How to avoid the clash of civilizations

After the terrorist attacks in Paris, European decision-makers are under strong public pressures to strengthen a narrowly construed security agenda, mainly aimed at deterring and foiling new jihadist attacks, whilst assuaging natural fears in the population. This will have serious implications on our system of democracy, civil rights and liberties. A system, it must be acknowledged, significantly eroded by, on the one hand, a decade and half of the post 9/11 “global war on terror” (GWoT), with its widespread abuses and a predominantly militarized response to the threat, only partly phased out by President Obama’s more targeted approach to Islamic terrorism; on the other, by several of the policies in place since then in European countries (such as detention, massive surveillance of citizens, etc.). A third element compounding the problem and turning it into a divisive question of coexistence and social cohesion is the pressure exercised by the growing waves of Europhobic, Islamophobic and anti-immigration parties.

If the past 14 years can tell us something, this approach won’t work. Worse, it has proved to be counterproductive for Europe’s security and its societal order. It’s time to draw some lessons learned in order to move forward –and not more backwards.

The importance of public discourse(s)

From the prism of Europe’s besieged normative model, much of the rhetoric triggered by the attacks is worrying. It often shows a stunningly limited understanding of the Muslim world, let alone Islam, the complex changes undergone by societies since the Arab spring or immigration. At times this rhetoric (by no means limited to forces such as the Front National in France or the surging Pegida movement in Germany) is tinged by Islamophobic instincts. The problem would be essentially religious: Islam would be a violence-prone religion, inherently incompatible with any form of modernity, and hence a threat to Western and European societies. In a worrying attribution of collective responsibility more fitting of sombre times of Europe’s past and playing right into the victimization spin by Islamist radicals, this narrative further stigmatizes Europe’s Moslems, from Neuköln to those in Bosnia or Albania dreaming of the EU. Citizens and populations who have already bore the brunt of some aspects of those counter-terrorism policies.

Of course, such rhetoric conveniently forgets modern European history. This style of ruthless attacks, as befell on Charlie Hebdo’s journalists, were daily routine, for instance, in the villages across Eastern Bosnia, during the war of the 90s, which witnessed gruesome atrocities with strong religious undertones by Christian Orthodox cetniks (Serb nationalists) mainly against the Bosnian Muslim populations. It is worth remembering the Moslems in the “greater Middle East” have suffered the highest number of casualties from militant jihadist groups.
Only by way of example, according to some estimates, more than half of the 61 journalists killed in 2014 were Muslims, but Western media have mostly focused on the beheadings of their American or European colleagues.(1) 82% of all incidents from Islamist terrorism occurred in five predominantly Muslim countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. Moreover, 90% of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that have gross human rights violations. The three main factors associated with terrorism, according to the Global Terrorism Index, are “state sponsored violence such as extra-judicial killings, group grievances and high levels of criminality”.(2)

Importantly, the prevailing “war on terror” or “war of civilizations” rhetoric plaguing the discourse of many European politicians (e.g. French PM Valls’ proclamation of “war” against jihadism) and pundits often makes total abstraction of the different factors contributing to Islamic terrorism – and not just the possible impact of our own policies.

The war discourse, similarly to that resulting from 9/11, is often accompanied with the usual categories of “us” versus “them”, together with proclamations of the West’s moral superiority. War, inevitably, requires a quasi-permanent state of exception and extraordinary measures, with much discretion bestowed on governments. From another vantage point, others claim that this form of terrorism is, at bottom, mostly about politics, power and geopolitics, with religion and Islam specifically being just a tool, secondary in relevance.

It is often forgotten that the power dynamics within the Arab and Islamic world have, particularly since the 1970s, encouraged more conservative if not reactionary visions of Islam which in turn have been used to justify violence. Particularly in the Sunni world, those countries most supportive of this reactionary wave were and are also main Western allies in the region. This crisis has actually deepened the economic leverage that different Gulf countries have acquired with crucial European countries in terms of investments, arms purchases and shopping of important companies, thus significantly reducing Europe’s independence in dealing with the threat of Islamist radicalism and its patrons.

The case for policy questions and lessons learned

What the Paris attacks and the evident flaring up of Islamist terrorism across the world still merit is a bold, comprehensive policy assessment of triggers and root factors which may explain this phenomenon and point to sensible forms of containing it. Such a policy reassessment should encompass justice and home affairs, European countries’ domestic policies, our very political discourse and, lastly, foreign policy. A reassessment not just tailored to contain the threat and prevent new attacks, as European policymakers and agencies are currently undertaking, nor a revision of all measures and policies from the scratch. We mean rather a broader lessons learned exercise of the experience under the policies in force since the global waking up to Jihadist terrorism, after 9/11 and the attacks on European populations in Madrid, London or Paris. The very profile of the terrorists (the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly) warrants that, as it underlines a two-fold failure: of France’s integration policies, and of intelligence.

When it comes to European foreign and security policy, the focus of our analysis, admittedly, many of such lessons learned are more question-mapping in nature. But this is precisely what the current challenging context demands – not more ready-made answers to fundamentally complex issues and security threats.

The neighbourhood: a security priority

Under fresh winds of new leadership and spiralling instability beyond our borders, Europeans have jump started a review of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU’s strategic goal of building a ring of well-governed societies, with rule of law and good governance, as a firewall against instability, holds more valid than ever. Failed states and civil wars offer harbours to jihadist movements and operate as pull for European “foreign fighters”, so one of the priorities should still be to reduce ungoverned spaces where terrorist organizations can prosper.

A quick look at the map shows that there is instead a ring of ungoverned spaces around the EU or in its “near abroad”: Libya, Sinai, Yemen (where one of the Paris’ terrorists trained), Gaza, Syria, parts of Ukraine. Even the EU-bound Western Balkans are less stable than it had seemed a few years ago, and doubts are growing around the Balkan connections of foreign fighters. Our neighbourhood is now an arc of instability which poses manifold security risks to Europe. So we must look beyond our borders again to address our own security problems. Havi

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an effective way to stabilize this area of the world is key to having peace and security in Europe – not just off Europe.

Now, how to accomplish these broad goals has proved an uphill, dilemma-prone task. Rethinking our approach to non-European societies and their home-grown processes is fundamental. Exporting our political model and institutions will not just do. It is proving problematic in Bosnia or Kosovo, and is inevitably so in Morocco or Lebanon. And Europeans have seen their leverage waning as other actors increased theirs.

For a start, setting priorities is of the essence, and maybe different levels of ambition, even if it is still logical for Europeans to aspire for relations with all neighbours. The truth is that Europeans now lack shared priorities in the broader neighbourhood – which includes Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. This is not strategically wise. If we think of possible havens for terrorism, there is a potent security case for European engagement with Sahel countries and Libya, focused on stabilization and deterring possible spillovers. If we think in the long term perspective, there is an equally strategic case for supporting democratic consolidation in Tunisia, or reforms in Ukraine and Moldova, or a real peace consolidation in the Balkans. The latter cases will condition the formers and viceversa: a success of Tunisia’s transition in combining rule of law and security will influence Libya, whether as an example or as a form of containment, while the Libyan civil war may well hamper Tunisia’s transition, strengthen the local ISIS-branch, Daesh and act as a pull for terrorists – not to mention the humanitarian tragedy of refugees and migrants.

Geopolitics matter, but deep democracy matters too

With the rising insecurity across the neighbourhood, chiefly, the growing threat of jihadism, Europeans are partly dusting off the pre-Arab Spring toolkit of alliances with authoritarian regimes. Resorting to the “Sisis” to contain the “Isis”, whether in Syria or Libya, is deep in the mind of many European policy-makers and diplomats. Realpolitik trade-offs might be unavoidable in certain cases -for instance, one could see a case of overlooking Morocco’s imperfect democracy and human rights record whilst focusing on Rabat’s cooperation in the fight against jihadism, with countries such as Spain and France. The balance is never perfect. Ideally, Europeans should have a dynamic diplomacy with partners pushing for both aspects and trade-offs must be constantly reassessed – what was acceptable pre-2011 might (or should) not be acceptable now.

But, in other cases, such security-democracy trade-offs are patently flawed and, in the long run, are a recipe for more instability, turmoil and violence. History has demonstrated that an inclusive government is much better than a dictatorship which usually rests on divisive policies. In this regard, Europe’s dubious stance on Egypt’s Sisi, with its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, killings and overall human rights abuses, could end up being a textbook case of short-sightedness and moral failure. It is fair asking whether there is more Islamist terrorism today in Egypt after Sisi’s crackdown than there was before the summer of 2013.

Overall, if inconsistencies become the rule, Europeans strengthen the jihadist narrative, and such inconsistencies may come to haunt Europeans in other foreign policy crises. If peaceful political avenues are closed, advocates of violence always get the upper-hand. It should not go unnoticed that only one year passed between the start of the crackdown against Political Islam in Egypt (and elsewhere) and the onslaught of previously existing groups within violent Islam. If peaceful political avenues are closed, advocates of violence get the upper-hand.

So a geopolitical and security-only rationale for our foreign policy is misguided. Worse, it can actually threaten our security in the mid-to-long term. Empowerment and democratization matter for our security too, even if they lead to uncomfortable scenarios, such as moderate Islamist majorities in some neighbour countries. These popular demands cannot be quenched for long in the age of Bzrezinski’s global political awakening: we will see more, and more crackdowns by oppressive states and great powers. How will Europe react to such crackdowns?

This is why the deep democracy goal which the EU assumed after the outbreak of revolts in the Arab world must retain a central relevance in Europe’s foreign policy efforts. The trouble, though, continues to be striking a balance between universal standards and local circumstances. Europeans will have perhaps to settle for imperfect models in some cases, and define very carefully their support, whilst bearing in mind that transformative societal changes take generations to consolidate after strife, power struggles and even open conflict. If Europe wants to be a strategic actor, it needs to be patient, as it is with other long-term dossiers (such as fight against climate change).

But the fact remains that there is a strategic and moral case for Europe to prevent the shrivelling Arab Spring to become an Arab Winter. And there is a case to revise an approach and toolkit to such complex processes. Some of the EU’s established tools, such as ENP programs (on civil society, etc.), though lofty, have proved secondary to the main processes, whilst determined diplomacy by senior European officials and political engagement were an important component in the success of cases such as Tunisia.

The dilemmas of military intervention

The case for Western led military interventions has not been reduced after Iraq and Afghanistan, even if governments and populations are extremely weary of open-ended entanglements in complex scenarios. On the contrary, given the general unravelling of order, regional governance and the collapse of states from Sahel to the Middle East, we will witness overlapping demands for intervention in different crises, , and many such interventions will affect Muslim countries. The dilemmas besetting American and European governments will continue or even increase. And the sobering truth is that there is no clear cut rule, from the perspective of goal accomplishment (stemming humanitarian tragedies, instability, etc.) or from that of impact on fight against jihadism.

The experience of the last decade and half reveals some lessons learned, though, on whether or not to intervene, and, if so, how. One such lesson is that Western military intervention should never be the substitute for genuine regional shared strategies (for instance between Iran and Saudi Arabia to fight Isis) or national reconciliation. Another tentative lesson is that the avoidance of any form of interventions per se, as in Syria in 2011 (or even 2013, after the chemical attack), to avoid more Iraqs, can put you back to an even more intractable scenario, as President Obama and the international coalition against ISIS is coming to realize. Overall, Western governments should be cautious of the intervention spin, if then they are not willing to be true to their words.

Syria is a sad example of how regional players, almost completely left on their own when not indulged by Europeans, decided to wage a war by proxy instead of striking those tough deals that would have avoided the emergence of Isis. Not only Sunni powers and Iran did not manage to converge against Isis, but the intra-Sunni split lead to a competition in arming the most radical elements of the Syrian opposition which eventually marginalized the peaceful wing.

Surgical interventions, as in Libya, can bring short-term results (e.g. the stemming of a massacre in Benghazi) but the following power vacuum can actually lead to more instability, failed states and terrorist havens. Again, Libya proves that foreign interventions in Muslim countries are always tricky

and for several reasons: first, because it was presented as a “western” intervention whereas Qatar and the UAE played a crucial role; secondly, because the rivalry between the two countries started there; third, but most important, because that rivalry overlapped with rifts within the “revolutionary” anti-Gaddhafi camp which are behind the current civil war.

Libya is an example of how intervention per se is not wrong, but it can be very harmful if it is manipulated by regional powers and local actors to further their goals, often not peaceful ones. Also, military intervention should go hand in hand with a clear strategy for what comes after the end of the fighting, focusing on the need for power-sharing among the victors and to be agreed with regional powers. Otherwise it should be as surgical as possible – strictly to achieve absolutely minimal goals (e.g. targeted elimination of capabilities in the aftermath of a massacre, for instance) and avoid the regime change trap as a rule.

More generally, for our purposes, European and Americans badly need to close their “knowledge gap” about the Middle East. There is a strong case of knowledge of the strategic environment, of intelligence-sharing and understanding of possible partners, spoilers and swing actors. This can include occasional alliances even with peaceful or democratic Islamist groups, to broker peace settlements. The mistake in the past was instead to let regional allies of the West fund Islamist groups that were neither democratic nor peaceful. Ideology is an enemy of stability and a sound strategy when it comes to this part of the world and there is nothing worse than lumping all Islamists together into the same box: those advocating Political Islam which competes in the ballot box and those who condemn this strategy as Ansar al Sharia in Libya.

Moreover, European diplomacy should aim to weave a net of alliances, fragile as they might be, and rely on multilateral organizations to anchor complex interventions into broader peace and security frameworks. Short-term peace-making must always be part of a sensible, credible peace-building strategy. In this regard, another lesson is that peace settlements must reflect the realm of possibility in the local and regional circumstances, even if leading to results unpalatable to Western standards. But Europeans can also learn from the experience in the Balkans to avoid pushing for hastily haggled peace settlements which harm-strung these countries’ choices, as in Dayton’s Bosnia.

Lastly, the Iraq War debacle, with its upending of the regional order, stability and the colossal human losses, has beyond doubt contributed in different ways to the radicalization of thousands and thousands of Muslims across the world, and in Europe, from London’s multicultural neighbourhoods to Paris’ banlieus. That was certainly the case of at least one of the leading perpetrators of the Paris attacks. But pretty much every intervention or action carried out by Western governments will be used by jihadists. The risk of more attacks will be there. So a sensible policy would meticulously assess the pros and cons of intervening in Muslim-majority countries. That does not mean that Europeans should stand idle by the slaughtering of religious or ethnic minorities as well as ordinary Iraqis at the hands of ISIS.

Law enforcement, not war

It’s easy and media-effective to declare a war on terrorism. But if one looks at concrete and realistic policy-options, what works here in Europe is a combination of effective law enforcement and smart politics.

Some tools have already proven effective in the past. Others would require painful political compromises in increasingly anti-EU domestic politics. First, if the ability to move through the EU is the problem, then we should move ahead with creating an effective EU home office where intelligence and investigation sharing is automatic and fast. Today the principle is that of encouragement in the sharing of information, tomorrow it should be mandatory. Rather than talking about resurrecting border controls within Schengen, European policy-makers could well make use of two instruments that are part of the treaty: the European Police Office (Europol) and the Schengen Information System. According to media reports, Hayat Boumedienne, one of the accomplices of the Paris attacks, simply moved to Spain in order to fly to Syria avoiding French security system. Had French intelligence been automatically shared through existing mechanisms, her escape would have been a lot more difficult. Second, rather than announcing new, special anti-terrorism laws or surveillance systems, it would be more effective to increase the investigative capacities so that investigators are not forced to do the “triage” they did in France: stop following the known, home-grown terrorists in order to focus on “foreign fighters”. Unfortunately, the formers hit in Paris, not the latters. Third important point is the fight against the “white collars” of extremism: those who launder money, provide funding, give secret backing and ultimately buy weapons. Prosecuting them and, where impossible, deny them the access to European land and financial markets that would change their calculations. We tend to forget that modern-day terrorist organizations often share many of the main features of the mafia. Italy would have some expertise to share with its partners on this.

These three aspects are by no means exhaustive of how we should handle the domestic threat, but they are important in Europe’s outlook on its neighbourhood: the reaction to the Paris attacks has been focused on freedoms and tolerance precisely at the moment in which Europe is becoming less tolerant, more xenophobic and more obsessed with foreigners. This is not just unfair, it is mostly ineffective.

Upholding international and European human rights standards

Another crucial lesson learned is that if you stand by human rights, democracy and rule of law you have to be consistent. This rule is two-fold: to the possible extent with your allies and partners in the struggle against Islamist terrorism; and, impeccably, on your own systems and policies.

An unpalatable truth of these years of fight against Islamist terrorism is that Europeans, from the CIA rendition programs, to torture, have condoned, abetted, acquiesced and often actively contributed to severe human rights abuses and other breaches of international law – not to mention their own domestic legislations. These practices overwhelmingly affect Muslims, many of which European citizens –and many of which turned out to be innocents. Equally galling, the indefinite detention of people on dubious grounds, the killing or abuse of tortures, or other serious breaches have resulted in very limited accountability. The revelations of CIA-led obscene torture and abuses confirmed by the Feinsten Report of the US Senate will not result in prosecutions, much the same as the judicial review in some European countries of the CIA rendition program (e.g. Spanish Audiencia Nacional recently closed the process in Madrid).

This has tarnished Western and European normative reputation, perhaps beyond repair. The long lasting impact in the Muslim world of a proliferation of images of hooded man tied down, cross-like, with electrical shocks on their genitals, will come back to haunt the West in its fight against Islamist terrorism. These abuses have fanned the flames of extremism, sending throngs of recruits in the jihad against the West – and often providing very little intelligence or evidence to be used in the fight against terrorism. Indeed, these practices have usually proved pathetically ineffective, with the killing of Bin Laden on the basis of FBI evidence obtained lawfully, as a key case in point.

Hence, in the fight against this threat, an equal fight of impunity

against our own abuses and towards more accountability is necessary.

Conclusion

The threat of Islamist terrorism is here to stay. In an era of globalized insecurity and social media used to fan hate, we will have to live with certain levels of insecurity. This threat is thus not amendable to easy policy choices. But there are some policy options that have proved more effective, that seem sensible and that do not unnecessarily alter our political way of life. The haste by which some European governments are pushing for new restrictions (even toying with new Patriot Acts), whilst understandable from the position of public responsibilities, should be of concern. Too often political whims have prevailed over the dictates of sound policy options. Too often have political goals overruled intelligence facts, or intelligence abused to trample on core rights and liberties. And too often have abuses been conveniently put in the drawer. Europe is nowadays a bit less free, less tolerant and less secure. For that only, the terrorists have won.

Abroad, in terms of foreign policy, this scourge all but strengthens the case for deepening our involvement in peace and security challenges of our neighbourhood, even if there will remain difficult dilemmas. It requires, more than ever, statecraft diplomacy, fast on its knees, balancing geopolitics with principle, military tools with development and empowerment tools, and so forth. At home, re-enforcing our model of democracy, diversity and civil liberties must be part of the response to jihadism, which is perfectly compatible with targeted measures and intelligence to foil attacks and stem radicalization, with democratic and judicial checks and balances.

This is good policy. This will not eliminate Islamist terrorism, but will certainly not worsen the problem, neutralize some of its factors and, over the long term, contribute to diminish the threat. If anything, the experience since 9/11 makes a compelling case for shedding the war on terror narrative that has actually contributed to insecurity, regional instability and extremism. More civilizational discourse could act as a self-fulfilling prophecy and plunge us in scenarios that should have never been there on the first place. As Zweig testified to Europe’s moral relapse and self-destruction through nationalism and militarization of political cultures, our countries have had enough of wars and of civilizational clashes.

ENDNOTES

1. Rafia Zakaria, “Let's talk about the other dead journalists”, Al Jazeera America, 10 January 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/charlie-hebdo-deadmuslimjournalistsfreedomofspeech.html

2. Global Terrorism Index, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gti-findings



Mattia Toaldo is Policy fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations. @mattiatoaldo

Francisco Borja Lasheras is Policy Fellow and Associate Director of the Madrid Office, European Council on Foreign Relations. @lasherasborja