Spoil or shape: How Europeans can impact US-Russia talks on Ukraine
European policymakers have little direct influence over Moscow and Washington. However, they can use certain tools as leverage to help shape talks about Ukraine’s future—while ensuring to act in the EU’s best interest
Recent talks between the US and Russia are making Europeans anxious. While there is a chance that the discussions could bring Russia’s war in Ukraine to a state of quiescence, President Donald Trump’s posturing is making America’s reasons for decisive intervention in the conflict’s outcome unclear.
Now Europeans are afraid that the talks will produce undesired results—a settlement under Russian terms would leave Ukraine unstable, unprotected and unable to defend itself. As such, Europeans may be tempted to disrupt a conversation in which they cannot participate to ensure this is not the end result for Ukraine, or for themselves.
In fact, there is a danger that as soon as Europeans express (and act on) their own priorities, both Russia and the US will see Europe as spoiling what little progress the two countries think they have achieved. Instead, Europeans should use any possible leverage they have to ensure the talks lead to the desired outcome: preserving a sovereign and viable state in Ukraine, which is fully able to protect itself.
No invitation for Europe
A joint communiqué published after the meeting between American and Ukrainian officials in Jeddah mentions Ukraine’s insistence on involving Europeans in the “peace process”. However, it is clear that the US side met this demand with (at best) indifference. Despite efforts by European leaders to engage with Trump on his approach towards talks with both Ukraine and Russia, the US administration has shown no interest in what Europeans could actually bring to the table.
Russian statements insisted on the bilateral dimension of the first US meetings, presenting Ukraine as just one of many issues discussed during the latest call between Trump and Vladimir Putin. But Putin is being—even superficially—more forthcoming in his acknowledgement that Europeans could play a role in negotiations at a later stage. For example, Russia conditioned the entry into force of a US-proposed ceasefire in the Black Sea with the lifting of all sanctions affecting its exports of agricultural products—which requires EU approval. Thus, despite Europeans being left out of current ceasefire negotiations, they still have various instruments to use as leverage to shape the outcome of the talks.
Sanctions and security
In addition to sanctions against Russia, Europe can use its continued military and financial assistance to Ukraine to influence the negotiation. At each stage, Europe must ensure that Ukraine retains the capacity to refuse Russia’s demands, and the knowledge that it can rely on continued assistance from Europe.
Europeans committing to future security guarantees for Ukraine, contributing financially to Ukraine’s reconstruction, and integrating Ukraine into the EU is tantamount to Europe weighing in on the outcome of the US-Russia talks
Europeans committing to future security guarantees for Ukraine, contributing financially to Ukraine’s reconstruction, and integrating Ukraine into the EU is tantamount to Europe weighing in on the outcome of the US-Russia talks. Europe’s commitments to Ukraine might help nudge the Ukrainian government and public towards accepting a deal; if Kyiv is certain that Ukraine has a safe future within the EU, Ukrainians will be more inclined to accept difficult future trade-offs.
Now it is imperative that Europeans, in close coordination with Ukraine, define the kind of guarantees they are willing to provide to Ukraine and clarify the conditions in which they could offer these guarantees. They should then make clear to the US that these conditions are not only necessary for any deal to be accepted by Ukrainians and other Europeans, but also for it to last more than a couple of years.
Naturally, this scenario requires the Trump administration to seek a sustainable war settlement in which the US integrates European responsibility for ensuring a safe future for Ukraine. But following the first round of talks between the US and Russia, as well as leaks from conversations among high-level officials in the Trump administration, Europeans are doubtful about America’s intentions for Ukraine and its perception of its European partners.
Should Trump pursue a broader reengagement with Russia, he may prioritise a rapid agreement over a sustainable one. This would mean pushing Ukraine to accept Russia’s conditions, ignoring any demand for security guarantees, and potentially pressuring the EU to lift sanctions. This would leave Ukraine divided; Europeans would be faced with an unstable, unsecure and exhausted country, whose weakness could create additional challenges for their own security.
An uncertain future
If Ukrainians are forced to accept a bad agreement, without any guarantee for their future security, many would question the legitimacy of Ukraine’s political leadership; others may choose to leave the country altogether. This would trigger political instability in Ukraine and renewed outward migration, draining the youngest and most active parts of its population and leaving it less able to rebuild its infrastructure or defend itself in the future. For the EU, this scenario would create a vacuum directly at its border and open new possibilities for Russia to attack Ukraine again, once it reconstitutes its own forces.
Europeans alarmed by this prospect may be tempted to see Russia-US talks fail, in order to for Europe to maintain the status quo. This would buy time for the EU to build up its defence capabilities—even if this comes at the expense of Ukraine’s future.
But buying time is not a good strategy. First, the price will be paid with Ukrainian lives, which makes it morally difficult to spoil any process leading to a ceasefire, even if the chance of success is low. Second, many countries outside of Europe think Trump is more likely than his predecessor to bring about peace in Ukraine; they would be hard-pushed to understand why Europeans would deliberately spoil talks without offering an alternative path. This would likely accentuate Russia’s narrative that Europeans are warmongers and damage Europe’s ability to navigate a new international environment in which they already face isolation. It would also trigger increased divisions among Europeans societies and governments, which have varying ideas about how to end the war.
Europeans spoiling the US-Russia discussions to buy time only makes sense if their intervention can bring about a new, more favourable outcome. As the conflict currently stands, Ukraine is holding the line and Russia’s limited advances have come at a huge cost, but it would be naive to expect Russia’s military to collapse to the extent that it surrenders. It is also unwise for Europeans to hope for a radical political change in Moscow, or for them to expect the Trump administration to act solely in Ukraine’s best interest.
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Europeans should instead agree that their desired outcome is to preserve a sovereign and viable Ukraine. They should work to maintain the country’s ability to defend itself and use the various instruments at their disposal—sanctions, security guarantees, reconstruction and EU integration—to weigh in on the negotiations. They should ensure that Ukraine always has several options to choose from, instead of being pushed to accept Russia’s conditions, and that Russia’s options are limited. Europeans should be ready to spoil the conversation in order to steer it in the desired direction.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.