Why Europe’s withdrawal from humanitarian disarmament treaties could be a win for Russia

Problem

Finland’s government has announced plans for the country to formally withdraw from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (or the Ottawa treaty). In March, Lithuania’s withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) entered into force, a move which Poland is also considering. Beyond NATO’s eastern flank, there are also voices arguing for the UK and the rest of the alliance to follow suit.

As Europe looks to boost its defence capabilities with less – or even without – America, humanitarian disarmament obligations appear onerous in the face of a pragmatic assessment of defence capabilities, geographical points of vulnerability and Russia’s military resources. If Russia can secure an advantage because European countries do not use cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines, should Europe continue keeping these weapons off the table?  

Today, security and defence is top priority for Europe, and rightly so. But as Europe rearms, it is also reasserting a new wartime geopolitical identity. In this context, policy decisions regarding humanitarian disarmament treaties acquire a broader dimension. They are not just about weapons, but also about what characterises Europe in the international order.

When European countries pull back from the humanitarian treaties they previously championed, they might gain on tactics—but also forgo a part of their foreign policy identity. This might seem superfluous from a security perspective, but in the bigger picture of Russia’s attempts to destabilise Europe’s geopolitical model, such withdrawals are a loss for Europe and a win for Russia.

Solution

1. Contain the snowball effect and defend Europe’s foreign policy identity

Across Europe, governments and parliaments need to consider whether the foreign policy concession that comes from a collective turnaround on humanitarian disarmament is worth the expected defence gains. Some governments might ultimately conclude that rolling back certain norms is a price worth paying. But all should consider what it means for the future of Europe’s geopolitical identity.  

2. Race to the top, not to the bottom

European states, especially parties to the CCM and the Ottawa treaty, should strive to make anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions unnecessary in European defence. They should then factor this into investment in weapons procurement, and research and development. Europe’s current security environment should not trigger a race to the bottom on weapons banned by international treaties, but rather redouble efforts to find effective alternatives.

3. Be explicit on measures to protect civilians in the framework of European defence

EU states—including those withdrawing from humanitarian disarmament treaties—need to pay renewed attention to policies and training on the protection of civilians in the context of European defence. Here detail and specificity is essential, especially with protective norms being called into question.   

Context

The latest treaty withdrawal decisions, part of a broader movement across NATO’s eastern flank, have prompted swift counter-arguments from the humanitarian and human rights community, as well as criticism from Norway. There are concerns about where the backsliding will end and how it risks undermining international humanitarian law as a whole.     

In 2023, America sent cluster munitions to Ukraine (neither of which are party to the CCM). This stress-tested the European allies’ position towards the humanitarian disarmament agenda and provoked an uneasy mix of condemnation and discreet understanding. Today, the threat perception has changed dramatically in Europe; the stigma around landmines and cluster munitions seems to be eroding.