The plus sides of pragmatism: How the EU can engage with South Korea’s new president

Exactly six months after impeached president Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed attempt to invoke martial law, some political stability may finally be in sight for South Korea. On June 3rd, Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is set to become the country’s next president, with exit polls putting him at 51.7% of the vote, clearly ahead of second place Kim Moon-soo with 39.3%. With his party holding nearly two-thirds of the seats in parliament, he enters office in a strong political position. But it will not all be smooth sailing for Lee. He is inheriting a deeply polarised nation and a difficult geopolitical environment marked by China’s use of economic coercion and an aggressive North Korea, whose military ties to Russia are deepening.

Lee’s approach to dealing with these challenges will be markedly different from that of his predecessor. While Yoon embraced “values-based diplomacy” and overt alignment with the West, Lee emphasises coexistence and pragmatic engagement with neighbouring powers. Europeans must prepare for a diminished appetite in Seoul to openly confront China’s assertiveness, condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine or challenge North Korea’s growing military alliance with Moscow. But below the rhetorical surface, continuity in South Korea’s foreign policy is still possible.

The “problem-solver” president

Lee, who first laid out his foreign policy vision in a Foreign Affairs op-ed ahead of his last presidential bid in 2022, rejects a foreign policy based on “rigid ideology”, instead calling for a focus on “problem-solving”. In the name of this pragmatism, Lee has more recently reaffirmed the centrality of the alliance with America for South Korea’s foreign policy and vows to strengthen it. At the same time he has stressed the need to maintain good relations with neighbouring China and Russia and avoid “antagonising” them.

Lee has tended to frame relations with South Korea’s two big neighbours in terms of economic opportunity and downplays security risks such as a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific—including a Taiwan contingency. Lee has also argued against direct weapon deliveries to Ukraine and last October he publicly opposed the idea of sending an expert team to Kyiv to monitor North Korea’s troops in Russia. While Lee has acknowledged the growing relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow as a “quasi-military alliance” and a risk to security on the Korean Peninsula, he has implicitly blamed the Yoon government’s diplomacy for bringing them closer together.

In the case of Russia, Lee’s approach could lead to an overlap with US president Donald Trump’s attempts to strike a deal with Moscow, lift sanctions and re-establish economic relations. Some South Korean companies have already quietly expressed their eagerness to return to the Russian market. Given Russia’s and North Korea’s increasingly close relationship and Moscow’s increased sway over Pyongyang, Lee may also try to use an opening with Moscow to nudge North Korea to the negotiation table—a stated goal of his.

Things look more difficult in the case of China, where the US is likely to maintain higher pressure on Seoul to toe Washington’s line on economic security and export controls, limiting Lee’s room for manoeuvre. He will probably acquiesce to some US demands, given that Chinese demand for South Korean products is decreasing steadily anyway. At the same time, Lee has questioned the impact of a possible Taiwan Strait crisis for South Korea, and will likely try to resist US calls for greater South Korean security involvement in the region.

Doing the same, differently

 Europeans need to prepare for a South Korean government that will refocus its foreign policy back to its neighbourhood, de-emphasise the security links between Asia and Europe and pursue improved relations with China, North Korea and Russia

Europeans therefore need to prepare for a South Korean government that will refocus its foreign policy back to its neighbourhood, de-emphasise the security links between Asia and Europe and pursue improved relations with China, North Korea and Russia. This shift in tone by no means precludes a further deepening of EU-South Korea relations under the incoming Lee administration—but it does demand a change in Europeans’ diplomatic language.

In their engagement with South Korea, Europeans should tap into the pragmatic instincts of Lee by refraining from value-laden rhetoric and instead focusing on specific areas of mutual interest and economic benefit, including defence, economic security, trade and investment. Strengthened cooperation with Europe was explicitly included in Lee’s official ten-point campaign platform, offering an opening for Brussels to pursue new agreements under a different tone.

Defence cooperation is one promising area. Lee will continue the bipartisan tradition in South Korea of treating the defence industry as an economic growth engine. He is committed to increasing state funding for defence-related research and development, improving public-private coordination, and fostering global partnerships. As South Korean companies seek to tap into Europe’s growing defence budgets over the coming years, EU member states should assess where South Korean technologies can augment their own capabilities and improve Europe’s overall readiness.

Deepening the already significant trade and investment ties between the EU and South Korea is another area of opportunity, especially in the realm of green technologies. Lee has vowed to greatly expand the country’s share of renewable energy. Although regulatory hurdles remain, European wind developers have already won bids for offshore wind projects, deploying European turbines. The EU, on the other hand, can greatly benefit from South Korea’s key position in manufacturing affordable electric vehicles and batteries, which the bloc urgently needs to reach its ambitious climate goals in the transportation sector. Amid economic security risks from Chinese suppliers, South Korean companies and products represent viable, trusted alternatives.

Lee’s administration could also prove an important partner in coordinating strategies and responses to Trump’s tariff threats. Both South Korea and the EU face a familiar predicament: security reliance on the US, trade surpluses with Washington, and repeated exposure to tariff escalations. Lee has cautioned against rushing into any deal and has signalled openness to coordinating responses with other affected countries. This creates a valuable opportunity for the EU and South Korea to align their diplomatic and economic strategies, potentially forming part of a broader, united front to manage—and possibly mitigate—Washington’s protectionist impulses and its tendency to bully allies. As a start, this could be by coordinating closely and agreeing on common red lines on the minimum outcomes of any deal, for example completely removing the 25% tariffs on cars and auto parts.

With the right framing, cooperation even on sensitive issues such as Ukraine can continue and grow under Lee’s leadership. Lee is unlikely to deliver weapons to Ukraine, but even under the Yoon administration this was a distant prospect. But Lee has pledged support for the reconstruction of Ukraine, which could be a boon for South Korea’s large construction and infrastructure firms. Europeans can further attract such investments by framing Ukraine’s reconstruction pragmatically, in win-win economic terms. In this fashion, EU-South Korea collaboration—even on more sensitive issues such as the war in Ukraine—can continue and lead to practical results under a more cautious Lee administration.

Finding the sweet spot

Although Lee’s foreign policy instincts diverge from Yoon’s, the practical implications may be less dramatic than they appear. The greatest risk lies in a potential EU-South Korea split over Russia, especially if Lee and Trump jointly pursue re-engagement with Moscow. Yet even here, Lee’s inclination to boost South Korea’s defence sector could contribute to Europe’s rearmament task over the next few years. Meanwhile on China, persistent US pressure is likely to push South Korea towards continued diversification and alignment with like-minded partners, including the EU, despite a more balanced rhetoric on the surface.

To help maintain amicable and productive relations, Europeans should avoid making too strong demands and instead gently encouraging Seoul to maintain alignment on important issues like Ukraine. By focusing on mutual gains and avoiding rhetorical clashes, Europeans can help turn Lee’s interest-led diplomacy into an opportunity for deeper, more resilient cooperation.