The point of no return: Why the EU must not send Syrians refugees back

European leaders are debating how to increase Syrian refugee returns. But rather than pushing for deportations, the bloc should focus on addressing security concerns and improving economic conditions inside Syria to encourage voluntary returns

Syrians who were refugees in Lebanon return to their home country after a journey to the opposition held northern Idlib province through the crossing Aoun al-Dadat north of Manbij, on October 9, 2024
Image by picture alliance / Middle East Images | Bilal Alhammoud
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Problem 

EU leaders will today discuss increased refugee returns to Syria amid intensifying concerns over migration. This follows a push by eight member states for a review of the Europea Union’s Syria policy, which rejects engagement with President Bashar al-Assad and upholds that Syria is unsafe for returns. Even Germany, a longstanding steward of the EU’s firm position on Syria, is talking about sending refugees back.

However, while the European political tide is moving, the situation in Syria remains a fundamental obstacle to a shift in approach. The country’s hostile security conditions –  the key reason that Syrians overwhelmingly don’t want to go home – make a wider push for safe returns impossible. There are repeated examples of Syrians being arrested, conscripted into the army, and killed upon return. The country’s dire economic conditions are also a major disincentive to return.

Any move to send Syrians back will make the EU complicit in humanitarian and legal violations. It will also push Syrians to seek new trafficking networks to once again leave the country and reach Europe. The past year saw an increase in attempted illegal sea crossings from Lebanon to Cyprus, with Syrians remaining desperate to leave the region.

Solution

The EU must remain committed to the principle that returns need to be “safe, voluntary and dignified” but can do more to support those choosing to return, which reached 38,000 in 2023. One pathway could involve increasing support into Syria to improve economic opportunities. This would mean more European funding for “early recovery” aid and for basic service provision to better meet local needs. This comes with the challenge of navigating the predatory Assad regime, but there remain opportunities to do more. The EU could also assess how sanctions exemptions could be used to boost local community and private sector economic development given that Western sanctions are worsening economic collapse. Improved economic conditions could help encourage more voluntary returns.

Fundamentally, however, any prospect of widescale returns depends on addressing the country’s security environment. Given international fatigue with the crisis, this requires a more meaningful EU strategy, working with partners such as Arab states and the United Nations, but also using some engagement with the Assad government, to press for improved conditions. Assad has shown little willingness to support returns but, amid the country’s deepening economic collapse, the EU could also consider laying out some incentives like sectoral sanctions relief if verifiable mechanisms ensuring the protection of returnees are implemented.

Finally, the EU should keep supporting neighbouring countries hosting millions of refugees. As regional conditions deteriorate, many are likely to attempt the risky journey to Europe rather than heading home. The plight of Syrians in Lebanon is particularly daunting amid increasing local hostility and Israeli attacks, but the answer should not be forceful deportations.

Context

The influx of more than 280,000 people from Lebanon into Syria in response to Israeli attacks is adding momentum to the debate, with some European officials seeing this as a sign that Syria is ready for more returns. But, while some European counties already recognise parts of Syria as safe – a position recently rejected by the European Court of Justice – the lack of diplomatic ties with Damascus means that returns are not enforced.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

Author

Director, Middle East and North Africa programme
Interim Director, Africa programme

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