The likely lads: Why Merz’s new political generation will decide Germany’s future

In February 2025, Germany will hold a federal election—and polls indicate that the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) allies are likely to triumph.

The change will usher in a generational shift of decision-makers in Berlin, which could see the country turning away from its supranational outlook and instead leading new intergovernmental alliances comprising of north-eastern European state groups, such as Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. It could even stretch to non-European Union states like Norway and the United Kingdom.

But this new approach does not so much stem from 69-year-old likely CDU chancellor Friedrich Merz as from the party’s leading figures. They are, by and large, much younger than Merz and view Germany’s role in Europe in a more self-assured way than previous generations of CDU politicians.

Should Merz triumph, the new German government will have a mandate to pursue a foreign policy based on integration steps concerning defence spending and debt-sponsored innovation policies. Eventually, Germany will be less likely to aim for the broad supranational alliances it previously developed to ensure no state was left behind. Instead, a ‘two-speed Europe’ is likely—although it come at the cost of alienating Germany’s core EU partner, France.

Competing visions

Ever since German chancellor Olaf Scholz was sworn in three years ago, his ‘traffic light coalition’—comprising of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, and the Free Democratic Party—lacked a clear leading party and had low public approval. In the absence of coherence, his government seemed less inclined to account for the interests of its European partners in foreign policy decisions.

For example, the coalition approved a serious domestic economic stimulus package to cushion economic losses due to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. However, it did not consult Germany’s main European partners prior to its implementation, despite the package having a substantial effect on their economies.

In contrast, former chancellor Angela Merkel’s ‘grand coalition’— comprising the CDU, the CSU, and the SPD—enjoyed high public approval during her entire tenure. Now election polling shows the CDU and CSU in the lead once again, with between 30% and 32% of the vote. Indeed, as many people support the CDU and CSU as support the parties of the entire former traffic-light coalition, put together. These numbers indicate that the conservatives—with potential chancellor Merz at the helm—will win the election.

Those who support ceding national power to the EU’s institutions might read this as a return to the supranationalism Germany exercised under Merkel. But trying to work out Merz’s whole personality requires slotting many seemingly contradictory aspects together; and this complexity in his character traits reflect in his politics. Some commentators argue that Merz is too pro-American and too spirited; too inclined to aim for one big partner like the United States, instead of forging compromises with many smaller European countries.

During his interviews in the election campaign, he suggests going into debt to finance the German armed forces; but he also remains a fiscal hawk, a proponent of the famous-infamous “black zero”—in other words, Merz is advocating for Germany to not take on any debt. This contradictory stance may herald the revival of a conflict with southern European economies over debt mutualisation.

It is likely that, under Merz, Germany will instead act more in accordance with its short-term interests, building ad hoc intergovernmental alliances—such as with northern European states—in order to achieve this. Voters casting their CDU ballot in the hope of a more inclusive, supranational German leadership might be disappointed.

Generational shift

Merz is not the bearer of the coming change: he is part of an older generation of German leaders that is keen on power-sharing with EU institutions in Brussels. They understand modern German foreign policy also in the context of atonement for the atrocities committed during the second world war; Europe based its vindication on ensuring that Germany was denied a too-strong leadership. In turn, this relegated power to Brussels.

However, the younger and more conservative Germans are, the less they are willing to link current German foreign policy with the impact of the second world war. This was apparent in the Eurozone crisis in the 2010s, where Germany rejected Greece’s demand that Berlin pay further second world war reparations; it became even clearer during the migration crisis in 2015, as international observers linked Europe’s hospitability towards refugees with the Holocaust. However, in their rhetoric, hardly any German politician made this explicit connection.

The likely lads

Furthermore, apart from Merz, the CDU’s leaders are generally younger—the powerful leader of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst, is 49; the informal leader of the CDU’s conservative wing, Jens Spahn, is 44. Politically socialised in a reunified Germany, this new generation refers to their country as a clear leader in both Europe and the EU. Their parents were born after the second world war, while their grandparents—who might retain some connection to the post-war order—have long since passed away. Consequently, they lack the ties which defined previous generations of German leaders. To them, restraint is a foreign policy concept not rooted in personal conviction.

Their likely influence on Germany’s future foreign policy is reinforced by changing societal perceptions of the second world war, which is losing clout as the prime defining feature of Germany’s past. Instead, it is increasingly considered as just one aspect, superseded by democratic Germany’s success. Now, among younger and more conservative voters, there is a broad desire to see Germany acting more in its immediate national interest; for instance, by forging alliances with countries outside of the EU. This is also reflected in the rise of the AfD.

Wüst alone represents at least one-third of the entire CDU’s political power, through his leadership of its chapter in the German state where it could have the most influence, North Rhine-Westphalia. For his part, Spahn leads the party’s informal but more conservative wing, which flirts with nationalist positions, in particular during migration debates. However, Merz needs the faction on board to decide any major future German foreign policy commitments.

Ultimately, both Spahn and Wüst are heavyweights. They have the political credibility and rhetorical power to make the country’s wider conservative-leaning voters either back or oppose changes to German foreign policy.

Two-speed Europe

Germany pursuing a strategy based largely on its short-term national interests makes ongoing supranational integration unlikely. However, sometimes Germany’s focus on intergovernmentalism for its own interests can lead to greater integration leaps—for example, the 2022 European Sky Shield Initiative, which Germany led, as well as its swift purchasing of anti-aircraft defence systems for Ukraine. In reaction to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Germany forged these schemes with some European partners—albeit against the will of France, Italy, and Poland.

As such, appealing to short-term German political, economic, and security interests will be key for European partners that wish to retain a strong connection with a Merz government. Europeans should now stop expecting Germany to act in response to its action in the second world war, in particular when it comes to restraining its national power. Instead, Germany’s involvement in future European integration will be more entrenched in German realpolitik.

The main advantage of a ‘two-speed Europe’ is that it could be a mere pause; a bridge, until the entire EU follows the example of the north-eastern group and makes greater steps towards integration. The arrival of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 is a good example of how this spill-over effect can impact the whole of Europe.

Merz’s future foreign policy strategy is likely to alienate France and Italy, which are two countries already struggling with their currently limited impact on the European theatre

The greatest disadvantage, however, lies in its polarising potential. Merz’s future foreign policy strategy is likely to alienate France and Italy, which are two countries already struggling with their currently limited impact on the European theatre. China and Russia could happily boost this spat by fueling nationalism and national inferiority complexes in both countries.

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But the EU is well-practiced at internal diplomacy. Its decision-makers should know to embrace the German leadership whenever its policy is backed by implementable proposals that are shared by a large group of states and credible financial investment; and to let it peter out when it is just cheap talk. But the EU must not be offended by daring proposals to avoid exacerbating inner-European frictions.

In short, Europeans should only react if a Germany under Merz puts its money where its mouth is and pursues a more self-assured foreign policy to achieve substantial integration leaps—even if this bold approach raises a few eyebrows at first.