and Japan of a UN resolution calling for a probe on North Korea for crimes against humanity, which passed in November. The EU and member states were also united on Myanmar. The EU scaled back its sanctions, the EU and Myanmar held their first bilateral Human Rights Dialogue in May, and the EU increased its development aid programme to Myanmar. Following the military coup in Thailand in May, the EU expressed concern and declared it was reviewing its relations with Thailand. The conclusion of cooperation agreements with Thailand was suspended, as were official visits between Thailand and the EU. But although Europeans were united, it is not clear that they had much impact.

48 – Relations with China on Russia/Ukraine

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

4

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

9

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

C+

After Russia annexed Crimea and destabilised eastern Ukraine, China remained officially neutral, while taking advantage of EU sanctions.

The Ukraine crisis was the EU’s biggest foreign policy challenge in 2014. The EU and its member states adopted a unified position but failed to persuade China to support them. Despite repeated calls on China to put pressure on Moscow, the country stuck to its principle of non-interference and refused to get involved. Discussions were held between the EU and China on the issue during Xi Jinping’s visit to Brussels in March and again on the margins of the ASEM meeting in October. But, despite China’s sensitivity to sovereignty issues (particularly in relation to Taiwan and Tibet), it did not take sides. Mainstream Chinese media even condemned “Western interference” in Ukraine and expressed sympathy for Moscow. China did say it was “shocked” after pro-Russian separatists shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in July, but still did not directly criticise Russia. China abstained in the subsequent UN Security Council vote on a resolution condemning the referendum in Crimea, but this can be interpreted neither as a condemnation of Russia’s actions nor as a show of support to the EU.

Overall, relations between China and Russia do not seem to have been particularly affected by the crisis, and might even have improved as a result of international sanctions on Russia. In particular, in May and November, two deals were signed to supply Russian gas to China. Since the crisis began, Chinese and Russian leaders have met several times. Xi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the margins of the APEC meeting in November, Li met with Putin on the margins of the ASEM meeting, and Li went on an official visit to Moscow in October. Even in Central and Eastern Europe, EU member states seemed more interested in Chinese investment than in the possibility of leveraging relations with China to solve the Ukraine crisis. This raised eyebrows in Japan and Korea, which complied with most Western sanctions against Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine.

49 – Relations with China on Syria, wider Middle East and Africa

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

4

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

3

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

5

6

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

11

13

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

B-

B

While China expressed concerns regarding this year’s security developments in the wider Middle East, it refused to get directly involved.

In the second half of 2014, ISIS emerged in Iraq and Syria, which raised serious concerns among EU member states. On the margins of the tenth ASEM meeting in October, Chinese and European leaders declared that “they [had] reviewed the situation in the Middle East, Northern Africa, and the Sahel and agreed to increase cooperation to counter the common threat of extremism and terrorism in these regions”. However, this position has not yet been followed by concrete measures by China. Despite calls from the US, and to a lesser extent from the EU, China was reluctant to engage in the fight against ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria. At the UN anti-terrorism summit in September, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recognised the threat and “supported” anti-terrorism efforts by countries in the region, but said China would not share intelligence or commit troops or weapons. China voted in favour of UN Security Council Resolutions 2139 and 2165 on humanitarian access and aid in Syria. However, it did not show any greater willingness to get involved in the Syrian conflict than it did in 2013.

Meanwhile, China remained involved in peacekeeping missions in Africa. In fact, China now has more personnel in blue helmets in Africa than any other permanent member of the Security Council, including an infantry company in Mali and a full battalion in South Sudan. China also made an important contribution to the response to the Ebola epidemic in Africa in 2014. But while China’s engagement in Africa, mostly within the UN framework, has been increasing, it does not seem to be a top priority on China’s foreign policy agenda. Besides, although this increased involvement often occurs alongside the EU, it does not necessarily result from European efforts to engage China in these areas.

50 – Relations with China on North Korea

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

4

5

5

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

3

1

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

6

5

6

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

13

11

13

Grade

n/a

n/a

B

B-

B

There was minimal EU-China cooperation on North Korea. While China distanced itself from its ally, the EU and Japan cooperated closely on human rights.

Both the EU and China addressed the issue of North Korea in 2014, but they did so independently rather than together. China’s tough stance towards North Korea has hardened since North Korea’s nuclear test in 2013. In 2014 it distanced itself further from the regime in Pyongyang and actually initiated a rapprochement with Seoul. Indeed, Chinese and South Korean leaders met on several occasions this year, and Xi Jinping visited South Korea before North Korea, which was a first. China remained committed to the Six-Party Talks to address Korean Peninsula issues – Xi Jinping even called it the “optimum” process to tackle proliferation. In January Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin made back-to-back trips to Pyongyang and Seoul to attempt to resume the talks.

Meanwhile, the EU continued and intensified its policy of critical engagement with North Korea. The EU and member states increased contacts at the official and civil society level (if it is possible to speak of civil society in North Korea). When High Representative Catherine Ashton visited Seoul in May and signed an agreement facilitating the participation of South Korea in EU crisis management operations, she and her counterpart discussed the issue of North Korea. In parallel, the EU worked closely with Japan on human rights issues in North Korea (see component 47). The EU and Japan referred North Korea to the ICC for crimes against humanity. As a result, however, talks with North Korea were halted in November. Finally, the EU also declared it remained committed to supporting Six-Party Talks as the only way ahead in addressing proliferation issues in Asia.

51 – Relations with China on energy and climate change

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

4

4

5

5

Resources /5

4

4

5

4

3

Outcome /10

5

7

6

5

6

Total / 20

13

15

15

14

14

Grade

B

B+

B+

B+

B+

Ahead of the Paris climate conference in 2015, Europeans made efforts to engage China on climate change, but they still prioritise economic relations.

In 2014 Europeans redoubled their efforts to engage China on climate change. Alongside the European Commission, a number of member states raised the issue during bilateral visits – notably France, which will host the Paris climate conference in 2015, Germany, and the UK. This led to important though nonbinding statements of intention from China. For example, following Xi Jinping’s visit in March, the EU and China recognised the need to strengthen cooperation on climate change. In later statements, the EU-China Urbanisation Partnership was identified as a preferred mean of cooperation. (It should be noted, however, that climate was only one of 20 points included in the joint EU-China statement in March.)

Later, the EU and China reiterated their commitment to a successful outcome of the COP21 after Li Keqiang’s visit in October. However, economic and commercial issues were again higher up on the agenda. Moreover, even this progress was somewhat overshadowed by the China-US agreement on climate change, which was announced following the APEC meeting.

In October the EU made a unilateral commitment to very ambitious climate goals.

The EU also used multilateral forums to try to engage China on climate change. Following the UN climate change summit in New York in September, Xi, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and US President Barack Obama issued a joint statement in which they committed to working with the EU for a strong deal on climate change in Paris in 2015. At the UN climate summit, Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli reiterated China’s objective to cut carbon intensity by 40 to 45 percent of 2005 levels by 2020. He also said China’s carbon emissions would peak “as early as possible”. China’s increased willingness to engage and cooperate on climate issues may be influenced by a year of heavy pollution and growing environmental concerns at home.

52 – Relations with Asian partners on maritime security

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

4

5

3

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

3

1

2

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

6

5

4

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

13

11

9

Grade

n/a

n/a

B

B-

C+

The EU failed to play a mediating role in maritime disputes as member states sought to remain “neutral” to preserve their bilateral relations with China.

In 2014 the EU’s involvement in maritime disputes in Asia was limited. While the EU is a relatively non-controversial partner in the region, it failed to use this status and its experience of regional cooperation to try to defuse tensions between Asian neighbours. EU member states showed little interest in the situation and were unwilling to get involved on an issue on which China is extremely sensitive and on which, therefore, they think they have little to gain and much to lose. As a result, even as tensions in Asia increased, member states were mostly silent. When asked, they adhered to the EU’s official line of promoting a peaceful solution within the framework of international law, maintaining and ensuring freedom of navigation and trade in the region, and encouraging the implementation of a code of conduct in the South China Sea to avoid an escalation of tensions. The EU also identified ASEAN as the key to defusing tensions.

Europeans were careful not to take sides – with the exception of a rare statement in support of Vietnam in May after China moved an oil rig into Vietnamese waters. Following the Philippines’ call for international support, the EU simply reiterated its position that disputes should be resolved through international law. At the tenth ASEM meeting in Milan in October, growth and security were at the top of the agenda. European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said he looked forward to “reaffirming our joint responsibility for promoting peace and security in Asia and Europe”. But the summit produced very few results in terms of maritime security and mostly focused on uncontroversial issues. However, cooperation with Japan did increase in 2014. The EU and Japan held a summit in May and carried out a joint counter-piracy exercise in the Indian Ocean in October. Despite mounting tensions in Asia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK continued to sell arms to countries in the region other than China.

Chapter 6: Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management

European efforts at crisis management in 2014 were overshadowed by the EU’s inability to develop a coherent, effective, or humane policy on the thousands of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean. Over 200,000 people attempted to reach European shores by boat in 2014, straining the resources of economically depleted southern EU members such as Italy and Greece. Northern European governments, including the UK and Germany, shied away from authorising a concerted EU-wide response in spite of the thousands of migrants who died or suffered during the year.

Many of the migrants trying to reach Europe came from trouble spots such as Syria, Libya, and the Sahel. EU members’ efforts to stem conflicts in these places have been consistently insufficient. A shortage of humanitarian funding caused the UN to cut rations for Syrian refugees this winter. Only a small number of EU members, led by the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, have been willing to offer military assets to back French and UN-led stabilisation operations in Mali. There was equally little enthusiasm for an EU military mission to CAR, which focused on securing a section of the capital, Bangui, while sectarian violence continued to claim lives elsewhere.

The European response to the Ebola crisis was similarly half-hearted throughout much of the year, although this also reflected a failure by the WHO to grasp the scale of the problem early enough. International action was only galvanised in the third quarter of the year by a US push to contain the disease. The UK and the European Commission responded with a major increase in direct and indirect assistance, but other EU members, including France, lagged behind (although French bilateral support to Guinea was strong). By the end of the year, Cuba had deployed more doctors to Ebola-stricken countries than had any EU member.

The EU’s weakness vis-à-vis these crises reflects the effects of austerity. Some EU members have promoted lower-cost multilateral initiatives to address crises. Luxembourg made unusually good use of a temporary seat on the UN Security Council to push through two resolutions on humanitarian access to Syria in cooperation with Australia and Jordan. France persuaded the US to back another resolution, which was vetoed by China and Russia, to refer Syria to the ICC. But such diplomatic flourishes had little or no impact on the ground.

The Ukraine crisis also highlighted the flaws of multilateral diplomacy. Britain and France worked with the US to raise the crisis in the Security Council and the UN General Assembly. Yet Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution on Crimea’s referendum on its status and ignored a General Assembly vote condemning the referendum. Big non-Western powers such as Brazil and India refused to side with the West in these debates.

The Netherlands, supported by Australia and Malaysia, placed sufficient pressure on Russia to pass a Security Council resolution in the wake of the destruction of Flight MH17. This helped facilitate recovery efforts but had little lasting political effect.

EU and US efforts to shape Russian decisions through the G7/8 and G20 have proved equally futile. The European members of the G8 backed Moscow’s exclusion from the group in the first half of the year, but this diplomatic slap on the wrist had no notable impact on Vladimir Putin’s behaviour. Western statements on the events in Ukraine at the G20 summit in Brisbane in November caused Putin to leave early – a largely symbolic success.

European officials have been able to take some comfort from their influence over longer-term multilateral processes. Hungary’s ambassador to the UN played a pivotal role in debates on future international development goals, co-chairing a complex UN working group designed to draft successors to the MDGs. But major EU donor countries, notably the UK, are worried that the resulting framework contains 169 goals. Further discussions of this text loom next year and issues such as reforms to the IMF and the World Bank may be disruptive.

There is likely to be an uptick in talks on UN reform in 2015 too, as the organisation reaches its 70th birthday. Anticipating this, Germany has reinvigorated its perennial quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council, together with Brazil, India, and Japan. Berlin seems less committed than its partners, while Italy continues to campaign against the German bid.

The EU has also played a prominent role in advancing UN negotiations on climate change prior to a major conference in Paris. The Europeans have agreed to make pioneering cuts in their carbon emissions, despite opposition from sceptics such as Poland. They have also been criticised by developing states and big non-Western economies, including China and Brazil, for failing to commit more financial aid for poor states to handle climate change. Tellingly, the most widely noted advance in this process was November’s Sino-American promise on cutting carbon emissions, rather than any European action.

Shortly after its climate change statement with Beijing, the US announced a tariff deal with India that unblocked the stalled WTO negotiations. For all their financial and political commitments to multilateral diplomacy, the EU and its members seem unable to deliver such breakthroughs.

This shortcoming has applied to negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme. The talks were meant to conclude in November but have been extended. Outgoing EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton continues to coordinate the talks and has been praised by both US and Iranian officials for her diplomatic role. But it has been clear that the decisive actors in the process are Washington and Tehran: Brussels, Berlin, London, and Paris are at best significant but limited supporting actors.

Whereas 2015’s development and climate talks are likely to bring deals of some sort – although not necessarily good ones – Europe’s ability to engineer satisfactory deals through multilateral institutions is still very much in question. In the interim, the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean is profoundly hurting the EU.

53 – European policy at the UN (includes UNSC, GA, HRC, and UN reform)

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

2

2

3

4

Resources /5

2

3

2

4

4

Outcome /10

3

4

3

5

3

Total / 20

9

9

7

12

11

Grade

C+

C+

C-

B-

B-

European states are frustrated by their limited impact at the UN and serious reforms appear unlikely.

Europe made limited progress on major crises at the UN in 2014. Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning the Crimean referendum, and ignored a General Assembly resolution opposing it, even though the latter had the backing of 100 states. There was only slightly more room for diplomacy over Syria.

As a temporary member of the Security Council, Luxembourg took an unusually prominent role in negotiating two resolutions on humanitarian access to Syria. Its willingness to push this initiative, working closely with Australia and Jordan, won it widespread praise. It has not, however, made a major difference to aid deliveries.

France was especially active in the Security Council early in the year, orchestrating plans for peacekeeping in CAR. The UK played a significant role in designing UN sanctions against ISIS. But the EU looked confused in late December, when its members on the Security Council split over a Palestinian resolution setting a timetable for peace talks with Israel.  France and Luxembourg backed it, while the UK and Lithuania abstained.

The paralysis over Syria fuelled new calls for Security Council reform. Poland argued that Russia’s power in the Security Council should be curbed in light of its behaviour in Ukraine. France pushed a proposal to limit the use of the veto in mass atrocity situations. This has gained traction among the wider UN membership, but China and Russia are opposed, and the UK and US are sceptical that it can ever be made a reality.

Late in the year, Germany renewed its long-standing campaign for a permanent seat on the Council in partnership with Brazil, India, and Japan. The four powers will try to secure a deal in 2015. The chances of success remain slim.

A growing number of East European politicians launched campaigns to replace Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General in 2017. Candidates from other regions, such as Latin America, are also emerging.

54 – European policy in the G8, G20, IMF and WTO

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

2

n/a

3

4

4

Resources /5

3

n/a

5

4

4

Outcome /10

5

n/a

4

7

4

Total / 20

10

n/a

12

15

12

Grade

C+

n/a

B-

B+

B-

Europeans used the G7 and G20 as platforms to criticise Russia over Ukraine, but with little impact.

Both the G7/8 and the G20 were overshadowed by the Ukraine crisis. Russia had been slated to host the G8 in 2014, but Western members of the group suspended preparatory talks during the Crimea crisis. In late March G7 leaders announced that they would boycott Sochi and meet in Brussels in early June without Vladimir Putin (even if he did attend D-Day celebrations with EU leaders straight afterwards).

EU members appeared divided over how hard a line to take against Russia through the G7. In April the G7 declared joint targeted sanctions against Russian officials. But Italy and Germany opposed authorising additional punitive measures at the Brussels summit, which instead made a general plea for peace. Nonetheless, the G7 did agree further sanctions against Russia in coordination with the EU later in the summer. Although these steps have failed to really shape the conflict, the G7 has been a useful coordination mechanism.

European leaders also used November’s G20 summit in Australia as an opportunity to criticise Putin to his face, although non-Western members of the group did not join in. Putin left Australia early. Indicating mounting European frustration, Angela Merkel made some of her firmest comments on Russia while in Australia. But, again, the G20 provided only a useful diplomatic platform to communicate Western and European concerns over the crisis, without delivering concrete results.

The Australian G20 did make progress on economic discussions, although the group is still far from its crisis-era peak. Europe and the US succeeded in persuading climate-sceptic Australia to include firm references to climate change in the summit outcome.

The most important factor in Europe’s relations with the Bretton Woods institutions continues to be the IMF’s role in the continent’s bailout regimes. Greece failed to free itself from IMF-EU oversight during the year, fostering political uncertainty. As 2014 wore on, the IMF sounded alarms about the state of the European economy.

55 – European policy on non-proliferation and the arms trade

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

4

4

4

4

Resources /5

n/a

4

4

4

5

Outcome /10

n/a

5

3

8

7

Total / 20

n/a

13

11

16

16

Grade

n/a

B

B-

A-

A-

Europeans played important roles in dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons, the Iran nuclear talks, and ratifying the ATT.

Two WMD issues led the European agenda in 2014: the dismantling of Syria’s chemical stockpile under the auspices of the UN and OPCW and nuclear talks with Iran.

The Syrian process relied significantly on European contributions. Denmark oversaw the naval aspects of the operation, supported by Norway, China, and Russia. Italy hosted a US ship repurposed for the destruction of Syria’s most dangerous materials, while the UK took others to Britain to be destroyed. Despite early doubts, the UN-OPCW operation completed its mission in October 2014. There are still suspicions that the Syrian regime has kept some chemical weapons in reserve, but the removal and destruction of its declared stockpile was nonetheless a significant achievement – especially given the risks of ISIS seizing remaining stocks.

The EU also had a prominent role in the nuclear talks with Iran, especially because of the personal influence of Catherine Ashton as chair, although the US is obviously the primary force on the Western side. The talks failed to reach a conclusion by the deadline of November and were extended by seven months; Ashton maintained the confidence of all sides to such an extent that she was asked to stay on for this extra period of negotiation after leaving office as European foreign policy head.

EU governments have also played a role in hastening the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty, which was signed in 2013 after considerable European advocacy. The Treaty required 50 ratifications to come into force and most EU member states helped complete this process. Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Poland were the only EU members not among the first 50 ratifiers. The Treaty reached the necessary level of support in September and came into force in late December.

56 – European policy towards the ICC and international criminal tribunals

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

4

4

4

4

Resources /5

4

4

3

3

3

Outcome /10

7

7

7

5

4

Total / 20

15.0

15

14

12

11

Grade

B+

B+

B+

B-

B-

European support for the ICC at the UN has struggled to sustain the court in a year that raised sensitive issues in all regions.

The ICC had a difficult year. In May, France scored a small victory when it persuaded the US to support a UN resolution referring Syria to the ICC, a move that Washington had previously rejected as diplomatically counterproductive. This initiative had the backing of all EU members except Sweden, which continued to view it as potentially damaging. The French proposal was, in any case, a political gambit rather than a realistic plan: China and Russia predictably vetoed the resolution.

Later in the year, the ICC faced a series of setbacks involving African cases. The most prominent was the trial of Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta, who faced charges relating to the violence that followed the country’s 2007 elections. In 2013 European members of the Security Council had helped to block a motion to postpone the case made by the African members of the Security Council. However, after delays, the ICC prosecutor withdrew the case in December 2014 due to insufficient evidence.

Shortly afterwards, the ICC announced that it was ending investigations into crimes committed in Darfur, a move that Sudanese president and ICC indictee Omar al-Bashir declared as a “victory”. The ICC has also failed to persuade Libya to surrender Saif Gaddafi for trial, confirming a trend of African non-cooperation that threatens to do the court deep damage. European governments face the conundrum of trying to strengthen the ICC without making it look like a neo-colonialist ploy.

The ICTY has continued its cases against former Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, but was widely criticised when it provisionally released another high-profile alleged war criminal, Serbia’s Vojislav Seselj, after ten years in custody. This was especially sensitive because Seselj is an outspoken opponent of the relatively pro-EU stance taken by the current government in Belgrade.

57 - Humanitarian response to refugee crisis in Middle East

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

2

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

3

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

5

3

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

10

8

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

C+

C

EU states and the European Commission have increased aid to Syria and Iraq this year, but the humanitarian challenge remains significant.

The Syrian conflict and its spillover into Iraq have posed a major challenge to the overstretched international humanitarian aid system. The US and Arab countries (many of which are involved in fuelling the conflict) have made major pledges of humanitarian aid, but European donors have also contributed significantly. The European Commission calculates that the EU has collectively pledged €3 billion since the Syrian war began, including to countries bordering conflicts. But this has still not been enough.

One obstacle has been the Syrian government’s refusal to permit humanitarian access. Luxembourg played a leading role in crafting two UN resolutions addressing this challenge (see component 53), including gaining authorisation in July for aid agencies to operate inside Syria without government approval. Yet by December, only a fraction of the 12 million displaced persons inside Syria had received supplies.

With violence increasing, donors had to raise their spending well beyond their projections: the European Commission, for example, had earmarked €150 million for Syria in 2014, but spent over €400 million. The Iraq crisis presented a further threat. During the Mount Sinjar emergency, Britain and France used military means to get aid to the suffering. The UK also made a major donation of tents and other equipment for the displaced through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Ireland is among the highest per capita aid contributors to Syria.

Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, and Sweden made significant efforts to accept asylum seekers. Spain focused on preventing Syrian asylum seekers from staying in the country. Bulgaria, Greece and Italy struggled to deal with the flood of refugees and migrants arriving on their shores, receiving little support from the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, arrivals in Europe are low in comparison with countries bordering on conflict zones. The UNHCR estimated that in summer 2014, 123,671 Syrian refugees were in Europe, compared with 2.8 million in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. The inadequacy of international assistance became clear when WFO rations for Syrian refugees were at risk this winter.

58 - Response to immigration crisis in Mediterranean

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

1

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

5

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

D+

Europe’s response to the growing humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean has been disjointed and insufficient.

Serious instability in the EU’s neighbouring regions – notably in the Middle East, in Central Africa, and in the Horn of Africa – combined with the enduring allure of better economic prospects in Europe has meant that over 200,000 migrants have crossed the Mediterranean to the EU in 2014. The International Organisation for Migration estimates 3,400 lives were lost trying to make the crossing in 2014. Yet EU states – led by Germany and the UK – have fallen short of taking responsibility for this as a collective problem, leaving the southern member states on the front line and able to offer only stopgap responses.

Until October, the Italian navy led Mare Nostrum, a search and rescue operation that had a cost of around €9 million per month. However, in the face of the ongoing migrant flows north to Europe, this was superseded by the much more limited Triton border control operation, led by Frontex and supported by 21 member states. NGOs voiced concern that if previous efforts had been insufficient, the new operation had no hope of coping with the scale of the problem.

The rhetoric about tackling the issue at source has largely been used in defence of member states’ decisions – such as the UK’s in October – not to cooperate on missions in the Mediterranean, driven by the toxic debate on the effects of immigration within EU states. No real attempt was made in 2014 to join up border management with security or development efforts, and discussion remained in JHA Council. Across Europe, governments have been hamstrung by public concerns about immigration, allowing far right parties to stoke these fears to gain further political advantage.

59 – International aid

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

2

2

2

Resources /5

n/a

3

3

3

4

Outcome /10

n/a

6

6

4.2

6

Total / 20

n/a

12

11

11

12

Grade

n/a

B-

B-

B-

B-

EU humanitarian and development aid levels remained constant in 2014, but debate grew on how to respond to development needs in the future.

Preliminary figures suggest that European development budgets remained roughly level in 2014, although a number of EU members (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Romania) made cuts. After years of reductions, Italy managed a modest increase to its aid spending this year, while Spain hopes to reverse a long decline in its spending in 2015. Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the UK also maintained or raised aid levels.

There is a growing debate about the value of development aid in some leading donor countries, such as the Nordic countries and the UK. Denmark has merged its development and international trade portfolios, shifting attention to the role of business. A British parliamentary bill putting the UK’s aid commitments on a firm legal basis enjoyed support from many parties but was fiercely criticised by some Conservative MPs.

The future of aid was also a matter of debate at the UN, where diplomats are working on a new generation of development goals to be agreed next year. Hungary’s ambassador to the UN co-chaired negotiations on these goals in the first half of the year and was widely praised for securing a draft deal in the face of many tensions. Some EU members, notably the UK, are concerned, however, that the draft contains over 170 targets, and some significant differences – such as the governance of aid institutions – still need resolution. Ireland’s UN ambassador is leading the follow-on round of talks, which could easily go to the wire in mid-2015.

Humanitarian aid budgets came under pressure as multiple crises raised demand for assistance in Africa and the Middle East.

As in previous years, the European Commission has played a major role in covering gaps in humanitarian assistance, disbursing well over €1 billion in response to crises in the course of the year. But UN agencies have not received all the money they requested from EU and other donors to handle many recent crises.

60 – Ebola

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

3

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

7

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

12

Grade

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

B-

After a slow start, almost all EU states made financial contributions, with the UK and France leading medical and logistical support.

European governments were slow to respond to the outbreak of Ebola, but this reflected a slow reaction by the WHO and UN. In France, Médecins Sans Frontières was able to raise awareness relatively early, but it took a major push by the Obama administration to galvanise large-scale international action in the last four months of the year. This included a deployment of 3,000 troops to the region, a far bigger direct commitment than either any European country or the EU as a whole has been willing to make to date.

Almost all EU members have made some financial contribution to multilateral efforts to combat Ebola, although there has been domestic criticism of some, such as Spain, for continuing to move too slowly. France and the UK have had the greatest stake in the crisis due to their historical ties to two of the worst affected countries, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Through much of the crisis, it has been assumed that each would “adopt” their ex-colonies, while the US has had a comparable focus on Liberia.

French direct aid to Guinea helped limit the outbreak there, although its commitment of €120 million to wider aid efforts has been criticised as being too small. France and Germany also cooperated in setting up a European evacuation mechanism for international medical personnel (although Germany was embarrassed when one of its aircraft malfunctioned on a well-publicised flight to West Africa). Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden were the other most active EU donors. UK direct efforts, including a military medical deployment, proved less successful in Sierra Leone, but London has committed almost twice as much financially as Paris has to handling the crisis, winning praise from the US for enabling UN and WHO efforts.

Ebola has failed to reach worst-case scenario levels and there is a general agreement that the international response was, if imperfect, just about good enough.

61 – Climate change

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

4

5

4

3

3

Resources /5

4

4

3

3

4

Outcome /10

7

7

6

5

6

Total / 20

15

16

13

11

13

Grade

B+

A-

B

B-

B

Despite internal divisions, Europeans remain leaders on climate change, yet hard diplomacy lies ahead.

Climate change diplomacy has focused on the 2015 Paris summit, which aims to succeed where the 2009 Copenhagen conference failed by agreeing a global treaty on limiting carbon emissions. The major way-markers in the run-up to this goal in 2014 were a leaders’ summit at the UN in September 2014, EU talks in October, and a final preparatory meeting for Paris in Peru in November–December.

The September summit was largely an awareness-raising exercise, although it saw steps towards combating deforestation, a theme Denmark has prioritised. Denmark and France were also among states making pledges to a fund to help developing nations adapt to climate change, but critics ranging from China to Western NGOs have fiercely castigated Europe as a whole for pledging too little to this effort.

The October talks in Brussels resulted in an EU-wide commitment to cut carbon emissions by 40 percent by 2030, although Poland and other eastern EU members won concessions in reflection of their reliance on coal-fuelled power plants. Climate activists argued that this deal compromised the EU’s achievement, but European officials were keen to emphasise their commitments as a model for others. Alongside Denmark and France, Austria, Germany, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden continue to lead EU climate policy, with Estonia, Ireland, Poland, and Romania dragging their feet. The deal in Brussels was overshadowed, however, by November’s bilateral US-China agreement on limiting emissions, indicating where the greatest influence on the process lies.

The Lima conference saw all governments commit to making similar pledges before Paris, although proposals for a rigorous review of each country’s commitments were dropped. It is not clear how meaningful many pledges will be, and most observers believe the final Paris negotiations will be extremely tough. Although the EU remains a genuine leader on climate change, a very strong binding framework on climate action is out of reach, and the strength of the EU’s example on carbon reductions is offset by inevitable complaints about funding from developing nations.

62 – Mali

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

n/a

4

2

3

Resources /5

n/a

n/a

4

3

3

Outcome /10

n/a

n/a

2

8

3

Total / 20

n/a

n/a

10

13

9

Grade

n/a

n/a

C+

B

C+

France and the UN struggled to stem a resurgence of violence.

The security situation in Mali deteriorated in 2014, reversing the gains that followed the French intervention in 2013. French forces continue to target Islamist groups in the north of the country and Paris has reorganised its military presence in West Africa to focus on counter-terrorist operations. But the Islamists, able to take advantage of chaos in southern Libya, have proved unexpectedly resilient.

Parallel EU and UN missions have tried to assist the Malian government. The EU has focused on training the army, but the government insisted on launching a premature offensive against separatists in the north in May and sustained a defeat. The UN mission has also had difficult relations with the government, which is very keen to avoid international meddling in its affairs.

A number of European countries are involved in the UN force. The Dutch have sent attack helicopters and special forces and have cooperated with Nordic countries to set up an advanced intelligence cell. These are unusually high-grade assets for a UN mission in Africa, but the mission as a whole remains poorly equipped and has been slow to deploy in the north due to logistical limitations. Poorly equipped African units have been easy targets for the Islamists and over 30 peacekeepers have been killed (to date, no European UN troops have died, although the more aggressive French commandos have suffered fatalities).

By the last quarter of the year, the Security Council was debating options to strengthen the UN further. Sweden has readied a significant contribution of specialist personnel for 2015. But it will be hard to isolate Mali from wider currents of instability in the region, including not only southern Libya but also northern Nigeria, where European governments – notably the UK – are backing the campaign against Boko Haram. Mali and its neighbours are almost certain to suffer more serious violence in 2015.

63 – Somalia

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

4

4

4

4

Resources /5

n/a

4

4

4

4

Outcome /10

n/a

6

7

6

8

Total / 20

n/a

14

15

14

16

Grade

n/a

B+

B+

B+

A-

Despite continued violence, the EU’s investment in Somalia’s stability is slowly paying off.

Somalia remains a priority for the EU in Africa. The EU anti-piracy mission off the country’s cost – part of a wider array of naval forces protecting shipping – had a successful year. Only two pirate attacks had been reported by the start of December, down from almost 200 three years ago. The EU has decided to extend the mission for another two years. As of late December, the flotilla consisted of three vessels from Germany, Italy, and Spain.

On land, African Union peacekeepers and the Somali army undertook a series of offensives against the al-Shabaab Islamist group through the course of the year, capturing a series of towns and cities. EU military trainers, who had previously been working with Somali troops in Uganda, were deployed to Mogadishu to run in-country training for the first time in February. The security situation in the capital remains volatile, however, with continuing attacks on international targets throughout the year. While weakened, al-Shabaab was still able to conduct a massacre in eastern Kenya in December. The AU force’s reputation was also harmed by a report in late 2014 itemising numerous cases of sexual abuse by its troops against Somali women.

In the last quarter of the year, the UN highlighted mounting food and water shortages. Efforts led by the UN to establish a stable political system in Mogadishu have inevitably been rocky. Nonetheless, Somalia’s overall progress is still a success both for the European governments, notably the UK, that have championed the country and for the EU institutions that have invested heavily in it in recent years. It remains to be seen whether the threat from al-Shabaab can be contained or extinguished effectively enough for the EU and its allies to shift their focus from stabilising Somalia to long-term state-building and development work.

64 – The Sudans, DRC, and CAR

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

4

4

2

2

Resources /5

n/a

2

3

3

2

Outcome /10

n/a

6

4

4

2

Total / 20

n/a

12

11

9

6

Grade

n/a

B-

B-

C+

C-

Europe’s response to the crisis in CAR has been half-hearted and the humanitarian consequences dire.

When France intervened in CAR in December 2013 to halt a “pre-genocidal” situation, Paris may have expected a relatively easy operation. Instead, violence continued throughout 2014 and sectarian killings led to a mass exodus of Muslim citizens. European efforts to control the crisis have been only half-hearted.

Although the EU deployed a CSDP mission (EUFOR RCA) to CAR in the second quarter of the year, a lack of enthusiasm among member states (with the honourable exception of Estonia, which offered troop contributions) meant that the mission’s strength was well below the 1,000 troops that planners had originally envisaged, and it concentrated on securing the capital’s airport and surrounding areas. This was still a challenge – thousands of displaced people are camping at the airport – and EU troops helped to contain a particularly dangerous spike of violence in October. But the broader task of stabilising CAR has been left to French and African peacekeepers. The latter came under UN command in September. NGOs have accused the French of showing excessive caution in handling some violent incidents.

The EU has extended EUFOR RCA to March 2015 to help the UN complete its deployment, which has been slow. The mission remains a source of contention between France and many other EU members, notably the UK, which question whether it is feasible to rebuild CAR. The European Commission, which had long tried to highlight the “forgotten crisis”, remains a leading source of humanitarian aid.

The crisis in neighbouring South Sudan remains unresolved, with 80,000 civilians sheltering on UN peacekeeping bases a year after violence broke out in December 2013. EU members, including the UK, helped the UN by flying equipment to the mission at the height of the crisis, but there is no significant European military component on the ground. Likewise, in the DRC, African contingents have played the leading role in still-incomplete UN stabilisation efforts in the east of the country.

65 – Afghanistan

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Unity /5

n/a

3

4

2

3

Resources /5

n/a

3

3

3

2

Outcome /10

n/a

4

4

4

5

Total / 20

n/a

10

11

9

10

Grade

n/a

C+

B-

C+

C+

Europe’s residual role in Afghanistan is likely to be marginal.

The year 2014 marked a turning point in Afghanistan’s history as national elections created a new opportunity for the country and NATO concluded its combat operations. Europe’s influence in Afghanistan has long been marginal, with the US firmly in the lead both militarily and politically. Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s transition also marks a turning point for many European armies, which bear serious scars from campaigning there.

The legacy of their efforts appeared at risk in summer 2014, when elections led to a prolonged stand-off between two candidates: Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. Ghani eventually gained the presidency in September in a power-sharing deal with Abdullah and quickly improved relations with Western powers, which had suffered under his predecessor, Hamid Karzai. But there was an increase in violence in 2014 and concerns remain about the government’s ability to fight the Taliban.

NATO has launched a new training mission, meant to involve up to 12,000 personnel, but at present, the US is the major contributor. Germany has pledged 850 troops to the mission and Italy and Spain have also made significant pledges, but the overall level of enthusiasm among Europeans is low. The US has had to keep more troops than planned on the ground to fill the gap.

The EU also maintains a CSDP police-training mission in Afghanistan, and has committed to extending this until the end of 2016. Its priorities are primarily institutional, including strengthening the ministry of the interior and promoting professionalism among the police. It will pass off some of its duties to other EU agencies at the end of 2015. The UN, meanwhile, will maintain a political presence in the country.

Tables

Abbreviations

APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEM – Asia-Europe Meeting

ATT – Arms Trade Treaty

AU – African Union

BIT  –  Bilateral Investment Treaty

CAR – Central African Republic

COP21 – The 21st session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Association

EEAS – European External Action Service

ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy

EULEX – EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

EUFOR RCA – European Union Force in the Central African Republic

FTA – Free Trade Association

GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council

GSP+ – An extension to the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences for developing countries that have proved commitment to sustainable development and good governance.

ICC – International Criminal Court

ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

ISIS  – Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

IMF – International Monetary Fund

JHA Council – Justice and Home Affairs Council of the EU

JPoA  – Joint Plan of Action

LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas

MDGs – Millennium Development Goals

MENA  –  Middle East and North Africa

MEP – Member of the European Parliament

MEPP – Middle East Peace Process

NDRC – China’s National Development and Reform Commission

ODIHR – The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OPCW – Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

RMB – renminbi

TTIP  –  Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UAE – United Arab Emirates

WFP – World Food Programme

WHO – World Health Organisation

WMD – Weapon of Mass Destruction

WTO – World Trade Organisation

About the authors

Julien Barnes-Dacey is a senior policy fellow in the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Adam Baron is a visiting fellow in the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Susi Dennison is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Anthony Dworkin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Ellie Geranmayeh is a policy fellow in the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

François Godement is director of the Asia & China programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations

Nigar Goksel is a senior analyst for the European Stability Initiative and editor-in-chief of the Turkish Policy Quarterly.

Andrew Hammond is a policy fellow in the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Richard Gowan is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and research director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. Chi Kong Chyong is a Visiting Fellow in the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations and director of the Energy Policy Forum at the University of Cambridge.

Agatha Kratz is the chief editor of China Analysis and a research fellow at the Asia Centre.

Francisco de Borja Lasheras is a policy fellow in the Wider Europe programme and associate director of  ECFR Madrid.

Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Daniel Levy is the director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Kadri Liik is a senior policy fellow on Wider Europe at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Sophia Pugsley is the programme coordinator of the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Angela Stanzel is a policy fellow in the Asia and China programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Rachel Tausendfreund is editorial director at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Vessela Tcherneva is a senior policy fellow and acting director of the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Mattia Toaldo is a policy fellow on the Middle East and North Africa at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Nick Witney is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Thomas Wright is a fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Table of Contents

EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2015

Acknowledgements

Foreword

Introduction

Chapter 1: Russia

Chapter 2: United States

Chapter 3: Wider Europe

Chapter 4: Middle East and North Africa

Chapter 5: Asia and China

Chapter 6: Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management

Tables

Abbreviations

About the authors

Table of Contents

EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2015

Acknowledgements

Foreword

Introduction

Chapter 1: Russia

Chapter 2: United States

Chapter 3: Wider Europe

Chapter 4: Middle East and North Africa

Chapter 5: Asia and China

Chapter 6: Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management

Tables

Abbreviations

About the authors