Why Orban and Hungary are not one and the same

If Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party lose Hungary’s parliamentary election on April 12th, it will largely be due to the dismal record of their economic policies, and because of the state capture and corruption that have characterised their 16-year rule.

Still, the Orban project has never been only about economics. The political strand includes his glorification of illiberalism, nationalism and nativism. It also features a “special path” in foreign policy, characterised by links to like-minded powers alongside burgeoning conflict with Brussels. Just five days before the decisive vote, Orban hosted in Budapest US vice-president J.D. Vance, a reliable ally in railing against the EU.

But new opinion polling conducted for ECFR reveals a different Hungary from the one Orban sells to Europe and to his friends around the world. The poll, conducted in late March and early April, shows most Hungarians do not share their prime minister’s conception of the EU as an enemy, nor do they align consistently with his other preferences and grievances. Indeed, should opposition leader Peter Magyar and his Tisza party succeed in unseating Orban, they will have a mandate for a foreign policy reorientation towards Europe and away from Hungary’s path to date.

The EU is not an enemy

Orban has spent many of his years as prime minister painting the EU as an enemy of the Hungarian people. This does not seem to have worked. In early 2026 three-quarters of Hungarians trust the EU “completely”, “somewhat” or “a little”; only 15% do not trust it at all. Trust in the bloc does not even divide voters of the two main parties to a significant degree: an overwhelming majority (95%) of voters of Tisza trust the EU at least “a little”; so do two-thirds of Fidesz supporters. And people trust the EU more than they trust any Hungarian political leader or their country’s media and judiciary.

A similar pattern emerges in people’s opinions about the next Hungarian government’s relationship with the EU, albeit with more division between Fidesz and Tisza voters.

Not only do 77% of citizens support the country’s membership of the bloc but most (43%) also hold the view that the next government should have a “very different approach” when it comes to Hungary’s position within the EU. Only 19% would like the country to continue along Orban’s current course. Moreover, 66% support the country’s accession to the euro zone.

Orban has spent many of his years as prime minister painting the EU as an enemy of the Hungarian people. This does not seem to have worked.

Fidesz voters are quite uniform in wanting the next government to keep the current one’s approach to the war in Ukraine and relations with the US—but they are split on Europe. Asked about how the next government should position itself within the EU, 44% favour Orban’s current approach while 45% would prefer minor or major changes. They are divided on accession to euro zone, too: 46% of Fidesz voters oppose adopting the common currency, but 43% would like to adopt it. On both points, opposition voters demonstrate a more uniformly pro-European orientation.

EU bashing seems to have lost its mobilising power for Orban and Fidesz. Likely because of this, anti-Ukraine rhetoric has become their rallying cry during the 2026 campaign.

Ukraine is divisive

On the surface, voters of the two main parties diverge as one might expect on Ukraine. A majority of Tisza voters (57%) say Hungary’s next government should take a “very different approach” to the war from the current one. Among Fidesz voters, 72% prefer to stay on the same course. Most Tisza voters (61%) would also support the next government in allowing the transit of military aid to Ukraine through Hungary, while most Fidesz supporters (77%) would oppose it.

But when asked about specifics, Tisza voters are split down the middle. This applies to financial support for Ukraine, the country’s EU membership and perceptions of President Volodymyr Zelensky (whom 44% of Magyar’s electorate consider a “good” leader for his country—but 42% a “bad” one).

This is why Orban was able to replace his old “hard Euroscepticism” with a new “anti-Ukrainism”. It has become a tool to rally his own electorate but also to divide and demobilise opposition voters.

A not so special path

The differences in foreign policy preferences between Tisza and Fidesz voters run deeper than attitudes to Ukraine. Asked about what foreign policy they would prefer the next government to take, 77% of Tisza voters clearly support closer alignment with European partners. Fidesz voters are divided, with some (25%) suggesting Hungary should balance between the West, Russia and China; some opting for a closer alignment with Donald Trump’s America (24%); and only a handful (16%) saying the European option is best for Hungary. On this, the preference of Tisza voters also aligns with the prevailing view of Hungarians in general.

In terms of alignment with countries in the EU, the camps look for different allies. Magyar’s supporters prefer closer relationships with Germany, Austria and Poland. Unsurprisingly, those voting for Orban mainly pick Robert Fico’s Slovakia as a country Hungary should build alliances with.

When it comes to perceptions of Russia, voters of the two camps differ radically. Just 6% of Fidesz voters perceive it as their country’s adversary. But this is the dominant view (40%) among Tisza voters. Both sets of voters view America positively, as either Hungary’s ally or a partner, yet they are strongly divided on Trump: 74% of Fidesz voters say he is a good leader for the US, while 80% of Tisza voters say he is a bad one. Tisza voters also challenge Fidesz’ pro-Chinese orientation. While more than half of them (55%) acknowledge China as Hungary’s necessary partner, a clear majority (67%) would support policies aimed at limiting Chinese investments in Hungary (as a matter of comparison, only 35% of Fidesz voters support these, though this is still a non-negligible minority).

Tisza voters would thus expect Magyar to reorientate Hungary’s foreign policy towards Europe, even if only 10% of them say “relations with the EU” are the most important issue the country is currently facing. (Many more—31%—point to corruption and governance.) But, despite years of anti-EU campaigning by Orban’s government, a realignment with Europe would also enjoy support from some Fidesz voters.

An old and a new normal

Such coalescence around Europe could help a new government in Budapest bridge the gap between the two opposing camps. However, should Magyar win, Hungary’s European partners would be wise not expect a complete U-turn on foreign policy. Old habits may die hard concerning Hungary’s involvement in funding for Kyiv or its support for Ukraine’s EU membership, given their potential divisiveness among Tisza voters and the generally negative opinions among Hungarians.

Crucially, a change in government in Budapest would come with the imperative to put Hungary’s own house in order first after 16 years of failed Orbanomics, corruption and state capture. So, rather than press for a smooth return to a “normal Hungary”, European leaders and policymakers should work with the new government to establish what the new normal should mean—and where its limits are.

That alone would still open vast opportunities that seem unattainable for as long as Orban calls the shots.