Cold comfort

ALL of Europe rejoiced when the European Space Agency deposited Philae, a probe the size of a kitchen appliance, on the surface of a comet 300m miles (480m km) from the Earth. It was like throwing a dart blindfolded across an ocean and hitting the bullseye. Philae fell silent soon afterwards, but not before dispatching reams of data and a shot of optimism to a continent that has had little to cheer. Closer to home the European Union finds it harder to exert influence—even over its neighbourhood.

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine is providing an early test for the EU’s new high representative for foreign policy, Federica Mogherini, who previously served (albeit briefly) as Italy’s foreign minister. NATO is warning of a renewed build-up of Russian troops and kit in eastern Ukraine. The recent sham elections in two pro-Russian separatist regions in the Donbas were “respected” if not recognised by Moscow. The Minsk ceasefire accords signed in September by Ukraine, Russia and the separatists are being honoured only in the breach. Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s president, is preparing for “total war”.

How did Europe allow such devastation on its doorstep? EU officials cite the claim that, whereas in 1989 Ukraine was at roughly the same level as Poland, today it is three times as poor. The implication is that with the right policies Ukraine’s turn from its European destiny may be corrected. It was this thought that inspired the brave protesters, many flying EU flags, who filled the Maidan in Kiev a year ago. They sought not just the downfall of Mr Poroshenko’s predecessor, Viktor Yanukovych, who had bowed to Russian pressure to reject an EU trade deal, but an end to the corruption and thievery that had defined their country since independence. The real battle-cry of the Maidan was for a modern, European-style state. Instead, Ukraine has become a bloody war zone and an economic basket-case.

Ukraine was always going to be difficult. By late 2004, when the Orange revolution brought pro-Europeans to power in Kiev, the EU had begun its expansion to the east. Then “enlargement fatigue” left poorer ex-Soviet countries like Ukraine in the cold. The European neighbourhood policy, designed to bring about political and economic change in the EU’s neighbours without the offer of membership, was a dismal failure. It substituted technocratic gradualism for hard-headed politics and so failed to respond to the needs of individual countries and regions.

But the trickiest problem is Russia. Vladimir Putin decided that a Europe-leaning Ukraine was a threat to Russian interests. His meddling, notably the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of the east, has been unpredictable and opportunistic, and emblazoned with nationalist ideology, whether revanchist talk of Novorossiya or attacks on America. His “Eurasian Economic Union” has ambitions to rival the EU, even if its membership is limited so far to Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The scales have certainly fallen from European eyes. On November 16th Mr Putin left a G20 summit early after being harangued by his fellow leaders. Soon afterwards Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, issued an unusually forthright assessment of the Russian threat, not only to Ukraine but also to Georgia, Moldova and the Balkans. Mr Putin’s willingness to escalate in Ukraine has outstripped Europe’s ability to respond, notwithstanding the sanctions the EU has put in place. At their meeting this week EU foreign ministers agreed merely to condemn the Donbas votes and to extend sanctions to a few more separatists.

This was also the first foreign ministers’ meeting to be chaired by the redoubtable Ms Mogherini. Many analysts, and even some EU governments, were against choosing her, fearing that she would exemplify her country’s long-standing pro-Kremlin tilt. Some added that, like her predecessor, Cathy Ashton, she was too inexperienced for the job—though she has a long political and international background on Italy’s centre-left.

As well as convincing naysayers, she faces the hard task of maintaining unity among EU member countries. Many chafe against the damage that they claim sanctions on Russia are causing to their economies. With Europe’s larger countries, now including Germany, increasingly forging their own foreign policy it is not clear what difference Brussels can make.

The tools for the job

Yet the EU is not toothless. Ms Mogherini has many “instruments”, in the jargon, at her disposal, including a well-staffed, brainy diplomatic service and the European Commission’s financial clout. She is a commission vice-president, who despite her peripatetic job promises to attend every weekly meeting of the college. She has some shrewd ideas about how to make best use of the EU’s unwieldy bureaucracy. Senior officials hint that they are ready to provide more economic assistance if the Ukrainians get serious about judicial reform, business liberalisation and so on. Yet it is hard to think of a country in which Europe’s money, or the power of its example, has proven transformative without there being an offer of membership, however remote. It is not clear if it can work any better in Ukraine.

Ms Mogherini’s best hope may be to buy time. Mr Putin’s endgame is not clear, perhaps even to himself. Some fear that he wants a land bridge to Crimea. Others suggest that, despite appearances, he may be starting to engage more with the West. Perhaps most likely is a continuation of low-level fighting, as the separatists try to secure or expand their territory. The EU’s sanctions will remain in place until next spring, and may well be extended. Andrew Wilson, a Ukraine expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, suggests that Russia may then be more vulnerable to pressure, particularly if oil prices stay low. But will Ukraine’s economy last that long?