More Than Half Of Young Russians Would Like To Emigrate, Survey Finds

As Russia reasserts itself on the international stage, its leaders may find less comfort in the views of young people at home.

A newly-published survey by the respected Levada Center research institute has found that more than half—53%—of Russians aged 18 to 24 would like to leave the country, for good.

The survey data were gathered between October 26 and November 2, with 1601 people questioned across Russia.

The figures for the 18 to 24 age group are especially striking because the general sample suggested that overall only a minority—21%—of Russians would like to emigrate: 57% said "definitely not"; a further 20% "probably not."

A Rising Russian Mood For Emigration

The researchers wrote, though, that their surveys showed a "gradual rise in a mood for emigration among youth aged 18 to 24, continuing from 2014."

The desire to emigrate seems to be prompted by different motives, but the overall impression is simply this: those who want to leave think that life is better abroad. They cited the desire to give their children a better future (45%), or "the economic situation in Russia" (40%).

While the reasons given did not necessarily include overtly political ones—54% of those wishing to emigrate expressed approval of the work of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin—it is the younger generation that has been most visible at recent protest marches in Russia.

And if this is the generation that most wants to leave, it is also the generation that is best equipped to make the move. They have been able to travel more than their predecessors (for most of the last century permission to take a trip abroad was very hard to come by); the world of work beyond Russia is recognizable from what they have become used to at home—even if they think things will be better abroad; educated professionals may well have learnt foreign languages that will help their transition.

They may have grown up in a world in which Russia's relations with the west have steadily gone downhill—with Moscow's 2014 annexation of Crimea, although it boosted Putin's popularity at home, a low point—but they see themselves as individuals pursuing careers rather than representatives for Russian foreign policy.

Changing Views In Foreign Policy Circles

There are changing views in those circles, too, as a new generation comes through. In a recent policy brief for the European Council on Foreign Relations, the Russia expert Kadri Liik concluded, from her study of young Russian foriegn policy professionals, that Russia's "long preoccupation with the West – which has, at times, bordered on obsession – is now changing and transforming."

There was caution, too. This generation may be keen on seeking opportunities abroad, but it does not mean—in policy circles, at least—that they are pro-western. In fact, Liik argued, "the West should not hold out hope for the optimism of the 1990s to return once Putin departs."

In the meantime, it seems that a majority of the coming generation of Russian professionals would themselves like to depart—with all the possible implications for domestic politics and foreign policy that might entail.

Russia may have established new influence in the Middle East. It would claim success in Crimea, too. The attitudes of the generation who will be relied upon to lead in the future suggest that not all of them are impressed enough to want to commit their own futures to the land of their birth.