The long game: How Europeans can shape the outcome of Ukraine-Russia talks

Not much came of the talks between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul on June 2nd. Even after the first meeting on May 16th—the first direct talks between the two in three years—the process has borne little fruit. Both sides have published their negotiating frameworks, which are by and large mutually exclusive. They also agreed to continue prisoner swaps. At the same time, Russia continues to pummel Ukraine with a record number of drones while Kyiv pursues daring operations deep in the Russian territory—which Moscow vows it will respond to.

The way things are going, few European diplomats think this American-led approach could lead to a ceasefire anytime soon, let alone a sustainable peace. And so far, Europeans have been largely left out of the process. But their action could become a decisive factor in getting closer to a peace that, for now, still appears very far away.

A ceasefire that could backfire

The Istanbul meetings show that both sides are entering talks with limited commitment and expectations. Russia has shown little interest in ending its war against Ukraine on anything but its own terms, likely believing time favours it militarily, diplomatically, and politically. These terms—including Ukraine’s neutrality, ceding territory to Russia and demilitarisation—are deeply problematic for Europeans. Demilitarisation, in particular, would leave not just Ukraine but the whole continent in a vulnerable position.

Yet for Moscow to accept anything less than these terms would mean it will have to give up its goal to control most, if not all of Ukraine—if not now, then in a few years’ time. The conditions Russia came with to the second meeting in Istanbul show that the Kremlin’s baseline is the same as three years ago: make its control of Ukraine akin to Germany’s of Vichy-era France: part directly occupied by Russia, part taking orders from Moscow.

To achieve this, the Kremlin is pursuing a two-pronged tactic. First, it displays performative interest in the talks to keep Washington involved, preferring a direct Trump-Putin meeting to settle its broader demands without Ukrainians in the room. In parallel, it hopes to break the resistance of both the Ukrainians and the rest of Europe. Here, Russia assumes that its grinding military advances will break Ukraine’s frontline and erode Europeans’ political will to support it: electoral politics in the United States, Slovakia, Hungary, and now also Poland, have already eroded support for Ukraine or its EU integration. More EU countries could follow sooner rather than later.

As part of this tactic, Russia might be even ready to agree to a ceasefire later this year, in return for substantial benefits such as the lifting of US sanctions and a reboot of US-Russia cooperation. But such ceasefire could be temporary as Russia is yet to achieve most of its core objectives. The respite would allow Russia to rearm and attack again in a few years.

Ukraine, for its part, hopes at least for a durable ceasefire which would allow it to recuperate, recover and boost its own deterrence posture. But even if a deal were possible, Ukrainians fear it would come at a high price, leaving the country vulnerable and Europe exposed to future Russian aggression.

For now, discussions between Russia and Ukraine will most likely remain focused on a ceasefire—no peace deal acceptable to both sides is likely soon. But many peace processes begin with both sides far apart and minimal commitment to a compromise. Some eventually succeed, while others fail. However, with a united European front investing in its capacity to help Ukraine protect European security, Europeans could strengthen Ukraine’s hand well enough to reach some kind of pacification of the conflict in the months to come.

With a united European front investing in its capacity to help Ukraine protect European security, Europeans could strengthen Ukraine’s hand well enough to reach some kind of pacification of the conflict.

Europeans’ threefold task

Europeans are not at the table. But the chances for success of the talks partly depend on them. Whether Ukraine can achieve a minimally acceptable deal depends in a large part on whether European governments, militaries and publics are able to safeguard the continent’s peace and security. Europeans (both EU and not) face a threefold task:

• Provide Kyiv with robust and sustained military support, even if there is a temporary truce. This is the only way to prevent Russia from achieving military victory or political control over Ukraine. Besides donations of military equipment from Europeans’ shrinking stocks, this means greater investment into Ukraine’s growing defence sector, alongside the so-called “Danish model”. Such investments are a two-way street. In return, Europeans would get access to some of the continent’s most innovative defence technologies and products. Besides an act of solidarity, this is a strategic necessity for the rest of Europe. A stable, sovereign Ukraine is a critical bulwark keeping Russian forces away from the EU’s borders. The alternative—a Moscow-controlled or chronically unstable Ukraine—would create a security vacuum with dire consequences for European stability.
• Quickly strengthen Europe’s own defence capabilities. The EU must invest in its military to deter any potential attacks on member states and to maintain its capacity to assist Ukraine. This means higher defence spending, more dynamic defence policy innovation and greater integration of defence markets. But it also means much leaner and faster ways to innovate and respond to crises. Neither Ukraine, nor Europe have another five or ten years for European solutions to become a reality. Speed is of essence. A key lesson from recent years is the urgent need to accelerate the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Europe must move from slow, reactive measures to rapid, proactive “firefighting” approaches. To do so, the EU needs to deliver on the recommendations of the Niinistö report as well as its own Readiness 2030 initiatives, streamline decision-making and reduce bureaucratic delays to enable agile responses to emerging threats.
• Reframe the terms of EU policy on Ukraine. For over three years, the focus has been on ‘helping Ukraine’. This is a worthy goal, but it has been losing traction across the continent. It is not enough for the European Commission president to say that “Ukraine is fighting for the ideals of Europe”. Ukraine is fighting for Europe, not just for its values. When America supported its allies in the second world war, it framed it as defending America itself, rather than just helping others. Similarly, governments must work more to explain to citizens, whether an Irish teacher or a Spanish farmer, that supporting Ukraine is not just a charitable EU policy but has clear self-interest: it helps prevent greater security threats and avoids the much higher costs Europe would face if Russia were to overrun Ukraine.

The current talks will be anything but easy and may not go very far. Yet they are still worthy of European support. Irrespective of whether they succeed, a ceasefire alone will not solve Ukraine’s or Europe’s security dilemmas. What will, however, depends on whether Europeans can sustain the momentum needed for a stronger defence posture for themselves and for the military, economic and political support for Ukraine to keep it sovereign and strong enough not to be overpowered.