When culture war and trade war clash: Trump’s troubled alliance with Europe’s far right
The Trump administration and far-right European politicians see an opportunity to transform the EU from within. In turn, liberal Europeans have an opportunity to undermine this transatlantic alliance—before it gathers real momentum
President Donald Trump has long hated the European Union. He hates it because it has a big trade surplus with America, because its size and economic power make it a tough negotiator and because it tends to fine American companies owned by his friends. And apparently, he hates it most of all because he (wrongly) believes it prevented him from developing his golf course in Ireland.
But in his second term, the Trump administration has found yet another reason to hate the EU. The EU, it turns out, is also a bastion of “woke” liberal values that allegedly suppresses free speech and rigs elections. Worse, it supports the even more hated Democrats on cultural issues such as abortion, transgender rights and diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI). As one Republican insider put it, “[t]here is a lingering anger from Trump’s first term toward the bien-pensant crowd in Brussels who openly criticized Trump’s domestic politics and came out against the Dobbs [abortion] decision.”
Winning the culture war in the United States thus requires weakening the Democrats’ European allies. Trump has many potential supporters in this struggle: the burgeoning political parties of Europe’s far right. They offer the MAGA Republicans a new way to win that struggle. Trump doesn’t need to destroy the EU to win the culture war. He just needs to work with like-minded European partners to transform the EU in their illiberal image.
The Trump administration’s culture war in Europe is running headlong into his trade war and his general toxicity in Europe
As of now, however, the Trump administration’s culture war in Europe is running headlong into his trade war and his general toxicity in Europe. Tariffs risk alienating the very constituencies that form the base of support for Trump’s far-right allies. His growing unpopularity means aligning with him may not appear politically advantageous for these forces. Such weaknesses give liberal Europeans an opportunity to blunt Trump’s culture war in Europe.
A new coalition of the willing
Trump’s political friends are advancing across the EU. Last year’s European parliamentary election brought about the formation of the Patriots for Europe group as the third largest European parliamentary faction. Formed by—among others—the Czech ANO party, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Hungarian Fidesz and the French National Rally, the Patriots overtook the long-established European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)—another largely far-right formation—led by the Brothers of Italy and the Polish Law and Justice party.
Connections between Trump’s circles and the far right in Europe go far beyond the well-documented endorsements and exchanges between Trump and Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban or Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni. The guest list at the president’s inauguration provided a vivid illustration of the spread of connections to the far right including all major parties of the Patriots, ECR and even some from the extreme right Europe of Sovereign Nations group, like the Alternative for Germany (AfD).
The far right’s anti-EU vision
The European far right is highly critical of the EU’s institutions, regulations and bureaucracy. Many of these parties used to argue for their countries to leave the EU altogether. Since the epic disruptions of Brexit, though, they usually advocate for changing the EU from within. Herein lies fertile territory for MAGA Republicans.
Ideas about such transformations were recently set out jointly by the Polish Ordo Iuris Institute for Legal Culture and the Hungarian Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC), which are closely linked to Law and Justice and Fidesz respectively. Expanding on the common theme, their report calls for putting national sovereignty first, making all EU decisions by unanimity and stripping the European Commission and the European Parliament of many of their powers.
This work illustrates the direction of some of the EU’s prominent far-right actors, particularly in Central Europe. They no longer want to destroy the EU—they want to turn it into a conservative, sovereigntist bloc that poses no obstacles to their anti-woke, illiberal agendas at home.
These alternative visions for Europe excited great interest from Republican circles in the US during the Biden interregnum. Various Trumpist organisations used the time to establish connections between MAGA Republicans and the European far-right, particularly in Hungary. The organisation behind the infamous Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation, for example, was involved in discussions developing the Ordo Iuris—MCC report and hosted its presentation in March at its Washington headquarters.
A two-front challenge to the European project
The convergence of the Trump-led MAGA movement and Europe’s far right means that liberal Europeans now face a two-front war. On the internal front, the European far right, emboldened by Trump’s election, feels increasingly empowered to push for the transformation of the EU’s institutional core. On the external front, the US uses its connections to European political parties as leverage in its trade and regulatory war with the EU.
Recent US interference in European politics, including high-profile endorsements and the instrumentalisation of online platforms, forms part of this effort. Trump adviser and CEO of X, Elon Musk, openly endorsed the AfD during this February’s German parliamentary election. His overt support did not appreciably boost the party’s results but it contributed to the further normalisation of the extreme-right party and its agenda. It also gives a sense of what to expect in coming elections in Poland, Romania, France and beyond.
How to counter illiberalism on the European front
This new far-right transatlantic alliance is not without its challenges, though. Trump is unpopular in Europe, even in countries with a strong far-right voter base. The European far right itself is divided on numerous policy issues and many such parties are traditionally anti-American. Although the US under Trump is vastly different from the US they despise, the president’s “America First” approach may very well provoke animosities in their ranks. Trump’s trade war, for example, directly affects many far-right constituencies in Europe.
Of course, far-right parties can and do blame the tariffs on Brussels’ inability to reach a deal with Trump and they tout their closeness to him as an advantage. Karol Nawrocki, Law and Justice’s candidate for the Polish presidency, for example, blamed the tariffs on “the EU and European elites” and promised that if he wins he “will be ready to negotiate customs issues directly with the United States in bilateral relations.” Hungarian foreign minister Peter Szijjarto told the press that his government has been “holding talks with the United States for a couple of months now about a special bilateral cooperation [on trade]” and even voted against the EU’s counter-tariffs to make a point.
But even when they are in power, far-right parties’ proximity to the Trump administration offer them no easy escape from the political and economic consequences of the president’s erratic policies. As Jean-Philippe Tanguy, the chief economic adviser to France’s far-right leader Marine Le Pen, put it: “Donald Trump casts populism in a negative light. I’ve always thought he was toxic and that we needed to distance ourselves.”
The negative perceptions of Trump and his impact on Europe also give the EU’s liberal actors the chance to consolidate their efforts, build broad coalitions and articulate a compelling case for unity and supranational integration. In doing so, they could bring down the emerging far-right transatlantic alliance before it really takes off. At stake is not just the EU’s integrity and economic prosperity but the liberal, rules-based vision of Europe that has underpinned peace and cooperation for decades.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.