The ticking clock: Why NATO’s deterrence against Russia is under pressure

Vladimir Putin has not gone to any trouble to hide his hostile intent towards NATO. “I think no one doubts [European military build-up] will force Russia to act,” the Russian president told a foreign policy forum in Sochi last October, “and Russia’s countermeasures will not be long in coming. It seems (to me) that the response to these threats will be, to put it mildly, very convincing.”

But an attack on NATO is not fated just because Putin wants to, despite the lack of constraints on his actions in the Kremlin. Just how “convincing” Russian aggression will be depends on the strategic calculus of three key conditions: a ceasefire in Ukraine that would free up Russia’s forces and equipment; its military strength; and a perceived likelihood of success based on a view of NATO as frail and divided. If each variable leans towards Russia’s favour, an attack becomes a realistic possibility. Even short of fully building its military capacity, a shift in this equation could entice Russia to attack in the hope of getting concessions from NATO such as partial demilitarisation in eastern Europe—a long-desired Russian goal.

1: The ceasefire variable

A ceasefire in Ukraine—which remains uncertain but not impossible—would drastically alter the strategic landscape, especially if it is part of broader political settlement dictated by Moscow’s maximalist demands. The terms Russia secures will determine if it has the military flexibility and political legitimacy to pursue its imperialist foreign policy. This would include Ukrainian demilitarisation, political influence in Ukraine and control of Donbas. The end of active combat would allow Moscow to reposition significant military resources on its borders facing NATO’s eastern flank, where the alliance anticipates a conflict within the next decade. Russia may not even need full military capacity for a limited operation—a ceasefire could free up enough Russian forces to support any attack with credible reserves. In Ukraine, only a defeat would weaken Russia sufficiently to force a recalculation of its militaristic trajectory.

2: Soaring military capacity

Even as the fighting continues, Russia is adapted to war. Its economy has been on a war footing since 2022 and its defence industrial base operates at wartime capacity. Despite sustaining around 1.2 million battlefield casualties, Russia increased its army personnel by 234,000 in 2025. The scale of growth is striking: in 2024, Russia assembled a new army corps and motorised rifle division near Estonia. In 2025, it formed 5 new divisions, 13 brigades, and 30 regiments. Plans for 2026 include 4 additional divisions, 14 brigades, and 39 regiments. According to Estonian intelligence, Russia’s military-industrial complex has increased artillery ammunition production 17-fold since 2021, meaning it can probably replenish reserves even while fighting Ukraine.

Russia is not merely growing its capacity. It is learning from nearly four years of combat in Ukraine to build a force that integrates battlefield lessons into revised doctrines and training programmes, although this is not without the Russian army’s structural shortcomings. It has also signed “strategic treaties” with China, Iran and North Korea to flout Western sanctions and give its war effort an extra boost. Once the war in Ukraine is over, Western intelligence think Russian could take between six months and five years to rebuild its military to be capable of a larger armed aggression.

3: Breaking NATO from within

The third and final variable is Moscow’s assessment of NATO’s advantage. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the alliance has grown stronger in terms of spending, force readiness and membership. NATO’s 3.2 million uniformed personnel far outnumber Russia’s 1.2 million. But Russia does not fear European military power. It sees Europe as politically weak and has been able to inflict damage through sabotage, cyberattacks and disinformation. Rather, Russia’s biggest deterrent is American commitment to NATO—now under unprecedented strain.

President Donald Trump has turned American foreign policy upside down, reshaping what risks and rewards Moscow sees in Europe. Any situation that creates a deadlock in NATO increases the likelihood of Russian aggression by weakening a primary deterrent. The most acute—though not the most probable—danger for European security would be an American seizure of Greenland that would leave Europe divided over how to respond and NATO unity disintegrated. Another, albeit less immediate, threat is if Washington goes ahead with a plan to reduce American forces from Europe.

The calculation

A perfect storm forms when three developments align: there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, Russia partially rebuilds its military over 6 to 18 months, and there is a significant breakdown in NATO unity. Moscow has a habit for calculating risk when it sees opportunity—and it has a history of miscalculation. In Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022), the Kremlin assessed conditions as favourable, expecting weak resistance and a limited Western reaction.

Western assumptions about Russia’s fear of consequences have repeatedly failed to predict its willingness to act, Ukraine being the prime example

Western assumptions about Russia’s fear of consequences have repeatedly failed to predict its willingness to act, Ukraine being the prime example. Facing an already fractured NATO, Moscow might launch a limited operation on its eastern flank to extract political concessions, gambling that a divided alliance would struggle to mount a unified response.

Scenarios of attack

Moscow would likely pursue one of two operational pathways. The first would be a gradual escalation in its hybrid war—using, for example, fifth column activities, “volunteer” forces, nationalist militias, private military companies and special force deployments—to create the conditions for limited military aggression. Russia’s military would not need to be at full capacity. The second possibility is a rapid escalation, especially if Moscow assesses Western resistance as weak. This would likely be a limited operation using special forces or airborne units capable of rapid mobilisation and deployment to seize part of a NATO member state’s territory. Such scenarios could target, first of all, NATO’s north-eastern flank, with some Baltic states being particularly vulnerable. Regardless of the path Moscow chooses, it would likely unleash threats to use nuclear weapons to deter Western military assistance and undermine defender morale.

The objective in either scenario would not be territorial conquest but rather to force political concessions that undo the post-cold war security architecture in Eastern Europe. Moscow would likely present an ultimatum with specific demands and a short deadline: the removal of allied military presence and the reimposition of military restrictions on NATO members that joined after 1997 such as limits on troop numbers and military equipment, dismantlement of critical installations such as the missile defence bases at Redzikowo in Poland and Deveselu in Romania, and banning military activities near Russia’s borders.

What is Europe to do?

Today, Russia is deterred by active combat in Ukraine that ties down and bleeds its forces and a relatively unified NATO underpinned by American military commitment, including the nuclear umbrella, with its members’ defensive and offensive capabilities. These protective barriers are not hypothetical concerns. Russia is kept at bay by conditions that are actively deteriorating: Ukraine ceasefire negotiations continue, and settlement appears more plausible than Ukrainian victory; America’s Department of War demands Europe assume primary responsibility for conventional defence; Trump’s fixation on Greenland strains NATO alliance cohesion. As Ukraine’s former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba warned, once these barriers fall, the analytical question inverts: not “why would Russia attack?”, “but why would it not?”.[1]

European security stands on thin ice. The question is not whether these conditions might someday change, but whether Europeans will recognise how close they already are to losing them and respond with the urgency required. Even if NATO was wounded, Europeans still control safeguards: regional defence plans, defence spending, limited yet key American capabilities, economic pressure through sanctions, and long-term support for Ukraine so that it either fights or comes out victorious.

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[1] Author’s conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, Paris, January 26th 2026