Warming up: How the EU can prepare for COP29 in the wake of the US election
To keep climate cooperation from icing over, European policymakers should be ready to show leadership at COP and take the reins from the US, regardless of its president-elect
It’s that time of year again. The next United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) will start on 11 November in the Azeri capital of Baku. Its headline goal is an agreement on how to finance efforts tackling the climate crisis and support the growing number of countries affected, as well as agreeing on where this money should come from.
These goals have long been known, as have the challenges in reaching agreement on them – from disappointment among global south countries towards the G7 for being slow to come forward with climate finance, to simmering resentment between G7 states over their unequal contributions. This year, however, preparation for the conference will be made even more difficult by the US presidential election barely a week before. The election’s possible outcomes will throw COP29 discussions into very different lights and even risk a non-outcome.
For the European Union, an ineffective COP and a continued decline in climate diplomacy would be bad news. Not only would it counter the bloc’s ambition to address global warming, but it would threaten its framework for green competition which needs a global emissions reduction project. To prevent such an outcome, there are three scenarios that European policymakers should have in mind when preparing for COP29.
A re-election of Donald Trump is the most straightforward. In this scenario, it is highly likely that that within a week of the election, Trump will have already signalled his intention to re-withdraw the US from the Paris agreement – repeating the process he began in 2017 – and significantly disengage from climate diplomacy. A second Trump administration would almost certainly move away from its predecessor’s heavy investment in the greening of US industries through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and instead lean into finger pointing diplomacy towards other global powers such as China and India for doing less. While US representatives at COP29 would still be there on behalf of the Biden administration, it would be hard for them to push partner countries towards more ambitious climate finance if it was obvious the US would not hold to any agreement reached.
The election of Kamala Harris, on the other hand, would signal ongoing US commitment to multilateral efforts on climate. However, the impact on the outcome of COP29 may not be so different. While Harris has been at pains to underline that her administration will not simply be Biden 2.0, more of the same is largely to be expected. She was a strong supporter of the IRA package as vice president and her speeches imply that for her “the freedom to breathe clean air’’ is a given in terms of what she aspires to achieve for Americans. But in the domestic politics around the United States’ energy transition, she has shown herself to be pragmatic and willing to weaken her climate commitments when politically convenient – stepping back from a 2019 position on banning fracking for example. When it comes to how much of a leading role the US will play in the global climate finance package that comes out of COP29, Harris may echo such pragmatism. After a fiercely fought election, her climate spending priorities will likely be related to economic growth, job creation, and public services rather than on a high-profile contribution towards multilateral facilities.
The third scenario is an unclear election outcome by the time policymakers assemble in Baku. This carries a very real risk of plunging the conference into uncertainty. But it could also be the scenario that unlocks the most effective response from EU leaders by forcing them to fill the space left open by the US on climate leadership. The catch, however, is that this approach would also be the most impactful under either president-elect: the US cannot be relied upon to lead multilateral climate financing, even if some scenarios would be more damaging to COP than others.
To step up to the challenge, EU governments should coordinate closely ahead of COP29 to find a common position. This will give climate finance discussions firm direction and allow the EU to play the role of a committed global leader that will broker results. In particular, the role of China will be an important one to manage in global climate diplomacy after the US election. The US-China relationship has been crucial at earlier COPs and trade tensions between the two are currently very high. Especially if Trump wins, the EU may need to increase its efforts towards Beijing and other middle powers by stressing the interdependence of their green growth efforts. Greater EU-China cooperation on climate could help avoid China’s anti-West alliance with the global south growing stronger. EU policymakers might also need to think creatively about how to work with likeminded partners such as the United Kingdom on how they can insulate the Paris agreement through a second Trump administration.
While there may be strong divisions between EU member states on the priority to give the European Green Deal in the coming years compared to other – albeit interlinked – challenges such as security and cost of living, there is common agreement on the need to be competitive. In a world which is decarbonising, staying competitive means driving forward the greening of European industry. Maintaining the consensus of European businesses on this is much more straightforward in an international environment where all major powers are doing the same.
To ensure a positive outcome at COP, European policymakers need to illustrate domestically and to their global partners that climate diplomacy is not only about doing the right thing and contributing towards global climate finance targets. It is also about maintaining a framework in which European companies can successfully compete. Rather than writing Baku off as a lost cause without a clear level of commitment from the US, EU attendees should be prompted to shape the outcomes they need.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.