Why France should close its permanent military bases in Africa

In late November, France’s foreign minister Jean-Noel Barrot boarded his flight from Chad after what he probably thought had been a tense but productive meeting with the country’s president, Mahamat Idriss Déby. Little did he know that, a few hours later, one of France’s most important military alliances in the region would be in tatters.

Chad’s ministry of foreign affairs released a respectful but entirely unilateral statement, ending a decades-old defence agreement between the two countries. But Chad was not alone in its bold request that France retract its military presence from inside its borders: on the same day, Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s interview with Le Monde signalled his views in no uncertain terms: “There will soon be no more French soldiers in Senegal,” he said.

If French officials can draw one policy message from these countries’ stance on French military presence in the region, it is that the remaining permanent military bases in Africa have become a noose around Paris’s neck, hamstringing even the best thought out French policies. Now, France should hand over its various bases and transition to a flexible model of military cooperation, already favoured by similar-sized former colonial countries like Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and their respective partners.

France’s remaining permanent military bases in Africa have become a noose around Paris’s neck, hamstringing even the best thought-out French policies

France’s remaining permanent military bases in Chad and Senegal, but also in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, have become major political vulnerabilities for Paris and for their African host governments. First, hostile actors and strategic competitors can easily weaponise them against France’s overall policies towards the continent. Second, African countries increasingly perceive permanent foreign military presence as an infringement of their national sovereignty—in turn, this is detrimental to European-led capacity-building efforts aimed at empowering African states. Closing the remaining French bases would resolve both of these issues.

For decades, France has actually been downsizing its military presence in Africa: budget constraints, the end of French military service, and shifting geopolitical priorities all play a role. Certain sections of the French diplomatic core advocated for the bases’ closure years ago; but this notion was met with strong resistance from sections of the French military establishment, which argued that the bases are critical for intelligence gathering, military cooperation, and crisis-response capabilities.

Importantly, there are inbuilt structural incentives for the French Ministry of Defence to retain the bases for recruitment purposes, including the allure of a colourful military career. Deployments abroad, whether on bases or as part of overseas operations, have a motivating effect on military personnel.

When France intervened in Mali at the government’s request in 2013 to stop jihadists and rebels from moving towards the southern capital, Bamako, this process of downsizing stalled as soldiers were thrown into the fight. Malian authorities and their international partners initially lauded France for its actions. But as the years progressed France became widely criticised for its conduct. Operation Barkhane, France’s sprawling counter-terror mission across the Sahel, was often dubbed as France’s “forever war” in the media.

But this process of downsizing has been accelerated dramatically by events over the last few years. A series of coups in the Sahel—first in Mali in 2020, then in Burkina Faso in 2021, and finally Niger in 2023—led to the expulsion of almost all European forces fighting a dizzying array of jihadist groups, and an influx of ineffective and often murderous Russian mercenaries. The coups eventually forced France to speed up the end of Operation Barkhane in November 2022.

The coups, and a wave of primarily Russian-led, anti-French disinformation attacks, shook the established French view of its relationship with Francophone Africa and led to introspection among many officials. France has taken significant steps to try and change the relationship since. This includes attempts to shift attention towards civil society engagement, African youth, economy and culture, and addressing historical grievances. It has set up initiatives such as the Creation Africa Forum and the future Maison des Mondes Africains, which both showcase Africa's cultural and creative industries. Historians have been commissioned to analyse France's colonial past in Cameroon and its role in the Rwandan genocide.

On top of these initiatives, President Emmanuel Macron announced a renewed French diplomatic and military strategy for the African continent in 2023. The stated aim was to develop a new model of military cooperation, with bases turned into academies or managed jointly with partner countries. Macron charged Jean-Marie Bockel, special envoy to the president for Africa, to consult with governments hosting permanent French military bases, excluding Djibouti. In November, Bockel proposed a significant reduction in the number of staff per base but stopped short of recommending a complete shutdown.

Second, the French ministry of defence is working to redefine its command structure in Africa. In June 2024, it created a Command for Africa (CPA), with full operationalisation expected by early 2025. It established a joint decision-making structure for west and central Africa, directed from Paris: one of its main objectives is to maintain the capacity to deploy units in support of African armies while reducing the permanent military footprint locally.

Over the last few years, France has also tried to boost military cooperation at the European level. It has launched initiatives such as the Takuba Task Force, a group made up mainly of special forces units from several European Union countries with the aim to fight terrorists across the Sahel. The EU also carried out a series of civilian and military missions in the region as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

However, the initiatives were often cumbersome and slow, and eventually fell flat. The setbacks hypercharged negative sentiment towards the long-standing French and European military presence, deemed ineffective in responding to the ever-worsening security situation—while disinformation campaigns accused it of being cover for the secretive exploitation of natural resources.

Bockel’s report and the French military’s rethink of its Africa Command are long overdue. However, the two initiatives are largely French affairs, siloed off from the sociopolitical developments on the ground. And the shock in French circles at the news from both Chad and Senegal underlines this fundamental disconnect: both events  should have been anticipated, given the volatile political relations in the region and the wave of recent anti-French sentiment.

It’s simply not in France’s interests to keep its permanent military bases even if the local governments request it. However, this does not mean ending security and defence cooperation as a whole. Africans and Europeans have a common interest in working together to tackle major challenges, such as the fight against terrorism and transnational organised crime. France and other European countries have much to offer in terms of operational training and capacity-building programmes. But they could be more flexible, minimise the number of personnel on the ground, and limit the duration of deployments while remaining responsive to the needs expressed by African partners, including the provision of military equipment, arms and training.

Since 2017, France has taken many steps in the right direction. Now handing over its remaining bases to the relevant national authorities is the only way to counter hostile rhetoric, their widespread political instrumentalisation, and to avoid further public discontent in the host countries. The recent announcements by Chad and Senegal may appear to be setbacks for Paris and more broadly, for Europeans. However, the events could also present an opportunity to accelerate the much-needed rethink of an old and often problematic relationship. France needs to close this historic chapter and move onto the next.