Victory foretold: How Europeans should respond to Tunisia’s unfair presidential election
Tunisia’s authoritarian president is not as secure as he seems. European leaders should refrain from rushing to congratulate his inevitable, imminent re-election
Tunisia’s presidential election on 6 October will be the first since the country’s 2011 democratic revolution that is not free and fair. Tunisia’s president, Kais Saied has rolled back political freedoms since he staged a power grab in 2021, dismantling independent institutions, pushing through a new constitution, and locking up political opponents and other critics. Building on these moves, Saied has organised the election to guarantee he wins.
When his victory is announced, European leaders may feel tempted to congratulate him to preserve their relations with the notoriously prickly president. But they should pause before they speak: the election process itself has shown that Saied’s position remains insecure and resistance to his regime is growing. Europeans should be careful not to enhance the legitimacy of an undemocratic leader who faces real opposition at home and is failing to deal with his country’s pressing problems.
Saied was first elected president in 2019, running on a populist platform that aimed to capitalise on Tunisians’ disenchantment with the political elites who had managed the country since the revolution. Twenty-one months later, he began an unrelenting process of centralising power by dismissing the government, suspending parliament, and assuming all executive power. In the following years, he put in place a system that allows few constraints on the president’s authority. He dismantled or took control of the independent bodies that were supposed to guarantee the independence of the judiciary, media, and electoral processes. And he arrested dozens of political opponents, civil society leaders, journalists, and lawyers who had spoken out against him, charging many with crimes including conspiring against the security of the state.
The run-up to the presidential election has confirmed Saied’s determination to manipulate the country’s political processes. But it has also revealed at least some pockets of resistance to his programme of consolidating power. He called the election in July, allowing little time for candidates to meet the onerous qualification criteria, and his hand-picked electoral commission turned down all but two of the 16 people who submitted themselves as candidates to run against him. However, in a series of rulings in late August, Tunisia’s administrative court reinstated three of the disqualified candidates with the highest public profiles, restoring some uncertainty to the election campaign.
Nevertheless, the electoral commission then refused to approve the candidates, rendering the election legally questionable. The country’s parliament passed a law stripping the administrative court of the power to rule on electoral disputes. Tunisian criminal courts have also arrested and prosecuted one of the three remaining candidates, sentencing him to 12 years in prison on charges of forging endorsements for his candidacy. And the electoral commission refused to allow several independent NGOs to monitor the vote count on the grounds that they received funding from abroad.
The chaotic run-up to the election testifies to Saied’s weakness, as well as to the reactive and improvisatory nature of his leadership. Since the election authority refused to obey the court’s ruling to approve the candidates, Saied’s regime has faced a series of attacks and protests. The influential UGTT trade union said the election authority had mounted “a serious attack on the judiciary” and called the last-minute change to electoral laws unacceptable. Civil society and opposition political groups, which have remained divided since 2021, launched a new coalition network in defence of rights and liberties last month.
Without any meaningful political network, Saied appears increasingly reliant on the security services and the army for his support. But there are rumours in Tunisia that some army officers are uncomfortable with the role they are being asked to play and with Saied’s ineffective leadership. Under his presidency, Tunisia’s economic problems have worsened dramatically, with high public debt, inflation, and shortages of essential goods. Saied’s refusal to accept a deal with the IMF limits Europeans’ ability to give Tunisia financial support. While the president appears to retain some public backing, there have also been protests against the economic hardship his policies have created. Enthusiasm for his centralising political project appears minimal: turnout in the parliamentary election of 2022-23 reached a meagre 11 per cent in the second round. Some observers anticipate another very low turnout in this week’s presidential vote.
Tunisia’s authoritarian drift under Saied has posed a dilemma for Europe. The European Union and some member states, led by Italy, are keen to work closely with Tunisia to stem migration from the country and resolve the economic problems that drive it. Saied has proved an effective partner in some ways: irregular arrivals in Italy from Tunisia have fallen significantly since the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with the country last year. But Saied’s migration policy is built on a foundation of rights abuses and xenophobic rhetoric, and it tarnishes the EU’s reputation to support it. More widely, Saied’s haphazard policymaking and his attack on Tunisian democracy do not serve European interests. The EU will inevitably continue to work with Saied as long as he remains president, because of the extensive ties between Europe and Tunisia and to prevent Russia and China from making further strategic and commercial inroads. But European policymakers should balance their engagement with Saied against the harm that would be done if they endorsed the legitimacy of an unfair election. At a time of increasing contestation within Tunisia over the country’s political future, EU leaders should refuse to give credit to the election and avoid congratulating Saied over a victory which many Tunisians will see as invalid. In the aftermath of the vote, they should also seek to broaden their contacts with those groups within Tunisia, including the military and opposition networks, which will be influential in determining the country’s future direction.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.