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In Bahrain, a protester runs for cover from tear gas during clashes with police in the village of Sitra, as tensions rise across the Middle East over the killing of Nimr al-Nimr. Photograph: Mohammed Al-Shaikh/Getty
In Bahrain, a protester runs for cover from tear gas during clashes with police in the village of Sitra, as tensions rise across the Middle East over the killing of Nimr al-Nimr. Photograph: Mohammed Al-Shaikh/Getty

The Saudi execution of a Shia cleric has deepened Islam's sectarian rift. Where does that leave the west?

This article is more than 8 years old

The beheading of a spiritual leader by Riyadh has unleashed a torrent of anger from Tehran and brought the two nations to the edge of open conflict

Saudi Arabia’s announcement last weekend that it had executed 47 people for terrorism, including a leading Shia cleric – and the furious response from the Shia community, led by Iran – had an immediate and dramatic impact on a region already riven by war and ideological division. And it has left the international community floundering as it tries to respond to conflicts spilling across the globe.

But what are the longer-term consequences for the Middle East and beyond? And how will capitals from Washington to London to Moscow respond to the actions of their allies in the region? The escalating tensions between Riyadh and Tehran have cast a long shadow over hopes for stability in the Middle East, and in the short term will pile yet more misery on those least able to bear it, the battered civilians of Yemen and Syria.

The conflict has already threatened to undermine the historic US-Iranian nuclear deal by making Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, look weak and his country unpredictable, forced the west publicly to shore up its recently strained alliance with Saudi Arabia, and deepened regional and sectarian division by spurring a flurry of diplomatic snubs to Iran.

The defiance and anger in both capitals will not fade soon but, while neither government is eager to step back from the brink, both know a direct military confrontation would be ruinous, bloody and asymmetrical.

Riyadh has a far more impressive arsenal, accumulated through years of multibillion-dollar purchases from western arms manufacturers, and benefits from the protective aura of its partners. “Tehran knows that, however much the relationship between Saudi and western allies has been deteriorating recently, they are still a critical ally, and so they know they would not just be going head to head with Saudi,” said Ellie Geranmayeh, policy fellow for the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

However, Iran has a bigger army, boasts around three times Saudi Arabia’s population to draw on for new recruits, and can project its power at sea. Military constraints do not mean the latest episode in a bitter and long-standing political and economic rivalry is likely to be shrugged off easily by either side. Last time the capitals cut diplomatic ties, in the late 1980s, they were not restored for four years.

Avoiding direct confrontation, both are likely to escalate instead their role in proxy wars across the region. These conflicts have become the forum for them to project their ambitions and exercise their rage. “The Syrians, the Yemenis, will be the ones who suffer,” said Geranmayeh. “The way that both sides have behaved has not been of the calibre of responsible regional powers.”

Syrian peace talks are due to start later this month, after a huge international push. And while neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia is likely to walk away, because that would further damage strained relations with powers behind the negotiations, they will not attend with much desire for success.

“The standoff is likely to diminish the chance of a diplomatic breakthrough in the Syria talks, but it is unlikely to derail the negotiations,” said Ali Vaez, senior Iran analyst with the International Crisis Group.

“Russia will nudge Iran and the US will push Saudi Arabia to the table. Also, neither Tehran nor Riyadh would want to be seen as the inflexible party at fault of a diplomatic stalemate that will cost the lives of tens of thousands of innocent civilians. Yet even if they participate at the talks, they will likely be less amenable to compromise.”

An even riskier strategy, but one both countries already flirt with, is stirring up restive minorities within their rival country. Just as Saudi Arabia has a sizeable Shia minority, Iran is home to Sunnis, including Arabic-speakers, but once client groups are unleashed both governments know they may be much harder to rein in.

It was the execution of one of the most prominent Saudi Shias, cleric Nimr al-Nimr, that sparked the crisis; the Saudi embassy in Tehran was sacked in protests. Saudi Arabia found Nimr guilty of terrorism; his supporters say he was an advocate for an oppressed minority. “The reality is that Saudi Arabia’s execution of a prominent Shia cleric amid sectarian strife in the region was reckless and Iran’s failure to protect Saudi diplomatic missions was deplorable,” Vaez said. “The best option for the west is to avoid taking sides and instead try to contain the crisis at a time when the region needs dialogue more than ever.”

Officials and analysts with ties to Riyadh say it was just a timeline laid out by the judicial process. “Saudi Arabia did not take into account Iran when carrying out the sentences on the convicted terrorists,” said Mohammed Alyahya, research fellow at the Gulf Research Centre thinktank, based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. “During the judicial process leading to his conviction, his case was scrutinised by 13 judges in three courts.” But the country’s judiciary is not isolated from its ruling family and it was clear that the execution would stir up tensions. Some analysts think the move was intended to reinforce Saudi Arabia’s alliances by reminding western nations where their core interests lie in times of turmoil.

Riyadh’s rulers are under political and economic pressure at home, as oil prices plunge; and at a time of uncertainty they have been disconcerted that the historic nuclear deal could thaw Washington’s ties with Iran. Closer to home, Islamic State is mounting an ideological challenge to the House of Saud as leaders of the Sunni world. Other observers think the execution was carried out to mute potential domestic criticism of the execution of many more Sunni prisoners convicted of terrorism, whose sentences were carried out at the same time.

Whatever the cause, the spat initially appeared to offer strategic satisfaction for Saudi Arabia as a highly publicised parade of countries followed Riyadh’s lead and cut ties with Tehran, or at least downgraded them. There was also a round of grudging support from western and regional allies, with politicians and opinion pieces in Europe warning that Saudi Arabia has a long history as a reliable ally while Iran is unpredictable.

But on closer examination the fallout is less clear-cut. Allies who have closed ranks entirely and cut ties with Iran are smaller, vulnerable nations – Somalia, Sudan. More powerful regional allies, such as the UAE, may be displeased and downgraded ties by recalling ambassadors, but calculated that they didn’t want to break off ties with Tehran entirely. “The number of countries that followed Saudi Arabia in cutting their diplomatic ties with Iran says more about Saudi’s solitude than Iran’s isolation,” said Vaez, pointing out that neither side had much claim to the moral high ground.

In Iran, what began as a setback for Rouhani may end up delivering an advantage. The attack on the Saudi embassy appeared to unite opponents of his nuclear deal at home and abroad by escalating tensions and exposing internal division in society.

But while the burning embassy sent a clear message that Rouhani’s more conservative opponents were in charge of the security apparatus, it also sparked an unexpected backlash at home, including in Friday sermons preached around the country.

“If you look at the aftermath of those attacks on the Saudi embassy, the unexpected push back across the Iranian establishment, it might actually give Rouhani ammunition to take on the hardliners, to create a consensus within the Iranian decision-making body to marginalise the groups,” said Geranmayeh.

  • The headline on this article was amended on 11 January 2016.

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