Why the EU should use Kosovo’s election to advance its goals in the Western Balkans

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted the European Union to revive its long-stalled push for enlargement in the Western Balkans. Three years later, and the initial enthusiasm to bring all six of the region’s countries into the European project has dimmed; the political momentum from Brussels is fading. A core issue at the heart of this impasse is the unresolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia.

However, depending on the February 9th parliamentary election outcome, the next Kosovar government will either ease or further complicate EU efforts in the region. If the opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) secure enough votes to form a coalition, they could govern independently and likely resume constructive cooperation with Western partners—including on normalising relations with Serbia. Conversely, a strong victory for the ruling party, led by incumbent prime minster Albin Kurti, could mean continued tensions with the EU and maintaining the status quo regarding relations with Serbia.

The election is also playing out against a backdrop of uncertainty in America’s policy towards the Western Balkans. This leaves Kosovo—which regards the United States as its most important ally and partner—in an increasingly vulnerable position. The EU must prepare for multiple political scenarios while identifying any possible opportunity to reset its strained relationship with Kosovo.

Asymmetric struggle

The reasons behind the continual relationship breakdown between Kosovo and Serbia are complex. Since 2011 the EU has tried—and so far failed—to broker a lasting settlement on normalisation of relations between the two countries. The most recent agreement in 2023, intended to clear the path for Kosovo’s participation in international organisations through a form of “de facto” Serbian recognition, has gone nowhere. While Serbian president Aleksandar Vucic actively worked to stall progress, the West also faced an unexpectedly difficult partner in Kurti. His scepticism toward EU mediation, combined with an erratic and confrontational approach, has contributed to the deadlock.

Kosovo’s relationship with the EU also remains beset by a lack of full recognition. On one hand, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain still do not acknowledge its independence, preventing Kosovo from becoming a candidate for EU accession (which requires unanimity among member states). As a result, Kosovo’s European future is entirely tied to the elusive goal of normalising relations with Serbia. This puts Kosovo in a weak position for any negotiations and limits the EU’s leverage to push for compromise.

On the other hand, Kurti—distrustful of both the EU’s ability to enforce agreements and Vucic’s willingness to uphold them—has taken multiple uncoordinated actions, often to the frustration of Kosovo’s Western allies. Instead of relying on the EU-mediated dialogue, his government has prioritised police operations flexing Pristina’s authority in northern Kosovo and targeting Serbian parallel institutions such as tax offices, banks and postal services. The country was on track to integrate some of the services which Serbia still provides to the Kosovo’s Serb community into its own system—including health and education—through a framework of self-management, via an agreed Association of Serbian Majority Municipalities. Politically delicate for Kosovo, which sees the initiative as granting a form of territorial autonomy to Serbs in the country’s north, Kurti’s approach bypassed this process entirely.

In response, the EU blamed Kosovo for undermining the dialogue and imposed punitive measures, including freezing financial aid and cutting high-level diplomatic contacts. Yet these sanctions have had little effect on Kurti, who remains popular at home. Meanwhile, the EU’s failure to impose similar consequences on Serbia, especially after failing to hold accountable those responsible for the Banjska attack in 2023, has only reinforced perceptions of bias.

Sovereignty vs. pragmatism

Kurti has made his “sovereignist” agenda the centerpiece of his re-election campaign, portraying himself as the defender of Kosovo’s sovereignty while framing Western criticism as appeasement of Serbia. However, this confrontational stance has isolated him internationally. Over his four years in power, his relationships with Western allies which guarantee Kosovo’s security, including key regional partners like Albania, has deteriorated.

In contrast, his two main electoral rivals PDK and LDK—which governed Kosovo for most of its post-independence period—represent a more traditional and pragmatic pro-Western approach. The two parties have nominated competent technocrats with clean records as their prime ministerial candidates, both of whom historically focus on securing international recognition, economic development and security guarantees. Their efforts largely align with the EU’s broader goals of democratic consolidation and regional stability; in this election, their messages prioritise economic concerns.

While little reliable polling exists, Reuters has reported that Kurti’s party could achieve 40% of the vote—a 10% drop from the previous election. Combined with the rising momentum of PDK and LDK, this could complicate Kurti’s path to power. Any result below 40% could create space for the opposition to form a coalition without him—their preferred outcome—or at least limit his ability to govern unilaterally.

Such a development could also facilitate the normalisation of relations with Serbia. Yet this would require the EU to shift its policy towards Serbia by prioritising a democratic trajectory which looks beyond Vucic. A renewed accession process for Serbia and a credible EU perspective for Kosovo would serve as key incentives for both countries.

An EU opportunity

Regardless of the election outcome, the EU must be ready to reset its relationship with Kosovo and support any government willing to engage in a more constructive and predictable dialogue. But it must also brace for potential shifts in US policy: under President Donald Trump, the new administration could either disengage from the region (potentially even withdrawing troops) or take a more active role that challenges the EU’s approach to date.

To avoid misalignment, the EU should ensure its approach to the Balkans remains complementary to, rather than at odds with, US interests—the latter, through NATO, remains indispensable to regional security. A crucial first step is for the EU to recalibrate its strategy toward Kosovo: instead of relying primarily on punitive measures, the EU should emphasise incentives such as lifting restrictions and securing Kosovo’s recognition from the five EU holdouts. Done successfully, this would fundamentally change the political calculus of any government in Pristina.

For the EU to truly move the Western Balkans forward, it must stop tolerating leaders who exploit instability for political gain and prove that the path to European integration is tangible and achievable

More broadly, the EU needs to recognise that its credibility in the region hinges on a decisive and values-driven enlargement process. Kurti may be a troublesome partner, but the real threat to regional stability is Vucic’s ability to stall progress and keep Serbia on a path increasingly at odds with democratic norms. By accommodating these tactics, the EU has inadvertently reinforced Vucic’s leverage—at Kosovo’s, and the region’s, expense.

For the EU to truly move the Western Balkans forward, it must stop tolerating leaders who exploit instability for political gain and prove that the path to European integration is tangible and achievable.

Agon Maliqi is a policy analyst, civil society activist and media writer.