Why the EU should pay attention to Italy’s and Albania’s migration gamble

The migration deal between Italy and Albania got off to a rocky start. With the first migrants arriving on Albanian shores in October 2024, the agreement established an Italian jurisdictional enclave near the port of Shengjin, about 50 miles north of Tirana. Two detention centres were built on Albanian territory to handle asylum claims made by migrants from “safe countries of origin” (SCOs) and for the detention of migrants pending repatriation.

Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni praised the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as a model for migration policy. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen even presented it as an example of “out-of-the-box thinking”. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Court of Rome have since blocked the detention of asylum seekers arriving in Albania, placing the agreement on hold.

For EU policymakers, the failure of this migration policy should serve as a cautionary tale on the viability and effectiveness of such agreements. Its problematic implementation should also dissuade other EU countries, or third countries such as the United Kingdom, from considering the Italy and Albania migration policy as a blueprint for future European migration management.

Rather, EU and third countries must strive for a comprehensive pan-European approach towards migration. This should refrains from using outsourcing methods and instead approach migration in a solution-oriented way—while safeguarding the bloc’s cohesion and credibility at the international level overall.

A flawed approach

The MoU, signed by Rome and Tirana, is a unique model of migration management in that it established Italian jurisdictional enclaves in the Albanian towns of Shengjin and Gjader. As well as conducting the screening, initial registration, and processing of asylum claims of SCO migrants, the agreement—costing €830m over five years—puts forward an accelerated border procedure, whereby a decision on permissibility is required within 28 days, including an appeal.

But the deal differs from past models used by countries such as Turkey and Tunisia, or the UK’s failed “Rwanda scheme”, in that it shifts the EU’s asylum procedure beyond the bloc’s borders without transferring the jurisdictional responsibility to the third country. In the first instance, this de-territorialisation practice poses practical problems such as time management. For example, with the journey from Italian waters to Albania taking up to three days, there is a higher chance of the degrading treatment of migrants, as well as difficulties in ensuring that asylum procedures meet EU standards.

In this situation, Italian authorities have pledged to apply the same standards as if the migrants were being process in Italy; based on past experiences of how migrants are processed in other ‘third’ countries, however, NGO and human rights groups have raised concerns that processing outside the EU’s jurisdiction will not guarantee fair procedures or access to protection.

Trading places

The CJEU and Rome court’s decisions were, within this framework, driven largely by their rejection of national-made lists of “safe countries”. For example, the CJEU interpreted that EU member states cannot classify a third country as an SCO if it does not meet safety conditions uniformly throughout its entire territory, which then triggered the ruling of the Rome court. This was based on the first group of asylum seekers that arrived in Albania hailing from Bangladesh and Egypt, two countries which do not meet the overall SCO criteria—despite Italy including both countries in its SCO list.

Transferring those seeking asylum between the two countries increases their vulnerability while extending and complicating the asylum process

However, the government had not considered that certain groups, such as LGBTQ+ individuals, victims of female genital mutilation, and political opponents do not benefit from adequate safety conditions in their countries of origin. The ruling led to the group being repatriated to Italy from Albania, together with part of the Italian staff working in the detention centres. Transferring those seeking asylum between the two countries increases their vulnerability while extending and complicating the asylum process.

Meloni won’t back down

Despite its negative reception, however, the Meloni government is continuing to defend the deal. After the rulings, the Italian cabinet issued a decree to allow the government to change the list of safe countries, which the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation recently reiterated is a decision to be made by the government ministries. This is, however, just a preliminary ruling: the final decision lies with the CJEU, which has primacy over national jurisdiction.

For those in favour of the migration pact, the rulings reinforce Italy’s ‘underdog’ stance by portraying the Italian government as under attack by “politicised judges”. But resorting to ad hoc government decisions to bolster support for a badly implemented scheme could further impose national responsibility on managing migration, in doing so isolating member states further from one another at a time when EU cohesion in its common asylum process is imperative.

Should individual nations further prioritise their national interests over collective responsibility, regardless of the principle of EU solidarity, the EU risks accusations of hypocrisy in dealing with ethics and asylum seekers’ human rights.

Reality check for the EU

The Italy and Albania test case also demonstrates that, regardless of how political propaganda inflates their effectiveness, European migration externalisation policies have limits. The CJEU decision shows that they can create more challenges than benefits for participating member states; pursuing them risks internal legal complications, ethical problems, and tensions within and between EU institutions.

The EU’s reliance on prioritising and channelling migration via national lists of “safe countries” is also dangerous to EU cohesion. It leads to divergent migration management among member states and further undermines the integrity of the common migration system, which is already under threat from national migration approaches taken even by liberal politicians such as Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Poland’s Donald Tusk.

Instead, countries should await the implementation of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum—expected by 2026, the pact will likely redefine the concept of safe countries at the EU level, allowing member states to prioritise a more unified and comprehensive approach over ad hoc bilateral agreements. The uncoordinated and self-serving actions taken by member states so far should also serve as a wake-up call for the EU to accelerate the pact’s implementation, and prioritise and implement key components within an accelerated timeframe.

Rather than replicating the Italy-Albania model, other countries should wait for the operability of the pact and approach migration jointly within an EU-wide framework. This would prevent their governments from facing legal disputes with other jurisdictions, accusations of poor compliance with fair procedures for asylum seekers’ protection, and use of controversial law decrees that can further weaken the EU’s internal cohesion.

Course for the future

And the Italy and Albania protocol offers another valuable lesson for EU policymakers. Despite the short-term political propaganda that such policies can generate, externalising migration management through contentious and legally precarious agreements is counterproductive and short-sighted. A more sustainable and effective solution would invest in efficient, inclusive asylum systems, supported by integration and regularisation measures, and flanked by political-economic partnerships that address the root causes of migration.

This approach would benefit the EU in the long run by addressing the problem rather than circumventing it with security measures. It can do this in at least three ways: by helping develop a sense of collective responsibility at the European level; by seeking to mitigate local issues that drive migration from countries of origin, potentially reducing migratory flows; and by anticipating a partial resolution of the declining EU demographics issue that is likely to occur.

At the same time, such an approach would also benefit migrants. A more sustainable, human-oriented solution could significantly alleviate the potential for suffering and offer a greater guarantee of rights protection.