Up in arms: European security options for a post-cooperative era

In 2007, Russia faced a serious problem: its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with multiple nuclear warheads were out of service. Fearing that the country would fall behind the United States in terms of strategic warhead counts, Russia subsequently upgraded its single-warhead Topol-M to accommodate multiple warheads. But the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), signed in the 1990s between the US and the former Soviet Union, did not permit such modification of an existing missile type: so Moscow disguised the modified Topol-M as a ‘new’ RS-24 missile. The difference in visual identity was obvious, and escalation seemed imminent. However, against all odds, Washington simply agreed that Moscow paint the RS-24 launcher red to distinguish it from the single-warhead-carrying Topol-M. In doing so, the two sides resolved a potential nuclear conflict before it had even begun.

The ease at which an incident with such a high potential for conflict was resolved remains astounding. The START regime’s flexibility offered Washington and Moscow the necessary political framework to understand each other’s intent, and allowed both countries to retain a strategic balance in their nuclear missile arsenal. But the START treaty was only one of many that aimed to preserve security in Europe in a post-cold war environment: others included the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty; the Vienna Document (VD); the Open Skies treaty; and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. All built on each other’s frameworks to promote trust and confidence; prevent surprise attacks; and minimise unintended escalation – and as of 2024, most are largely defunct. The origins of their demise are placed variously with Russian president Vladimir Putin’s vision of a Zeitenwende at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, or even earlier with America’s 2003 withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Previously, evidence gathered by treaty committees could give participating states the political legitimacy to expose illicit developments of a treaty member and justify political responses, such as economic sanctions, to the public. But the paralysis of these post-cold war treaty regimes undermined the platforms for cooperation; and the consequences became visible when Russia amassed troops before its all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Instead of a joint interpretation and collective response, a major divide emerged between western states. While the US and the United Kingdom were convinced of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine, European states – in particular Germany – remained sceptical, interpreting the troop buildup as a way for Moscow to leverage political concessions. This initial divergence weakened the West’s unity and compromised its military resolve against Moscow.

Moreover, in the period leading up to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the country’s years-long refusal to exchange military information and allow inspections of Western treaty members on its territory was in direct contrast to previous treaty regimes (especially the CFE). This lack of cooperation compromised the West’s once-comprehensive insight into Russia’s military activities. Open-source intelligence technologies may have captured Russia’s military build-up along Ukraine’s borders, but the years of preceding developments remain a blur: the West struggled to anticipate Moscow’s activities, recognise its intent, and initiate early countermeasures. Furthermore, in the absence of a functional notification framework, military incidents between Russia and the West, such as aerial or naval confrontations in border regions, surged.

Erosion in the operational power of existing arms control treaties has therefore significantly increased the risk of intended and unintended escalation in Europe. But it has also compromised the chance of a collective political response during imminent crises: with no modern comprehensive communication framework between signatories, there is a black hole of information regarding any military activity at all.

Future of security

Through its all-out invasion of Ukraine, Russia has walked away from the notion of collective security and rendered any residual trust from the arms control treaties of the 1990s and 2000s obsolete. Because Russia’s revisionism means the restoration of existing treaties is highly unlikely, a key challenge for European security is finding alternative ways to restore the political and technical values as underlined in the treaties. Furthermore, NATO’s strengthening of its deterrence methods across Europe, such as stationing troops at key border locations in Estonia, could decisively alter Moscow’s strategic calculations and perhaps renew the Kremlin’s interest in negotiating. Increasing costs of military confrontation could highlight the potential benefits of arms control and cooperation. But until then, Western states need to mitigate the costs and risks of missing arms control regimes – starting with the following steps.

Firstly, NATO member states should strengthen cooperation with their partners in intelligence sharing and joint assessment, to ensure a timely and coordinated response to crises. Through NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance framework, its members can collect, analyse, and share intelligence data. The alliance also conducts annual exercises to test intelligence processing abilities during crises. Building on its Unified Vision 2023 exercise, in which Sweden participated before it was an alliance member, NATO could also invite ‘partner’ states such as Ukraine and Moldova to partake in future exercises. Improving shared access to information and promoting quick, coordinated responses between allied states is key in offsetting the decline of joint arms control treaty forums.

Secondly, smaller European states may consolidate their competencies in joint arms control agencies and strengthen their cooperation with other national agencies. As Europe moves towards a deterrence posture, some military planners no longer consider expert posts for arms control – such as arms control equipment specialists – a necessary expenditure. But the loss of critical knowledge and expertise maintained between national counterparts for decades will not only affect the negotiation and implementation of future treaties; it may also weaken states’ abilities to conduct relevant monitoring missions outside of the current treaty regimes. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg created the Benelux Arms Control Agency (BACA) in 2014, which receives training and advice from the German Bundeswehr Verification Center (BwVC) as its official partner. By bundling cross-border expertise and strengthening cooperation with external organisations, BACA’s influence is such that it can assume relevant roles in European arms control, including an international monitoring mission in Ukraine. European governments should develop further multinational collaborations to enable a cost-efficient development, preservation, and possible amplification, of European arms control expertise. And, as Europe’s largest arms control centre which regularly provides training and support to other nations, the BwVC could take a leading role in this process.

Lastly, Western states could, unilaterally or collectively, consider displaying measures of military restraint. America’s decision to deposit conventional intermediate-range missiles in Europe as a response to Russia’s deployment of nuclear-capable SSC-8 missiles is a good example: if balanced well, these moves can signal political restraint and credibility, not only towards Russia, but also towards non-aligned nations. But such measures should avoid undermining the West’s ability to deter military aggression. With the current arms control architecture beyond repair, Europe must ensure such a robust political framework exists through which its leaders can also advocate for a military response, if necessary.

Overall, the erosion in the political and operational power of existing arms control treaties has significantly increased the risk of escalation in Europe. It has weakened the ability of the allied states to deliver a collective political response before, or during, crises. But it has also left critical gaps in the collective response of states to illicit military developments. If European leaders fail to adapt to the new circumstances of a post-cooperative era between Russia and the West, the consequences could be a renewed arms race; escalation beyond manageable control; and a weakened capacity for collective defence. As such, Western leaders must act decisively with measures that are both independent of current treaty regimes, and easily actionable and cost-effective – but that also help to stabilise the security environment. Because what is at stake is nothing less than the security of Europe.