Two-year timer: How Europeans can support Tusk against Poland’s right wing

On June 1st, Polish citizens voted in Karol Nawrocki, a right-wing candidate affiliated with the Law and Justice (PiS) party, as the country’s president. Europeans, faced with unprecedented Russian threats and shifting US priorities under President Donald Trump, cannot afford to lose Poland as a strategic partner. Prime minister Donald Tusk should work to balance Poland’s domestic and foreign policy agenda in a way that maintains his country’s position in the core European group, which includes Germany and France—and demonstrates to Polish citizens that the country is better off when it works closely with Western Europeans. Tusk’s allies, for their part, can help him achieve this.

New kid on the block

Nawrocki is likely to prove a more radical president than his predecessor Andrzej Duda—despite the two hailing from the same PiS camp. He is younger, more energetic, a former boxer with a combative disposition; although a political newcomer, his strong right-wing mandate (he captured 88% of far-right votes from Slawomir Mentzen and 92% from ultra-nationalist Grzegorz Braun) gives him leverage to challenge the policies of Poland’s liberal government under Tusk. Duda, by comparison, signed in more legislation put forward by Tusk’s government than he vetoed. And Poland itself is different after eight years of PiS in power, with social media and the spread of disinformation exacerbating the party’s more conservative and right-wing disposition.

The election result is therefore a warning to Tusk, who responded by almost immediately calling a vote of no confidence for June 11th 2025. The prime minister will attempt to adapt to the new reality by renegotiating the coalition treaty, reshuffling his government and, as he puts it, “governing and making decisions despite a president attempting to block us”.

On the other hand, Nawrocki will likely be more independent from PiS and its leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski than Duda; he is not a party member and has no experience in politics. His relative dissociation from Kaczynski could create an opening for a dialogue, especially with regard to strengthening security and defence in the face of the Russian threat and regional partnerships with the Nordics, the Baltics, and Britan. Nawrocki and Tusk should find common ground on these fundamental issues—particularly as security matters have historically transcended partisan divides in Poland.

Tusk and his European allies have two years to counter the right’s arguments about the EU. They need to demonstrate to Polish voters not only that Europe can be strong on defence without undermining NATO; but that climate policy can boost European and Polish competitiveness and that the European Green Deal will benefit ordinary people

Now Tusk and his European allies have two years to counter the right’s arguments about the EU. They need to demonstrate to Polish voters not only that Europe can be strong on defence without undermining NATO; but that climate policy can boost European and Polish competitiveness and that the European Green Deal will benefit ordinary people. Tusk, however, must also be sure to balance his European programme with his important domestic agenda. Although Tusk promised to reform Poland’s judiciary, Naworcki’s victory means this is now not possible through legislation. The prime minister must instead deliver elsewhere, lest obstructionism by Nawrocki cost Tusk the 2027 parliamentary election—and see Poland to return to a right-wing, government.

A small patch of common ground

There are some matters on which Nawrocki and Tusk agree. They are both committed to Poland’s relationship with the US and to NATO; to Poland’s crucial role on Europe’s eastern flank; to maintaining high domestic defence spending; and to strengthening regional partnerships (diplomatic, military and economic) with Nordic, Baltic and eastern European allies. Poland’s participation in the Three Seas Initiative will continue, and Nawrocki will likely continue in the Polish political tradition of supporting security and defence agreements with Britain.

Indeed, once in office Nawrocki may even discover surprising alignment with Tusk on several issues which Poland has championed during its EU Council presidency. These include calling for increased Western European defence spending; pushing for reduced energy prices; revising the European Green Deal; delaying the introduction of the Emissions Trading System for Poland; opposing the EU migration pact; supporting deregulation initiatives; and the complete phase out of Russian fossil fuels across Europe. And, while Weimar Triangle, Weimar+ and E5 meetings will continue to occur at the prime ministerial level, the government would be wise to brief Nawrocki on their outcomes and maintain a collegial attitude between the two camps.

Bilateral battles

Nevertheless, Nawrocki’s opposition to further EU integration means he will remain sceptical of deepening bilateral European relationships. The new president is distrustful of the treaty signed by Poland and France, citing his opposition to its apparent promotion of the Green Deal. Nawrocki’s ability to veto the treaty is also problematic, as non-implementation will jeopardise Tusk’s push for Poland to strategically realign with Europe. However, even without full ratification, Poland and France can still embark on collaborative industrial projects, including AI, quantum computing and hydrogen technologies, collaborate on migration policy and cyberspace, and provide mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack on each other’s territory. But it is not only France in his crosshairs: Nawrocki will also likely oppose any bilateral Poland-Germany treaty unless the latter addresses the historic compensation issue.

Nawrocki’s scepticism toward Germany and France exemplifies Poland’s historic distrust of Western Europe to guarantee its security. In 2025, this is situated in what Poland perceives as unpreparedness for a territorial conflict with Russia and Western Europe’s likely return to “business-as-usual” relations with Moscow following any ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. For Western Europeans to counter Poland’s deeply held perception—and demonstrate to its right wing that they have shifted away from prioritising economic engagement with Russia over military deterrence—they need to increase defence expenditure, rapidly develop and procure military capabilities, and provide energy security without Russia. If Europeans gets serious about defence, Tusk has the chance to demonstrate to Poland’s right wing that a shift towards Europe is beneficial to Poland’s population at large. This could allow Poland could remain a liberal, progressive country.

Navigating Trump and Russia

Nawrocki’s proximity to Trump creates a complex dynamic. Tusk is pro-American and buys American weaponry, but Warsaw’s Presidential Palace will likely seek a more prominent role in Poland-US relations given Nawrocki’s ideological alignment with Trump. Nawrocki could become Trump’s mouthpiece on criticising Europeans for being weak on defence, which puts Tusk in a difficult position. He will need to reassure his European allies that Poland will not bilateralise ties with America at the expense of a common European position on issues such as trade, technology and security. For their part, Tusk’s European allies need to support Poland by seeking a new modus vivendi between the US and the EU, which avoids the withdrawal of US troops from Europe at all costs. Overall, Western Europeans should not call for European autonomy from the US, but rather for a stronger, more independent Europe within the transatlantic alliance.

With the election of Nawrocki, Poland’s policy on Ukraine has also become significantly more complicated. Nawrocki opposes Ukraine’s NATO membership and reminded Volodymyr Zelensky of the two countries’ bilateral historical issues in response to the Ukrainian president’s congratulatory post on X. Nawrocki also deployed anti-Ukrainian-migration rhetoric throughout his presidential campaign—however, unlike many right wing European parties, Nawrocki is not pro-Russian and Poland will not become Hungary’s new best friend.

But Nawrocki’s Ukraine policy will have the greatest impact on enlargement. Nawrocki cannot block Poland’s logistical support and military transfers to Ukraine, but he can significantly influence the public discourse. The worst-case scenario would be growing public scepticism toward Ukraine’s potential future EU accession, leading a future Polish government to declare a referendum on the issue. To avoid this, Tusk should spend the coming two years, before the 2027 election, focusing on showing Poland’s farmers and truckers what he can deliver for them from the European level.

*

As president, Nawrocki cannot directly shape Poland’s foreign and European policy. He is, however, well-placed to deliberately obstruct the time remaining in Tusk’s term by vetoing legislation on judicial reform, social liberalisation  and European integration. Any ensuing political chaos could strengthen Poland’s right-wing flank; this could help return PiS (or a new or different right-wing formation) to the government.

But Tusk and his allies in the European capitals—and especially Paris and Berlin—have two years to show that the EU can deliver tangible security and economic benefits for Poland. Done correctly, Tusk should be able to demonstrate that the EU’s deliverable benefits outweigh any populist alternatives.