The long game: How Europe can outlast Russia’s war of attrition
While Trump lingers indecisively and Moscow bets on Europe falling apart, the only logical strategy for the EU is to double down on its support for Kyiv
The “will they, won’t they” drama over a US-Russia deal on Ukraine has been this year’s political soap opera. In its latest twist, a two-hour call between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump led to the announcement of a second US-Russia summit—only for it to unravel five days later when Trump declared he had no interest in having “a wasted time”.
Nearly 10 months in, prospects for a settlement remain remote as Trump continues to sit on the fence. The US president has not dropped out from negotiations entirely and still supplies Ukraine with weapons—now sold, not given—and intelligence, but balked at providing Tomahawk missiles. He finally imposed sanctions on Russia’s two biggest oil firms, yet they can be circumvented and still fall short of the “secondary tariffs” he once threatened.
Recent disclosures confirm that the Kremlin’s core demands remain unaltered: a binding ban on Ukraine ever joining NATO; Ukrainian military withdrawal from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; Ukraine’s demilitarisation; and Russian veto rights over any post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. In short, Kyiv’s de facto capitulation and a fundamental reconfiguration of the Ukrainian state.
Moscow’s unwavering repetition of these demands shows Putin still believes time is on his side. He bets on the long-term erosion of European unity and support for Ukraine, and that the US role—in Europe and worldwide—will shrink. The Russian leader articulated this vision in his recent Valdai Club address: Russia will continue to support European governments that prioritise “national interests” over supranational integration, boost anti-Ukraine and anti-liberal political movements, and intensify information operations that erode EU cohesion.
However, not all is as it was. Russia has recently resorted to substantial tax hikes to fund the war, with unpredictable political consequences. War spending is now projected into 2026 and beyond. Rebuilding military capacity, whether for renewed offensives or deterrence, will remain high even under a temporary ceasefire. Russia will no longer be able to achieve the economic growth it has seen in the first years of the war. Every coming year will be more difficult.
The question, then, is whether Putin’s resolve can outlast Europe’s.
A European five-year plan for Ukraine
The EU should not expect the US to resume its role as active guarantor of European security. Trump’s refusal to send Tomahawks to Ukraine shows the limits of American help. More likely now is a model in which the US channels existing stockpiles to Europe for onward transfer to Ukraine rather than intervening directly.
The EU’s most pragmatic strategy is to brace for a conflict that could last an additional 2–4 years
Given limited US support for its Ukraine policy, the EU’s most pragmatic strategy is to brace for a conflict that could last an additional 2–4 years and formulate a five-year plan. It should commit roughly €100bn annually to Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction, and make these financial, military and security commitments plainly visible. A transparent roadmap would blunt Moscow’s subversive tactics and make internal manipulation futile. And there are still creative ways to work with Russian frozen assets to help lighten the burden.
However, to topple Russia’s economy entirely would require India and China to halt oil and gas purchases—something neither the EU nor the US can do. And while the EU’s 19th sanctions package will increase pressure on Russia, its effects will be gradual.
Whatever long-term posture the EU adopts towards Russia and Ukraine, Moscow will persist in treating the bloc as an adversary, employing the full spectrum of hybrid tactics seen in the past decade. Stopping this meddling would require an unilateral EU retreat—ceding Ukraine and validating Putin’s gains. The viable alternative is a resolute commitment to a five-year agenda, predicated on the EU’s ability to outlast Putin’s regime and secure Ukraine’s sovereignty.
The prolonged confrontation with Russia is inevitable; tackling it with a long-term plan and sufficient resources is the only sensible course.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
