The art of the off-ramp: How Europe can pressure Trump to end the war in Iran

Donald Trump did not start the war with Iran because he wanted another quagmire in the Middle East. From his past uses of force, we know that he likes to dominate the story, achieve quick wins and then loudly claim victory. In Iran, it has not worked out that way. Tehran has refused to surrender and closed the Strait of Hormuz. The oil price has soared to over $100 a barrel, US gasoline prices have risen by roughly a third to $4 a gallon, and the US president’s approval has sunk to 36%. Trump has responded in the only way he knows how: with bluster, threats of escalation and hints that a deal may yet rescue him.

Europeans cannot control or even directly affect American domestic politics, but understanding the strains Trump is under can give them an opening to stop the war. Trump faces a cocktail of internal pressures, and some matter far more to him than others. He has not shown much care about legal objections, strategic incoherence or irritating allies. He does, however, seem worried about pump prices, stock prices, poll numbers among his base, elite Republican nerves and whether he can still present himself as the man who ends crises rather than ignites new ones.

Europeans cannot force Trump into a ceasefire, but they can sharpen the pressures that make one attractive and help provide an off-ramp he can sell as a win

Coordinated messages from European leaders can affect domestic American debates and how they are felt in the White House. While Europeans cannot force Trump into a ceasefire, they can sharpen the pressures that make one attractive and help provide an off-ramp he can sell as a win.

The table below summarises these pressures in order of their importance to Trump (by our reckoning) and explains how Europeans should exploit them.

Europeans should understand which pressures matter most to the Trump administration. Gasoline prices come first, general inflation next. Internal administration and congressional pressure matter less on their own, but they can reinforce the broader sense that the war has stopped serving Trump’s interests. Allied refusal to legitimise escalation also matters because it denies Trump both prestige and burden-sharing.

This effort carries an obvious risk. Europeans could easily overestimate their leverage and start behaving as if they can engineer American politics from abroad. They cannot. Trump will make his own decisions, and he may still choose escalation if he thinks a dramatic show of force better suits his image. Europeans can have a strategy to deter that, even if they cannot control or even predict Trump.

That strategy should rest on three efforts, derived from the table above, that are within European control. First, Europeans should keep public pressure on the economic consequences of the war and show that a ceasefire is the quickest way to lower prices and calm markets. Second, they should deny Trump the allied endorsement and support he craves for further escalation, while making clear that they would strongly support diplomacy and a maritime stabilisation mission tied to a ceasefire. Third, they should build an off-ramp that flatters Trump’s vanity: not “retreat”, but “deal”; not “climbdown”, but “reopening Hormuz”; not “accepting limits”, but “restoring order”. Trump will claim victory no matter how this war ends. Europeans should want that to happen sooner rather than later.

The US administration felt confident in starting this war without consulting America’s European allies, in part because they likely believed pressure within the NATO alliance works only in one direction. Europeans should show Washington that it runs the other way too. As fuel prices rise, markets fall, allies balk and his domestic coalition frays, Trump faces pressures he cannot bomb or bluster away.

Europe cannot create those pressures, but it can sharpen them. And in this crisis, that may be the best route to a ceasefire.