The prodigal power: How Poland could make a diplomatic comeback

When the leaders of France, Germany, and Britain meet today with the Ukrainian president in London, the Polish prime minister will not be among them. Poland—Ukraine’s largest Western neighbour— was not involved in drafting a 20-point peace plan for Ukraine in November either. Hailed as a new leader of Europe after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland now stands out by its absence. Even in the most significant discussions around Ukraine after the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska this August, the White House invited European leaders, but neither the Polish president nor the prime minister was among them.

For the EU, sidelining its largest northeastern member—the bloc’s frontline against Russia—creates an internal political imbalance which can only weaken European security. For Poland, this marginalisation rekindles the historic trauma of great powers dictating its fate, which stokes populist anti-EU narratives.

However, unlike the past couple of years, when Berlin and Paris clashed with Warsaw over Russia and security, today a considerable realignment unites European governments and the Polish one on core principles: rejecting any enforced Ukrainian territorial concessions; using frozen Russian assets to support  Ukraine; and insisting that a sustainable peace must be grounded on Ukraine’s full sovereignty and its ability to defend itself. There is now scope—and hope—that a closer relationship may develop once again, benefiting the bloc.

Leadership setbacks

Poland had become one of Europe’s leading powers in the last few years for two main reasons. The Polish government’s decisive leadership in rallying Western support for Ukraine immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion (while others wavered in hesitation) was one such reason. The other was the return to power in 2023 of former European Council president Donald Tusk as Polish prime minister, which ended eight years of populist rule and restored liberal hopes across the continent for a pro-democratic and pro-European agenda.

Poland ranks third, after America and Germany, in financial support for Ukraine as a share of its GDP, but its main contribution dates to 2022-2023, when it donated hundreds of tanks and welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees. Since then, bilateral friction and worsening public mood have soured their relations. The Polish government imposed an embargo on some agricultural products from Ukraine and insisted that Ukraine cannot join the EU until bilateral historical issues are resolved. Poland has also firmly opposed sending troops to Ukraine for post-settlement peacekeeping.

Ukraine fatigue is felt in society too. Restricting Ukrainian refugees’ access to social services became an important and popular issue in this year’s presidential election. According to recent opinion polls, only 22% of Poles express sympathy toward Ukrainians, while a majority (53%) opposes Ukraine’s accession to NATO. A substantial share of Poles (42%) are also against Ukraine’s  EU membership (51% in favour).

The effect of domestic politics

Moreover, combative domestic politics have dealt a blow to Poland’s international standing. Since his 2023 win, Tusk’s approval ratings declined sharply amid a strong populist opposition from the Law and Justice (PiS) party, which has the largest number of seats in the parliament. These developments have impeded his foreign policy ambitions. Poland’s EU presidency in the first half of 2025 was solid, but the government was torn apart by infighting, preventing it from delivering the major impetus for the EU that some observers had expected.

Acknowledging the rising tide of conservatism, Tusk adopted hard and EU-critical positions on migration, climate policy and relations with Germany. This shift to the right failed to deliver political dividends though: his candidate for the Polish presidency, Rafał  Trzaskowski, unexpectedly lost the June presidential election against the hardline nationalist Karol Nawrocki. Since then, Polish politics has been paralysed by a major conflict between the president and the government.

Foreign policy has emerged as a primary battleground in this standoff. Although the president’s formal powers are circumscribed, Nawrocki wants to shape Poland’s diplomacy. He is close to Trump, who supported him in the campaign, and hostile to the EU. Most importantly, the new president has adopted an openly critical stance on Ukraine, declining to pay a state visit to Kyiv and bluntly saying that if Zelensky wants to speak to him, he should come to Warsaw. Poland’s once-unified consensus on Ukraine is gone, its policies now bewildering European partners and diminishing Ukraine’s interest in keeping Poland’s seat at the table. Thus has Poland’s self-marginalisation taken shape.

Signs of a comeback

Tusk’s room of manoeuvre has slightly widened, not least in foreign policy.

However, there are signs that this self-inflicted impasse is not Poland’s last word. Tusk seems to have recovered from the summer hangover caused by the painful defeat in the presidential election. His party in October was leading the polls (38%) with a high margin ahead of the PiS (29%), which has failed to capitalise on Nawrocki’s success. The right-wing parties are strong but divided; their return to power in the 2027 parliamentary elections is far from certain.

Tusk’s room of manoeuvre has slightly widened, not least in foreign policy. The government is starting to push back against mounting anti-EU rhetoric from the opposition, led by PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński’s claims that the EU threatens Poland’s sovereignty. Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski forcefully rejected Kaczyński’s claims and Nawrocki’s idea of transforming the EU into a Europe of nation-states. In November, Poland also finally joined NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List initiative, committing $100m for the acquisition of US weapons for Ukraine. This could improve relations with Ukraine, while the government works on its ties with Germany. A Polish-German intergovernmental consultation in Berlin concluded positively in early December, with plans to strengthen security and defence industrial cooperation. However, their strained relationship will be more difficult to fix as it is primarily caused by domestic political calculations in each country. This may well continue to hinder Poland’s ability to assert itself in European diplomacy.

If the domestic political front is brought under control, Poland’s reputation as Ukraine’s key supporter strengthened, and relations with Germany restored, Poland will be poised to reclaim its place at the heart of European efforts to develop a common response to the worsening security environment. European leaders should help Tusk strengthen the Polish voice in Europe. Poland (as well as Finland and Denmark) is part of Europe’s frontline against Russian aggression; it safeguards essential transit routes for weapons to Ukraine and is a key contributor to NATO’s defence and deterrence efforts. The more Poland is explicit about its goals and its contribution, the more obvious it will be to other European leaders that it needs a seat at the table.