Western Sahara shuffle: Trump’s foray could make or break peace

Having already touted a string of peace deals, president Donald Trump is turning his attention to Western Sahara in his quest for a Nobel peace prize. Fifty years since Morocco occupied Western Sahara, the conflict is now again the focus of US diplomacy. Over the past few months, American officials have been pursuing two intertwined tracks: to resolve the Western Sahara conflict and broker a reconciliation between Morocco and Algeria, who have been at odds over Western Sahara (among other issues). All of this by the end of the year, according to Trump’s envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff. These are highly ambitious goals, but real progress is achievable with the right diplomacy.

So far, however, the US is in danger of getting this wrong. As the Western Sahara penholder at the UN Security Council, the Trump administration opted to push through a resolution last week framing autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan rule as “a most feasible solution”. The resolution explicitly and exclusively centres future negotiations on Morocco’s autonomy plan. This was not the case before. Now, in effect, there is only one option that the UN Security Council will consider for the Sahrawis: autonomy under Moroccan rule. Together with France and other European states, the US hailed the vote as a historic step towards long-overdue peace.

The passing of the resolution was a huge diplomatic victory for Morocco, which has used this autonomy plan to secure international acceptance of its claims. Morocco has already won recognition of its sovereignty over the territory from America and France, and will now be pushing for other Western countries to follow suit. It has, however, shown little interest to date in actually applying its proposal on the ground, wary that doing so might inspire restive regions, such as the Rif in northern Morocco, to demand autonomy as well.

Despite Morocco’s diplomatic gains, the US push to impose international recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara risks squandering the opportunity to negotiate a mutually acceptable “third way” for Western Sahara. Worse, the US could turn the stalemate into a dangerous regional crisis.

Behind the scenes, Washington has been pushing to roll up the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara, MINURSO.[1] If MINURSO withdraws, Morocco could be tempted to push across the 2,700 km-long sand berm that divides Western Sahara to capture the eastern half of the territory currently outside its control and contain Polisario fighters based across the border in Algeria. This could expand the conflict, triggering direct Algerian intervention.

Besides, making autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty the only basis for a solution contradicts what most Sahrawis want, stripping their recognised right to self-determination of all meaning. Given that Morocco is hostile to Sahrawi national rights, lacks democratic and human rights safeguards, and its monarchy has absolute power, many Sahrawis loathe the prospect of direct Moroccan rule. Even the UN’s envoy to Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, has acknowledged that the autonomy plan has shortcomings. In a briefing to the Council last year, he challenged the Moroccan government to demonstrate how this plan would allow for “some credible and dignified form of self-determination by the people of Western Sahara, and under which modalities.”[2] To date, no response has been given.

Sahrawis may be powerless to prevent Morocco’s international ascendency. Yet international law does give them the power to withhold their legal consent. Without this, the Western Sahara conflict cannot be resolved.

Africa’s last colony

Though described in official jargon as a “Non-Self-Governing Territory”, Western Sahara is actually Africa’s last colony. It had initially been colonised by Spain in 1884 during Europe’s “scramble for Africa”. But, according to the UN, the people of Western Sahara have yet to be decolonised over a century later because, as Spain prepared to withdraw from the territory in 1975, Morocco’s King Hassan II launched a massive demonstration of 350,000 Moroccans, the Green March, that led to Morocco’s occupation, settlement and annexation of Western Sahara’s coastal strip.

The Green March took place even though a UN mission that year had concluded that a majority of Sahrawis were in favour of independence and the International Court of Justice had ruled that no “ties of territorial sovereignty” existed between Western Sahara and Morocco. The world’s top court further concluded that the people of Western Sahara already constituted the territory’s sovereign authority, which meant (and still means) that Morocco did not have a valid legal claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara.  The ensuing war lasted until a ceasefire was brokered in 1991, leaving Western Sahara divided.

Today, a majority of Sahrawis live in refugee camps in southern Algeria. But they still overwhelmingly want independence.[3] After years of deadlock and diplomatic drift, Polisario resumed fighting in November 2020—demanding Morocco re-commit to the UN’s original ceasefire deal that included a UN-monitored referendum on independent statehood or formal integration into Morocco.

A new push for negotiations

Yet after five years of hostilities, the armed option has failed to make any headway. If anything, Morocco has strengthened its position on the international diplomatic front. In a last-ditch effort to prevent the Security Council’s swing behind Rabat, the Polisario softened its positions. In a letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres on October 20th, the movement declared it would return to the negotiating table without preconditions, abandoning demands it had held since fighting resumed.[4]

In the same letter, the Polisario also submitted an updated version of its own 2007 proposal. In it, it detailed possible shared arrangements with Morocco concerning Western Sahara, implying that these could form the basis of a future Moroccan-Polisario deal that could be jointly put to a referendum. Polisario’s foreign minister, Mohamed Beissat, confirmed this view, signalling willingness to negotiate a free association agreement “which could resemble what Morocco proposes”—an approach ECFR had already suggested in 2021.

These Polisario moves provide a genuine opening to advance a realistic political path and align with Algeria, which has long supported the movement. Algerian officials have signalled their desire for a bilateral agreement with the US to boost investment in the country’s energy sector and security cooperation.[5] They also want to de-escalate tensions with Morocco. While resolving the Western Sahara conflict is not a condition for this, Algeria does want enough progress to revive negotiations and prevent Western Sahara from falling fully under Moroccan control.

Many younger Sahrawis, including those living under Moroccan occupation, favour escalating attacks against Moroccan police and economic targets, but the Polisario has so far sought to contain the violence and keep a foot in the diplomatic lane.[6] As it faces growing pressure from an increasingly frustrated and angry domestic constituency, the Polisario needs a tangible win to vindicate its international engagement.  

A power-sharing arrangement that exists between outright independence and integration into Morocco as envisaged by the autonomy plan could be negotiated

In April, one senior Sahrawi official close to Polisario leader, Brahim Ghali, privately indicated that the movement was prepared to re-enter talks “with everything on the table”—implying the Polisario would be willing to discuss Morocco’s autonomy proposal, so long as this was not presented as the only option for talks.[7] Based on discussions with Polisario officials, a power-sharing arrangement that exists between outright independence and integration into Morocco as envisaged by the autonomy plan could be negotiated. Yet considerable work would be needed to convince Sahrawis that such a deal would protect their rights and interests.

Unlocking dialogue

To unlock diplomatic progress, the UN Special Envoy should issue invitations to both sides that are carefully crafted to convey that the discussion would focus on a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict in line with international law and UN Security Council resolutions. Wording to this effect, which does not tie talks exclusively to the autonomy plan, could allow the Sahrawi movement sufficient cover to come to the negotiating table and would, in turn, facilitate movement towards an Algerian-Moroccan detente.

European countries will need to do their part by avoiding moves, such as recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which will further disincentivise flexibility by Rabat—something that will be needed to reach a negotiated deal.

EU members should also capitalise on the Polisario’s willingness to engage in negotiations to “reach mutually acceptable provisional arrangements” that would preserve the current economic interests of Morocco relating to Western Sahara’s natural resources.[8]

As ECFR has long argued, brokering an economic deal between Morocco and Polisario could lay the foundation for a broader power-sharing agreement—whether it is called “free association” or “enhanced autonomy”. This would not only allow the EU to escape its current legal and political headache over trade with Western Sahara, but it would also increase its ability to shape a more successful US diplomatic strategy. A negotiated deal between Morocco and the Polisario is still possible. But avoiding another half-century of conflict will require all parties, including UN Security Council members themselves, to move away from unilateral moves and zero-sum calculations.

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[1] Discussions with European diplomats, Geneva, London, Brussels, July to November 2025.

[2] Briefing by Staffan de Mistura, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, October 16th, 2024. Copy on file.

[3] Field visit to the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, September 2022; Discussions with Sahrawi civil society activists, Barcelona, April 2025.

[4] Letter by Brahim Ghali, Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario, to Antonio Guterres, United Nations Secretary General, October 20th, 2025. (Copy on File)

[5] Discussions with Algerian and Polisario officials, Algiers, September 2022 and Brussels, January 2023; Discussions with European diplomats, Geneva, London, Brussels, July to November 2025.

[6] Discussions with Sahrawi civil society activists, Barcelona, April 2025

[7] Discussion with senior Polisario diplomat, London, March 2025.

[8] Letter by Brahim Ghali, Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario, to Antonio Guterres, United Nations Secretary General, October 20th, 2025. (Copy on File)