The other counter-offensive: Ukraine’s diplomatic push in Africa

Shortly after Russian forces invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the UN General Assembly convened to deplore Moscow’s aggression and demand it withdraw from Ukrainian territory. Twenty-eight African countries voted in favour and 25 abstained or did not participate. Only Eritrea voted with Russia.

But as the war has dragged on, Moscow has doubled down on its efforts to gain support for its war. Since 2022, Russia has leveraged its growing political, economic and military footprint across Africa in the hope of breaking its diplomatic isolation, circumventing Western sanctions, and securing its economic interests. It has deployed fierce disinformation campaigns to fuel anti-Western sentiment across the continent, with the support of other hostile powers like China. Just last month, state-media outlet Sputnik opened an “Africa Hub” in Addis Ababa. It has also actively worked on disrupting Ukrainian grain exports to the continent by imposing naval blockades, withdrawing from the Black Sea grain deal back in 2023, and regularly attacking Ukrainian grain port facilities since.

In response, Ukraine has dedicated considerable means to boost its diplomatic presence in Africa. A few months into the war, Kyiv appointed a special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, and has since launched a targeted communication strategy and conducted a series of ministerial visits. Its number of African embassies in the past three years has nearly doubled. Additionally, it has launched a humanitarian “Grains from Ukraine” programme coordinated by the World Food Programme, which benefited around 8 million people affected by the war-induced food crisis in 12 African countries. A Ukraine-Africa summit is also under discussion.

But Ukraine’s outreach was late to the game—Russia was making significant inroads into Africa back in 2012. With very limited resources given the wartime constraints, it has also been less impactful than Russia’s, which operates around 40 African embassies, a wide PMC network, and maintains strong bilateral ties across the continent.

Moreover, Kyiv’s strategy lacks clear objectives. In particular, recent instances of Ukrainian military involvement in African conflicts have led to blunders and setbacks. The most notable was the Tinzaouaten attack, where separatist Tuareg rebels, allegedly supported by Ukrainian intelligence, inflicted a major defeat to Russian Wagner mercenaries, who are deployed at the Malian junta’s request to back the army in its fight against jihadist insurgencies. The attack killed dozens of Malian soldiers. Mali and Niger subsequently broke off diplomatic relations with Ukraine, while Senegal summoned the Ukrainian ambassador after he praised the attack. The Economic Community of West African States also condemned the external interference in a regional conflict, seeing it as an escalation of current geopolitical tensions. Reports of Ukrainian special forces deployed in Sudan to fight alongside the army against the Rapid Support Forces, have further blurred the contours of Ukraine’s intensions in Africa.

The most recent UN vote, in February this year, showed further erosion of African support for Ukraine. The number of countries voting with Ukraine has whittled down to 13, while those against has grown to 8. Notably, several countries receiving Russian military support such as the Sahelian juntas, Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic now side with Russia. The drastic shift in America’s position, general fatigue over the conflict, and a perceived European double standard with other conflicts in Africa and the Middle East likely all contribute to this dynamic.

Yet the consistently high amounts of abstentions and non-participations in UN votes since 2022 suggest that African countries remain deeply divided on the conflict, with some viewing it as a European war where they shouldn’t have to take sides. At least publicly, many African countries have sited their historic non-alignment positions.

Amid these divisions, South Africa is seeking to position itself as a mediator. It has consistently declared itself “neutral” by calling for inclusive peace talks. In June 2023, President Cyril Ramaphosa took the lead on an unprecedented African peace mission comprising seven heads of state, with different stances on the war. While the initiative failed to yield any tangible results, it marked the first time African countries actively supported peace talks outside of the continent. Since then, South Africa has also joined the Ukrainian Peace Formula meetings. Despite this, Pretoria maintains its close ties to Moscow, dating back to the Soviet Union’s historic support of the African National Congress and now both countries’ membership of BRICS+. Pretoria has even conducted several joint military exercises with Russia together with China and in 2023 a US ambassador accused it of supporting Russian war efforts.

Ukraine’s success in engaging with the continent will not stem from moral appeals, but rather from building a compelling narrative backed by long-term investments that align with African economic and geopolitical needs

Ukraine’s outreach to Africa is a delicate balancing act that is yet to be perfected. Kyiv is hoping to reawaken dormant relations to garner much needed international backing while countering Russia’s growing influence on the continent. Yet it must do this without rekindling the cold war dynamics that once turned Africa to a battleground between the Western and Eastern blocs. African countries will not take kindly to Kyiv’s efforts if they perceive Ukraine using them as mere pawns against Russia. The waning African support for Ukraine underscores the limits of urging African leaders to reconsider their neutral stance invoking respect for territorial integrity. Ukraine’s success in engaging with the continent will not stem from moral appeals, but rather from building a compelling narrative backed by long-term investments that align with African economic and geopolitical needs.

Many African countries have an interest in the war ending primarily due to economic concerns, especially food security. The surge in global grain and fertiliser prices at the outbreak of war has severely affected African economies, given their strong dependence on both Russian and Ukrainian imports. On a wider scale, however, Russia offers little to African countries. Its direct investment represents less than 1% of overall flows to the continent and is insufficient to drive substantive economic growth. In terms of trade, exchanges between Africa and Russia account for less than 2% of import and 1% of export volumes . Moreover, the Kremlin’s geoeconomic bargains on grain also increases African dependence that could further threaten food security.

It is in both Ukraine’s and many African governments’ interest to develop stronger relations. For Ukraine, new partnerships expanding beyond agriculture and the food industry to technology, engineering, defence and the education sectors could help revitalise its economy and contribute to post-war recovery. African states, in turn, have much to gain from Ukrainian investments as they seek to diversify trading partners amid the threat of an escalating international tariff war sparked by the Trump administration. In terms of military cooperation, Ukraine currently has one of the most sophisticated and battle hardened armies, and could bring great support to African forces facing security crises.

As Ukraine’s main allies, Europeans should quietly support these efforts by sharing lessons learned from long-standing engagements across the continent, and facilitating Ukrainian investment in flagship projects under the Global Gateway initiative, such as the Lobito Corridor. Importantly, they would also benefit from combining forces on communications offensives aimed at exposing Russia’s predatory and murderous tactics across the continent.

Later this month, President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected in South Africa for Ukraine’s first state visit on the continent. The visit holds significance beyond its symbolism: Ukraine and its European allies are struggling to maintain international support, especially after Washington publicly humiliated Zelensky in the Oval Office and began dictating the pace and terms of peace talks with Russia. The visit may not be an immediate game-changer in Ukraine’s strategy but it is an important step forward. South Africa remains a crucial geopolitical player.

With Ramaphosa chairing the G20 and maintaining direct channels with the Kremlin, he may be able to sway Russia on specific points in the event of direct peace talks between the two parties. Kyiv efforts to reposition itself in Africa have been significant, but securing more African allies and developing mutually beneficial partnerships are still a long way off.