Ukraine negotiations: How Europeans can be at the table, not on the menu

The Trump administration plans for a “peace” in Ukraine are now crystal-clear—and its looking far more like a fragile short-term settlement on quasi Russian terms than a ceasefire leading to a lasting peace. Washington is “ready to start negotiations immediately” with Moscow, and before they have even begun, it has conceded two major Russian demands: Ukraine will not regain control of its 2014 territory or gain NATO membership.

This should not have come as a surprise to Europeans. The US approach and most of the principles were part and parcel of the president’s campaign—a Trump administration would end the war “in 24 hours” and directly engage with Russia to do so. And just like that, among this week’s hustle of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) meeting, the NATO defence ministers meeting and the Munich Security Conference, the new US administration has spoken with Ukraine, European allies—and Russia.

After three years of the US refusing direct contact with Vladimir Putin, Trump did not wait long to have a phone call with his Russian counterpart. In parallel, the secretary of defence, Pete Hegseth publicly spelled out at the UDCG American expectations with regard to the role the Europeans should play, and the sort of “peace” the US was seeking, next to remarks on burden sharing and defence spending.

Pete Hegseth’s remarks made clear that Europeans were expected to contribute to the implementation of the deal. Even if he had to partially walk back his comments to state that “everything is on the table” and that only “the leader of the free world”, Donald Trump would decide “to allow or not allow”.

In this context, it is difficult to decipher Washington’s tactics: confusing the adversaries, the allies, or simply keeping all options open. But one thing is clear—Europeans better pull their act together, not only for the sake of Ukraine, but for their direct security interests.

If Europe wants to be at the negotiating table rather than being on the menu, it is time to act with unity and clarity, rather than continuing to act surprised, divided and embarrassed

If Europe wants to be at the negotiating table rather than being on the menu, it is time to act with unity and clarity, rather than continuing to act surprised, divided and embarrassed. Some initial statements are going in this direction, but this effort should be actively pursued through several concrete steps to signal a clear message to Kyiv, Moscow and Washington.

First, and contrary to a common belief in Washington, the EU accounts for the largest share of the financial support to Ukraine and a growing portion of the military assistance. Europeans need to make clear that this support is not conditioned on continued US support, can be further increased if necessary and will continue post-ceasefire. This would meet Pete Hegseth’s expectation that Europeans carry the largest share of this support.

Second, Europeans need to clarify what they are ready to offer in terms of security guarantees. If indeed the US expects European countries to provide the boots on the ground, Europeans ready to play their part should now clearly state not only their readiness to step in but also the conditions to deploy such a force. By making clear to the US the nature of the mission they could undertake, including the chain of command and rules of engagement, as well the expected level of US support (intelligence and logistics), this would give Europeans leverage in deciding the nature of a ceasefire they could support. In the same vein, Europeans should clarify that they are not willing to join a vague “peacekeeping” force, but are working on the means to provide solid and credible security guarantees to Kyiv. This would significantly raise the costs and risks for Russia restarting the conflict and should allow Europeans to have a direct role in the peace talks. Europeans cannot reasonably be expected to provide the security guarantees for a deal they are not negotiating.

Third, Europeans should not oppose efforts to halt the conflict but need to make clear that such a negotiation cannot happen without Ukraine’s and Europe’s direct involvement. Nor can the EU be expected to lift sanctions to reward Russia for a poor and fragile deal it did not agree to. Just as the Trump administration made clear it expects Europeans to carry the largest share of the burden of Ukraine (and European) security tomorrow, Europeans need to spell out what they are ready to deliver and their expectations in this new phase.

Finally, Putin, who probably celebrates his new status as a special negotiation partner of Washington, has not shown any signs of an openness to compromise or closing a deal soon. This creates an opportunity for Europe to shape—even partially—the terms of the deal. With the future of Ukraine and of European security on the table, Europeans must take a seat before others decide on their role and carve up the spoils.