Tisza’s foreign policy offer: Plans for a post-Orban Hungary    

On July 26th 2025, the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, held his annual speech at Fidesz’s summer camp in Transylvania, spouting his usual lambasting of the EU for “supporting, at a global level, the ideology – which we might call progressive or woke – that President Trump has been fighting against”. Back in Hungary, Peter Magyar, leader of the opposition Respect and Freedom (Tisza) party, stood before a crowd in Szekesfehervar and declared Hungary’s place to be in Europe and in the West.

His speech felt like a time capsule. It recalled an era when Hungary’s foreign policy still aligned with its allies. In style and tone, it was a throwback to the early 2010s and to Orban’s own origins when Fidesz’s first foreign minister, Janos Martonyi, stuck to a triad of foreign policy priorities: EU and NATO alignment, good neighbourly relations, and responsibility for Hungarians abroad. These fundaments, once shared across political lines in post-communist Hungary, have long been subjugated to party politics by Fidesz.

Under Orban, Hungary’s domestic and international posture has changed dramatically. Foreign policy, once predictable, is now riddled with vetoes, brinkmanship and ideological antagonism. What Tisza offers is not a new doctrine, but the revival of an old: repairing trust and re-anchoring the country in its alliances, while still strengthening its sovereignty. It is a foreign policy of recommitment—but the change it could bring is radical. Whether Tisza gets the chance to implement its vision will be decided in the parliamentary election on April 12th, when Fidesz will face its strongest challenger in 16 years. Despite the deeply uneven playing field, the election could bring the victory of the centre-right Tisza, which has been leading Orban’s party in the polls for over a year.

Go West

As Tisza’s foreign-minister designate Anita Orban put it, Hungary must “stop being a stick in the spokes and start being a spoke in the wheel”—part of a working system, not its breakdown

Tisza’s primary foreign policy goal is to restore Hungary’s position as a reliable member of the EU. As Tisza’s foreign-minister designate Anita Orban put it, Hungary must “stop being a stick in the spokes and start being a spoke in the wheel”—part of a working system, not its breakdown. This would start with rebuilding trust among allies and ending the government’s role as a spoiler in EU decision-making, which has often appeared less to be about protecting national interest and more about protecting those of Russia and China. Tisza has signalled this will stop, resonating with the majority of the party’s supporters, who believe the EU stands for the values they consider important—and does a good job in doing so.

For Tisza’s volte-face to be credible, its recommitment to the EU would need to be backed by a restoration of democratic norms and rule of law—this would also deliver Tisza’s goal of “bringing home” suspended EU funds. Its programme sets broad but often unspecific targets for the necessary reforms, and even the development of a new constitution. But the party will be faced with a captured state and institutions controlled by Fidesz loyalists limiting a new government’s room for manoeuvre. Tisza will likely be forced to negotiate a compromise to access the funds before their expiration, while the EU will need to focus on safeguards to avoid another disappointment similar to that in Poland.

National sovereignty remains central to Tisza’s rhetoric, too. The party will not shy away from asserting itself in its alliances, should it consider Hungarian interests at stake. Most recently, Tisza MEPs broke ranks with their political family, the European People’s Party, and supported referring the Mercosur agreement to the Court of Justice of the EU, over concerns for potential harm to Hungarian farmers.

Migration, one of the most sensitive topics in Hungarian politics, will likely remain an area where Tisza opposes Brussels the hardest. The party has signalled it will retain a hard line on border protection, including the maintenance of the controversial border fence and opposition to relocation quotas and the Migration Pact. But here too, tone and practice matter. The Orban government openly flouted EU asylum law even in the face of hefty fines. Tisza is more likely to return to the table and negotiate derogations it believes to serve the national interest.

What Tisza rejects is the notion that sovereignty must be wielded against Brussels. Rather, they argue, the EU is the vehicle through which Hungary can protect its interests and exercise its sovereignty. Tisza’s supporters seem to concur in regarding the EU as a useful platform: most of them perceive the EU to have the global standing to deal with global powers on an equal footing.

A regional reset

One of the clearest contrasts to Orban’s foreign policy is Tisza’s ambition to reset relations with key regional partners—especially Poland. The Warsaw-Budapest axis collapsed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the two capitals diverged sharply on Moscow. For Tisza, repairing this relationship is a precondition for reviving the Visegrad Group as a meaningful forum for central European cooperation.

This extends to other neighbours, too. Tisza has plans to pursue constructive relations, but also to settle disputes concerning ethnic Hungarians. This means that Tisza would pursue a negotiated settlement with Slovakia over the recent dispute on the criminalisation of the public questioning of the Benes decrees—which has been largely ignored by the Orban government. Finding a resolution, however, will not be without difficulties: Slovak prime minister Robert Fico may oppose Tisza’s positions due to his close ties with Orban, and for domestic political gain.

Settling the decade-long dispute about the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia in Ukraine is another matter high on Tisza’s agenda, but it will likely seek a negotiated solution and not use this issue to take relations with Ukraine hostage as Orban has done. Tisza is also likely to end the current government’s veto policy blocking support for Ukraine. But it has ruled out sending weapons or troops—reflecting both domestic political caution and a desire to distance itself from hawkish European leaders that Fidesz accuses Tisza of being a puppet for.

Unlike Orban, the party does not outright oppose Ukraine joining the EU. But it expects a merit-based process with conditionality, and it promises to put the country’s EU membership to a national referendum. This allows Tisza to square its commitment to European integration and navigate a toxic debate in Hungary where Fidesz portrays it as serving Ukrainian interests.

Giving Moscow the cold shoulder

Tisza also plans to make Hungary a global, rather than eastern, player, reminiscent of Hungary’s 2011 strategic line adopted under Martonyi. As such, Tisza intends to cooperate with any country, as long as it is on a principled basis, guided by international law and does not contest Budapest’s traditional alliances. With this line, Tisza is doubling down on shaping an independent foreign policy that serves the country’s interests but also seeks to reassure partners it will no longer be a spoiler. This means resetting Hungary’s cosy relationship with Russia.

The Orban government’s close ties to the Kremlin, dependence on Russian energy and the opacity of its major bilateral deals have raised security concerns domestically and among allies. Tisza’s answer is to review non-allied influence in the country, renegotiate opaque deals—with Russia and beyond—and diversify energy sources and routes. Success is anything but guaranteed, but Anita Orban’s experience could help. She spearheaded Hungary’s energy interconnectivity in the 2010s and pushed for EU-backed infrastructure development as the then energy-ambassador. During her time, Hungary was a constructive regional energy player—a role it could take again.

Strengthening Hungarian sovereignty with energy independence is a goal both American and European partners could get behind. In fact, the Orban government already started negotiations with the Trump administration about nuclear cooperation and, at long last, procurement of American LNG while scrambling to negotiate an exemption from looming US sanctions on Russian energy imports. Tisza could stay this course of diversification. At the same time, Tisza’s goal to do away with dependence on Russian energy—whatever that means exactly—by 2035 could conflict with the EU’s intention to ban Russian gas imports by 2027 and will certainly come under question in Brussels.

Foreign policy front and centre

Foreign policy used to be an afterthought in Hungarian elections. That changed by the early 2020s—not only because of the war in Ukraine, but because foreign policy became deeply politicised. Orban’s Eastern opening, frequent vetoes, and rhetorical attacks on Brussels made Hungary’s place in the world a matter of domestic contestation.

Tisza has responded in kind. The party is making foreign policy a campaign priority, introducing Anita Orban as its second minister-designate, right after Istvan Kapitany for the economy. The message is clear: national recovery and international reintegration go hand in hand.

The foreign policy vision Tisza offers is radical compared to the status quo of recent years. But its emerging principles—EU and NATO loyalty, good neighbourly relations, and a responsibility for ethnic Hungarians abroad—are anything but revolutionary. What makes them stand out is that Hungary under Orban has strayed so far from them. In place of confrontation, Tisza’s offer to the West is cooperation.

On April 12th, 2003, Hungarians voted to join the EU. On April 12th, 2026, they will vote again, this time in a general election. Peter Magyar, who understands the power of symbolism, has already cast the choice as a referendum on Hungary’s future. His message is simple: it is time to return to Europe—again.