Staatsräson: How Germany’s Israel policy hobbles EU strategy

Just days before his election to the chancellery earlier this year, Friedrich Merz announced that his government would be one of Europe’s “strongest supporters”. Initially, he made bold moves, visiting Paris, Warsaw and Kyiv, and raising hopes he’d revive Europe as a geopolitical force. But reality hit fast. The new chancellor concluded that Europe “per se” was not a German national interest, even as he continued to call for stronger European sovereignty, observers stressed. This reflects a tension at the heart of his foreign policy: he wants to strengthen Europe as a strategic actor, but only insofar as it aligns with Berlin’s priorities, a contradiction that many of his predecessors also faced. However, that undermines the EU’s ability to stand united, and ultimately to articulate its interests and act strategically on the geopolitical stage.

This is particularly evident in the Middle East. Political fragmentation left the EU sidelined in Donald Trump’s September Gaza peace plan that led to a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, even though much of the plan’s groundwork and positive elements drew on an earlier European-Arab initiative to support Gaza’s reconstruction and governance reforms. Europe’s geopolitical voice is being tested in the Middle East—not in Ukraine, where member states’ interests have broadly aligned from the outset.

Germany—the EU’s largest and arguably most influential member state—has contributed significantly to Europe’s marginalisation. Tensions within German foreign policy identity and interests disrupt the EU’s capacity to act strategically as a geopolitical actor. The underlying reason for this is Germany’s adherence to Staatsräson. The concept refers to the principle that the interests and survival of the state can override moral, legal or individual considerations, what is typically referred to as “raison d’état”. Yet in Germany, it has a different connotation. It is primarily used to describe Germany’s special relationship with Israel.   

Undermining Europe’s geopolitical ambitions  

Coined by former chancellor Angela Merkel in 2008, the term linked Germany’s core interests to Israel’s security, arising from a responsibility to prevent a repetition of its mass atrocities during the second world war, first and foremost the Holocaust. In a speech to the Israeli Knesset that year, Merkel explained that “this historical responsibility of Germany is part of my country’s raison d’état. That means the security of Israel is, for me as German Chancellor, never negotiable”. However, the doctrine has come to mean unwavering support for the Israeli government, often disregarding national and European interests and wider peace efforts in the Middle East. 

Staatsräson has come to mean unwavering support for the Israeli government, often disregarding national and European interests and wider peace efforts in the Middle East.

Indeed, this interpretation of Staatsräson has slowed the government’s response to Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid, muted its support for the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s arrest warrant for Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, and kept it silent on other war crimes. These (in)actions have undermined Germany’s claim to uphold international law and the EU’s credibility as a defender of such, both in the Middle East and across the global south. For example, Berlin’s vote could have broken the blocking minority on suspending trade preferences with Israel under the association agreement, a decision requiring qualified majority voting (QMV) in response to the Israeli government’s war crimes. This requires at least 15 out of 27 countries to vote in favour of a proposal and those countries must represent 65% of the EU’s total population. Germany accounts for roughly 19% of the EU’s population and its vote would have been decisive. This missed opportunity highlights the gap between Germany’s strategic priorities and upholding international law as well as its role in shaping EU external action.

Ultimately, this incoherence also weakens the EU’s geopolitical ambitions in rallying support for Ukraine, as its condemnation of Russia’s illegal invasion and calls to support the ICC’s warrant against Putin appear hypocritical in other parts of the world. As a result, some observers now argue Germany should discard the term Staatsräson altogether (at least for a while) as it has become empty and directionless.

However, abandoning the term Staatsräson alone will not make Germany’s foreign policy more coherent or align it better with European and German values and interests. Even Merz admitted his discomfort with the term but insists that dropping it would not alter his pro-Israel stance. What is needed, instead, is a fresh look at policies tied to guaranteeing Israel’s security. If Germany’s Staatsräson is about historical responsibility, then it should focus on security for the state of Israel as a refuge for Jewish life—not on unconditional political alignment with Israel’s government. German policy, as currently applied, has failed to guarantee such security.

In fact, Germany’s support for the Netanyahu government and Israel’s illegal use of force under the banner of Staatsräson has been counterproductive in achieving security. Attacks on Israel, from Yemen’s Houthis and Lebanon’s Hezbollah for example, had steadily intensified in response to Israel’s escalation in Gaza. Israel’s unlawful attack on Iran in June also led to 27 civilian deaths in Israel when Iran retaliated. Netanyahu’s rejection of even the limited provisions in Trump’s peace plan regarding a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, and phased withdrawal from Gaza, likewise ignores the structural roots of insecurity and undermines conditions for a sustainable peace. Ongoing ceasefire violations attest that this approach is not working.

After unpacking the Staatsräson rationale and its effects, there is little to suggest that this doctrine should ever prevent Germany from supporting EU measures that would advance the Middle East peace process, even if that means pressuring Israel.

How Berlin can turn the EU from bystander to actor

With a ceasefire in place, discussions on EU sanctions on Israel have stopped. Germany—and Europe more widely—must, however, learn from the policy failures outlined above so the EU can act effectively on the geopolitical stage. The Middle East crisis is far from over. The ceasefire violations on both sides, Netanyahu’s retreat from key peace commitments, and ongoing settler violence in the West Bank all suggest that the EU will probably need to push Israel towards stability before long. European leaders should use their joint leverage to pressure Israel into a complete troop withdrawal from Gaza and a genuine political pathway for Palestinians, including in the West Bank, and the wider implementation of a peace plan—despite its many faults.

Germany should back a clear EU warning that if Netanyahu torpedoes the deal or moves towards full annexation of the West Bank, the suspension of the association agreement will quickly return to the table. Suspending trade-related parts of the EU-Israel association agreement would ratchet up domestic pressure on the Israeli premier. Although his approval ratings jumped after the peace deal, widespread protests and low support during the Gaza war reveal deep dissatisfaction with his handling of the conflict.  Many Israelis see the country’s international standing as weakened, with 62% identifying with the liberal-democratic camp. Suspending the agreement would reinforce these views and likely erode the premier’s support further.

Berlin should also champion further EU sanctions against Israeli settlements, including bans on settlement trade and investment. If violence restarted or the Trump peace plan collapsed, a coalition of member states would likely back sanctions—and with Germany’s support the EU could reach the population majority needed to act. Even in other, more limited scenarios, Berlin’s stance would be decisive in mobilising EU leverage over Israel. This would reinforce the EU’s strategic agency and credibility in the region and demonstrate Europe’s capacity to act collectively—despite fundamental divergences on a topic. It would also send a clear and effective warning to other aggressors like Russia.

The EU’s inaction during Israel’s campaign in the region has sabotaged Europe’s credibility as a defender of international law and a serious geopolitical actor. With its decisive position in Europe, Germany must stop using the Staatsräson doctrine to undermine the EU’s capacity to act in the Middle East. Although it may be unrealistic to expect Germany to lead sanctions against Israel—understandably given their complex relationship—it should not obstruct EU measures that reflect its own values and interests. A credible, Berlin-backed European warning about potential sanctions on Israel would reinforce the EU’s strength in the Middle East and beyond.